The influence of non-governmental organisations on a multinational company's corporate social responsibility approach during a crisis by Busch, Malte
 Coventry University
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
The influence of non-governmental organisations on a multinational company's








Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of this thesis for personal non-commercial research or study
            • This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission from the copyright holder(s)
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 11. Jan. 2022
   
    



































The Influence of Non-Governmental






































   
    



































        
       
The Influence of Non-Governmental







A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the University’s















         
        
        
         
             
         
        
            
          
            
     
     
              
         
      
           
             
           
         
        
         
          
    
           
        
            
           
           
        
        
       
  
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate and understand the direct and indirect
influence of German non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on the corporate social
responsibility (CSR) approach of the Volkswagen Group (VWG) within the German
institutional framework in the context of a crisis. It builds on previous studies that 
identified gaps in the understanding of NGO influence and the role of contextual factors.
This research applied a qualitative methodology with semi-structured interviews as the
main method of data collection. The case-study approach has been chosen as a 
methodological strategy to analyse the direct and indirect influence of six NGOs on the 
German multinational corporation (MNC) VWG within the context of the emissions crisis. 
For this study, 34 semi-structured interviews were conducted with NGOs, one of VWG’s
CSR representatives, employees, suppliers, CSR and automotive experts, and 
representatives of German political institutions.
The findings of this study not only explain the trajectory of an unfolding scandal but also 
the effects those events may have in reconfiguring the role and influence of key
stakeholders. It shows that current stakeholder conceptions must be reassessed
regarding the role of NGOs and political actors. The results reveal that the strong
intertwining between German policy makers and VWG is a determinant that limits NGO
influence, which leads to conditional direct and conditional indirect influence on VWG via
policy makers. The findings indicate that the coercive stakeholder pressure instrument
‘lawsuit’ is a means of unconditional indirect influence with which NGOs successfully
operate to exert influence. It also illustrates that the simultaneous and successive use of 
the multiplicity of direct and indirect influence instruments can lead to effective influence 
on an MNC’s CSR approach.
This work builds on stakeholder theories and CSR concepts and contributes to the
stakeholder literature by expanding our collective understanding of the direct and
indirect influence of a particular stakeholder group (NGOs) on the CSR approach of an
MNC. Moreover, this thesis contributes to the NGO influence debate by putting an 
emphasis on the perspective of NGOs. This thesis also intends to contribute to
management practices by providing a better understanding of how MNCs may use 
existing stakeholder models more effectively to engage in effective dialogues with NGOs.







   
 
       
    
     
       
       
         
        
         
         
         
      
     
      
       
      
    
     
     
     
      
       
    
      
        
     
     
    
      
      
     
    
       
   
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACEA Association des Constructeurs Européens d’Automobiles
European Automobile Manufacturer's Association
AGM Annual General Meeting
BITC Business in the Community
BMAS Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales
Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
BMVI Bundesministerium für Verkehr und digitale Infrastruktur
Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure
BUND Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland
Alliance for the Environment and Nature Conservation Germany
CARB California Air Resources Board 
CDP Carbon Disclosure Project
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands
Christian Democratic Union of Germany
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CO2 Carbon Dioxide
CSI Corporate Social Irresponsibility
CSO Civil Society Organisation
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
CSP Corporate Social Performance
DCGK Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex
German Corporate Governance Code
DJSI Dow Jones Sustainability Index
DKA Dachverband der Kritischen Aktionäre
Association of Ethical Shareholders
DUH Deutsche Umwelthilfe
Environmental Action Germany
EMAS Eco-Management and Audit Scheme
EBB European Environmental Bureau
EC European Commission
EP European Parliament






      
     
   
      
      
      
    
    
        
    
   
    
    
    
   
    
     
      
     
      
    
   
      
      
    
      
     
      
     
     
      
   
     
    
       
FAZ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei
Free Democratic Party
FoE Friends of the Earth
FTSE Financial Times Stock Exchange
DCGK Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex
German Corporate Governance Code
GRI Global Reporting Initiative 
GTAI Germany Trade & Invest
IAA Internationale Automobil-Ausstellung
International Motor Show
ICCT International Council on Clean Transportation
ILO International Labour Organisation
ISO International Organisation for Standardisation
KBA Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt
Federal Motor Transport Authority
MNC Multinational Company
MoP Member of German Parliament
NABU Naturschutzbund Deutschland
Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NOx Nitrogen Oxide 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PEMS Portable Emission Measurement System
PR Public Relations
RDE Real Driving Emissions
RDT Resource Dependence Theory
SPD Sozial Demokratische Partei Deutschland
Social Democratic Party of Germany
SZ Süddeutsche Zeitung









     
    
    
    
   
     
        
         





VDA Verband der Automobilindustrie
German Automobile Industry Association
VW Volkswagen
VWG Volkswagen Group
WBCSD World Business Council for Sustainable Development
WLTP Worldwide Harmonized Light Vehicles Test Procedure
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND STRUCTURE
1.1 Research Background and Rationale
The purpose of this thesis is to understand the direct and indirect influence of German
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on the corporate social responsibility (CSR)
approach of the Volkswagen Group (VWG)1 within the German institutional framework
in the context of the VWG emissions scandal.2 This study contributes to the debate over
the influence of the civil society stakeholder group ‘NGO’ on multinational corporations
(MNCs)3 by drawing on stakeholder theories and CSR concepts. The MNC VWG is
Germany’s biggest company with traditionally close relationships to political and other
societal actors, which makes it interesting to study the influence of NGOs. 
This work intends to contribute to the stakeholder influence literature by providing a 
better understanding of the direct and indirect mechanisms with which NGOs exert
influence on MNCs’ CSR approaches. Therefore, this study shows how the strong 
interweaving between German policy makers and the automotive industry affects where
and how stakeholders may exert influence. Although the stakeholder theory contributes 
to a conceptualisation of the various firms’ stakeholders and their roles and importance, 
‘it does not provide explanatory mechanisms of how stakeholders influence firms’ (Lee
2011: 284). Therefore, this study expects to unearth the influence mechanisms in the
context of an MNC’s crisis and explains the NGOs’ interactions with VWG and policy
makers. Thus, this study follows the call for more empirical research ‘to reveal the
broader relationship among corporations and NGOs’ (Arenas, Lozano, and Albareda 
2009: 176). To do so, it examines how NGOs in Germany influenced VWG’s CSR
approach with data gained before and after the scandal at the German MNC. By doing
this, it considers that the influence of NGOs has been underestimated and under
researched in the literature (Arenas, Lozano, and Albareda 2009; Lyon 2010). 
1 
The abbreviation ‘VWG’ will be used throughout the text. The term ‘Volkswagen (VW)’ will only be used 
when referring to the car brand or in connection with subsidiaries, such as VW Financial Services.
2 
The case study takes place within the German institutional environment of the corporation headquartered 
in Wolfsburg. However, the role of important international institutional actors, such the environmental
authorities in the USA and the European Union (EU) will be considered as well.
3 
The term ‘MNC’ has been chosen, as it refers to corporations that operate ‘in more than two countries’ 
(Ritzer 2010: 198) and have a national headquarters and a management approach that is shaped by the 
origin of the company. VWG fulfils these criteria. Whereas, according to Hirst, Thompson, and Bromley






           
           
           
          
            
   
          
              
         
          
          
        
          
      
            
        
         
         
         
                
      
         
         
           
           
         
    
          
          
            
        
               
																																																						
             
     
Authors such as Frooman (1999) and Hendry (2005) approached questions regarding
stakeholder and NGO influence by applying the resource dependence theory (RDT). This
theory states that organisations depend on critical resources inside and outside the
organisation. People in control of these resources are powerful and influence the
organisations’ behaviour (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). However, the RDT lacks to explain
the influence of changing relationships among more than two stakeholders. Therefore, 
this thesis uses stakeholder theories and CSR concepts to understand the influence of 
NGOs on MNCs and the overall interplay between these groups and policy makers. The
work considers Harrison and Freeman’s (1999: 484) demand, subsequently repeated by 
Frynas and Yamahaki (2016: 9), that research must develop a better understanding of 
the ‘many differences within stakeholder groups…and fine-grained ideas about each’ of
these groups. To gain a better idea of the stakeholder group NGO, this study emphasises
the perspective of this civil society actor. Thus, it contributes to the stakeholder theory 
by improving the understanding of the perceptions of NGOs on their role and influence 
in the interactions with MNCs. It addresses the call from scholars to better understand 
stakeholder views and their different demands and requirements (e.g. Arenas, Lozano,
and Albareda 2009; Burchell and Cook 2013; Frooman 1999). In addition, NGOs play an
increasingly important role as critics, advisors, co-creators of CSR programmes, and
moderators between businesses and policy makers (Baur and Palazzo 2011; Bendell
2000; Curbach 2003; Yaziji and Doh 2009). The influence of NGOs has grown in the last
decades (Doh and Guay 2006), and civil society organisations (CSOs) have developed 
into ‘important actors influencing the conduct of business, including business– 
government interactions and the broader role of business in society’ (Dahan, Doh, and
Teegen 2010: 20).
4 The importance of the work of NGOs was illustrated in 2015 when
the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT), along with researchers of West
Virginia University, discovered that VWG cheated on diesel-emissions tests (Franco et
al. 2016; Topham et al. 2015).
Moreover, this thesis addresses the real-world problem practitioners have described as
the discrepancy between existing theoretical frameworks and the reality of MNCs that 
requires a more dynamic understanding of the needs and expectations of NGOs. This
discrepancy is reflected in the complex tension between MNCs and civil society actors 
who are aware of the success factors of interactions but still struggle to manage them
4
In this thesis, the terms ‘NGO’ and ‘CSO’ are used interchangeable. ‘CSO’ is the broader term and ‘NGO’ 





     
            
            
       
          
          
           
            
         
           
             
         
        
           
        
             
  
              
               
             
          
         
             
            
               
           
         
           
         
           
           
              
																																																						
         
 
effectively. This real-world problem might be due to ‘differences in defining and tackling 
problems’ (Kieser and Leiner 2009: 517), as well, as ‘differences in logics between
academics and practitioners’ (Bartunek and Rynes 2014: 1184). One of the reasons for
a certain lack of understanding among the various actors is the different priorities that 
they assign to each other. While MNCs, such as VWG, focus strongly on shareholders
and customers, such a market concentration is not a stakeholder orientation that 
encompasses the needs of a variety of stakeholders (Ferrell et al. 2010). The strong
focus on shareholder value shapes the formulation of business strategies and may lead
to the failure of recognising opportunities to integrate stakeholder values (Jones and
Nisbet 2011). This could be considered one reason that there is a lack of understanding 
of ‘secondary’ stakeholders, such as NGOs. The shareholder value focus may lead to a
MNC’s neglect of legal and economic risks, as shareholders’ interest may dominate the
stakeholder interaction. High sales numbers and satisfied shareholders might lead to the 
false belief that a corporation has done all right and that there is no need to engage in
sustainable dialogue. Therefore, this thesis also integrates a practical perspective on
how NGOs influenced VWG within the CSR stakeholder interaction with the intention to
minimise the gap between the theoretical comprehension and practical complexity.
News of the VWG ‘device defeat scandal’5 reached the public in September 2015 and
revealed that the MNC used software to cheat in emissions tests in its diesel cars. This
study intends to show that a scandal of these proportions may recur if a critical interplay 
of forces, such as corporations, unions, political actors, and NGOs, changes to a one-
way relationship in which a corporation has a strong say in legislative decision-making
processes. In addition, it refers to a relationship in which political authorities do not fulfil 
their obligations to critically monitor the actions of MNCs and in which unions primarily
care about their own position of power and intention to retain jobs at any price. The thesis
also demonstrates that the system of checks and balances on the behaviour of MNCs is
failing. It reflects the ambivalence of the role of NGOs. On one hand, the organisations
have played a crucial role in exposing the ‘Dieselgate’ scandal (as it has become known
colloquially), and it can be considered ‘an achievement of civil society that a major
corporation was brought to justice’ (Rhodes 2016: 1510). On the other hand, the case
showed that NGOs have not been taken seriously for many years by car producers, such
as VWG. The underlying issue is that different levels of power in the MNC-NGO
5 
The ‘device defeat scandal’ at VWG became public on 18 September 2015 and is referred to as the 





             
             
   
               
      
       
            
            
            
         
       
        
          
         
           
         
         
           
              
         
         
   
   
         
        
   
         
         
            
    
																																																						
          
              
       
    
relationships may lead to a limited change of behaviour of the MNCs. MNCs such as
VWG may not see the obligation to invest resources (time and money) in dialogues and
the implementation of discussed solutions.
The events at VWG are a good example of a mixture of organisational and institutional
failure. Meanwhile, there is well-documented evidence that several political institutions,
such as the German Government and the European Commission6 (EC) (Zerfass and
Seiwert 2015), knew of the situation or at least could have anticipated the problems that 
VWG now faces with several authorities, most notably the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). For many years, internal and external observers praised the
closeness of political, corporate, and labour actors as an important factor of the German 
economic upswing. This tripartite system, also referred to as Modell Deutschland
(German Model), has been considered a major positive point of the German economy.
However, experts and journalists now posit that these linkages between political
institutions, unions, and MNCs are among the reasons for the crisis at VWG (e.g.
Dudenhöffer 2016a; Mayer 2016; Seiwert et al. 2015). After this substantial crisis, 
companies now better understand the financial and reputational damage that may be
caused when the core business goes diametric to the proclaimed corporate values
(Bovens 2016; Painter and Martins 2017). In other words, the best CSR is worth nothing, 
if companies do not adapt their corporate policies and strategies to an ethical way of 
working and do not consequently implement existing CSR approaches. Therefore, it is
essential that corporations take the various stakeholders, such as NGOs, and their
concerns and expectations seriously.
Thus, to summarise:
• Drawing on stakeholder theories and CSR concepts, this thesis aims to 
understand the influence of NGOs on the CSR approach of the MNC VWG in the 
context of Dieselgate;
• It contributes to stakeholder influence literature by elaborating on the direct and
indirect mechanisms of NGO influence under consideration of contextual factors;
• This study contributes to the stakeholder theory by emphasising the perspective
of NGOs and their perception of their role and influence; and
6 
In 2012, current President of the European Parliament Antonio Tajani (since 2017) was informed by a
manager of a German supplier about the modified software according to the German magazine
Wirtschaftswoche. Tajani was the former vice-president of the EC (2010-2014) and the European 





             
     
 
    
             
          
           
       
            
          
        
          
             
          
                
          
           
          
            
           
         
       
        
         
        
             
               
         
          
               
            
• It shows that such a major scandal recurs if there are no sustainable and
transparent relationships between MNCs and other societal actors, such as 
NGOs.
1.2 Research Questions and Objectives
The review of the relevant stakeholder and CSR literature raised the following research
questions and objectives. The overall guiding research questions are as follows:
• How do NGOs influence the CSR approach of an automotive MNC during a
major organisational crisis under consideration of contextual factors?
• How do NGOs perceive their role and influence on an automotive MNC?
The following three research objectives will help answer these research questions. The
first research objective is to examine the development and chronology of VWG’s 
‘Dieselgate’ scandal in the German political institutional context in which the scandal took
place. It is important to create the context of the case study and to understand how the
scandal evolved, who the relevant actors are, and what the scandal means for VWG and 
the industry as a whole. It not only explains VWG’s crisis but also the roles of key actors,
such as NGOs and the German Government. In doing so, it contributes to a better
understanding of one of Europe’s biggest corporate scandals. It considers Painter and
Martins’ (2017) recommendation for more research that triangulates the current data on
the crisis with material gained from sources other than VWG. Several scholars have 
investigated the influence of stakeholders on MNCs in general and of NGOs more
specifically (den Hond and de Bakker 2007; Hendry 2005); however, studies on 
stakeholder theory ‘often overlook the national and regional contexts and their particular
legal, social and political backgrounds’ (Arenas, Lozano, and Albareda 2009: 177). When
examining NGO influence, this study addresses the gap by considering the contextual
factors: the intertwining of policy makers and industry and VWG’s crisis.
The second objective is to explore the influence of NGOs on the CSR approach of a
MNC in Germany in the context of a crisis. There are various studies that investigated
the effect of stakeholder influence quantitatively (e.g. Henriques and Sadorsky 1999;
Kassinis and Vafeas 2006; King 2008; Surroca, Tribó, and Zahra 2013). However, there 
is a lack of qualitative studies that examine how influence is gained and exerted (Hendry





        
         
             
           
            
       
         
              
          
              
             
          
        
            
            
     
       
             
          
        
           
           
        
        
           
              
      
      
     
          
      
  
contributes to stakeholder theory and builds on Hendry’s (2005: 98) recommendation to
further research NGOs’ ‘reasons for pursuing […] tactics in a given situation’. 
While there is a good understanding in the literature that NGOs occasionally influence
MNCs and policy makers successfully, there is not much ‘agreement on the factors that
make NGO lobbying [on international organisations] effective’ (Tallberg et al. 2015: 213).
As previously stated, the contextual knowledge is required to understand better the
influence of NGOs on the MNC and the perception of NGOs of their influence in the 
situation of a crisis. This study examines how NGOs exert influence under the condition
of a strong and long-lasting intertwining between policy makers, VWG, and the car
industry as a whole. Thereby, it explains the platforms and forums with which NGOs
influence VWG. In particular, the study identifies how the NGOs intended to exert
influence on the MNC in direct interactions, such as partnerships and stakeholder
dialogues. Lyon (2010: 1) stated that ‘despite their prominence, NGOs remain poorly
understood’. This study responds to this call for more research on NGOs by showing 
how NGOs effectively exert influence on an MNC’s CSR approach. In doing so, the role
of NGO alliances will also be studied.
The third research objective is to understand the NGOs’ perception of their role and 
influence on a major MNC’s CSR approach in the context of ‘Dieselgate’. It follows the
request from different scholars to understand stakeholders’ views and perceptions better
(Arenas, Lozano, and Albareda 2009; Burchell and Cook 2013; Frooman 1999). This
study also considers Camerra-Rowe and Egan’s (2010: 416) conclusion that ‘the growing
role of environmental and social interest associations’ has been neglected. Further, it
builds on Friedman and Miles’ (2002: 2) finding that stakeholder theory almost
exclusively focused on the ‘analysis of stakeholders from the perspective of the
organisation’. Building on these authors, this thesis contributes to a better understanding
of how NGOs perceive their influence on the MNC. This objective also aims to discover
the discrepancy between MNCs’ and political institutions’ affirmations on the importance 
of NGOs and their actual or perceived relevance.
In short, the guiding research questions and objectives are the following:
• Research Question 1: How do NGOs influence the CSR approach of an 






            
 
          
    
        
      
        
            
 
       
       
      
        
          
       
           
         
      
  
         
           
          
             
           
          
       
          
        
           
           
         
          
     
• Research Question 2: How do NGOs perceive their role and influence on an 
automotive MNC?
• Research Objective 1: To examine the development and chronology of VWG’s
‘Dieselgate’ scandal in the German political institutional context;
• Research Objective 2: To explore the influence of NGOs on the CSR approach 
of a MNC in Germany in the context of a crisis;
• Research Objective 3: To understand the NGOs’ perception of their role and 
influence on a major MNC’s CSR approach in the context of Dieselgate.
1.3 Research Design
For this research, a qualitative research approach has been chosen to answer the 
study’s research questions and objectives. The approach enabled the researcher to
understand the mechanisms of direct and indirect NGO influence and the NGOs’
perception on their role and influence on VWG’s CSR approach. This study positions
reality from the perspective of the participants, reflecting the researcher’s subjectivist
ontological stance and interpretivist epistemological position. The ontological standpoint
posits that social phenomena are the result of the perception and actions of social actors
(Klenke 2016). The interpretivist epistemological view sees the world through the
perspective of the participants and acknowledges that different actors perceive the same 
reality differently.
This research conducted semi-structured interviews as the main method of data
collection. The case study has been chosen as a methodological strategy to analyse the
direct and indirect influence of key NGOs on the German MNC VWG. The phenomenon
of NGO influence forms the case study, and the six NGOs are the units of analysis within 
the context of the VWG emissions crisis. For this study, 34 semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with NGOs, VWG’s CSR representative and employees, suppliers, CSR
and automotive experts, and representatives of German political institutions. The data
were collected in two phases between November 2015 and February 2018. The first
broad round of interviews included various stakeholders and was aimed to gain a better
understanding of stakeholder views on CSR, their role in the interaction with VWG, and 
the perspective on NGO influence. The preliminary analysis showed that the data gained
from the stakeholder group NGO was most significant and promising. Therefore, the
second stage focused on the depth by interviewing NGOs about their influence and 





         
          
       
            
          
       
         
          
         
            
    
       
           
            
       
           
          
        
        
              
        
         
          
            
           
          
      
              
   
           
    
           
Secondary data from various sources, such as automotive associations, industry
experts, NGOs, and policy makers, were analysed. This information complemented the
data gathered from the semi-structured interviews, helping to offer important context on 
the wider issues surrounding the crisis and the influence on stakeholder interactions. The
secondary data and relevant literature were analysed iteratively by applying open, axial,
and selective coding. The following aggregate dimensions emerged: ‘structures of
intertwining’, ‘mechanisms of conditional direct NGO influence’, ‘mechanisms of indirect
NGO influence’, and ‘NGO perception of (conditional) influence’. These dimensions
formed the data structure that has been adapted iteratively throughout the study. The 
findings in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are structured according to the aggregate dimensions.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
This chapter has provided background information and presented the research 
questions, objectives, current gaps in the literature, and the research design being used
to address the research questions. Chapter 2 will set out the research setting by giving
an overview of the German automotive sector and a chronology of the VWG emissions
crisis. Moreover, the role of NGOs in Germany will be explained by presenting profiles
of the organisations and controversies around them. The contextual chapter closes with
a section on VWG and its CSR approach before and after the crisis. Then, the MNC will
be introduced, and how VWG reacted upon the diesel crisis will be discussed.
Chapter 3 presents the literature review and consists of two parts. The first part defines
CSR and describes the key concepts to understand a systematic, integrative, and 
strategic CSR approach. These concepts serve to better understand how MNCs
approach stakeholder interactions with NGOs and how they translate the outcomes of 
these exchanges into corporate behaviour. The second part of the literature review
introduces and explains various stakeholder theories, which form the core perspective
of the study. Stakeholder concepts will provide insight into the various direct and indirect 
stakeholder influence approaches, stakeholder categorisations, and typologies.
Moreover, the chapter describes the roles NGOs may play in the interaction with MNCs
and the factors for a successful MNC-NGO dialogue.
Chapter 4 outlines the methodological framework by providing information on the
qualitative case-study approach and the data collection methods. Thereafter, the data 





          
       
          
          
            
          
           
    
          
        
        
             
        
           













of Intertwining’, is the first dimension of the data structure and presents findings
regarding the contextual factors that limit NGO influence.
Chapter 6, ‘Mechanisms of NGO Influence’, considers the insight of the previous chapter
and is divided into two areas. The first constitutes the direct approaches of NGO
influence, which are limited by the interconnection between policy makers and industry
and therefore are considered to be conditional. The second part is about indirect
approaches of NGO influence, of which the coercive approach ‘lawsuit’ was identified as
an unconditional means of influence.
Chapter 7 focuses on the perception of NGOs and identifies greenwashing and corporate
social irresponsibility (CSI) elements that are salient in the MNC-NGO interaction.
Chapter 8 will discuss the key findings based on the literature and is structured according
to the three research objectives. The final chapter, Chapter 9, brings the key aspects
together, presents the theoretical contributions, and derives practical implications for
NGOs, MNCs, and policy makers. It presents the author’s reflective comments and






























   
  
            
        
           
             
     
        
          
     
        
          
         
          
        
  
  
          
          
         
         
       
        
           
              
         
         
          
       
           
																																																						
          
  
CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH SETTING
2.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the context of the study by providing information on the German
automotive industry, the emissions crisis, the NGOs involved and VWG’s environmental
approach. It is crucial to understand the players, the environment, and the scale of the 
scandal as well as the implications for the relationships between NGOs, VWG, and policy
makers before analysing and discussing the data findings. The automotive sector is very 
particular for Germany’s economy and policy makers and therefore needs to be 
explained. Together with Chapter 5, this section attempts to answer the first research
objective that aims to understand the context in which NGOs influence MNCs.
The chapter starts with explanations regarding the German automotive industry. 
Thereafter, information on the background, development, and chronology of the VWG
case will be provided. The subsequent section introduces the interviewed NGOs and 
presents key information about these organisations (refer to Table 1). The chapter closes
with a profile of VWG and a summary of VWG’s CSR and environmental approach before 
and after the crisis.
2.2 German Automotive Sector
Automotive manufacture is the biggest industrial sector in Germany, it employs 792,000 
people7 and has a turnover of over €400 billion (Verband der Automobilindustrie [VDA]
2016). The biggest German automotive producer is VWG (with its brands Volkswagen,
Audi, and Porsche), followed by the Daimler Group, BMW Group, Opel, and Ford. In 
2016, one-third of Europe’s automobile manufacturing took place in Germany
(Association des Constructeurs Européens d’Automobiles [ACEA] 2018). German car 
manufacturers have long benefitted from the high worldwide demand for premium cars,
which is reflected in the strong export orientation of the industry. In 2015, 77% of all cars
that were produced in Germany were exported (VDA 2016: 7). Cars and automotive parts
are the most important export goods with a share of 19% (or €226.7 billion) of Germany’s
exports in 2015 (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2017). The importance of the
German automotive industry sector has been emphasised in various statements in the 
interviews. For example, it was called the ‘backbone of the German economy’ (Interview
7






           
      
          
        
          
      
     
            
         
        
             
            
      
            
                 
             
           
         
      
               
        
        
            
             
           
              
          
        
      
  
             
          
																																																						
     
#15, opposition party). According to Germany Trade & Invest (GTAI), cars ‘made in
Germany’ have been associated with ‘quality, reliability, durability, efficiency, and safety’
(GTAI 2016: 5). However, the positive image has been eroded due to scandals and 
revelations, most notably Dieselgate in 2015. The self-acclaimed technological
leadership of Germany’s automotive industry has been overshadowed by those
occurrences and the realisation that foreign companies, such as Toyota and
Renault/Nissan, are more advanced regarding future, non-fuel technologies. The much
smaller and specialist niche manufacturer Tesla could also be named among these
companies; however, it specialises entirely on the production of electric cars. The
upcoming structural change due to new propulsion technologies and alternative fuel-
source vehicles will be a litmus test for the German automotive industry. Experts forecast
major changes in the automotive industry due to the advancing developments of battery-
driven cars, autonomous driving, and the ‘sharing economy’ (Dudenhöffer 2016b; VDA
2016). The electrification of cars will change the automotive landscape in Germany, and 
it remains to be seen how MNCs such as VWG, BMW Group, or Daimler Group will react
to these changes. In particular, the planned quota on electric vehicles in one of the most 
important markets, China, alarms car producers, as German companies mostly sell
petrol-driven and diesel cars in China (Ankenbrand 2017). In 2016, every third car
produced by a German automotive manufacturer was sold in China (Fuss 2017).
The EC identified the automotive market in Europe as one of the key sectors, and in
2012, it published a CARS 2020 Action Plan that might have wide consequences for the 
German industry, especially the initiative towards a ‘new driving test-cycle and test
procedure’ (EC (COM) 636 final 2012: 11).8 This will put the producers under pressure
considering that VWG was not the only producer that designed its cars so that these only
meet the regulatory requirements in laboratory environments. The CARS 2020 Action
Plan was published in a phase in which the ‘European automotive industry was facing
severe difficulties from a fall in demand’ (EC (COM) 636 final 2012: 11) and had the 
intention to improve the market conditions for the manufacturers. Now, after Dieselgate, 
the plan might have gained in importance by showing a pathway to the automotive 
companies towards alternative fuels.
In addition, VWG has always played a dominant role in the German automotive industry
‘generating a 45.7% share of the industry's volume’ in 2015 (Marketline 2015: 2).
8 





         
           
              
          
             
            
             
         
         
          
            
    
            
        
         
     
          
              
     
           
             
         
              
  
              
         
      
         
            
          
            
																																																						
       
Traditional German automotive companies, such as the Audi Group and Porsche Group,
were acquired by VWG in the 1960s and 2009, respectively (VWG 2008, 2016a). Other
brands, such as the premium producers Bentley and Lamborghini and the bus and truck
manufacturer MAN, also belong to the corporation. VWG sells more and more of its cars 
in China, which is the world’s biggest single car market (VDA 2016). While China is the 
most important market for VWG with almost 4 million cars sold in 2016 (40% of its
passenger cars), the car market in the USA remains significant and was the fourth
biggest single market for VWG in 2016 (after China, Germany, and the UK) (VWG
2016a). Although the corporation is confident that it will benefit from the slow recovery of
the US car market, it is aware that ‘success here will largely depend on how
transparently, thoroughly and quickly we deal with the diesel issue and restore customer
confidence’ (VWG 2016a: 185).
The next section will describe in detail the background, development, and chronology of
Dieselgate and explain the role of the EU before the scandal became public. Moreover,
it will introduce some of the players that were involved in the scandal.
2.3 Background, Development, and Chronology of VWG Crisis
In 2006, VWG decided to enter the US market with its ‘clean diesel’ technology. The
news magazine Der Spiegel reported that, in autumn of the same year, there was an
argument among engineers and managers including colleagues from the software 
department about how to fulfil the strict exhaust gas regulations in the US (Kröger 2017).
After the discussion, a top manager decided to use the software programme, the ‘defeat 
device’, that detected when a car was tested and improved the performance temporarily
(the car emits less exhaust gases). He added the request that the software should be
untraceable.
In the same report, Kröger stated that, in 2007, the side effects of the software
manipulation became apparent, as the filters of the exhaust systems clogged up quickly.
It would have cost VWG €250 per car to solve the problem and reduce the damaging 
effects on the hardware. The decision regarding whether to solve the issue or not could
have only been made by the highest level of senior management. This was one of the
first indicators that the former chief executive officer (CEO), Mr Winterkorn, should have
known about the manipulation.
9
From 2007 to 2013, the manipulated software created
9 





       
         
              
        
          
             
             
     
           
         
           
            
         
           
      
      
            
         
            
           
                  
    
       
         
            
           
            
            
        
       
             
              
																																																						
           
continuous technical problems, which required a more ‘fine-tuned’ software to ensure
that the manipulation remained uncovered (Kröger 2017). Reports stated that the EU
received detailed information in 2012 that none of the tested diesel cars complied with
the nitrogen oxides10 (NOx) laws (Pauly 2016). There is well-documented evidence that
several political institutions, such as the German Government and the EC, were aware
of the ‘defeat devices’ at an early stage and could have anticipated the issues that not 
only VWG faced but all diesel car producers would later confront (EC (COM) ENTR
D5/PÅ D 2010; Zerfaß and Seiwert 2015).
In 2014, the ICCT published a report that showed the discrepancy between the values
that manufacturers of diesel cars published and the on-road fuel consumption, also
called real driving emissions (RDE; Franco et al. 2014). Moreover, VWG was aware of
the explosive force of this report and held a conference to address the topic. According
to the magazine Handelsblatt, Winterkorn received two notifications of the outcome: first 
in May and then again in November 2014 (Handelsblatt 2016). However, there is no 
evidence regarding whether he read the notes.
In 2014, researchers at West Virginia University and the ICCT tested Volkswagen diesel
cars with the intention of comparing them with the US manufactured vehicles (US
Department of Justice 2017a). The scientists found a significant discrepancy between
their findings and those that VWG published claiming that their cars were among the
most efficient and environmentally friendly on the market. The researchers presented the 
results of the testing to the EPA in May 2014 (Ramsey 2015). In the same year, the EPA
and the California Air Resources Board (CARB) asked VWG to explain the emerging 
questions. However, the corporation stated that it could not explain the mistakes and 
pursued a strategy ‘to disclose as little as possible’ by presenting data and testing results
‘in an attempt to make it appear that there were innocent mechanical and technological 
problems to blame’ (US Department of Justice 2017a: n.p.). On 18 September 2015, the 
EPA announced its intention to investigate VWG (EPA 2015). During the same period,
CARB sent a letter to VWG summarising the events including ICCT’s, WVU’s, and their
own test results. During the discussions with VWG, the corporation admitted that it used
a ‘defeat device to circumvent CARB and the EPA emission test procedures’ (CARB
2015: 2). The chief of CARB’s emissions compliance, Hebert, stated in the letter that
VWG had the chance to fix the NOx issues with a recall in December 2014. However, 
10 





           
        
         
           
           
           
             
            
            
        
            
 
           
    
          
           
            
      
   
           
           
         
        
           
             
          
          
              
  
             
           
            
             
the ‘fixed’ cars still failed the NOx standards, and VWG was not able to provide a solution 
to the problem. That meant that the managers at VWG must have known about the
problem for around a year and had the chance to fix or at least to reduce the extent of
the consequences. The corporation admitted to the existence of a defeat device in late
August 2015, when it could no longer be denied. It showed that VWG’s management, or
at least parts of it, were not taking the emissions and investigations seriously. The focus
on passing regulatory tests in Germany might have clouded the view on the RDE tests
in the USA, which revealed the real emissions of the cars. Among the most surprising
discoveries in the VWG scandal, and their use of defeat devices for diesel cars, was the
fact that it had been known to all involved parties for many years. For example, political
actors, manufacturers, and NGOs knew about it or had the chance to retrieve relevant
information.
The EU defined defeat devices in 2007 as any ‘element of design which senses
temperature, vehicle speed, engine speed (RPM), […] delaying or deactivating the 
operation of any part of the emission control system […]’ (Council Regulation (EU) No
715 2007: 5). That is a rather broad definition for Grabiel and Grabiel (2016), who were 
commissioned by ICCT to analyse the situation of defeat-device systems in the EU. They
demanded a modification of the definition of the emission control system in the context
of a defeat-device system. 
In 1998, the EPA (1998b) sent an open letter (one of several that were sent) to car
manufacturers defining criteria to evaluate and identify ‘defeat devices’. The authority
stated it would do everything to enforce the Clean Air Act of 1963 that prohibits defeat-
device systems. In an enforcement alert, the EPA (1998a) described the cases of Honda
and Ford, which had to pay millions of dollars because they built in defeat devices in their
cars. Clearly, VWG should have been warned that the US authorities would take this
offence seriously. A relevant difference among the US and the European legislation is
that the American Clean Air Act prohibits defeat devices in vehicles, whereas the 
European law leaves a loophole. Defeat devices are allowed if these serve to protect the 
engine (Regulation (EC) 715/2007).
The NGO Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH 2015) reported that the diesel car emissions of
German automotive manufacturers were more than 25 times higher than allowed. More
recently, the NGO sued the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure





           
           
       
     
              
        
       
           
      
  
            
      
           
            
         
             
           
           
            
          
             
     
            
       
    
              
           
        
      
              
          
           
         
at VWG (DUH 2016d). The DUH (2017a) won this lawsuit, and the BMVI was forced to 
release these documents. More precisely, the NGO stated that the ministry refused to 
share documentation that showed evidence of the proceedings of the meetings between 
the BMVI and representatives of the automotive company. Moreover, according to the 
DUH (2016d), the ministry does not grant insight into the proceedings of the meetings of
the parliamentary investigation committee, protocols of results, and raw data of the tests
that were done on behalf of the committee. Jürgen Resch, the federal executive director
of DUH (2016d: 1), stated that the ‘Federal Minister of Transport, Dobrindt, systemically
impedes the clarification of the diesel emissions scandal’. Resch complained that ‘while
authorities in Washington, California and even in South Korea demand the compliance 
of limit values for NOx on the street, his Ministry [of Transport] permits car companies to 
exceed limit values multiple times’ (DUH 2016d: 1).
The Verkehrsclub Deutschland (VCD 2016: n.p.), an ecological traffic club, stated that
Federal Minister of Transport Alexander Dobrindt, who was called ‘the best friend of the
automotive industry’, should be put under pressure by his fellow ministers and that the
clarification of the emissions scandal should not be left to him. Similarly, Oliver Krischer,
the vice parliamentary party leader of The Greens and one of the eight members of the
5th parliamentary investigation committee, put his hopes in the various ministers of states
for the environment to increase the pressure on the German Government and Minister
Dobrindt (Deutscher Bundestag 2015). In summary, political actors from the opposition
and NGOs accused the minister of lacking objectivity and being too closely aligned with
the industry. This section provided a chronology and background information to VWG’s
emissions crisis. The next section is about the NGOs’ role in this study. It introduces the
selected NGOs and explains why they play an important role in Germany.
2.4 Definition, Role and Importance of NGOs in Germany
There is no clear and official definition of NGOs (Baur and Palazzo 2011; Curbach 2008).
Martens (2002: 272) stated that ‘remarkably, despite the increasing interest and the
growing literature on the issue, NGOs have not yet sufficiently been defined’. An NGO
may be understood completely differently by companies or international institutions, such
as the World Bank or the United Nations (UN). Part of the problem is that the expression
‘non-governmental organisation’ is a negative definition that simply describes what
NGOs are not: governmental organisations. There are differentiations among NGOs, for





         
            
           
      
            
         
      
   
         
         
          
        
       
       
            
          
           
       
             
          
  
       
          
               
            
            
          
        
         
              
          
           
         
        
(ENGOs), northern NGOs (NNGO), southern NGOs (SNGOs), or more broadly into
CSOs. However, this work follows the first principle of the definition of the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe that NGOs are ‘voluntary self-governing bodies or
organisations established to pursue the essentially non-profit-making objectives of their
founders or members’ (Council of Europe 2007: 1). In this study, the terms NGO and
ENGO will be used; however, ENGO refers only to the four environmental NGOs: Bund
für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (BUND), DUH, Greenpeace, and
Naturschutzbund Deutschland (NABU).
In its 2012 ‘Stakeholder Universe’, VWG mentioned the NGOs BUND, NABU, and 
Transparency International Germany (TI). Other named NGOs, such as ‘terre des
hommes’, the German Red Cross, and SOS children’s villages, do not focus on
environmental matters and did not issue statements after Dieselgate. In addition, VWG
listed organisations such as Globescan and SustAinability as NGOs; however, these are
strategic consultancies rather than NGOs. Moreover, VWG’s CSR representative stated 
in the interview (Interview #3) that NGOs are very important stakeholders and that there
is an intensive contact with NABU to re-establish the relationship. However, the data
presented in the findings chapters will show that this might be a rather difficult endeavour.
The business magazine Wirtschaftswoche named Greenpeace, Foodwatch, DUH,
NABU, BUND, and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) as the six most important NGOs in 
Germany (Krumrey et al. 2013: 1). Similarly, Vondenhoff and Busch-Janser (2008) stated
that NABU, BUND, and Greenpeace are indispensable in the political landscape and 
have considerable influence. Markham (2011: 9) stated that BUND, NABU, and 
Greenpeace belong to the ‘most important environmental organisations in Germany’.
Greenpeace is one of the world’s biggest NGOs and is described to be ‘the most widely
recognised organisation of its kind’ (Warkentin 2001: 66). Along with BUND and NABU,
Greenpeace is among the strongest NGOs in members in Germany (see Table 1).
Etscheit (2016), who sees the big environmental organisations critically, stated that 
NABU and BUND developed into influential pressure groups with powerful voices in 
policy. Senior representatives of these six NGOs were interviewed in this study. In this
work, the four ENGOs play a more important role than other NGOs because of their size, 
experience, budget, status as established NGOs, and more importantly, because of the
situation regarding the events around the Dieselgate scandal, which fall within the
ENGOs’ domain of expertise. Moreover, all the selected NGOs direct their activities in





              
       
      
          
       
        
      
       
          
           
              
           
            
              
        
     
            
           
         
            
           
         
  
  
           
         
      
																																																						
        
              
            
     
          
          
                
        
  
63) considered BUND and NABU to be organisations that represent a ‘mix between a
public interest lobby and a participatory pressure group’, whereas they classify
Greenpeace as a professional protest organisation.
In the debate regarding the role and influence of NGOs, it is important to consider that 
the Umwelt-Rechtsbehelfsgesetz (Environmental Appeals Act)11 (European Directive
2003/35/EC 2003) enables certain ENGOs ‘to appeal against violations of environmental
law’ (Umweltbundesamt [UBA] 2018a: n.p.). To be able to exercise this right, an ENGO
has to be recognised by the UBA (Federal Environment Agency), and the Federal
Environment Ministry. The NGOs BUND, DUH, and NABU are among these associations
that are recognised environmental organisations, whereas Greenpeace is not part of the
list (UBA 2018b).12 The three NGOs are therefore entitled to file a lawsuit if they perceive
that environmental laws were violated or not enforced. For example, the NGOs may sue
German federal states or cities if they do not ensure that air pollution control plans are 
complied with. The right to sue would also enable NGOs to file a lawsuit against a federal
authority, such as the Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (KBA; Federal Motor Transport Authority), if 
it does not enforce existing laws.
The criteria for becoming a recognised organisation are, for example, that the association
pursues charitable purposes, is organised in a way that it is able to exercise its
participatory rights and applies the ‘everyman principle’ (i.e. that the association should
take everyone who wishes to become a member) (UBA 2017). It is speculation that
Greenpeace does not fulfil the last criteria, as the association resembles corporations in
its organisational structure. It is hierarchically organised with only 40 voting members
(Greenpeace 2016b).
2.4.1 NGO Profiles
In the following subsection, the six NGOs interviewed during fieldwork will be introduced
and briefly described; however, there will be a greater focus placed on the ENGOs, as
they play a bigger role in the study due to their orientation on environmental and 
11 
The Environmental Appeals Act is the implementation of a European directive about the ‘UN/ECE
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters’ (better known as the Aarhus Convention) (European Directive 2003/35/EC 2003).
The Aarhus Convention enables the public to access information and participate in decision-making
processes with effects on the environment. It grants, for example, ENGOs, which were recognised under
national law, rights to act on behalf of the environment and access to justice.
12 
While the DUH is only a recognised environmental organisation, BUND and NABU are also recognised






            
         
            
       
         
   
   
     
     
 
 
     
  
 











   
   

















   
 
   
   
  





























































         
    
 
automotive topics. These NGOs are not industry specific, which means that they deal
with various companies from different sectors. Table 1 shows a summary for each ENGO
(BUND, DUH, Greenpeace, and NABU) that plays a role in this study and provides
information on the year founded, annual budget, funding sources, number of staff and
members, affiliation with other NGOs or umbrella organisations, headquarters, other
office locations, and geographic focus.
Table 1: Comparison of ENGOs Studied
Demographics BUND DUH Greenpeace NABU
Year Founded 1975 1975 1973 
In Germany: 1980
1899
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Full-time: 90 Full-time: 220;
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Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (BUND)
With more than 584,000 members, BUND is one of the big NGOs in Germany. The core
themes of the politically committed lobbying organisation are climate and nature
conservation; however, there are also experts working on renewable energies and traffic.
The NGO regularly publishes articles and reports on transport issues and the VWG
emissions crisis. BUND can be described as a rather cooperative NGO that is willing to 
engage in interactions and actively seeks dialogue with MNCs and policy makers. The 
organisation regularly publishes reports and comments on energy transformation,
environmental developments, new regulations, and laws. According to BUND, the NGO
lobbied successfully at EU level for a directive for the protection of birds and against the
readmission of glyphosate (BUND 2016).
Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH)
This NGO leads campaigns that are well-covered by the media against carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions and plays a major role in the NGOs’ intention to decarbonise the
automotive industry. The organisation regularly receives support from the established
environmental expert Axel Friedrich,
13 
cofounder of ICCT and ‘one of the whistle-blowers
in the Volkswagen exhaust gas scandal’ (VWG 2016b: 38). In addition, DUH is not a
typical environmental organisation like BUND and NABU with local groups and hundreds
of thousands of members. Rather, it is a small organisation that initiates lawsuits, 
campaigns, and projects and has frequently been cited in the media as part of the 
reporting about Dieselgate due to the organisation’s own measurements of car emissions
and lawsuits against federal authorities.
Greenpeace
Greenpeace is a worldwide active and a highly professional environmental protection
network that executes campaigns at company headquarters, on production plants, or on 
the Transport Ministry (Greenpeace 2017; Behrmann and Jennen 2017). One of the
campaigns that increased the public awareness of Greenpeace took place in 1995 when 
the organisation ‘occupied’ the Shell oil platform Brent Spar for three weeks with the
objective that the corporation did not dump the platform (Greenpeace 2016a). For 
various scholars, the pressure of Greenpeace on Shell is a prime example of the
influence of NGOs (Ditlev-Simonsen and Wenstøp 2013; Detomasi 2007; Porter and
13 





          
          
           
      
             
         
         
         
          
            
       
 
   
       
      
           
           
          
           
          
            
            
             
             
            
       
            
         
        
           
        
        
 
Kramer 2006). In the annual report, the NGO listed various examples of recent
successful pressures on MNCs: Shell dissociated itself from drillings in Alaska;
companies such as Aldi, Lidl, and Tchibo obliged themselves to detoxify their textiles;
and ‘Austria and England announced decarbonisation plans’ (Greenpeace 2016b: 2). 
The aspect that differentiates Greenpeace from BUND, DUH, and NABU is that it states
that the government and industry do not contribute to the NGO’s financing (Greenpeace
2016b). According to Koch (2014), Greenpeace’s power is formed by a combination of
professionally executed campaigns and the support of members and citizens who will be
informed by public activities. The resulting ‘power resource’ (Koch 2014: 132) enables
Greenpeace to take part in political decision-making processes and to represent its
interest to the top management of corporations.
Naturschutzbund Deutschland (NABU)
More than 620,000 members belong to NABU, which is one of Germany’s biggest NGOs.
More than 2,000 groups are spread throughout the country, building a strong local
network (NABU 2016). Its original focus was on animal and nature conservation; 
however, NABU’s work resolves around various environmental policy issues. The NGO
maintains several departments, among others, one that works on transport policy issues
(NABU 2016). The organisation is regarded as a peaceful and solution-oriented NGO.
In addition, NABU has always been more open than other NGOs for partnerships with
companies (Markham 2011). Until the end of 2015, NABU had a cooperation with VWG, 
in which the NGO advised VWG regarding environmental aspects and initiated projects
with the corporation (e.g. the ‘green fleet’ programme and the renaturation of moors)
(NABU 2013). The cooperation has not been extended due to the scandal at VWG. 
Moreover, NABU would only consider a return to the partnership if VWG demonstrably
changes its corporate governance and environmental practices (refer to Section 6.2.1 
for a detailed analysis of NABU’s demands on VWG). However, NABU still works with
Volkswagen (VW) Financial Services, which has contributed around €2 million since
2012 to NABU’s moor protection projects and plans to add another €1 million by 2019
(VWG 2016c). Information on and controversies around this cooperation will be
explained in more depth in Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. Below are the descriptions of the





     
       
        
          
          
        
 
 
    
      
         
        
 
     
        
            
            
     
     
             
           
          
     
       
   
             
          
              
              
             
         
         
             
Dachverband der Kritischen Aktionäre (DKA) 
The DKA (2018: n.p.) was ‘founded in 1986 by several non-governmental organisations
like environmental, human rights and anti-Apartheid groups’. The association currently 
has 28 member organisations. The NGO often speaks at the annual general meetings
(AGMs) of MNCs, including those at VWG, at which the DKA criticised VWG’s
governance structures and their lack of investigations after the emissions crisis (Dufner 
2016).
Transparency International Germany (TI)
As an international organisation that fights against corruption and supports the
prevention of criminality, the NGO TI published reports after the VWG scandal and 
criticised the corporation’s internal structures and compliance system (TI Deutschland
2015).
DKA and TI were interviewed and included in the study as these NGOs provided a 
different perspective on the VWG scandal and how NGOs may exert influence. Both 
NGOs concentrate more on the corporate governance implications of the scandal and
less on the technical details of how VWG cheated and the concrete environmental
consequences of the company’s behaviour.
2.4.2 Criticism and Controversies of NGOs
There has always been criticism of the approaches of NGOs and how organisations such 
as BUND, DUH, Greenpeace, and NABU try to achieve their objectives. Some of the
controversies are connected to the status of ENGOs as recognised environmental and
nature protection associations, which have the right to file suits, for example, regarding 
environmental regulatory decisions for industrial installations and infrastructure
measures (UBA 2018a).
One of the critiques offered is that NGOs misuse their special status to threaten
companies with lawsuits, then negotiate a deal with the involved companies and
withdraw the lawsuit after money has been paid into a foundation, which is then usually
managed by the suing NGO. In 2012, a TV report, that was shown on the channel Das
Erste (‘The First’), spoke of a ‘sale of indulgences’ (Burgschat and Hilbert 2012) and
addressed examples in which the NGOs BUND and NABU took money from companies
and withdrew lawsuits. For example, BUND put €800,000 that the NGO received from a 





             
     
         
        
           
       
       
           
       
            
           
       
         
        
         
      
          
           
       
            
      
           
       
          
         
           
    
          
          
																																																						
         
           
         
              
      
 
example is the NGO NABU, which received €920,000 from the car company Daimler
Group and withdrew a lawsuit against the construction of a proving ground (Biederbeck, 
Neubacher, and Traufetter 2013). However, two years later, both NABU and BUND were 
not satisfied with the progress of the planning and demanded that Daimler Group fulfil
the requirements regarding the nature conservation law (BUND press release 2014). In
the TV report (Burgschat and Hilbert 2012), the environmentalist Knake stated: ‘The
functionaries of the nature conservation associations are currently completely withdrawn.
They have lost sight of their goals, have doubled their efforts, but not towards nature 
conservation, but in the direction of money’.
Furthermore, the journalists argued that it is not clear what exactly happens with the 
money in the foundations (Burgschat and Hilbert 2012). Moreover, NABU rejected the
accusations that were presented by Burgschat and Hilbert (2012) and stated that
‘mediations’ would often reach better results than lawsuits against companies and
federal authorities (Ludwichowski 2012). These ‘mediations’ are often concomitant with
conditions and restrictions that are imposed upon the company and which would,
according to the NGOs, frequently exceed legal requirements (Ludwichowski 2012).
These reports and occurrences raise the question about who watches CSOs. There is
the impression that the ENGOs of this study improved their image because of their
reporting, investigations, and educational work in the aftermath of the VWG emissions
scandal. However, NGOs might easily lose legitimacy if the public feels that they have 
transformed into groups that lose sight of their original purpose.
Considering the accusation that the biggest German NGOs might be ‘venal’, new 
environmental organisations and parties have emerged to protect the (local) environment 
against measures to fight (global) climate goals (Etscheit 2016). For example, there is a 
controversy among NGOs and policy makers regarding whether it is justified to destroy
the landscape by building wind turbines contributing to wider climate protection goals 
(e.g. NABU 2016; Rucht and Roose 1999).
14 
The arguments of some NGOs are that lawsuits might not have any effect; however, an 
agreement with companies or consortiums that allows them to implement the planned
14 
This conflict divides environmental protection organisations and ecological parties like The Greens. On 
one hand, these organisations fight against nuclear and coal power, as these forms of energy generation 
are not sustainable and a large producer of CO2 emissions (coal power). On the other hand, building wind 
turbines and bio gas plants have negative effects on nature reserves and animals. This leads into the wider






            
          
            
        
 
             
           
          
          
           
              
           
           
            
     
           
            
             
         
             
              
         
          
           
          
          
      
          
         
             
            
               
   
project might provide foundations with money that could be used for environmental
projects (BUND 2014, Ludwichowski 2012). However, this view is problematic,
considering that it argues that environmental destruction in one place could be offset with
projects elsewhere instead of ensuring that the environment is not harmed in the first 
place.
In an article of the newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), the authors criticised that the
NGO DUH calls for transparency from other players but lacks transparency when it
comes to names and sums of donating companies (Hägler and Otter 2017). In the
interview with the author (Interview #29), one of DUH’s senior representatives indicated 
that some companies that sponsor DUH’s activities may be pressured from other actors
in the industry to stop their engagement. The SZ article also suggested that the DUH
intended to protect their donors. However, Hägler and Otter (2017) stated that, at the
request of the newspaper, DUH revealed that 39 companies paid €1.2 million in 2015.
Among these companies are the German Telekom and Krombacher (brewery) and the
Japanese corporations Kyocera (electronics company) and Toyota.
Over the years, Greenpeace has been criticised from various directions, for example,
that it focuses too much on ‘easily winnable battles’ (Markham 2011: 237) to improve its
image. Another criticism came from one of its early members, Patrick Moore, who stated
that the ‘trend toward abandoning scientific objectivity in favour of political agendas’
forced him to leave Greenpeace (Moore 2008: n.p.). However, it is beyond the scope of 
this work to analyse whether the critique of Greenpeace is justified or whether the
different actors follow a hidden agenda. Therefore, it might be a possible limitation of this
work that the author had to use the information available.
There will always be discussions and controversies about the credibility, legitimacy, and 
sincerity of NGOs that take money from companies for services as part of a cooperation
or as donations. However, it might be a trade-off that would need to be accepted if society
desires powerful and flexible NGOs. Elkington and Beloe (2010: 23) identified ‘forms of 
organisational schizophrenia’ when people within an NGO who oppose NGO-MNC
cooperation meet with people who think partnerships with MNCs are beneficial. Ashman
(2001) stated that an NGO may risk losing its legitimacy and eventually its source of
funding if its followers perceive the organisation’s behaviour in the partnership with the
MNC as inappropriate. One way for NGOs to face these challenges is to be as





            
  
   
           
             
        
             
         
           
           
            
           
         
            
              
       
           
             
        
       
          
          
      
         
           
     
             
         
          
            
      
On a more global scale, the former dean of Yale Business School, Jeffrey Garten, stated 
that:
[NGOs] have acquired the high ground of public opinion without being subjected 
to the same public scrutiny given to corporations and governments. The danger
is that they can too easily misrepresent facts and damage the reputations of other
institutions without being held accountable. (Garten 2002: n.p.)
Elkington and Beloe (2010) added that the pressure for more NGO transparency and
accountability increases, the more budget they will have to handle and more political
influence they will have. Garden’s statement leads towards another point of criticism,
namely that NGOs are not democratically elected, yet claim to represent civil society.
Curbach (2003) stated that the importance, that NGOs play for regulatory policy
processes, does not gloss over the fact that these organisations are not democratically
legitimised. She wrote that the danger of the ‘rule of the associations’ (Curbach 2003:
137) is greater, the more informal and confusing international (policy) negotiations are.
Macdonald (2008: 163) referred to the former Vice Chair of FoE, Tony Juniper, when
stating that NGOs may derive their legitimacy by ‘’representing’ certain interests that
have ‘public support’’. However, Nölke (2000) stated that NGOs make decisions in
camera and often do not record, in annual reports or on websites, how certain decisions
have been made. The author continued that it ‘contradicts the democratic requirements
of transparency and imputability’ (Nölke 2000: 354-355) that outsiders might have
difficulties to understand the occurrence of NGO decisions. This aspect refers to the lack
of internal democracy. For example, Zürn (2000: 108) stated that an ‘NGO [that]
participates in either making or the implementation of a collectively binding decision […] 
must be democratically governed’. Curbach (2003) identified the trade-off between a 
NGO’s effectiveness and its striving for a democratisation of its decisions, which is a 
process that usually requires time.
The lack of transparency may make it more difficult to identify whether NGOs follow a 
hidden agenda by pleasing few donors rather than serving the interest of civil society.
NGO challenges, such managing situations of competition (for resources, donations) and
cooperation (e.g. alliances) with other NGOs may contribute to the perception that certain





            
             
            
        
           
      
    
       
       
            
      
     
    
               
       
             
            
       
           
           
            
               
        
          
              
           
         
            
        
           
          
            
          
Spiro (1995: 258) responded to the objection that NGOs lack democratic legitimisation
by stating that, ‘if numbers are the benchmark of legitimacy, the NGO community easily
passes the test’, considering that some NGOs have more members than countries
citizens. That points to Spiro’s (1995: 258) statement that ‘most international institutions
are in formal terms themselves wildly undemocratic’. He named the example of the UN
General Assembly that grants a small country such as San Marino the same voting 
power as China.
Summarising, NGOs play an important role in policy making processes and the creation 
of pressure on MNCs to be more accountable and transparent in their sustainability
engagement. However, it needs to be stated that NGOs show deficits regarding the
transparency of decision processes and control mechanisms.
2.5 VWG and its CSR (Environmental) Approach
2.5.1 VWG: Profile and Previous Scandals
The VWG is one of the biggest automotive manufacturers in the world and the biggest
company in Germany (Gneuss and Lehman 2017). In 2016, the corporation’s revenue
was €217.3 billion with a net income of €5.4 billion. In the same year, VWG sold more
than 10.2 million cars (VWG 2016c). Moreover, VWG was founded in 1937 (VWG 2008)
and has always been a prime example of the social market economy in Germany. The 
power of unions and the works council at VWG is significant. Representatives from
Germany’s biggest union, IG Metall, constitute 50% of VWG’s supervisory board (VWG
2014). The special feature of the MNC VWG is the VW-Gesetz (Volkswagen Act) that
was passed when VWG was privatised in 1960. One of the features of the law is that the
German Federal State of Lower Saxony owns 20% of VWG shares and has veto power
over important decisions. Another aspect of the law is reflected in the two-thirds majority
rule that grants employee representatives the power to stop, for example, the closure of
production sites (VWG 2008). These special rules make the supervisory board extremely
powerful and have been criticised by various people, for example, the automotive expert
Dudenhöffer (2016a). The rules have been made responsible for VWG’s constant (price)
pressure, considering that top management must ‘please’ powerful stakeholders, such
as unions, works councils, and politicians (two representatives of the Federal State of
Lower Saxony are members of the supervisory board), with different interests. The
journalist and VWG expert Büschemann stated that various scandals are attributable to





            
           
             
              
              
            
          
           
          
          
      
   
   
                 
       
          
           
               
         
       
     
           
        
       
       
        
          
          
          
     
           
        
chosen illegal and dubious means to win their support for severe changes and
restructuring measures (Scheunert 2016). All these factors might have led VWG to
circumvent emission laws to reduce costs in other areas, as the current power structures
in VWG’s supervisory board would make it very difficult for the company to reduce the
workforce and to close inefficient units. This cost pressure might have been one factor
that made VWG susceptible to such a crisis and led to the formulation of environmental 
promises that could not have been kept (in the interactions with NGOs). For example,
Jung and Park (2017: 128) summarised the reasons for Dieselgate in these three
elements: ‘Austere leadership styles, insular corporate governance, and drawbacks from
family feuds and nepotism’. In addition, the thesis will demonstrate that the strong
proximity between VWG (and the automotive industry) and the German Government is
another very important factor that might not have caused the crisis but contributed to its 
occurrence and made the investigation of the scandal more difficult.
Various scandals in the last couple of years suggest that a system has grown in VWG in
which bad practices and illegal detours are tolerated to reach one goal: to increase 
profitability. In 2005, the VWG corruption scandal revealed that top managers of VWG
paid for prostitutes, luxury travels, and services to debauch and bribe the works council. 
The former chair of the works council, Volkert, was sent to prison and the former
personnel manager, Hartz, was put on probation for two years for paying a ‘special
bonus’ to Volkert of around €1.95 million between 1994 and 2005 (e.g. Seib 2008). The
personnel manager used a slush fund to keep worker representatives ‘satisfied’. Some
of the past scandals revolve around or have origins in VWG’s problem of high production 
costs. Since the works council and the unions are traditionally strong at VWG (and the 
political influence cannot be neglected), a personnel reduction has never really been an 
option. Therefore, the corporation must always find alternative cost savings. That is a 
reason the ‘tough negotiator’ José Ignacio López was hired in 1993, as he had a 
reputation of putting suppliers under high pressure. However, it ended in a crisis, as
López stole secret documents from his former employer GM. Similarly, VWG was under
pressure to perform well in the US market and considered the ‘clean diesel’ technology
a great chance to play a more important role in the US automotive market. However, 
there was a reason that other European car producers kept their hands off selling diesel





       
            
        
            
           
             
          
           
        
        
         
          
           
             
          
      
             
        
          
       
  
         
        
            
          
        
              
       
            
        
       
																																																						
            
             
    
2.5.2 VWG’s CSR and Environmental Approach Before and After the Crisis
Before the crisis, VWG was represented in many sustainability indices. For example,
VWG was listed in ‘The Sustainability Yearbook 2013’ in the ‘Robeco Sam Silver Class’ 
(RobecoSam and KPMG 2013), part of the ‘Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) – Global
500 Climate Change Report 2013’ in the group with the second highest scores of 99 
points (CDP 2013) and received 93 out of 100 points in the FTSE4Good ranking (FTSE
2013).15 Moreover, VWG was the industry leader in 2013/2014 of ‘Automobiles and 
Components’ in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) (S&P Dow Jones Indices and
RobecoSam 2013) and called itself ‘the most sustainable automotive group’ (VWG
2015b: n.p.) two weeks before the scandal became known.
After the scandal, VWG was deleted from the following ratings: RobecoSam, CDP, and 
Sustainalytics, and was suspended from FTSE4Good. The penalties are evidence of the
disapproval and dismay felt by global organisations at the actions and are a signal of
how serious they perceived them to be. For example, FTSE Russell, the provider of the
FTSE4Good index, stated that VWG was suspended, as it was ‘deemed to have misled 
government agencies and consumers’ (FTSE 2015: n.p.). Furthermore, VWG withdrew
from the following alliances until the scandal will be fully clarified: Biodiversity in Good
Company, CSR Europe, Econsense, the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), and 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD; Richter 2016). These
alliances present the participating MNCs as organisations that understood how important 
the integration of CSR into the overall strategies is.
In a 2013 article, VWG’s CSR managers wrote about the importance of a modern CSR
approach that integrates CSR topics into all departments, unlike traditional CSR
management at which top management decides to spend money on social projects that
are implemented by teams that work independently from all other areas (Prätorius and 
Richter 2013). Furthermore, the CSR managers stated that the stakeholder management
‘formed the core of the integrated CSR approach’ that was based on a process that was
‘communicated openly and constructively at eye level’ (Prätorius and Richter 2013: 121). 
The analyses in Chapters 6 and 7 will show that this has been a perception that was not
shared by civil society stakeholders, such as NGOs and sustainability experts. In another
article written by senior representatives of VWG’s CSR management, the corporation’s
15 
The Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE 2018: n.p.) is the most important stock index in the United 
Kingdom: ‘The FTSE4Good Index Series is designed to measure the performance of companies





          
          
        
          
           
 
          
          
           
       
         
        
        
            
          
       
       
               
            
       
             
           
            
         
        
       
            
      
          
       
          
          
former chairman, Pischetsrieder, was cited as stating that VWG wanted to become ‘a 
transparent company both inside and out’ (Kopp and Richter 2007: 209). Ironically, this
very corporate culture that had been praised by VWG before the crisis as one factor of 
success has been heavily criticised by the media and scholars and was identified as one
of the reasons a crisis of such an extent could happen (e.g. Bovens 2016; Jung and Park
2017).
Regarding the environmental approach, VWG stated the importance of three target
areas: ‘To continuously reduce our carbon footprint, […] our pollutant emissions and […] 
our resource consumption’ (VWG 2016c: 7). It aims to reduce the ‘five main
environmental performance indicators – energy and water consumption, waste for
disposal, as well as CO2 and VOC [volatile organic compound] emissions per vehicle 
produced’ by 25% between the levels from 2010 and from 2018 (VWG 2016a: 89). As
part of VWG’s environmental strategy, the company declared its aim to ‘become a role 
model in all things related to environment’ (VWG 2016a: 170). The following is an
example of guidelines that VWG formulated: ‘We employ a holistic approach by
researching, developing and democratizing environmentally friendly innovations,
significantly reducing the environmental burden in the process’ (VWG 2016a: 170).
Furthermore, VWG admitted that it ‘failed to live up to our own standards in several areas. 
The irregularities in the handling of emissions tests contradict everything that we stand
for’ (VWG 2016a: 7). The head of Coordination CSR and Sustainability declared that
‘clean diesel wasn’t clean. It had failed to deliver on its environmental claims’ (Prätorius
2016: 24). As outlined in Section 2.2, VWG experienced its most severe crisis ever in
September 2015. In its annual report, VWG stated four legal areas that pose a significant 
financial risk because of Dieselgate (VWG 2016a: 95): criminal and administrative
proceedings worldwide; product-related lawsuits worldwide; lawsuits filed by investors
worldwide (points 1-3 exclude the USA/Canada); proceedings in the USA/Canada.
In reaction to the crisis and the pressure to change, VWG launched its ‘together-strategy 
2025’ with the objective to bridge ‘the conceptual gap between sustainability and 
business objectives’ (VWG 2016c: 7). The company intends to reposition itself with the
long-term goal to become ‘one of the world’s leading providers of sustainable mobility’
(VWG 2016c: 8), which slightly shifts the corporation’s focus from being solely a car





        
  
           
            
        
        
             
     
       
         
            
            
            
 
          
           
         
          
         
         
 
             
              
        
          
        
         
        
          
     
              
           
         
such as Moia and started partnerships with others like Gett to accommodate the trend
that more people use cars on demand and car-sharing services.
As a consequence of the crisis, VWG established a ‘Sustainability Advisory Board’ in
2016 (Prätorius 2016) that was also demanded by the NGO NABU (Interview #7). This
advisory board consists of representatives from ‘politics, research and NGOs [who]
advise Volkswagen on topics such as sustainable mobility, environmental protection and
the future of work’ (VWG 2017: n.p.). Moreover, in 2016 the company created the new
division 'Law and Integrity' and hired the well-reputed manager and former senior judge,
Christine Hohmann-Dennhardt. She had to leave VWG after less than a year due to 
disagreements between her and powerful people within VWG. In an article of the weekly
newspaper Die Zeit, it was posited that Hohmann-Dennhardt was forced to leave by
VWG’s managers, as she was believed to be taking the investigation of the diesel 
scandal too seriously and planned to ‘leave no stone unturned’ (Tatje 2017: 26). 
2.6 Summary
This chapter provides the contextual background of the thesis by briefly summarising the
German automotive sector and the events around the VWG emissions scandal. It has
presented information about the studied NGOs by providing their profiles and insight
about controversies around the NGOs’ work. In addition, the chapter explains why the
NGOs have been chosen. It ends with an overview on VWG and their CSR approach 
with an emphasis on the corporation’s environmental orientation before and after
Dieselgate.
To conclude, there are several reasons that conducting research on the influence of
NGOs in the context of the German automotive sector and a major organisational crisis
provides insight. First, the German automotive industry is the most important sector in 
Germany and has historically been strongly interconnected with political institutions,
which provide the possibility to examine various NGO influence approaches. Second,
the emissions scandal at VWG revealed a significant discrepancy between the
corporation’s extensive CSR activities and their behaviour. The crisis revealed the
ambivalent role of NGOs as investigators of the scandal and as actors who were
passively involved by providing legitimacy and credibility to the automotive MNCs.
Therefore, the crisis offers the opportunity to examine the role and influence of NGOs.
Third, the automotive sector has always been under intense scrutiny of NGOs leading to





   
  
  
         
          
      
         
        
       
       
       
             
    
   
            
            
           
           
           
        
          
        
     
         
        
        
           
        
             
        
       
     
CHAPTER 3: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 
STAKEHOLDER THEORIES
3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of relevant stakeholder theories and CSR concepts.
It starts with a review of CSR by providing a working definition and various perspectives,
conceptualisations, and key CSR models. It elucidates the development and evolution
of CSR, introduces and classifies CSR concepts and offers a systematic and strategic
approach to CSR. After the review of CSR concepts, the literature on stakeholder
theories will be presented by introducing stakeholder definitions, classifications, 
typologies, and information on the various stakeholders, such as NGOs, which play a 
key role in the study. This chapter also reviews literature on the relationships between 
NGOs and MNCs and how civil society actors influence and perceive an MNC’s CSR
approach. These concepts contribute to the understanding and analysis of the data 
gathered in the primary and secondary data collection.
The stakeholder theory has been chosen as the primary theoretical lens, as it links the
notions of ethics and business, and it questions the view that striving for profit is a firm’s 
sole concern. A core understanding of the stakeholder theory is that it asks what the 
responsibility of a company is towards its stakeholders (Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar 
2004). Therefore, CSR concepts play an important role when applying stakeholder
theories to understand the content and quality of stakeholder interactions. In addition, 
CSR may be considered the vehicle with which MNCs interact with stakeholders,
considering that CSR departments and reports are important means of a corporation’s 
communication with its stakeholders.
Further, CSR contributes to classifying an MNC’s CSR approach by putting sustainability 
declarations and actions into a theoretical perspective. In addition, a better
understanding of a corporation’s CSR and sustainability approach helps to identify where
and how stakeholders, such as NGOs, may exert influence. Several authors stated that
stakeholder theory is connected to CSR, ‘as it provides a suitable theoretical framework
for analysing the relationship between business and society’ (Ayuso et al. 2012: 418;
Cordeiro and Tewari 2015: 835). Therefore, rather than separating both strands, 
stakeholder theories may be used to ‘create more fine-grained analyses that combine 





         
        
          
          
      




          
    
             
            
          
     
       
            
              
            
           
      
         
             
          
          
          
         
																																																						
              
         
        
             
 
           
           
         
              
             
          
The insight of scholars and some companies that suggests that a profound 
understanding of a company’s stakeholders is an important factor for success is a
significant reason that the concept of CSR and stakeholder theory are tightly connected
(e.g. Pedersen 2006; Russo and Perrini 2009). It is therefore an important similarity of 
both literature streams that a company is understood as an entity that is embedded in a 
society accompanied by the understanding that there is a multiplicity of stakeholders with
legitimate interests.
3.2 Corporate Social Responsibility
3.2.1 Definitions and Perspectives
While CSR can be defined in many ways, every definition reflects the authors’
perspective on CSR and the understanding about the scope of the concepts. The 
following two definitions will guide the understanding of CSR in this study. The EC stated
that CSR ‘concerns actions by companies over and above their legal obligations towards
society and the environment’ (EC (COM) 681 final 2011: 3) and that ‘enterprises should 
have in place a process to integrate social, environmental, ethical, human rights and 
consumer concerns into their business operations and core strategy in close
collaboration with their stakeholders’ (EC (COM) 681 final 2011: 6). The EC definition
may be quite broad, however it reflects the importance of stakeholders as partners with
which CSR goals can be implemented.
16 
The other definition is from Blowfield and
Frynas (2005), who considered CSR a parent concept and reflected that CSR does not
solely encompass activities that go beyond the law. It therefore contemplates the recent
development towards co-regulation that brings different societal actors together. The 
short version of Blowfield and Frynas’ (2005: 503) CSR definition is as follows: ‘CSR as
an umbrella term for a variety of theories and practices all of which recognize […] that
companies have a responsibility for their impact on society and the natural environment,
sometimes beyond legal compliance’.17 This definition has been chosen, as it suggests
that various terms such as corporate citizenship, sustainability, or business ethics can 
16 
In 2001, the EC published the definition that describes the importance of understanding the needs and
expectations of stakeholders. The institution defined CSR as ‘a concept whereby companies integrate social
and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders’
(Commission of the European Communities 2001: 6). This definition reflects the bidirectional character of
the exchange between the actors. 
17
The complete definition is the following: ‘CSR as an umbrella term for a variety of theories and practices
all of which recognise the following: (a) that companies have a responsibility for their impact on society and 
the natural environment, sometimes beyond legal compliance and the liability of individuals (b) that 
companies have a responsibility for the behaviour of others with whom they do business (e.g., within supply
chains); and (c) that business needs to manage its relationship with wider society, whether for reasons of





        
      
       
           
    
          
      
              
        
         
          
        
   
               
          
            
           
          
         
     
            
           
         
            
           
          
           
         
          
      
            
          
be considered part of the concept of CSR. Thereby, Blowfield and Frynas’ definition 
acknowledges a certain conceptual ambiguity, which reflects that scholars have
problems formulating definitions that provide enough clarity. In the following, the 
challenge of finding a common conceptual understanding of CSR will be further
discussed.
These definitions show that the three dimensions (social, environmental, and economic)
are parts of an integrative, academic CSR understanding. Both academia and practice 
may have different perceptions of the notion of CSR. For MNCs such as VWG, CSR is
only a sub-aspect of sustainability. The group’s sustainability report encompasses the 
three dimensions of ‘economy’, ‘people’ (social), and ‘environment’, which form the basis
of this study’s CSR understanding. Whereas for many business and management
scholars, CSR is understood more broadly containing economic, social, and 
environmental dimensions.
Authors who represent the opinion that CSR must be a crucial part of every company’s
corporate strategy may define the concept in a much broader way than scholars who
contemplate that wider socially responsible activities should be left in the hands of 
institutions or other organisations. For example, Davis (1973), Carroll (1979, 1991),
Jones (1980), and Frederick (1994, 2006) can be accounted in the first group, whereas
Berle (1931), Levitt (1958), Friedman (1970), Drucker (1989), and Henderson (2001) 
tend to represent the group that considers CSR a misdirection of corporate resources.
The institutional framework in which authors do research also influences the way
scholars define CSR. Some authors argue that the key point of CSR is that it is voluntary 
(Commission of the European Communities 2001: 6; 2002: 347 final; Kinderman 2009) 
meaning that a corporation’s social responsibilities begin where the law ends. Other
scholars point out that CSR is implied in some countries’ institutional (e.g. regulatory,
political, and cultural) frameworks, leaving less room for voluntary CSR (Brammer,
Jackson, and Matten 2012; Matten and Moon 2008). For example, in Germany,
companies must pay a mandatory contribution to their employees’ insurance. That would
be a voluntary act of the firm in other countries. This refers to Matten and Moon’s (2008)
concept of implicit and explicit CSR.
Frederick (1994: 151) expressed that an essential aspect of CSR is that companies have





     
     
            
        
            
          
          
          
           
          
           
         
       
              
  
           
        
              
          
        
        
           
          
         
       
      
           
																																																						
                 
        
        
         
        
 
               
            
       
‘continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to economic
development while improving the quality of life of the workforce’.
Sethi (1979) lamented that the term CSR was used excessively with the consequence
that the expression largely lost its meaning. Frederick (1994) described the uncertainty
regarding CSR during this time, which was expressed by the firms’ failure to retrieve a
manifest plan out of the catchphrase ‘CSR’. Decades later, authors still complain about 
the lack of conceptualised theories on CSR and the definitions on which the larger
academic community agrees on (Carroll 1991; Gulyas 2009; Kakabadse, Rozuel, and
Lee-Davis 2005; McWilliams and Siegel 2000; Perrini 2006). Moreover, scholars speak
of a ‘jungle of definitions’ (Crane, Matten, and Spence 2014: 5) and perceive that CSR
has different meanings for many people and that CSR is not easily differentiable from
related concepts, such as corporate citizenship, sustainable development, triple bottom
line, or corporate governance (Matten and Crane 2005; Matten and Moon 2008). Frynas
and Stephens (2014: 3) and Matten and Moon (2008: 405) speak of CSR as an umbrella
term because of this definitional ambiguity.
18 
Henderson (2001) criticised that the division into economic, social, and environmental
aspects presumes an agreement on terms and concepts, which does not exist in
reality.
19 
He continued by saying that it is misleading to categorise certain firm actions
as ‘social’, if it clearly follows an economic motive (that then also weakens the argument
of the voluntary nature of CSR). However, Dahlsrud (2008) explored 37 of the most cited 
definitions and found that even though they differ, the definitions may be grouped into 
five broad categories.
20 
When trying to demarcate CSR, Lockett, Moon, and Visser
(2006: 116-117) argued that the field of CSR cannot be considered a discipline, rather it
is a ‘study within management’. They indicated that CSR does not comply with the
definition of a ‘substantive discipline’ and is therefore better described as a field. There 
are relevant studies that move between the spectrums of the two diametrical
perspectives of CSR: the pure profit-making view and the altruistic view on CSR.
18 
Schneider (2012) stated that the different concepts can be subsumed under the term CSR. The definition
of the Commission of the European Communities (2001: 6) includes the triple bottom line concept. Elkington 
(1999) coined the term triple bottom line that refers to measuring the performance of a business in the three 
dimensions social, environmental (or ecological), and financial. Dahlsrud (2008: 3) stated in his investigation 
on the various definitions of CSR that the terms corporate citizenship and CSR are interchangeably used in 
the literature. 
19 
Economic, social, and environmental are the dimensions of the chosen CSR definitions. Henderson (2001)
used the definition of the WBCSD (2000) that states that CSR is part of sustainable development.
20 





            
               
              
               
         
         
       
         
       
          
         
     
         
            
       
            
      
          
        
     
   
 
           
        
           
       
                
    
              
           
           
																																																						
                
      
 
Carr (1968) represents the first extreme by stating that companies’ social responsibility
should be restricted to their business and is fulfilled as long as they comply with the law. 
Carr (1968: 145) stated that managers should leave their personal values at home and
must be directed by a ‘different set of ethical standards’ when entering the office. In his
understanding of CSR, companies treat other firms in a way in which they would not like 
to be treated. Years before Carr’s publication, Levitt (1958: 49) criticised the striving of 
companies to take on social responsibility and strongly recommended the adaption of a 
‘single-minded devotion to profit’. Decades later, some scholars have moved only
millimetres from this line, emphasising that CSR engagement should be kept to a 
minimum and that money could be spent more usefully on a company’s core business
(Drucker 1989). Friedman’s (1970) position is more moderate than those of the previous
authors, as he acknowledged that firms do have a certain moral obligation to 
stakeholders; however, he represents a similar neo-liberal view, stating that economic
CSR should maximise the wealth of the shareholders. He assigned the social and
environmental aspects of business to governmental and social institutions. According to 
Friedman (1970), CSR poses an agency problem within a company. Taking the
shareholders’ perspective (principals), CSR can be considered a waste of a corporation’s
resources. It might also be interpreted as an expression of executives’ (agents) selfish 
plans to improve their positions within the firm and finally their own career prospects.
Agency costs are the consequence of a situation of information asymmetry in which the 
risk-bearing shareholders are unable to monitor management (Aguilera and Jackson 
2003).
Carroll (1979, 1991) represents the altruistic perspective on CSR, indicating that
businesses should invest their resources for social good. He introduced his widely 
recognised four-level pyramid that defined CSR in the four dimensions: economic, legal,
ethical, and philanthropic. The author further developed McGuire’s (1963) understanding
of CSR, as McGuire was one of the first scholars who put the focus on the manager’s
perspective and considered the overall organisational responsibilities.
21 
The first two levels of Carroll’s (1979, 1991) pyramid state the economic and legal
responsibilities, which every company must follow to exist in the market. Figure 1 depicts
the four responsibilities of CSR. The economic dimension refers to the profitability of a
21
McGuire (1963: 144): ‘The idea of social responsibilities supposes that the corporation has not only






            
       
          
          
        
     
         
         
            
           
          
         




    
 
              
           
           
         
            
           
          
company and is the prerequisite for all other dimensions. The legal element also refers
to the very basic aspects of CSR: complying with laws and doing business within the 
legal framework. The third dimension concerns the ethical responsibility that does not
necessarily have to be followed, albeit it may be socially expected. The last level would
be the philanthropic responsibility that goes beyond an ordinary societal engagement of
a firm. Carroll (1999) revised his definition and increasingly used the expression 
‘philanthropic’ and not ‘discretionary’ since most of the examples of discretionary or
voluntary CSR behaviour were found in the philanthropic area. Carroll’s contribution to
CSR is one of the most cited literature articles in the area. Burton and Goldsby (2009)
remarked that Carroll’s pyramid built the foundation for many following concepts. Carroll
(1998) used the expression ‘corporate citizenship’ as a replacement for CSR, as the 
former embraces the four previously mentioned CSR components; a good (corporate)
citizen generates profits (meets economic responsibilities), obeys laws, and behaves
ethically and philanthropically. 
Figure 1: Carroll’s Pyramid of the Four Responsibilities
Source: Carroll (1979, 1991)
Elbing and Elbing (1967) stated that firms should recognise and take on their social
responsibility and commitment. Davis (1973) represents the perspective of those who
see CSR as an integral part of business activities. For him, businesses have to
incorporate ‘social values into their decision-making machinery’ (Davis 1973: 321).
Frederick (2006) agreed and stated that company resources should also be directed to
social engagement. Wood (1991: 995) wrote that the ‘basic idea of corporate social
responsibility is that business and society are interwoven rather than distinct entities’. 
36 
Some materials have been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. Pages where 
material has been removed are clearly marked in the electronic version. The unabridged version 




       
        
         
       
   
         
        
        
         
       
         
           
       
       
   
              
             
          
             
           
          
              
      
          
           
           
          
																																																						
           
              
               
          
 
           
  
The author stated that the principles of CSR could be summarised in three phenomena:
legitimacy, public responsibility, and managerial discretion. For Baron (2001), companies
deserve the CSR label if they not only engage in CSR in the frame of a profit
maximisation strategy but also show the moral motivation to increase their social
performance.
To conclude the different perspectives, Carroll, Davis, and Frederick represent the 
normative, integrative, and ethical strands of the CSR literature that favours the 
incorporation of corporate responsibility into business decisions. Carr (1968), Levitt
(1958), and Drucker (1989) epitomise the neo-liberal or instrumental point of view that
separates business decision-making and social engagement (role of governmental
institutions) and considers CSR to be a means to ‘achieve economic results’ (Garriga
and Melé 2004: 51) rather than an ethical necessity (these aspects will be further
elaborated in Section 3.2.3). Further representatives of this approach are Jensen (2002),
Hart (1995), and Porter and Kramer (2006) (maximisation of shareholder value).
3.2.2 Formation and Evolution
This section will give a historical overview on the development of the theorisations of
CSR and a brief and general outline of the beginnings of (documented) social behaviour
of corporations and entrepreneurs. The concept of CSR has been formally known for
more than five decades when scholars started to write ideas on CSR.
However, indications for responsible behaviour of businesses towards society can be
traced back centuries (Carroll 1999). For example, in the Middle Ages, there was a 
European model of the ‘honourable businessman’ that is still known in Germany.
22
In the
mid-twentieth century, the economist Howard Bowen published the book Social
Responsibilities of the Businessman (1953), which was appraised by various authors,
such as Carroll (1999), Valor (2005), and Windsor (2001), to be one of the first significant 
contributions to CSR literature. Carroll (1999: 270) and Windsor (2001: 230) regarded
Bowen as the (modern) ‘Father of Corporate Social Responsibility’. Bowen (1953) stated
22 
Such an ‘honourable businessman’ or ‘honest merchant’ (German: ehrbarer Kaufman) embodies the
virtues of a person who acts to have long-term economic success without harming the interests of society
(Klink 2008). The guiding principles of the ‘honourable businessman’ have been included in the Deutscher
Corporate Governance Kodex (DCGK) (English: German Corporate Governance Code) that is a
governmental commission that was implemented by the German Government in 2001. The DCGK consists 






             
      
            
              
          
            
          
             
              
        
        
 
          
           
      
           
             
             
         
        
        
          
          
       
         
    
               
          
     
             
          
               
    
that it is the obligation of businesspersons to act in a way in which their behaviour aligns
with the values of society.
Two decades earlier in the 1930s, a debate took place between professor and lawyer
Adolf Berle and law professor E. Merrick Dodd. The two scholars argued about the
accountability of corporations. Berle (1931) took the view that corporations must mainly
represent the interests of the shareholders and the owners’ financial interests. Dodd
(1932) represented equal views; however, he added that corporations are accountable
to more stakeholders than just to the shareholders and have a wider responsibility to
society. Okoye (2009) pointed out that the discussion between Berle and Dodd may be
understood as a signpost for further development in the field of CSR. Macintosh (1999)
ascribed to the discussion far-reaching effects for the advancement of accounting and 
financial reporting all around the world.
The historian Morrell Heald (1970) sketched the perception of business people towards 
the social environment of a firm in the late nineteenth century until the 1960s. Heald
documented, especially in the 1920s, a phase of a new value creation in which 
executives understood that business and philanthropy may go hand in hand. In the late
1900s, the steel mogul Andrew Carnegie published a book on how fortunes of rich
individuals can be used for the benefits of society (Harvey et al. 2011).
Other tycoons such as Nelson Rockefeller followed. Wulfson (2001: 135) remarked that 
Carnegie ‘popularised the principles of charity’ and was considered one of the first
philanthropists that understood that giving may potentially have returns in form of
symbolic, social, and cultural capital (Harvey et al. 2011). Neil Mitchell (1989) formulated
the hypothesis that CSR developed as a reaction to increasing societal resentment 
against the power of evolving corporations. Tycoons and American business leaders
understood that philanthropic giving might change the perceptions of people and the
government towards bigger corporations.
In the 1960s, various authors, such as Likert (1967) in the US or Goyder (1961) in the
UK, further developed the discussion on CSR. At an early stage, Goyder (1961)
proposed that companies should publish social reports voluntarily and considered those 
to be complementary to financial reports. The authors saw such an audit as an effective
way for a firm to communicate with its stakeholders. Frederick (1994; 2006) described 
the time until 1970 as the epoch of CSR (CSR1) and titled the time after the 1970s as





              
             
            
       
            
            
        
       
       
         
        
    
            
            
          
      
         
         
            
           
            
        
          
           
       
          
           
         
            
         
            
         
            
        
The 1970s were also the period in which Wallich and McGowan (1970) contributed to
the CSR debate with their work on enlightened self-interest. The authors understood that
CSR must combine and reconcile the interests of the stockholders and the social interest
of the corporation. Frederick (1994) stated that, during the phase of CSR2, companies 
started to be more proactive in terms of CSR activities. The period of CSR1 was shaped 
by ‘why’ questions, whereas, during CSR2, firms asked ‘how’ (Frederick 1994). The ‘why’
questions of CSR1 questioned the overall purpose of CSR, while ‘how’ questions of
CSR2 suggested that many companies went a step further and shifted the focus on the 
necessary means to do CSR and the desired effects. The CSR debates in the 1970s
flowed into Carroll’s (1979) contribution of the four pivotal dimensions of CSR: economic, 
legal, ethical, and discretionary (described in more detail in Section 3.2.3).
3.2.3 Conceptualisation and Theorisation of CSR
The following section introduces relevant CSR concepts and theories and focuses on
models that contribute to the understanding of MNCs’ CSR approaches. The different
concepts and theories of CSR can be approached from different directions, perspectives,
and levels of analysis. Aguinis and Glavas (2012) structured and categorised the 
conceptual and empirical CSR literature into the institutional (e.g. Aguilera and Jackson 
2003; Brammer and Millington 2008, Campbell 2007; Henriques and Sadorsky 1999;
Scherer and Palazzo 2007), organisational (e.g. Bansal and Roth 2000; Davis 1973) and
individual (e.g. Aguilera et al. 2007; Muller and Kolk 2010) levels of analysis. The 
institutional level of analysis refers to one or more of Scott’s (2014) three pillars of 
institutions: normative, cognitive, and regulative. The institutional level is very concerned 
about how various institutional forces, such as economic, political, legal, financial, and
stakeholder pressure affect the firms’ CSR activities, whereas the organisational level of 
analysis discusses the actual motivation of the firms to engage in CSR. The individual
level is about the ‘commitment from supervisors to CSR’ (Aguinis and Glavas 2012: 943).
In other words, the literature on the individual level of analysis investigates managerial
commitment to CSR and the way CSR is communicated to employees.
Schneider (2012: 29) described the various qualitative steps an MNC may go through 
with its CSR approach in the ‘pyramid of the degree of maturity’ (German:
Reifegradpyramide) and gives an outlook of future CSR (refer to Figure 2). The author
was oriented towards Carroll’s pyramid of responsibilities of 1991; however, regarding
the content, it does not show many similarities. Schneider (2012) stated that Carroll’s





               
          
          
      
 
     
        
        
              
         
      
        
          
       
          
              
 
             
       
     
          
intended to change that by presenting a pyramid that aims to be an ‘inclusive model’
(Schneider 2012: 28) consisting of four levels. Figure 2 shows the following CSR levels:
CSR 0.0 (passive societal engagement), 1.0 (philanthropic CSR), 2.0 (societal and
entrepreneurial value creation), and 3.0 (companies as proactive political creators).
Figure 2: Pyramid of the Degree of Maturity
Source: Adopted from Schneider (2012: 29)
The CSR 0.0 level concerns the economic and legal responsibilities of a company.
Strictly considered, it is not CSR, as the company per se has an effect on society by
paying salaries to employees and selling goods to people. Thus, CSR 0.0 is restricted to
the firm’s compliance with laws and economic effects.
In CSR 1.0, philanthropic activities and CSR are characterised by an unsystematic 
implementation. That means there is no, or only a low reference to the firm’s core 
activities without addressing all three CSR dimensions (economic, social, and 
environmental). In this context, Visser (2012) stated that future CSR goes away from
isolated charity projects that do not benefit the firm and do not have a sustainable use
for the beneficiary.
In CSR 2.0, a company is not only aware of the various CSR-related issues inside and
outside the company but is also able to develop CSR strategies and include CSR
dimensions in existing strategies in a continuous exchange with stakeholders. Therefore,
strategic CSR can be found here. McElhaney (2009: 31) stated that strategic CSR is 
40 
Some materials have been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. Pages where material 
has been removed are clearly marked in the electronic version. The unabridged version of the thesis can 




         
            
       
             
              
           
        
          
    
          
            
      
   
         
            
            
      
              
           
       
   
                
            
         
             
           
        
    
      
           
          
																																																						
            
        
‘integrated with core business objectives […and] embedded in day-to-day business 
culture and operations’. The author named Ford as an example of a company that did
not integrate CSR in their corporate strategies. The firm’s undoubtedly philanthropic aid 
to breast cancer research is not connected in any way to the firm’s strategic goals. For
Porter and Kramer (2006), strategic CSR is the effective integration of CSR into the
companies’ strategies, leading to a competitive advantage. They provided the example
of Toyota that created the bestselling hybrid vehicle Prius that combined gas efficiency
and the reduction of pollutants. The authors mentioned Nestlé as another example that
was able to create a ‘symbiotic relationship’ (Porter and Kramer 2006: 10) between the 
success of the company and local communities. Nestlé improved their infrastructure with
investments and thereby secured reliable access to supplies. Porter and Kramer (2006:
11) called that the ‘strategic philanthropy that leverages capabilities to improve salient
areas of competitive context’. 
Husted and Salazar (2006) stated that strategic CSR benefits the company and
increases social output, whereas CSR activities that were coerced by regulators do not
result in a strategic benefit, neither for the firm nor for society. In short, strategic CSR
considers the firm’s resources and aligns CSR with corporate strategies. Consequently,
CSR is not understood as a contrast to value creation but as an important contributor
(Gelbmann and Baumgartner 2012: 287). Another aspect of CSR 2.0 is that companies
communicate internally and externally regarding their (CSR) values, activities, changes,
and challenges in a transparent manner.
The last level of Schneider’s (2012) pyramid is titled CSR 3.0 and could give a glimpse
of the future CSR behaviour of firms. It refers to the stage at which companies act as
‘proactive political creator[s]’ (Schneider 2012: 34) and not only follow regulations but
also regulate themselves and therefore go from being driven by regulations to being the
driver themselves.
23 
A difference from CSR 2.0 is that companies actively determine the
agenda of national and international CSR. Corporations might use Schneider’s (2012)
pyramid to derive their strategic CSR decisions.
Galbreath (2006) conducted another categorisation in which MNCs can be listed. He 
came up with four CSR strategic options, such as shareholder, altruistic, reciprocal, and 
citizenship strategies that can be listed in the pyramidal categories. A company that 
23
Self-regulating or ‘private mechanisms such as voluntary codes of conduct, standards, processes and





             
           
              
  
            
      
        
      
          
           
          
       
          
    
            
      
            
        
          
              
         
        
           
   
            
            
    
      
             
          
            
          
        
follows the shareholder strategy could be placed in CSR 0.0, the altruistic strategy, in
which firms act philanthropically in a rather unsystematic manner would be in CSR 1.0,
while the remaining two strategies, reciprocal and citizenship, can be listed in the more
sophisticated categories CSR 2.0 and CSR 3.0.
Garriga and Melé (2004) summarised the diverse CSR approaches and conceptions into
the four categories of instrumental, political, integrative, and ethical theories. The
instrumental theories consider CSR to be a mechanism to reach pecuniary goals. Within 
this set of theories, the relationship between business and society is mainly shaped by 
the idea of reaching economic (e.g. higher revenue) and/or pre-economic (e.g.
competitive advantage) objectives. For example, Husted and Allen (2006) stated that
competitive advantage can be reached by the clever allocation of resources to meet long-
term social objectives. The resource-based view finds application here, and CSR can be 
considered an ‘instrument to improve the dynamic capabilities of a corporation’
(Rendtorff 2009: 146).
Porter and Kramer (2006) argued that strategic CSR may lead to a competitive
advantage in the firm’s industry, for example, by the examination of the competitive 
context and the evaluation of results. Kemper and Martin (2010) described that
instrumental CSR gained immense significance in the last decades. It enabled
companies to show ‘pro-social attitudes’ (Kemper and Martin 2010: 230), while allowing
the corporations to strive for higher profits and to justify claims for more deregulatory
measures. However, after the financial crisis 2008/2009 when voices for more
deregulation became louder, companies cut their spending for CSR initiatives and saved
money in areas that were not considered high priorities, such as expenditures for
community programmes (Jacob 2012).
The second stream of concepts refers to political theories that discuss the ‘power of
corporations in society and a responsible use of this power in the political arena’ (Garriga
and Melé 2004: 51). Corporate institutionalism and corporate citizenship are among the
subcategories of the political theories classification (Davis 1973). Corporate
institutionalism is about how companies use and express their power in society. Davis
(1967: 48) explained that ‘social responsibilities of businessmen arise from the amount
of social power that they have’. In other words, ‘business is urged to use its power
responsibly’ (Fisher and Grant 2012: 2). Corporate citizenship considers companies to





           
            
         
           
          
         
          
       
            
            
            
        
          
       
             
          
              
          
         
         
            
          
  
  
             
        
               
          
       
          
          
																																																						
         
          
        
Integrative theories describe the way businesses incorporate social requirements to gain
legitimacy and prestige. Aspects such as stakeholder management and the pursuit for
corporate social performance (CSP), which includes various CSR aspects, fall under
integrative theories (Garriga and Melé 2004). Concepts such as public responsibility,
social responsiveness, stakeholder management, and CSP play a role within the
framework of integrative theories, as they indicate the companies’ attempt to align
business activities with social norms and values. Preston and Post (1975) developed the
principle of public responsibility and emphasised that a firm’s behaviour gains more 
legitimacy if CSR policies are developed in accordance with public policy processes.
They stated that public policies should serve as a standard for a company’s actions. 
Wartick and Cochran (1985: 758) understood CSP as ‘the underlying interaction among
the principles of social responsibility, the process of social responsiveness, and the
policies developed to address social issues’. Moreover, CSP focuses on how a firm acts
socially responsibly, how it deals with its stakeholders, and how the corporation responds
to societal issues (Wood 1991). The concept of CSP is not easy to capture due to the
‘multidimensional nature of the construct’ (Rowley and Berman 2000: 398).
The last theoretical classification that was proposed by Garriga and Melé (2004: 61) is
the ethical theories that ‘focus on the ethical requirements that cement the relationship
between business and society’. Such a relationship is observable between the various
stakeholders and the company. Therefore, the normative stakeholder theories can be
classified under ethical theories. Garriga and Melé (2004) also counted human rights
approaches, such as the UNGC or the SA8000 standard, as instruments belonging to
ethical theories.24 
3.2.4 Systematic and Strategic Approach to CSR
After understanding how ideas of CSR were formed and how scholars define and
conceptualise CSR, this section states a systematic and strategic approach of MNCs to
CSR. The purpose of this section is to provide a conflation of literature on systematic
CSR approaches. The theoretical understanding about how a CSR approach can be
comprised contributes to the comprehension concerning how stakeholders influence
such a company’s CSR approach. The following aspects of a systematic CSR approach
are compiled from several authors, such as Cramer (2005); Maignan, Ferrell, and Ferrell
24 
The UNGC is a ‘voluntary initiative based on CEO commitments to implement universal sustainability
principles and to undertake partnerships in support of UN goals’ (UNGC 2018). The SA8000 is a global





             
             
         
           
          
         
       
      
              
     
          
      
         
             
          
      
        
           
               
       
       
     
          
        
       
          
              
       
           
         
          
        
        
             
(2005); and Panapanaan et al. (2003), who illustrated in a concise and plausible way
with examples of real world case studies how a CSR approach can be created. A
systematic CSR approach may help MNCs manage their CSR activities better and be
more successful in interactions with stakeholders. In addition, O’Riordan and Fairbrass
(2014) presented a CSR stakeholder management framework with the four main pillars
‘context’, ‘choice’, ‘calculation’, and ‘communication’. This framework intends to provide
‘essential elements and steps involved in managing CSR’ (O’Riordan and Fairbrass
2014: 125) and was created based on data gained in the pharmaceutical industry.
Figure 3 lists and summarises key aspects of an MNC’s CSR approach (the sequence
of the implementation and application may vary among MNCs). The above-mentioned
authors largely agree that the first step of a systematic CSR approach is that a company
has a clear and thorough understanding of its stakeholders and the urgency and 
legitimacy of their needs, expectations, and demands (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997).
It also includes the firm’s awareness about a stakeholder’s power and the way the MNC
may involve stakeholders in the decision-making processes. A comprehensive analysis
of the institutional environment goes hand in hand with the understanding of
stakeholders’ behaviour that is legitimised by institutions (Lee 2011). The creation,
development, and application of an MNC’s CSR approach is driven by the interaction
with stakeholders. It is crucial for firms to understand that a CSR approach is not set in 
stone but is exposed to constant change according to the MNC’s relationships with its
stakeholders (Cramer 2005). The analysis and comprehension of stakeholders’ needs 
and expectations correspond to a proactive CSR orientation that could be understood as
a firm’s early warning system, supporting the anticipation of stakeholder actions. For
example, in advance of VWG’s emissions crisis, apparently, the corporation had received
signals regularly from internal and external stakeholders about its problematic and illegal
diesel practice but chose to ignore them (Zerfaß and Seiwert 2015).
The way an MNC understands its stakeholders can be reflected in its corporate values
and code of conduct. The second aspect of a systematic CSR approach is the 
formulation and adaption of corporate values to harmonise those with the MNC’s
stakeholder understanding. Codes of conduct may offer orientation for employees and 
external stakeholders. However, MNCs ought to avoid statements of ‘lofty intent and
purpose’ (Pedersen and Andersen 2006: 231) that are ‘awfully slippery’ (Klein 2000:
430). Economic and pre-economic objectives may be derived from a code of conduct





    
    
               
       
            
         
       
       
  
             
        
     
           
            
          
        
           
         
           
         
           
         
              
      
             
     
           
            
       
     
         
																																																						
          
  
CSR approach, and a pre-economic objective may be the creation of a corporate 
reputation (Mayerhofer, Grusch, and Mertzbach 2008).
The third characteristic of a systematic CSR approach is the way an MNC organises and
structures its CSR activities. This aspect refers to the establishment of a CSR
infrastructure that considers the creation of CSR departments and committees that not
only monitor but also train other departments regarding CSR-related questions and
create awareness of CSR issues (Maon, Lindgreen, and Swaen 2009). In addition, more 
structured and interrelated departments may deal with stakeholder issues more
successfully.
The next aspect unites the long-term strategic CSR plan with concrete actions. The CSR
content dimensions of economic, environmental, and social, which are derived from the 
guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), help structure and categorise CSR
strategies and actions. Cramer (2005) pointed out that the development of strategies and
the shaping of dimensions depend on factors such as size or corporate culture.
Galbreath (2006; 2009) emphasised the importance of integrating CSR into corporate
strategies by stating that several dimensions play a role when addressing CSR
strategically.
25 
The next aspect relates to monitoring and controlling of the CSR
approach. The authors recommended that MNCs measure their CSR approaches
against indicators of CSR audit systems, such as GRI (e.g. principles are human rights
and ecological and economic performance; GRI 2013), Eco-Management and Audit
Scheme (EMAS 2014), ISO26000, or the UNGC (2018). Some researchers proposed to
audit CSR activities together with experienced stakeholders (Gao and Zhang 2006;
Morimoto, Ash, and Hope 2005). The last aspect refers to the communication of CSR
activities to internal and external stakeholders (Burchell and Cook 2006).
The MNC’s CSR approach may be structured according to the three CSR dimensions,
economic, environmental and social, which form the criteria for the sustainability-
reporting framework GRI (2013) that is widely accepted among MNCs and institutions.
These dimensions are also the backbone of Elkington’s (1999) triple bottom line
approach that refers to the equal significance of economic, environmental, and social
objectives when aiming for sustainability. The economic dimension encompasses the 
effects of MNCs on the firm’s economic performance, market presence, and ‘economic







         
          
       
           
           
            
          
          
            
     
    
	
   
circumstances’ (Cramer 2005: 589) of stakeholders. It considers the MNC’s contribution
to the local community, the relationships with and involvement of employees and unions,
and the willingness to pay locally adapted minimum wages (Were 2003). Henderson
(2001) remarked that making profit is a social responsibility per se. The second
environmental element is about the firm’s effects along the supply chain and includes
the use of material, water, and energy and the way an MNC intends to measure the firm’s
consumption of these resources (GRI 2013). The social dimension refers to the MNC's 
effects on social systems. The GRI framework addresses this dimension extensively and
refers to categories such as labour practices, child labour, human rights assessment of
suppliers, and ‘freedom of association and collective bargaining’ (GRI 2013: 9).






   
    
         
       
         
     
          
          
          
    
           
      
          
          
       
       
          
        
        
        
      
         
          
          
        
         
         
        
         
      
   
           
         
3.3 Stakeholder Theories
3.3.1 Stakeholder Definition, Classification, and Relevance
Stakeholder theories may elucidate the way VWG approaches, interacts with, and 
perceives stakeholder pressure and may provide an understanding of how MNCs
manage the relationships with stakeholders and how stakeholders perceive their role 
and influence. In his influential work, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, 
Freeman defined stakeholders as ‘groups who can affect or are affected by the 
achievement of an organisation’s purpose’ (1984: 49). The book strongly contributed to
the understanding of how a company can form relationships with its external
environment. The publication created awareness among managers about the
importance of stakeholders when developing strategies and their contribution to a firm’s
success (Jones 1995; Laplume, Sonpar, and Litz 2008).
Donaldson and Preston (1995) argued that the stakeholder theory can be categorised
into three aspects: ‘normative’ refers to the moral rectitude and obligations of a 
company’s behaviour, ‘instrumental’ makes a ‘connection between stakeholder
approaches and commonly desired objectives such as profitability’ (Donaldson and
Preston 1995: 71), and ‘descriptive’ explains the actual corporate and managerial
behaviour. Freeman (1999: 234) questioned the usefulness of this ‘tripartite typology’. 
He criticised the distinction between descriptive and normative by arguing that the ‘idea
of a purely descriptive, value-free, or value-neutral stakeholder theory is a contradiction 
in terms’ (Freeman 1999: 234).
Clarkson (1995: 106) explained that stakeholders ‘have, or claim, ownership, rights, or
interests in a corporation and its activities’. Another explanation comes from Savage et
al. (1991: 61) who stated that stakeholders have ‘an interest in the actions of an 
organization and [...] the ability to influence it’. Freeman et al. (2010) observed that 
stakeholder theory considers not only the rights of shareholders but also those of
stakeholders to represent their interests towards the company, as the company ‘owes
morally significant non-fiduciary obligations’ (Lantos 2001: 604) to all stakeholders. 
Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar (2004) stated that the stakeholder theory is very much
about the company’s awareness about its purpose and the resulting responsibility and 
accountability, and the communication about the created value to their core 
stakeholders. Russo and Perrini (2009) suggested that the stakeholder theory is an





               
          
          
           
    
 




      
      
     
       
        
      
  
    
           
   
   
																																																						
            
          
       
         
               
          
level and quality of an MNC’s CSR approach is largely reflected in the relations with its
stakeholders. Figure 4 shows that companies should be aware of the nature of the stakes
(e.g. economic, political, and cultural), the stakeholders’ backgrounds, and whether they
are internal or external. That can be considered preparatory work before a firm classifies
or evaluates stakeholders in more detail.
Figure 4: MNC Stakeholders: Regional Extent and Environmental Factors
Source: Author
Authors classify stakeholders into different categorisations. Freeman (1984)
differentiated between internal and external stakeholders. Owners, customers, and 
employees are internal stakeholders, and governments, competitors, and the media are 
examples of external stakeholders. Clarkson (1995) differentiated between primary and 
secondary stakeholders.
26
In the same way, Carroll and Buchholtz (2015) separated
core, strategic, and environmental stakeholders. Lantos (2001) classified stakeholders 
into four levels: 
• the macro environment (society),
• the microenvironment in which the company is embedded, consisting of partners 
and financial stakeholders, for example, 
• the firm itself, and 
26
A firm cannot survive without its primary stakeholders such as ‘shareholders and investors, employees,
customers and suppliers’ (Clarkson 1995: 106), whereas secondary stakeholders, the media and social
interest groups, are not considered essential for the survival of the company. However, whether this
differentiation still makes sense is doubtful, considering that no MNC can afford to classify, for example,
NGOs as secondary stakeholders. However, the term ‘secondary stakeholder’ may be accurate, if it refers





    
           
      
         
      
         
     
   
           
           
           
           
              
     
          
      
         
           
       
        
            
      
     
            
          
             
       
          
         
           
      
           
• the level of family and friends of the firm. 
Steurer (2006: 56) distinguished the three perspectives within the stakeholder theory,
corporate, stakeholder and conceptual, as follows:
The corporate perspective focuses upon how corporations deal with
stakeholders, the stakeholder perspective analyses how stakeholders try
to influence corporations and the conceptual perspective explores how
particular concepts such as ‘the common good’ or sustainable 
development, relate to business-stakeholder interactions.
Therefore, the stakeholder perspective provides a lens through which the relationship
between NGOs and MNCs and the NGOs’ influence on the MNC may be analysed by
including the role of other relevant stakeholders, such as policy makers. The focus of
this work is on understanding how NGOs influence MNCs by examining their roles, 
perception, change of relationships, and, to a lesser extent, what kind of resources NGOs
have at their disposal to influence firm decisions.
Friedman and Miles (2002: 2) formulated the argument that stakeholder theory almost
exclusively focused on the ‘analysis of stakeholders from the perspective of the 
organisation’. Authors such as Frooman (1999) and Hendry (2005) applied the RDT; 
however, this thesis uses the stakeholder theory to understand the influence of NGOs
on MNCs and the overall interplay between these groups and policy makers. The work
considers Harrison and Freeman’s (1999: 484) demand, which has been repeated by
Frynas and Yamahaki (2016: 9) many years later, that research must develop a better
understanding of the ‘many differences within stakeholder groups…and fine-grained 
ideas about each’ of these groups.
While Figure 4 is a general classification of stakeholders and their geographical and
organisational backgrounds, it does not prioritise certain stakeholder groups. Scholars
provided various views on the importance that a company and its managers should give
to stakeholders. Clarkson (1995) remarked that companies should prioritise primary
stakeholders over secondary stakeholders. Ryan and Schneider (2003) stressed the
meaning of institutional investors, and Pajunen (2006) specified that a stakeholder’s
resources and network power are key criteria for the prioritisation of stakeholders.
Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) developed a more specific stakeholder typology to





         
          
         
           
         
         
        
          
        
      
       
         
         
           
          
          
      
             
          
            
           
           
       
        
   
powerful. Figure 5 illustrates these characteristics, which are relevant indicators for a 
company to determine the importance of certain stakeholders. Power relates to the
degree a stakeholder may influence the firm. The legitimacy attribute defines the claims
of a stakeholder without considering how much power a stakeholder holds. The extent
to which a company feels urgency and obligation to react to the needs of stakeholders
describes the urgency attribute. Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) warned of focusing only
on one of the stakeholders’ attributes and proposed that all three features should be 
considered when categorising a firm’s stakeholders. The authors referred to
stakeholders as definitive when they possess all three attributes: legitimate, urgent, and
powerful. Stakeholders that possess two attributes are called expectant, and 
stakeholders with a low salience are classified as latent stakeholders. Eesley and Lenox
(2006: 767) stated that salience results from the ‘stakeholder–request–firm triplet’.
Moreover, the authors determine the saliency of a stakeholder’s request according to the 
MNC’s actions and not the verbal or written affirmations of a stakeholder’s importance.
Driscoll and Starik (2004) proposed a fourth attribute to assess how relevant a 
stakeholder may be to a company and added the term ‘proximity’. The scholars stated
the hypothesis that a stakeholder is more important to a company when the proximity is
greater (e.g. the national government). Proximity also refers to the effect of the MNCs on 
the local environment. Driscoll and Starik (2004: 61) criticised the notion that managers
prioritise stakeholders, as that leads to the situation in which they ‘focus on short-term
economic results’, rather than on a long-term and sustainable orientation of their firm.
While there are various stakeholder models that categorise stakeholders in typologies
and classify them, stakeholder studies ‘often overlook the national and regional contexts






     
     
 
            
          
        
            
       
        
        
      
    
  
           
       
         
        
Figure 5: Stakeholder Typology
Source: Adopted from Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997: 872)
Several authors listed stakeholders that are most important for an MNC’s CSR approach.
Clarkson (1995) is among these scholars and summarised six groups of stakeholders 
(company, employees, shareholders, customers, suppliers, and public stakeholders),
whose concerns an MNC should incorporate into the firm’s CSR approach. Spiller (2000)
named community, environment, employees, customers, suppliers, and shareholders as 
the significant stakeholders that need to be considered by a company to be equally
successful on economic, social, and environmental levels. Henriques and Sadorsky
(1999) assessed the environmental literature and determined four CSR-relevant
stakeholder groups: regulatory stakeholders, organisational stakeholders, community
stakeholders, and the media.
Figure 6 shows the power-interest matrix (Mendelow 1991), in which the various CSR-
relevant stakeholders may be categorised. It proposes that companies should manage
their powerful stakeholders with great attention, such as shareholders, main suppliers,
regulators, and employees. Tokoro (2007) proposed that shareholders are among the
51 
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most important stakeholders regarding CSR, as they can influence and encourage
investments in CSR. For example, institutional investors or other shareholders that invest
in socially responsible investment funds ensure that CSR criteria play a role when
companies are evaluated.
Nowadays, discussions suggest that especially institutional shareholders are often 
among those who exert pressure on the firms’ management to follow CSR activities and
professional stakeholder management (Aguilera et al. 2007; López-Iturriaga and López-
de-Foronda 2011). López-Iturriaga and López-de-Foronda (2011) evaluated the data of 
more than 1,000 European MNCs and found that the influence of an MNC’s largest
shareholder on its CSR performance is greater if other (e.g. institutional) shareholders
can persuade the largest shareholder to insist that the company pursues CSR seriously.
Madsen and Ulhoi (2001: 81) stated that ‘regulation (secondary stakeholder) is still
perceived to be among the most influential stakeholders’. Fineman and Clarke (1996: 
729) indicated that stakeholders, such as green pressure groups, are ‘often taken
seriously in the planning and design of […] products and processes’. For de Bakker and
den Hond (2008: 8), ‘the influence of stakeholders over firms [is] the temporary outcome
of processes of action, reaction, and interaction among various parties’. Darnall, 
Henriques, and Sadorsky (2010) called for caution when evaluating the influence of 
stakeholders, as their study showed that the relationship between stakeholder pressure
and a company’s proactive environmental practices varies with firm size.
In the power-interest matrix in Figure 6, stakeholders that have a high influence but low
interest may be considered to be context setters that need to be treated carefully,
considering the legal and regulatory power of context setters, such as national
governments. The subjects are considered the stakeholders with low power and a high 
interest (e.g. smaller suppliers), ‘as they are subject to the power of others’ (Bryson 2011:
137). Stakeholders with low degrees of power and interest comprise the crowd, which
will be monitored. Maignan, Ferrell, and Ferrell (2005) proposed that stakeholder power
should be evaluated according to access to resources that are of high significance for
the company. Another crucial aspect is to understand to what extent the stakeholder
wealth depends on the success of the company. Furthermore, Maignan, Ferrell, and 
Ferrell (2005) suggested that companies communicate a definition of CSR that





        
            
        
       
       
       
      
            
          
         
              
        
        
       
      
      
        
         
              
           
   
 
Greenpeace can be considered an example of a powerful stakeholder (Friedman and
Miles 2006). In the early 1990s, Shell planned to sink an oil platform, and the NGO
successfully intervened by campaigning against the plan. Following Willer, Lovaglia, and 
Markovsky’s (1997: 573) definition of power: ‘structurally determined potential for
obtaining favoured payoffs in relations where interests are opposed’, some NGOs can
be considered powerful. For example, international organisations, such as the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International
Labour Organization (ILO), influence MNCs to adapt and comply with their standards.
Reed et al. (2009) criticised that the power-interest matrix provides little attention to
smaller interest groups and thereby isolates less powerful stakeholders. Another aspect
is that the matrix does not consider how stakeholders influence each other and how
organisations respond to that. Oliver (1991) coined the expression ‘stakeholder
multiplicity’ when trying to understand how organisations respond to institutional
(stakeholder) pressure. Neville and Menguc (2006: 377) emphasised the importance of 
understanding how stakeholders interact with each other and defined stakeholder
multiplicity as ‘the degree of multiple, conflicting, complimentary or cooperative 
stakeholder claims made to an organization’. Years before, Rowley (1997: 890) directed 
the focus on stakeholder networks by stating that ‘stakeholder relationships do not occur
in a vacuum of dyadic ties, but rather in a network of influences’. That means that firms
react on the interaction of aggregated stakeholder influence, rather than on the influence





   
         
       
             
           
         
       
           
         
           
               
        
           
             
          
            
         
         
       
Figure 6: Power-Interest Matrix
Source: Mendelow (1991) and Reed et al. (2009)
3.3.2 The Role of the Stakeholder NGO
Within the category of those stakeholders that are not directly involved in business
transactions, NGOs are widely recognised as one of MNCs’ key stakeholder groups
(Henriques and Sadorsky 1999; Spiller 2000). According to Clarkson’s (1995: 107)
definition, NGOs would be categorised as secondary stakeholders that are not ‘engaged 
in transactions with the corporation and are not essential for its survival’. Furthermore,
NGOs can be defined as formal and informal associations that do not belong to 
governmental or profit-making organisations. In Murphy and Bendell’s (1999: 6) words,
‘NGOs are civil society groups that have as their primary purpose the promotion of social
and/or environmental goals rather than the achievement of economic power in the 
marketplace or political power through the electoral process’. More than 20 years ago, 
Mathews (1997: 53) detected that ‘NGO’s role and influence have exploded in the last-
half decade’. For den Hond, de Bakker, and Doh (2015: 188), NGOs are ‘influential 
stakeholders of firms’. Even though NGOs play an increasingly important role in bringing
environmental and social issues on the agenda, they ‘remain poorly understood’ (Lyon
2010: 1). Moreover, various scholars noted that many stakeholder studies are primarily
from the corporate perspective and neglected the views of other stakeholders, such as 
54 
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NGOs (Burchell and Cook 2013; Camerra-Rowe and Egan 2010; Friedman and Miles
2002; Frooman 1999).
Moreover, NGOs distinguish themselves from other organisations, such as corporations 
and governmental or quasi-governmental bodies, by several features. The ownership 
structure, for example, is characterised by the non-profit orientation; therefore, there is
no ownership share. Moreover, donations and money that NGOs generate through 
services are usually ‘reinvested in the activities of the NGO’ (Schepers 2006: 284). In
addition, NGOs receive a great extent of their credibility and legitimacy due to their
independence. Although some might be funded by governmental organisations, NGOs
often act as independent actors outside of governmental influence (Fowler 1992). Unlike
corporations, NGOs are usually less accountable to their stakeholders, considering that
the organisations’ ‘performance is more difficult to measure’ (Rivera-Santos and Rufin
2010: 57). Even though there are significant differences among NGOs and MNCs, 
Scherer and Palazzo (2007: 1109) stated that NGOs have the ‘same legitimacy problems 
as corporations’, as they understand themselves as representatives of the citizens
without being democratically legitimised. Moreover, both actors ‘try to influence […]
political decision making’ (Scherer and Palazzo 2007: 1109).
It is difficult to generalise the role of NGOs considering that NGOs range from ‘aid 
provider to government advocate’ (Schepers 2006: 283). In their analysis on the
perception of the role of NGOs in firms’ CSR approaches, Arenas, Lozano, and Albareda 
(2009) found that NGOs are widely recognised as drivers of CSR. Similarly, Burchell and
Cook (2008; 2013) and Kaptein and van Tulder (2003) stated that NGOs create (public) 
pressure that leads MNCs to engage in CSR practices. However, at the same time,
Arenas, Lozano, and Albareda’s (2009) research showed that the NGOs’ legitimacy is
questioned by companies and unions who are described as reluctant to accept the
NGOs’ role as judges of CSR. For some companies, NGO pressure was an incentive for
entities to create their own (industry) standards (see Sasser et al. 2006). Moreover, there
are concerns that NGOs do not always understand the negative effects of their
interventions on businesses. A common accusation is that NGOs lack ‘knowledge of
business issues’ (Arenas, Lozano, and Albareda 2009: 183) and therefore overestimate
the importance of their own role. 
However, scholars increasingly indicate that the NGOs’ role in the interaction with MNCs





       
          
     
        
        
      
        
  
         
   
         
     
     
            
       
    
               
       
           
            
         
             
          
         
           
        
            
          
        
         
     
     
level of professionalism is required for NGOs to influence the interaction effectively. In a 
study of ten NGOs, Ählström and Sjöström (2005: 238) divided these CSOs into 
preservers, protesters, modifiers, and scrutinisers. The preservers are described to be 
the only group that ‘have a strategy of engaging in partnerships with business’ (Ählström
and Sjöström 2005: 230). The following are the explanations to these four
categorisations (Ählström and Sjöström 2005: 237-239):
• Preservers: ‘The ones whose goals are not inherently conflicting with joint action 
with business’.
• Protesters: These groups apply ‘protest and campaigns’ to exert (tactical)
influence on MNCs.
• Modifiers: Organisations that ‘change corporate behaviour through tactics such
as demonstrations, publications, public appeals and thought-provoking 
scenarios’ and can be considered less confrontational than protesters.
• Scrutinisers: ‘It is in the interest and nature of this group to not engage in
corporate collaboration, since independence is a prerequisite to their activities’.
Yaziji and Doh (2009: 6) distinguished between ‘self-benefiting’ and ‘other-benefiting’
NGOs. The main interest of self-benefiting NGOs is to take care of their members as
much as possible. Unions are an example of self-benefiting groups. Other-benefiting 
NGOs intend to serve the interests of others. Greenpeace or Amnesty International are 
examples of these NGOs. For Mühle (2010: 231), there are three categories of NGOs’
CSR involvement: first, ‘there are developers of CSR who bring topics and methods to 
the agenda, second, there are the diffusers of CSR who issue guidelines’ and third, there
are the enablers of CSR who ‘provide consultancy services for actually integrating CSR
into business decisions’. Mühle (2010) classified Greenpeace as a developer and takes
TI as an example of diffusers and enablers. The author considered especially the last
category to be NGOs that were drivers of the CSR movement.
Rieth and Göbel (2005: 249) described NGOs differently and offered a continuum in
which the NGO attitudes towards MNCs extend from cooperative to confrontational, with
‘positive’ being the most cooperative and ‘hostile’ being the most confrontational attitude:
• Positive: Dialogue and strategies to convince the partner;
• Benevolent: Demand for codices;





    
     
         
            
          
    
       
            
  
       
     
        
         
         
          
 
        
             
        
        
          
          
              
    
         
              
           
           
           
         
          
• Wary/distrustful: Court actions; and
• Hostile: Call for boycott.
Considering that the MNC-NGO interaction is insufficiently understood without
examining how NGOs involve and influence the government, it is important to examine
Clark’s (1992) work. According to the author, NGOs have three choices regarding how
to influence and form relationships with the state:
• Opposing the state ‘using whatever channels are available to frustrate any
governmental plan’ (Clark 1992: 152), which may be detrimental to the interests
of society;
• Complementing the state by filling gaps that government services create; and
• Reforming the state by helping departments to improve services and policies.
In addition, Teegen (2003: 273) argued that international NGOs have gained a significant
role ‘as informal institutions that complement, and often supplant, formal institutions in 
creating more effective environments for private and public sector actors to interact in’. 
Moreover, the NGOs’ role is described to protect ‘public and collective goods’ (Teegen
2003: 275).
The literature describes further approaches used by NGOs to exert pressure on MNCs,
governments, and other groups. For example, Sasser et al. (2006) found in their study
on the forestry sector that MNCs feel the pressure of NGOs responding to them to 
legitimate their business operations. However, the companies’ response was the
creation of their own standards, showing their commitment towards societal issues, while
they refused to become members of the NGOs’ initiatives by accepting their terms.
Therefore, the normative pressure of NGOs led to a reaction and influenced the firms’
behaviour, though not in the desired way.
When describing NGO pressure, Murphy and Bendell (1999) and Sullivan (2006: 413)
spoke of civil regulation that refers to the notion that ‘NGOs exert pressure on companies
to address the social or environmental impacts of their activities or operations’. Sullivan
(2006) stated that, among the activities that influence the ‘civil regulation’ strategy are 1)
damaging a company’s reputation, 2) lobbying for regulation on a political level, and 3)
involving actors, such as investors, to put pressure on corporations. Similarly, according





        
 
            
         
        
         
      
              
          
              
             
           
          
             
 
         
            
         
       
           
         
         
       
          
           
       
          
           
         
        
         
               
       
pressure in the Western world. For Spar and La Mure (2003: 81), successful NGOs are 
able to ‘threaten the firm with significant harm’.
Frooman (1999) conceptualised the various strategies for a stakeholder to influence a
firm and differentiated among direct/indirect ‘withholding’ (stakeholder is not dependent
on firm) and direct/indirect ‘usage’ (stakeholder is dependent on firm) strategies. The
‘withholding’ strategy refers to the influence that is exerted by a stakeholder in
withholding a key resource. The threat of withholding a resource may have a similar
effect to the actual execution of the strategy. However, the credibility of the threat also
depends on whether the NGO may ‘simply walk away from the relationship with no harm
to itself’ (Frooman 1999: 197). In other words, such a threat becomes more credible if
the NGO does not rely on the company’s resources. An example of the withholding
strategy is that an NGO terminates the dialogue to influence an MNC’s decision
regarding a product that would need to be modified. An example is NABU’s withdrawal
from the formal corporation with VWG at the end of 2015, as the NGO withheld resources
to exert pressure on VWG. 
The ‘usage’ strategy refers to the supply of a resource under certain conditions. Taking 
the same example, the NGO might continue the dialogue but only if the MNC is willing
to discuss the modification of the product. In other words, ‘withholding strategies
determine whether a firm obtains a resource, whereas usage strategies seek to attach 
conditions to the continued supply of that resource’ (Frooman 1999: 197). This statement
reflects the resource-dependent perspective, stating that the use and possession of 
resources determines the exerted power in a relationship and might contribute to explain 
why certain stakeholder-MNC relationships have an asymmetric power dynamic.
Several authors based their studies on Frooman’s (1999) stakeholder influence typology. 
For example, Hendry’s (2005) study with four ENGOs showed the complexity of
understanding the effectiveness of individual strategies. It is often not clearly measurable
and traceable that a certain influence strategy was effective or whether the multiplicity of
strategies led to an effect on the targeted company. According to the author, this
complexity is often not reflected in existing stakeholder influence models (e.g. Frooman
1999), which neglect, among others, the effects of NGO alliances and contextual
situations, such as crises (Pajunen 2006). Corporations tend to react to pressure if they
have a reason to believe that an NGO does have the power and resources to put the





         
               
          
        
      
          
            
         
           
         
              
        
           
            
               
     
          
    
 
           
         
        
          
            
              
   
          
         
            
        
           
         
               
potential to affect outcomes and actual use of that power’ (Pajunen 2006: 1263). For an
NGO to be able to influence MNCs’ CSR behaviour, that means it is important that they
prove that they possess the resources to implement one of the strategies mentioned
above or at least convincingly suggest having the resources to do so.
Hendry (2005: 97) listed various factors that influence the NGOs’ decision for choosing 
an influence strategy selection. Among these are the experience and expertise with a
strategy, the opportunity to use a strategy, the ‘bang for the buck’ of a strategy (cost
benefit considerations), and the involvement of potential allies (type, number, strength,
and ability). Sasser et al. (2006: 4) identified three approaches regarding ‘how NGO
activity influences actors other than states or inter-governmental regimes’. Direct
targeting describes the ways in which NGOs try to influence a company directly, whereas
indirect targeting encompasses ‘generalised campaigns against all firms, or a large 
group of firms, within the same industry’ (Sasser et al. 2006: 4). The third approach by
which NGOs exercise influence is supply chain targeting, which includes campaigns that
aim at ‘a firm’s producers or consumers’ (Sasser et al. 2006: 4) with a focus on bigger
names at the downstream of the supply chain. Yaziji and Doh (2009: 58) consider NGO
campaigns to be a form of ‘normative delegitimation – the process by which an
organisation’s normative legitimacy is diminished through challenges by outside
organisations’.
Peloza and Falkenberg (2009: 98) listed strategic factors for CSR collaboration
strategies between NGO and companies. In the ‘1-focused contribution’ a single firm and 
a single NGO collaborate. The authors stated that the benefits of these collaborations
are possibilities for firms to focus on specific projects and communicate with the NGO
more effectively. The risks are that the MNC might exert ‘undue influence over [an] NGO’
or could be tempted ‘to focus only on PR [Public Relations] aspects’ (Peloza and
Falkenberg 2009: 98).
Keck and Sikkink (1998) investigated transnational advocacy networks to understand
how these groups, of which NGOs play a key role, exert influence and achieve their
goals. The authors approached the topic from an international relations and social
movement theoretical perspective rather than from a business-stakeholder theoretical
lens. However, their findings proved to be useful, as these allow more differentiated
understanding of the dynamics and complexity of NGO influence. Keck and Sikkink





           
            
             
         
    
          
          
           
       
 
        
       
           
        
      
         
      
            
         
   
          
            
            
         
        
          
             
            
    
         
          
      
   
success for politically active advocacy network groups and NGOs. They also refer to
these stages as ‘goal achievement at several levels’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 24).
I. Issue creation and agenda setting (Stage 1): NGOs create the awareness of a
problem by providing information and by pointing out the urgency of a problem.
Thus, they can put this on the political or corporate agenda, which may be one
measure to judge NGO success/influence (Brühl 2003). Applied to companies,
it is a first positive step for NGOs that companies become aware of an issue.
That can be reflected in a company’s CSR report or website. A company might 
perceive the issue as such if it has the potential to become a reputational
problem.
II. Influence on discursive positions (Stage 2): NGOs influence organisational or
institutional actors in a way that these change their positions in the discussion,
and companies follow the NGOs’ line. Greenwashing might be an issue here
considering that companies may adopt the rhetoric of NGOs without
implementing the required changes within the firm.
III. Influence on institutional procedures (Stage 3): The third step is about the
formal change of company policies. An example is the implementation of codes 
of conduct or CSR principles (Curbach 2008: 377). However, there is also the
possibility in this stage that formal CSR engagement may be decoupled from 
fundamental organisational changes.
IV. Influence on policy change (Stage 4) on ‘target actors’: NGOs influence
governments or companies in that these do not ‘change their positions, but to
hold them to their word’, which is more likely ‘when the first three types or
stages of impact have occurred’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 26).
V. Influence on behaviour (Stage 5): Companies change their behaviour based on 
NGO influence (e.g. implementation of CSR practices within the company).
Besides these five stages of NGO goal achievement and successful influence, Keck and
Sikkink (1998: 25) developed a typology of four tactics with which NGOs garner
influence, exert pressure, and persuade actors.
1. Information politics: dissemination of information about an issue or cause;
2. Symbolic politics: use of symbolic stories to reach higher resonance;
3. Leverage politics: calling upon powerful actors to exert influence on the target 





        
 
               
           
          
          
       
  
       
      
      
        
         
        
            
         
        
             
        
           
           
          
      
         
       
        
  
       
             
       
          
4. Accountability politics: holding actors to their previously stated policies or
principles.
Winston (2002) stated that the view of NGOs on CSR in general determines their tactics
and strategies when approaching MNCs. He roughly differentiated two types of NGOs:
the NGOs that believe that voluntary CSR practices bring change more effectively and
those that see coercion as the only reason that MNCs follow CSR practices. The first
group perceives threats as more effective than actual binding laws and regulations.
These NGOs tend to be more cooperative than the ones who perceive ‘voluntary codes
mainly as corporate propaganda’ (Winston 2002: 77).
3.3.3 MNC-NGO Stakeholder Interaction and Dialogue
Stakeholder dialogue and stakeholder interaction are forms of the broader term
‘stakeholder relationship’. In the literature, the expression ‘stakeholder dialogue’ has
been clearly defined, unlike the term ‘stakeholder interaction’, which can be defined as 
the exchange of information between stakeholders and the ‘mutual influence’ of the
parties involved. However, it does not describe the quality of the exchange, whereas
stakeholder dialogue assumes that there is a willingness of the stakeholder to engage 
constructively. However, the expression ‘stakeholder interaction’ will be used,
considering that the NGO-MNC relationship often does not meet the criteria of a
dialogue. A conceptual distinction will follow within this section.
The CSR stakeholder dialogue can be understood as a medium for the ‘exchange of
[CSR offerings] between the firm and stakeholders’ (Murray and Vogel 1997: 142) and 
may be used to share information, stimulate change and transparency. Thereby, 
[the] exchange is one in which the firm offers something of value (typically 
a social benefit or public service) to an important constituency and, in turn,
anticipates receiving the approval and support of key individuals and/or
socio-political groups in its environment. (O’Riordan and Fairbrass 2008:
748)
For Pedersen (2006: 141), ‘as a participatory idea, the stakeholder dialogue should 
include the important groups and individuals who affect and/or are affected by the
decision on the issue in question’. Other academics consider the stakeholder dialogue





      
    
          
              
            
        
          
      
           
         
      
             
        
         
         
    
       
      
      
              
              
   
               
            
         
    
             
      
           
             
              
   
2013) and an instrument to obtain different perspectives on company innovations
(Ayuso, Rodriguez, and Ricart 2006).
Scholars have written about various reasons MNCs engage into a stakeholder dialogue
and why it is important for both the stakeholder and MNC. For example, there is pressure
coming from stakeholders to engage in a dialogue, as the insight that the dialogue can
provide is a means to reach CSR objectives, and it contributes to a mutual understanding 
of the different parties’ views (Kaptein and van Tulder 2003). Kaptein and van Tulder
(2003) formulated ten preconditions for an effective stakeholder dialogue: knowing each 
other and common areas of interest, trust and reliability, clear rules for the dialogue, 
coherent vision on the dialogue, dialogue skills, expertise in the subject matter, clear
dialogue structure, valid information as a basis, consecutive meetings, and feedback of 
results. Refer to Table 2 for more information on the MNC-NGO stakeholder dialogue
including types, drivers, and selection of dialogue partners.
The literature on stakeholder dialogue deals mainly with the firms’ perspective on the 
stakeholder interaction. For example, Pedersen (2006) listed four factors of
operationalisation that are important to create a successful stakeholder dialogue: 
commitment, consciousness, capacity, and consensus. Commitment refers to the MNC’s
willingness to ‘give priority and allocate resources to a certain issue’ (Pedersen 2006:
155). This aspect also includes the MNC’s motivation to involve high-ranking
management staff in the dialogue, which usually shows that a topic or dialogue is of
relevance for the company and that it is willing to include the results in day-to-day
business activities.
Capacity relates to the resources that the company is willing to make available for the
stakeholder interaction. Bigger companies usually have a higher budget for dialogue and
CSR activities; however, it does not say much about whether the corporation is seriously
committed to investing these resources into a more sustainable core product. 
That depends, among others, on the next pillar, consciousness, which refers to the
awareness of the selection of topics and whether these are integrated into the firm’s
overall strategies. Pedersen (2006: 154) explained it in the following way:
‘Consciousness is closely related to values, and the stakeholder dialogue must be an






             
     
       
          
        
            
             
            
          
           
          
       
             
           
       
        
       
          
        
            
          
          
   
          
             
            
        
           
   
          
            
         
       
The last factor is ‘consensus’, which can be considered ‘the degree to which the
organization and the stakeholders agree on their perceptions of the issues in question 
and the relevance of dialogue more generally’ (Pedersen 2006: 154). Even though
instruments and factors of successful dialogues are well-known, ‘little detail has been
generated’ on how dialogues lead to tangible outcomes (Burchell and Cook 2006: 213).
It is very unlikely that there is a productive dialogue with the firm’s stakeholders if the
MNC fails in one of these factors of operationalisation. Pedersen (2006) created a model
inspired by Olesen’s publication on strategic issues management (1995) on the various
stages of the stakeholder dialogue. It includes filters, such as selection, interpretation,
and response, which influence the outcome of the stakeholder dialogue. According to
van Huijstee and Glasbergen (2008: 299), the ‘ideal stakeholder dialogue – one that
promotes fundamental learning and creativity – is fairly well understood’.
However, the authors identified the need to do more empirical research to understand
whether there is a transition from dialogues that are mainly profit oriented (‘functional
orientation’) towards a sustainability-oriented dialogue. Van Huijstee and Glasbergen
(2008: 301) separated the stakeholder management literature on stakeholder dialogue
practices in the sustainability model and the strategic management model. In the first,
the stakeholder dialogue serves as a sustainability instrument. A company uses the
stakeholder dialogue actively for its CSR approach, creates learning, and clearly links
the firm’s activities to the topics discussed in the dialogue. In the strategic management
model, the firm’s main intention is to minimise risks and obtain business advantages by
engaging in stakeholder dialogue with an NGO. Both types describe the ideal models for
stakeholder dialogue.
Kaptein and von Tulder (2003: 210) observed two different stakeholder interactions: the 
stakeholder dialogue that is shaped by the firm’s interest in creating a win-win situation
and aligning goals with the partners and the stakeholder debate in which, for example, 
one partner tries to win the argument over the other in a rather destructive way. For
Veldhuizen, Blok, and Dentoni (2013: 116), an open corporate culture is required to
engage successfully in a stakeholder dialogue.
There are scholars who emphasise the positive effects of the stakeholder dialogue,
namely, that it leads to more sustainable actions of MNCs, legitimises the spending of 
corporate and stakeholder resources, and follows the trend that corporations involve





              
     
     
           
        
           
         
       
  
          
         
                 
       
           
              
         
    
        
             
         
            
        
       
       
          
  
             
           
           
         
            
        
       
2006). However, there are also studies that show that an increasing number of ‘NGOs
have already decided to no longer participate due to what they perceive as the 
unwillingness of companies to engage in meaningful dialogue and the use of
engagement processes as more of a ‘“tick box” CSR exercise’ (Burchell and Cook 2008:
45). This behaviour has led to the situation in which NGOs often do not perceive the 
interaction with MNCs as a dialogue but as a ‘one-sided “monologue” initiated and
controlled by the organisation’ (Jonker and Nijhof 2006: 457). A promising CSR 
stakeholder interaction then becomes a dissemination via CSR and sustainability reports
that does not include the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
Burchell and Cook (2013: 517) added that ‘a growing process of “dialogue fatigue” is
evident as NGOs find themselves inundated with requests to engage in processes that,
in many cases, prove to be little more than a talking shop’. According to Jonker and Nijhof
(2006: 458), the stakeholder dialogue is ‘guided and shaped by a confrontation of
different world-views, risks and interests’. Therefore, the success of the dialogue and
interaction depends on the type of relationship and how both actors perceive each other.
For example, Onkila (2011) differentiated the following four types of MNC-stakeholder
relationships in environmental management: power-based relationships, collaborative 
relationships, conflicting relationships, and one-sided contribution relationships. In a
collaborative relationship, the actors intend to engage at eye level. Table 3 lists the
different MNC-stakeholder relationships and provides more detailed information on the
role of the stakeholder and the described relationship. Even though, Onkila (2011) refers
to relationships in environmental management, the author’s differentiation of MNC-
stakeholder relationships may be applicable for discussions on topics within the other
CSR dimensions social and economic. It provides important insight considering that
managers ‘should be able to manage differences in stakeholder relationships’ (Onkila 
2011: 391).
A reason many stakeholder dialogues among VWG and NGOs do not lead to a
successful direction might not only be that NGOs do not understand the business and
the pressure that VWG may experience from other stakeholders but also that the MNCs
and NGOs have different objectives. Pedersen (2006: 157) stated that it is a ‘precondition 
for successful dialogue that there is an element of goal congruence, allowing the
participants to develop shared perspectives on common problems, questions, and





          
   
         
           
      
        
        
       
        
           
        
       
     






















especially companies, deny NGOs’ legitimation, as ‘NGOs’ criticisms often result from
lack of knowledge’.
A closer form of stakeholder interactions is NGO-MNC partnerships and cooperation.
Partnerships can be attractive for an MNC for several reasons. For example, it may
benefit from the NGO’s legitimacy and credibility and thereby compensate for
reputational deficits (Curbach 2008; den Hond, de Bakker, and Doh 2015). Moreover,
corporations may cooperate with NGOs to take advantage of their environmental
expertise and experience, consulting services (Utting 2005), and ‘linkages to other
societal stakeholders’ (so-called strategic bridges; Stafford, Polonsky, and Hartmann
2000: 122). However, for NGOs, a partnership can be a double-edged sword. On one 
hand, NGOs have to face the danger of losing legitimacy (Hartman, Hofman, and 
Stafford 1999) and might forfeit autonomy and their strength to exercise criticism on the 
partner. On the other hand, the organisations have the chance to exert more influence 




       
       
 
    
 
 
    
  
   





     
 




     
 
   
    
   
  










   
    
 
    
 
     
 
  
    
    
     
   
 
     
 
   
  
   
   






   
     
    
     
 
 
      
   
   
  
Table 2: MNC-NGO Stakeholder Dialogue: Drivers, Selection, Types, and Influence
Entities Drivers Selection of dialogue topics and
partners
Stakeholder dialogue: types, influence and tactics
MNC • Avoiding negative reputational
and financial consequences;
• Keeping licence to operate;





(Van Huijstee and Glasbergen 2008:
301)
• Based on issue matrix: high
probability of occurrence and high 
impact • initiation of stakeholder
dialogue will be considered;
• Based on power, urgency, and 
legitimacy typology.








(Van Huijstee and Glasbergen 2008: 303)
NGO • Influencing business practice;
• Representing their organisation
and members’ interests;
• Retaining legitimacy;
• Gaining a better understanding of
the different sides of the debate;
The selection is based on:
• Prospect of success;
• Certainty about MNCs’ ‘genuine 
motivations and that their CSR
policies impact on their main 
business’







• Achieving better outcomes
through partnerships.
(Burchell and Cook 2008: 39)
• Litigation
• Boycott
• Lobbying (to legislators)
Factors for lobbying:
• NGO wants ‘changes [to] become permanent across industry’
• NGO ‘cannot identify any economic benefits to firms as result
of voluntarily making desired changes’ (Hendry 2005: 97)
Tactics:
• Writing letters/emails, shareholder activism, negative publicity 
• ‘symbolic damage’ as intended outcome

















   
    
 















   
  
  
   
   
   
 
 




    
 
  




    
     
  
    
Table 3: Four Types of MNC-Stakeholder Relationships in Environmental Management










actors possess power over
the corporation and define






Positioning the corporation as a contributor to societal



















actions and possess the 
power to do so 




Those social actors who 
have legitimate 
environmental interests
in the corporation and
the environment itself
Actors to whose wellbeing and environmental action the 
corporation contributes positively 




   
           
           
      
           
      
  
       
      
           
      
         
          
       
  
         
         
        
        
        
            
             
       
             
            
        
       
      
          
        
          
3.4 Summary and Research Objectives
The literature review provided contextual understanding and relevant insight for this
research. The sections on CSR aimed to illustrate how companies approach social
responsibility and what the interconnections are between the CSR and stakeholder
literature. In addition, CSR concepts play an integral role in understanding the content
and features of the stakeholder relationships and dialogues between businesses and 
NGOs.
This chapter introduced the different CSR concepts and a systematic approach to 
CSR and emphasised the importance of integrating the economic, environmental, and 
social dimensions into a company’s business strategies. An MNC’s strategic CSR
approach is usually shaped by a thorough understanding of its stakeholders.
Therefore, the notions of Husted and Salazar (2006), McElhaney (2009), and Porter
and Kramer (2006) of strategic and integrative CSR will be considered in later
chapters, when data on the mechanisms of NGO influence are presented and 
discussed.
This conceptualisation of strategic CSR deserves consideration, as companies with
an integrative CSR approach gain their ‘licence to operate’ by claiming that they
consider stakeholders’ concerns and expectations. Therefore, these papers and other
associated works by these authors have informed the understanding of stakeholder
concepts, considering that strategic CSR encompasses stakeholder interactions,
which allow NGOs to contribute to the CSR approach of an MNC (Figure 3). However,
this work will show that there is a certain discrepancy between the NGOs’ perceptions
and those of an MNC that claims to follow a strategic CSR approach.
Stakeholder theory is the theoretical lens of this study and explains who can affect or
be affected by the actions of an MNC and explains the role and expectations of
stakeholders. Thus, this chapter shows that there are numerous stakeholder
classifications and theories that state the relevance and influence of stakeholders
(e.g. Mendelow 1991; Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997). 
Moreover, the contributions of Frooman (1999) and Hendry (2005) are noteworthy
and play a role when investigating the direct and indirect approaches of the influence





         
    
            
        
        
          
           
        
          
             
           
           
          
           
        
          
           
         
      
         
  
        
      
       
           
         
         
     
            
        
     
      
            
campaigns. Indirect influence is usually exerted via more powerful actors, such as the
government, courts, or investors.
Unlike Frooman’s (1999) and Hendry’s (2005) approach, this study does not apply
the RDT that categorises stakeholder influence approaches according to the use of
resources. However, Frooman’s (1999) model and Hendry’s (2005) refinements are 
significant for this study, as these improve the understanding of how NGOs exert
influence. For example, Frooman (1999) stated that indirect influence approaches are
more promising if stakeholders, such as NGOs, have less power than MNCs. 
Therefore, it becomes essential for NGOs to seek more powerful allies.
Equally important to this research are Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) five stages of NGO
goal achievement and their typology of four tactics. These stages range from ‘issue
creation and agenda setting’ (Stage 1) to ‘influence on behaviour’ (Stage 5). The five
types of influence and the different tactics (e.g. information and leverage politics)
contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics and complexity of NGO
influence. Moreover, Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) approach provides valuable insight
on the efficacy of NGO influence on an MNC’s CSR approach and proved to be useful
when analysing how NGOs achieve partial successes. The insight gained from these
scholars enhanced this study, as these informed the interview questions by
understanding the various direct and indirect influence methods and contributed to
the formation of the data structure and to the underlying dynamics of the stakeholder
influence mechanisms.
The review of the literature also showed that scholars agree on the ingredients of an 
effective MNC-NGO stakeholder dialogue. However, due to a possible lack of
understanding of each other’s positions, discussions about the stakeholder dialogues
show a certain degree of dissent regarding the efficacy of this direct influence method. 
Relevant stakeholder dialogue concepts were presented and inform the
understanding of how NGOs influence MNCs in direct interactions (e.g. Kaptein and
van Tulder’s (2003) factors of operationalisation).
A salient and intriguing aspect from the stakeholder literature came from Burchell and
Cook (2013), which questions the efficacy of dialogue among NGOs and MNCs. The 
authors stated that there is a certain saturation among NGOs to engage in dialogue
due to the perception that this instrument does not lead to sustainable changes in the 





            
         
              
        
        
          
       
        
       
          
         
         
             
         
          
        
        
     
             
        
          
            
     
               
       
              
        
       
             
             
 
            
         
of NGOs and corporate representatives about the quality and content of their
dialogue. It thereby paved the way for understanding that individual influence
instruments may not be as effective as the exertion of a multiplicity of instruments.
While influence instruments such as stakeholder dialogues, campaigns, and AGMs
have been well researched, the review also identified a gap within the stakeholder
literature, to which this study responds, namely, that the integration of contextual
factors has often been neglected in stakeholder studies (Arenas, Lozano, and 
Albareda 2009). This thesis will show that the context, such as the tight 
interconnections between policy makers and MNCs and an organisational crisis, plays
a decisive role. Therefore, the first research objective aims to examine the
development and chronology of VWG’s Dieselgate scandal, and the German political
institutional context. Building on that, the second research objective explores the
influence of NGOs on a MNC’s CSR approach in Germany in the context of a crisis.
Therefore, it draws from Frooman’s (1999) work on direct and indirect influence
approaches and Hendry’s (2005) insight that the NGO influence indicates a degree 
of complexity that is hardly depicted in existing influence categorisations. This study
also builds on Hendry’s (2005) recommendation to conduct further research to
understand NGOs’ motives for pursuing influence tactics.
The literature review revealed that the role and influence of the stakeholder group
NGO are under researched (Lyon 2010). Moreover, several scholars stated that there 
is a lack of studies that consider the perspective of stakeholders, such as NGOs 
(Burchell and Cook 2013; Camerra-Rowe and Egan 2010; Friedman and Miles 2002;
Frooman 1999). Thus, the third research objective is to understand the perception of 
NGOs on their role and influence on a major MNC’s CSR approach in the context of
Dieselgate. The literature shows that there is an ambivalence regarding the 
perception of the role of NGOs. On one hand, NGOs are recognised as the drivers of
CSR and watchtowers of MNCs’ sustainability approaches. However, on the other
hand, there is a certain discontent of the NGOs with the quality of the interaction with 
MNCs and the outcomes of the dialogues. Further, NGOs perceive a misfit between
the number of dialogues with MNCs and the achieved results (Burchell and Cook
2013).
The next chapter will discuss the methodological framework of the thesis by





         
         
          
 	 	
provides information on the selected case-study method, the data collection approach
with semi-structured interviews as the main method, a list of interviews and 
organisations, and explanations about the various steps in which the collected data



























    
  
            
       
         
          
         
      
    
              
         
      
          
          
            
     
  
       
        
         
         
    
 
             
       
       
          
       
            
         
          
         
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the methodology that underlies the thesis and tools that were
used to answer the research questions to solve the research problem. Methodology
denotes philosophical assumptions that motivate the study, while methods refer to
specific techniques to collect the required data (Bryman and Bell 2015). The chosen
methodology decides how the researcher understands the investigated phenomenon
and influences the way data are collected. Methodology is therefore of great importance
to reach the aims of the research project.
This chapter starts with a short overview on research philosophies and reflections on the
methodology, followed by the introduction of the case-study approach containing
relevant research questions and data collection methods. The section on data collection 
includes a brief chronology of the events that were relevant for the project, a list of 
interviews and stakeholder groups, and an interview guide. Thereafter, the analysis of
the data that includes the structure of the collected data will be presented. Reflections
on validity and reliability complete Chapter 4.
4.2 Research Philosophies and Methodological Reflections
There has been an ongoing discussion among scholars about the advantages and
values of qualitative and quantitative methods. The researcher is well advised to 
understand how mixed-method approaches complement each other, rather than seeing
them as ‘competing perspectives’ (Katsirikou and Skiadas 2010: 13). Differences
between the qualitative and quantitative research approaches are that the steps in the
qualitative process are more interlinked and theory-driven than in the quantitative method 
(Flick 2014). That means that, in a qualitative study, there is a ‘back and forth’ to collect 
and analyse data, and theories are developed while working in the field (Flick 2014: 91-
94). The previously described interweaving of qualitative steps solidifies the process of
understanding to a larger extent than might be possible in linear designs. This increases
the complexity and the inclusion of context, which also influences the researcher’s
position that is ideally open for new and surprising insight. In quantitative studies, the 
starting point is often a theoretical framework that has been created before the
researcher enters the field following a linear research procedure, unlike the rather 
circular orientation of qualitative research. The hypotheses derived from the theoretical






            
        
         
        
           
          
        
         
            
         
          
      
        
    
       
        
           
            
         
        
          
       
         
           
    
            
            
         
          
         
          
         
The differences between the two research methods may be reflected in the
epistemological and ontological research positions (Flick 2014). Ontology is ‘concerned
with [the] nature of reality’ (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2007: 108) and epistemology
describes ‘forms of knowledge and ways of accessing it’ (Morgan and Symon 2004: 28).
Guba and Lincoln (1994: 107) stated that it is more important to understand what the
paradigm or ‘world view’ of the research will be than the actual method. Sale, Lohfeld,
and Brazil (2002: 44) specified that the ‘quantitative paradigm is based on positivism’,
whereas the qualitative paradigm is built on interpretivism (Howe and Eisenhart 1990).
Positivistic research tends to be ‘undertaken […] in a value-free way’ (Saunders, Lewis,
and Thornhill 2007: 103) with outcomes, which ‘can be law-like generalisations’
(Remenyi et al. 1998: 32). Whereas, the interpretivistic approach to research
emphasises the meaning of the human in the process of gaining knowledge (Sarantakos
2013). It focuses on producing ‘deep, interpretive understandings of social phenomena’
(Klenke 2016: 23).
The research philosophies of objectivism and subjectivism are derived from the 
ontological position. Objectivism is concerned with social entities that exist outside of the 
reality of social players (Bryman and Bell 2015). Subjectivism deals with the perception
and consequent actions of social actors. The locus subjectivism refers to a worldview
that is constructed by individuals who create the reality that surrounds them (Ratner
2002). The subjectivist paradigm assumes that the historical, cultural, and economic
environment shape the actors. Daly (2007: 23) emphasised that there is no objectivity
as the ‘inquirer is always shaping the direction and outcome of the inquiry’. Ratner (2002)
stated that researchers working from a subjective, qualitative position do not exclude
objectivity per se, presuming that the inquirer is aware of that and reflects on values that 
could enhance an objective conception.
The lack of objectivity and standardised schemes when collecting data are often
mentioned in literature when scholars state the main criticisms that quantitatively working
researchers express towards qualitative research (Klenke 2016). However, (qualitative)
researchers state that this is a pseudo problem, considering that the researcher’s own 
objectivity is not a disruptive factor but an integral part of the researcher’s understanding 
of processes (Klenke 2016; Sarantakos 2013). Furthermore, Corbin and Strauss (2015)





         
        
            
    
           
     
         
         
         
      
           
          
         
         
              
     
              
             
   
    
   
            
         
            
       
        
         
      
       
          
           
        
    
the ideological discussions about subjectivity and objectivity are not helpful, as the
expressions are ‘loaded with negative connotations and subject to acrimonious debate’.
This research is inspired by a subjectivist ontological position following an interpretivist
epistemological approach with a qualitative research design that understands reality
from the perspective of the interviewee/participant. It is based on the interpretative
understanding that there is an ‘underlying pattern and order within the social world’
(Morgan 1980: 609). The qualitative research approach offers extensive ‘context-bound’
information that enables the researcher to obtain a ‘thick description of a phenomenon’
(Klenke 2016: 11). It focuses on processes, provides the tools to understand patterns,
and investigates a differentiated phenomenon in detail. Several scholars emphasised the
role of context as an important factor within the qualitative methodology (Grünbaum
2007; Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña 2014), as it enables the researcher to take a
holistic perspective by identifying which contextual aspects surround the units of
analysis. For Klenke (2016: 24), ‘interpretative researchers […] contextualise their
studies by setting them into their social and historical context so that the reader can see
how the current situation under investigation shapes the research process’. Therefore,
the qualitative methodology has been chosen, as it allows the researcher to take a closer
look at how NGOs influence the MNC VWG in the context of Dieselgate and to 
understand clearly the roles of other important actors, such as policy makers.
4.3 Case-Study Strategy as Research Design
4.3.1 Case-Study Approach
After choosing the qualitative methodology for this study, the tools and instruments most 
suitable for realising the study were determined. The case-study approach has been
chosen to analyse the direct and indirect NGO influence on VWG within the context of
VWG’s sustainability and emissions crisis. In this project, case-study research is 
considered a methodological strategy that helps to bring together the different data that
have been collected. There are various perspectives on case studies reflecting different
underlying research philosophies and purposes. For example, Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin 
(2014) adopted a positivistic research philosophy that considers the case study as a
means to develop propositions and to build theories (Eisenhardt) or to confirm and
extend existing theories (Yin). Stake (1995) took the interpretivist stance, in which case-
study research is motivated by the ‘social construction of meaning’ (Blumberg, Cooper 





         
         
              
             
            
         
         
         
         
           
       
         
             
          
         
        
          
        
     
          
       
           
         
           
             
    
             
          
          
        
         
           
          
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007: 25) defined case-study research as a method to
‘emphasise the rich, real-world context in which phenomena occur’. This distinguishes
the method from others, such as experiments, in which the context is ignored (Yin 2014).
Case studies can be understood as a method to collect data and as a broader
methodological strategy. Cases can be more concrete, such as a case study of an
individual, small group, or organisation, or less concrete, such as relationships,
phenomena, decisions, or projects (Merriam and Tisdell 2015). Grünbaum (2007) listed
various scholars’ definitions of and views on case study that show that there is no
common understanding. The author (2007: 83) stated that there is ‘ambiguity in the 
meaning of a “unit of analysis”’, as ‘conceptually stringent guidelines are not available to
differentiate between unit of analysis and the case’ (Grünbaum 2007: 79).
Unlike a quantitative approach with large samples, the qualitative case-study approach
does not offer breadth but depth. Doing research from case studies reflects the inductive
reasoning approach: developing or extending theories and concepts by identifying
patterns within one case or multiple cases. Using the case-study method is 
predominantly done if existing theory is flawed, patchy, or non-existing (Eisenhardt
1989). A case study may be approached without ‘a priori theoretical notions’ (Gillham
2000: 2), as theory will be built in a repetitive process of working with case data and 
evolving theories (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007).
However, Eisenhardt (1989: 536) also stated that a specification of concepts prior to the
case-study process may support the ‘initial design of theory-building research’. The
selection of multiple case studies enables the researcher to increase the ‘analytic power’
(Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007: 27) of constructs and theories. Multiple cases prepare
the ground for solid theory building and provide several perspectives (Creswell and Poth
2018). However, the use of single case studies offers the researcher rich insight into a
phenomenon and a holistic understanding of the investigated organisation (Merriam and
Tisdell 2015). A single case study can be particularly instructive if the case is extreme,
revelatory or ‘a critical test of existing theory’ (Yin 2014: 56). Siggelkow (2007) wrote that 
a ‘single case can be a very powerful example’ and even be enough to refute theories. 
This work adopted a case-study approach, as it allowed the researcher to better
understand the process of how NGOs exert influence on an MNC’s CSR approach and 
how their influence is affected by contextual factors, such as the VWG crisis and strong





         
        
       
            
         
           
       
               
   
             
         
         
          
        
            
           
           
        
        
        
      
            
           
      
            
         
            
          
       
           
          
  
understanding of a holistic view of NGO influence ‘within its total environment’ without
‘conducting a search for causal explanations’ (Gummesson 2000: 86).
Eisenhardt (1989: 545) remarked that a weakness of the case-study approach is that 
researchers might ‘lose their sense of proportion’ by building theories that are far too 
comprehensive. She added another drawback by stating that the lack of use of
quantitative methods, such as regression tools, may lead to a researcher’s inability to
evaluate the ‘voluminous data’ (Eisenhardt 1989: 547). Similarly, Blaxter, Hughes, and 
Tight (2010) pointed out the danger that the researcher might lose sight of the big picture
due to the amount of data.
Critics might claim that case studies are not really a scientific tool, as it is not useful to
generalise on the foundation of a single case or few cases. Flyvbjerg (2006) replied that 
many inventions and ground-breaking theories were developed after in-depth case-study
observations. He indicated that generalisation is only one of the skills a researcher
should have. Moreover, the author stated that generalisations are overrated, as case-
study results can still contribute to a valuable ‘knowledge accumulation’ (Flyvbjerg 2006:
227) in the respective field. Yin (2014) stated that research projects with single or multiple
case studies should strive for analytical generalisation and not for statistical
generalisation, which draws conclusions from the data to the population, whereas
analytical generalisation aims at either ‘advancing theoretical concepts’ (Yin 2014: 41) 
that are referenced in the study or new concepts that come out of the case study.
4.3.2 Selection of Case Study and Implications for Research
The selection of case studies can be the result of an ‘information-oriented selection’
(Flyvbjerg 2006: 230) and based on the expectancy of the cases’ content. Unlike
quantitative research, qualitative (case study) research uses ‘theoretical or purposive
sampling’ (Klenke 2016: 9). For Creswell (2014), criteria for such a purposive sampling
depend on how accessible, unusual, or data rich a case is. These criteria play a role 
when deciding that the case study will be on the phenomenon ‘NGO influence’,
considering that the NGOs were more accessible than corporations and promised to be
data rich. Stake (1995) stated that the prospect to learn from a case should be an 
important factor when selecting case studies. This case study offers the possibility to 






             
             
            
            
           
     
           
            
          
           
           
       
          
         
 
            
             
       
            
       
        
          
            
           
      
           
       
       
          
             
      
      
       
         
In this thesis, the case study is the phenomenon of the NGO influence on an MNC. 
Following Grünbaum (2007), it can be considered to be a multiple units of analysis
design, whereby the NGOs are the units of analysis. A well-defined separation between
case study and the units of analysis leads to a better transferability of the results, as it is
clear what the writer intends to transfer (Grünbaum 2007). The case-study method has
been chosen to answer ‘how’ and ‘what’ questions to approach the research problem
with more depth. The context of the case study plays an important role, and the
emissions crisis at VWG contributed to shaping the environment in which NGOs intend
to exert influence. In the course of the study, the strong interweaving between policy
makers and the automotive industry can also be considered a contextualising factor that
influences how NGOs affect VWG’s CSR approach. According to Poulis, Poulis, and 
Plakoyiannaki (2013: 305), a rich context is the ‘essence of qualitative case-study 
research’ and may ‘inform methodological choices’. By context, Welch et al. (2011)
referred ‘to the contingent conditions that, in combination with a causal mechanism, 
produce an outcome’.
There are several reasons VWG has been selected to illustrate the relationships with
NGOs and the mechanisms of their influence. The corporation has features that make it
unique in the German automotive sector and the overall economy. While VWG is one of
Germany’s largest and oldest companies, it is also characterised by a traditional
interweaving with political institutions and unions. Representatives of both institutions
are members of VWG’s supervisory board and exert per se a considerable degree of
influence on the organisation. Above all, VWG represents the extreme case of a
corporation that developed from a ‘model CSR company’ (as far as the perception of the
industry, wider public, numerous CSR experts and policy makers was concerned) to an
example of bad corporate governance when the ‘defeat device scandal’ became public.
The events of September 2015 created a situation in which the corporation never had
been in before in its history and revealed rich data on the role and influence of NGOs,
which experienced and observed VWG before and after the crisis.
These events contribute to justify why the phenomenon ‘NGO influence’ has been 
selected as the case study, and they meet Eisenhardt and Graebner’s (2007: 27) criteria
that single case research ‘exploits opportunities to explore a significant phenomenon 
under rare or extreme circumstances’. Eisenhardt, Graebner, and Sonenshein (2016:
1118) stated that extreme cases ‘generate insights that would otherwise be obscure’ and 





          
          
         
      
           
        
      
    
     
             
       
         
           
      
       
          
         
            
             
              
      
              
 
             
        
             
         
           
        
         
           
         
  
of the phenomenon ‘NGO influence’ within the crisis at VWG that revealed substantial
deception and greenwashing, offers the possibility to obtain insight about the role and
influence of NGOs. Moreover, it unearths data about the interaction among VWG, NGOs
and political actors by understanding how the relationships developed during the crisis.
The media coverage about the emissions scandal, the reactions of political and civil
society stakeholders after the crisis, and the rich documentation about partnerships
between VWG and NGOs are valuable complements to the collected primary data, which
will be described in detail in Section 4.4.
4.3.3 Boundaries of the Case
Several authors stated how important it is to define the boundaries of the case study
(Creswell 2014; Merriam and Tisdell 2015; Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña 2014). It has
been mentioned previously that Dieselgate is the context and an important boundary
condition of the study. The data collection took place after the crisis became public in 
September 2015; therefore, each interview was overshadowed by the events around 
Dieselgate. This illustrates that the boundary between phenomenon and context was not
very sharp, contributing to a better understanding, considering that it allowed us to
‘involve important contextual conditions pertinent’ (Yin 2014: 16) to the case. As
suggested by Creswell (2014), ‘time’ is a boundary and, in this case, is strongly 
connected to the context of Dieselgate. The scandal came up in 2015; therefore, the
focus is on the time from then until the completion of the study. However, the years
before the crisis will be considered, too, as interviewees and documentation referred to 
incidents and examples in the past that illustrate NGO influence and the relationship with
VWG.
Another boundary is the geographical focus on Germany. That means that only NGOs
that are strongly active in Germany were selected; however, the study also considers 
the NGOs’ activities at EU level, as those decisions have an effect on Germany and its
regulatory system. It can be stated confidently that the selected NGOs are the most
important ones in Germany, considering the NGO literature, VWG’s stakeholder matrix,
interviews with policy makers, and the analysis of the media coverage of Dieselgate. The
geographical focus also becomes relevant when examining VWG’s CSR approach. Even
though VWG is a transnational company that is active in most markets of the world, the 







            
             
              
        
       
           
       
            
         
       
     
  
           
        
             
            
           
            
        
        
         
         
           
    
        
             
 
        
       
            
            
4.4 Data Collection
The data collection chapter starts with a short chronology of events that were relevant
for the data collection process in the face of the scandal at VWG in September 2015. 
This chronology helps to put some of the events and statements that play an important
role in the data analysis chapter into perspective and provide a context of the 
occurrences. Afterwards, Table 4 will be presented, illustrating the initial and revised 
research questions, which reflect the shifting focus after the VWG scandal became
public. It follows a brief description of general tools to collect data within a case-study 
approach. Within Section 4.4.4, an example of the interview guide with adapted and more
specific questions will be presented (Table 5). In addition, a list of interviewees, roles, 
organisations, and stakeholder groups will be provided (Table 6). Thereafter, secondary 
data and direct observations will be discussed.
4.4.1 Brief Chronology of Events Relevant for Data Collection Process
Initially, I started the study with the intention to investigate who influences VWG’s CSR
approach by putting the MNC in the centre of the project and to find evidence of 
stakeholder influence from within the company. The research project started in May 2015
and the VWG scandal became public in September 2015. After that, it was clear that the
scandal would become part of the work; however, it was not well-defined how the crisis
would play a role; whether it frames the context or even shifts the focus of the work
towards corporate crisis management and deception. In February 2016, I interviewed
one of VWG’s CSR representatives, discussed the changes within VWG and the CSR 
department after the crisis and the possibility to obtain access to VWG’s headquarters in
Wolfsburg. In April 2016, VWG’s CSR representative replied that, due to the 
restructuration of the area of ‘sustainability’ within VWG, there was no possibility for field 
placement. Furthermore, I asked for access to VWG’s archive in Wolfsburg and 
contacted the archive’s director. He replied that I could not obtain access to the firm’s
archives, as VWG’s guidelines apply the Lower Saxony Archive Law that states that
there is a blocking period of 30 years on internal documents.
While it was disappointing that the data collection access would no longer be granted to 
the corporation itself, there remained the story of the various stakeholders to be explored.
This would present an important stakeholder perspective that so far has been under-





         
 
        
        
          
         
         
              
         
   
     
       
        
            
             
      
       
      
     
          
           
          
      
          
       
     
        
            
        
             
       
       
stakeholder perspective might be even more interesting and potentially illuminating and 
that the view of stakeholders has been neglected in research. 
I wanted to explore the dynamics of stakeholder influence and included several
stakeholders to determine the most influential ones. Therefore, I interviewed NGOs, CSR
and industry experts, suppliers, policy makers, and one of VWG’s CSR representatives
about their own and the NGOs’ influence on VWG. This happened in the first data 
collection phase that took place between November 2015 and October 2016. However,
gradually, in the process of analysing the data from the primary data collection phase, it
became clearer that the most interesting and controversial information was coming from
the NGOs.
An investigation of the literature identified a gap in the knowledge, namely that the
dynamics of NGO influence had not been explored yet under the consideration of the 
strong interweaving between policy makers and industry. The interviews with the NGOs
were about their interactions with VWG, their influence and CSR, in particular the
environmental dimension. Therefore, the initial data collection led me to narrow the focus
of the study and explore more deeply the NGO relationships, experiences, and 
influences. The ENGOs BUND, DUH, Greenpeace, and NABU are in a constant
exchange with automotive MNCs, such as VWG, and policy makers.
Consequently, I interviewed these organisations again for the second phase of the data 
collection. The interviews with all the other stakeholders were valuable, as those 
contributed to a better understanding of the complex context, whose tight connection
with the phenomenon is a key aspect of this study.
4.4.2 Overview on Data Collection: Instruments and Sources
The collection of data can be categorised into primary and secondary data (Bryman 
2012). There are different sources of evidence when collecting data. For example, 
documents, archival records, interviews, focus groups, direct observations, participant 
observations, physical artefacts, or audio-visual materials (Creswell 2014; Yin 2014). All
of them have strengths and weaknesses and may complement each other. In this study, 
data were collected using semi-structured interviews and documentation (summarised
in Section 4.4.5), and direct observations. These sources will be described in more detail
in the following subsections. The reason other data collection instruments were excluded 





           
         
     
              
            
       
            
            
            
       
      
  
            
               
              
           
           
       
        
         
          
               
          
      
         
      
        
             
           
           
          
             
   
groups were not considered, as they were not likely to deliver sensitive information.
Moreover, considering the difficulty of reaching most of the participants, focus groups 
would not have been practical.
Yin (2014: 118) stated that there are four principles when collecting data: first, the use of
different sources to construct validity via ‘data triangulation’; second, the creation of a
case-study database guaranteeing access to data during the project; third, the
maintenance of a chain of evidence to increase reliability, and lastly, caution when using
data from electronic sources. In this project, all the collected data in the form of Word, 
PowerPoint, and Excel files as well as audio records are stored on a laptop, saved on
external hard drives and the Coventry University’s cloud system ‘OneDrive’. Field notes, 
notes on interviews, and reflections about emerging concepts are stored in different
documents and are available on request.
A triangulation of data collection methods has been applied within the case-study
research strategy and refers to the use of ‘diverse data sources to explore the same
phenomenon’ (Arksey and Knight 1999: 23). Data triangulation can be a powerful tool to
increase the credibility and validity of a study by adding more sources (Denzin and
Lincoln 2013) and may lead to a ‘stronger substantiation of constructs and hypotheses’
(Eisenhardt 1989: 538). However, the reliability of triangulation depends on where the 
different sources come from. The manifold sources of data offer various ways to measure 
the same phenomenon (Yin, Bateman, and Moore 1983).
Triangulation has also been subject to criticism. Silverman (1985: 21) stated that it is
more complex and not sufficient to just integrate parts into missing parts, which might fit
perfectly well in a different setting, to ‘gain a perfect picture’. He warns that ‘what goes
on in one setting is not a simple corrective to what happens elsewhere – each must be 
understood in its own term’ (Silverman 1985: 21). Fielding and Fielding (1986: 33) called
for a more realistic picture of triangulation when stating that triangulation should add 
‘breadth and depth to our analysis but not for the purpose of pursuing “objective” truth’. 
Therefore, triangulation needs to be carefully used without assuming that it may offer the
definite truth. Another important aspect concerns the use of quantitative and qualitative
methods that may often be used to investigate similar issues; however, these methods
frequently refer to different research questions (Bryman 2012). Overall, authors agree






     
           
        
       
         
         
          
        
    
    
   
    
 
       
     
   
        
         
 
   
  
      
    




   
   
      
   
         
   
      
  
  
     
         
             
      
  
            
     
       
  
        
 
4.4.3 Initial and Revised Research Objectives and Questions
The research objectives and questions before and after the first phase of the primary
data collection are listed below in Table 4. The research project started off with these
initial objectives and questions, which were raised by the literature review on CSR
approaches and general stakeholder concepts. Considering the data received in the first
primary data collection phase, I reiteratively adapted the research objectives and
questions, as the focus shifted to the understanding of how NGOs exert direct and 
indirect influence on VWG in the context of a crisis.
Table 4: Initial Research Objectives/Questions
Initial Research Objectives Examples of Initial Research Questions
To explore how VWG defines,
composes, and implements its CSR
approach 
- How does VWG define, compose, and implement its CSR
approach in accordance with economic, social, and
environmental CSR dimensions?
- How did VWG organise and structure CSR before the crisis
in 2015, and how has VWG organised and structured its CSR
approach afterwards?
To examine how VWG and institutions
perceive the institutional influence on
VWG and its CSR (before and after the 
scandal of September 2015)
- How does VWG categorise, regard, and interact with its
stakeholders?
- How do the stakeholders perceive their influence on VWG’s
CSR approach?
To examine how VWG’s CSR approach 
and specific CSR-related decisions
reflect the influence of the institutional
environment and stakeholders
- What are the indications of institutional influence in the 
analysed CSR approach of VWG?
- How does VWG’s CSR approach reflect the influence and 
pressure of the institutional environment and stakeholders?
Source: Author
As previously described, the research questions and objectives have been adapted in 
an iterative process and were narrowed down after the first phase of primary data 
collection. The data gained from the interviews with the other stakeholder groups will be
used to corroborate, question, or add to the data drawn from the interviews with NGOs.
Revised research questions:
• Do NGOs in Germany influence an automotive MNC in the context of a major
organisational crisis, and if yes, how?
• How do the NGOs perceive their influence?
Revised research objectives:
• To examine the development and chronology of VWG’s Dieselgate scandal and





        
 
       
      
   
        
          
       
           
         
          
            
          
            
           
         
           
    
          
      
        
         
             
         
           
         
        
     
         
          
            
      
             
• To explore the influence of NGOs on the CSR approach of a MNC in Germany in 
the context of a crisis’; and
• To understand the NGOs’ perception of their role and influence on a major MNC’s
CSR approach in the context of Dieselgate.
4.4.4 Semi-Structured Interviews
For this project, the main source of data collection was semi-structured interviews. The
interviews were conducted with NGOs, one of VWG’s CSR representatives, VWG’s
employees, automotive suppliers, industry experts, and representatives of German
political institutions. Table 5 shows the themes and headings of semi-structured
interviews. Table 6 presents interviewees, positions, and organisations and is listed
according to the stakeholder groups. All interviews were conducted after the VWG
emissions scandal of September 2015. For the primary phase of data collection, the 
comprehension of the actors’ perception and interpretation regarding the relationships
between VWG, NGOs, and political institutions was one of the main reasons to conduct
interviews. Moreover, the aim was to understand the influence and pressure that has
been exerted in these relationships. Based on the analysis of the first data collection
stage, in which NGOs were described to be the most pressuring stakeholder, the second
phase of data collection was prepared.
Fontana and Frey (2000: 645) referred to semi-structured interviews as ‘one of the most
powerful ways in which we try to understand our fellow human beings’. Brinkmann (2013:
21) stated that compared to the structured interview, ‘semi-structured interviews can
make better use of the knowledge-producing potentials of dialogues by allowing much 
more leeway for following up on whatever angles are deemed important by the
interviewee’. The semi-structured interview is a method that allows the interviewer to
interact effectively with companies and organisations to provide more information. In the
semi-structured qualitative interview approach, the interviewer does not follow a
standardised set of questions but asks more open questions that could be linked to 
bigger themes (Flick 2014).
The participant’s answers direct the interview or at least largely influence the course of
the interview. This allows the interviewees to describe the facts in their own terms and 
the interviewer to ‘widen the range of legitimated answers’ (Wengraf 2001: 162). Gillham
(2000: 65) noted that well-done semi-structured interviews are possibly ‘the richest single





       
         
         
        
           
        
          
           
         
         
          
        
            
       
    
            
   
            
          
      
        
           
       
           
        
             
 
        
            
           
          
             
               
       
understanding what questions can be answered best in a face-to-face interview. Gubrium
and Holstein (1997: 114) stressed the importance of understanding interviews not only
as a source of information and a form of receiving answers to questions but also to think
about an interview as a powerful process in which meaning is constructed, namely, the 
‘understanding how the meaning-making process unfolds in the interview is as critical as
apprehending what is substantively asked and conveyed’. In this context, it is relevant to
point to the notion of ‘intersubjectivity’, which Abrams (2016: 58) described to be the
interaction between interviewer and interviewee and ‘the way in which subjectivity of 
each is shaped by the encounter with the other’. Goffman (1959) stated that people
behave and do things differently in different contexts. The nature of the social and cultural 
contexts influences the individuals’ interaction and whether certain aspects of the
personality are revealed or concealed (Anderson 2008). Considering these aspects,
there is no objectivity in interviews. It has to be clear that the course and the outcome of
the interview are influenced by the individuals’ ‘emotional baggage’ (Abrams 2016: 54).
Semi-structured interviews have also been chosen to grant the interviewees more 
freedom to talk about aspects they feel more confident about or knowledgeable without
being bound to a fixed protocol (Brinkmann 2013). It allows both the interviewee and the 
inquirer more flexibility when discussing certain aspects. The less rigid approach to a
semi-structured interview permits the researcher to learn more about the interviewee’s
attitudes, issues, and position within the organisation (Blumberg, Cooper, and Schindler
2014). Moreover, the data collection method semi-structured interview was selected
because it offers ‘retrospective and real-time accounts by those people experiencing the
phenomenon of theoretical interest’ (Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton 2012: 19). The topic
guide has been theoretically informed by the literature on CSR and stakeholder theories
(refer to Table 5 for more information). The use of semi-structured interviews allows new
insight and ideas to emerge that will inform the contribution (Flick 2014; Gioia, Corley,
and Hamilton 2012).
In preparation for the data collection process and to conduct semi-structured interviews 
effectively, two similar general guides were created. One interview guide was created for
the interviews with VWG’s representatives and suppliers and focused more on VWG’s
CSR approach, the role of stakeholders, such as NGOs, and the implications of the
emissions crisis. The questions for policy makers were derived from this interview guide.
Table 5 lists the themes of the other interview guide that was prepared for NGOs. The





          
         
         
  




   
  
  








    
  
   
 
    
 
    
 
    
  
  
    
  








      
                
          
            
        
       
         
          
         
          
    
           
             
         
         
        
             
               
   
approach, the relationship between NGOs and VWG, their perception of influence, and 
the stakeholders’ perspectives on the scandal at VWG. Appendix 1 provides specific 
questions on the semi-structured interview guide on the example of an interview with an
NGO representative.

















- Relationship before and
after scandal
- Perception of causes 
and reasons
- Effect on stakeholder
relationships
- Main forums and
platforms
- Direct (e.g. stakeholder
dialogues) and indirect
methods (e.g. pressuring 










The semi-structured interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes and were conducted
either in person or via phone. Most of the interviews lasted 30 minutes, which, for some
interviewees, especially politicians, was the maximum amount of time they made
available. One interview lasted 120 minutes and provided interesting insight into the
procedures of a multinational automotive supplier. The participants received information
about the project and the study’s procedure before the interviews (refer to Appendix 2
for the ‘Participation Information Sheet’ and ‘Informed Consent Form’). Interviews took
place at the premises of the stakeholders, for example, in the offices of NGOs and 
suppliers, at conferences and automotive industry fairs, and in the German Bundestag
when interviewing German politicians and political advisors. The interviews were
conducted between November 2015 and February 2018. 
The links with some of the participants, among others with VWG’s CSR Department, 
were already established in 2014, when I conducted a project about institutional influence
including corporate and institutional perspectives. The respondents were contacted via
email and phone to ask for interviews and/or written evaluations (refer to Appendix 3 for
an example of an email sent to an NGO for an interview request). Personalised emails
were sent stating the reasons the person was of relevance for the project. In many cases,
it was required to call the respective stakeholder group to ensure that the email was





             
      
        
            
             
          
       
     
           
            
          
              
         
 
          
             
             
      
           
       
             
        
           
          
    
            
        
           
         
        
           
            
         
When preparing the data collection, it was important to understand the relevant theories
and secondary material before approaching managers, NGOs, politicians, and CSR
experts. For several reasons, a thorough preparation of the interviews was very
important. First, I could tell the relevant persons during the first call (when date and time
were agreed upon) why the person is relevant for the project and what possible benefits
for the interviewee might be, for example, access to secondary material, overview on the 
topic of stakeholder relationships and influence. Second, I could better distinguish
between interesting and surprising information that the participant revealed during the
interview and information that was copied from annual reports or other publications.
Third, the interviewees were mainly people with restrictions in terms of time; therefore, I 
did not ‘waste’ time with questions that mainly cover topics that have been discussed
widely in the media but concentrated on the core aspects. Moreover, the likelihood of
asking generic questions was lower, and I was better aware of already existing 
information.
The conducted expert interviews have helped to refine the interview guide and offered
knowledge about the role of NGOs and CSR in the automotive industry and the political
arena. At the beginning of the data collection process, these expert interviews provided
valuable background information. For example, the interview with the CSR and 
sustainability expert of the German Government in November 2015 contributed to a
better understanding of the political perspective on the role of NGOs, Dieselgate, and
the state of the discussion of CSR. It also helped to refine the interview guideline, to get 
familiar with the terminology of political actors, and to obtain an understanding of who
the interesting NGOs are. This information contributed to a more purposeful research
process. Bogner, Littig, and Menz (2009: 2) pointed out that ‘expert interviews can serve 
to shorten time-consuming data gathering processes’.
Besides the interviews with CSR and industry experts, interviews were conducted with
key political actors, persons who may be considered to belong to the political elite.
Lilleker (2003: 207) stated that elites ‘can be loosely defined as those with close proximity 
to power or policymaking’. Richards (1996: 200) described advantages of elite 
interviewing and that those may help interpreting documents, especially when talking to
the authors of such a document, and events. Another benefit may be that those elites
offer insight ‘not recorded elsewhere, or not yet available (if ever) for public release’





          
   
            
            
         
        
       
      
            
          
            
        
           
          
         
         
        
         
           
          
       
           
      




































      
 
 
recalls events fragmentarily. Moreover, (former) policy makers may tend to adjust the
truth to be in accordance with the party’s perspective.
Most of the interviews were with members of the NGOs (BUND, DUH, Greenpeace, 
DKA, NABU, and TI) and with policy makers. 13 of the 34 interviews were with
representatives of NGOs. Table 6 provides more information on the organisations and
interviewees and states that 17 interviews were conducted face-to-face and 17 via
telephone. It is structured according to the stakeholder groups for ease of reference and 
provides information to the interviewees’ area of expertise and role. For several reasons,
it was important to talk to NGOs and policy makers. First, the civil society actors play a 
key role in the public review of Dieselgate. Therefore, press articles were followed and 
NGOs were contacted, which were mentioned and cited regarding their influence and
perception on VWG’s CSR approach and the defeat-device scandal. Second, NGOs and
policy makers were identified as key (CSR) stakeholders in VWG’s ‘Stakeholder
Universe’ (VWG 2012: 24-25). Third, they were willing to talk about VWG, the crisis, and 
their perception of their influence and pressure on VWG. Fourth, they were
knowledgeable about relationships of relevant institutions with VWG. The interviews with
the NGOs provided strong and rich data, which led to the decision to focus more on these 
organisations. Moreover, NGOs have become an increasingly important stakeholder
group; however, they have been neglected in research (e.g. Camerra-Rowe and Egan
2010; Markham 2011; Lyon 2010; refer to Section 2.4 for more information). As stated in
Section 2.4.1, for several authors and experts, the interviewed organisations are the 
most important environmental NGOs in Germany (Krumrey et al. 2013: 1; Markham
2011: 9; Vondenhoff and Busch-Janser 2008).
Table 6: List of Interviewees according to Stakeholder Group
Stakeholder Group Date – Role & area of expertise of Interview
& organisation nature of interviewee Number
interview
NGO: BUND 23/08/2016 Expert for transport policy: focus on 6
- telephone transport & sustainability topics
NGO: NABU 23/08/2016
- telephone
Expert for transport policy: focus on
transport & sustainability topics
7
NGO: TI Germany 12/9/2016
- telephone
Group leader: focus on human
rights and supply chain
sustainability
13
NGO: Greenpeace 13/9/2016 Expert for transport policy: focus on 14
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Stakeholder Group Date – Role & area of expertise of Interview
& organisation nature of interviewee Number
interview
NGO: DKA 10/10/2016 Leading member of organisation: 
- telephone focus on dialogue via AGMs
NGO: NABU 26/07/2017 Expert for transport policy: focus on
- telephone transport & sustainability topics
NGO: BUND 8/08/2017 Expert for transport policy: focus on
- telephone transport & sustainability topics
NGO: DUH 10/08/2017 Leading member of organisation: 
- telephone focus on sustainability topics &
dialogues with MNCs
NGO: DUH 25/08/2017 Expert for transport policy: focus on
- telephone transport & sustainability topics
NGO: BUND 29/08/2017 Expert for transport policy: focus on
- telephone transport & sustainability topics
NGO: Greenpeace 1/02/2018 Expert for transport policy: focus on
Germany - telephone transport & campaigns
NGO: Greenpeace 1/02/2018 Expert for transport policy: focus on
Germany - telephone transport & campaigns
Consultancy: 5/02/2018 Former CSR manager at BMW
- telephone Group and VWG
Supplier: 27/01/2016 Director for Germany, Austria, and
Multinational supplier - telephone Switzerland: leads (CSR)
1 exchanges with MNCs
Supplier: 29/03/2016 Director for Germany, Austria, and
Multinational supplier - face-to- Switzerland
1 face
Supplier: 24/08/2016 Director for Germany, Austria, and
Multinational supplier - face to Switzerland
1 face
Supplier: 18/10/2016 CSR manager: expert in various
Multinational supplier - telephone CSR dimensions & leads dialogues
(for all major OEMs) 2 with MNCs
Supplier: Supplier (for 19/10/2016 Sales manager for Germany - Short
electronic parts) 3 - face-to- interview at supplier trade fair in
face Wolfsburg
Supplier: Supplier (for 19/10/2016 Sales person and engineer – short
chassis) 4 - face-to- interview at supplier trade fair in
face Wolfsburg
Rating agency: 1/9/2016 Analyst: expert in various CSR
Oekom AG - face-to- dimensions
face
Government 19/11/2015 CSR and sustainability expert: ocus
- face-to- on various CSR dimensions
face
Political Party: 25/07/2016 Member of German Parliament
Christlich - face-to- (MoP). Member of Committee on 
Demokratische Union face Economic Affairs and Energy in
Deutschlands (CDU; German Bundestag
Christian Democratic
Union of Germany)
Political Party: Sozial- 1/9/2016 Politician (not an MoP), transport








Scientific assistant of politician
(involved in 5th parliamentary
face investigation committee)
Political Party: SPD 6/9/2016 MoP. Member of Committee on 













































    
 
 
    
    
  
 
    
 
 






    






   





    











           
          
            
     
  
            
   
      
          
            
      
          
       	
 
Stakeholder Group Date – Role & area of expertise of Interview









Political Party: SPD 21/9/2016
- face-to-
face




















Scientific assistant: expert in 15
transport policy & sustainability
MoP. Member of Parliamentary 16
Advisory Council on Sustainable
Development
MoP: focus on sustainability topics 17
Scientific assistant of politician
(involved in 5th parliamentary
25
investigation committee)
CSR and sustainability expert: focus 26
on various CSR dimensions
Sales person with responsibilities 23
that include sustain- ability aspects
Quality department 24
CSR representative 3
Moreover, VWG’s CSR representative was willing to discuss VWG’s CSR approach and 
who the key stakeholders were and are before and after the crisis became public.
Besides the CSR manager, I interviewed two VWG employees and suppliers to receive
an important (counter)weight to the statements coming from the MNC’s
CSR/sustainability department.
The following criteria were considered and needed to be fulfilled when approaching
politicians and political advisors:
• Being a traffic and/or automotive expert;
• Having a strong focus on economic and sustainability topics; and
• Being involved in the investigation committee of the German Bundestag that
examined the crisis of VWG at the political level.
Table 7 summarises the selection criteria for the interviewees of the different stakeholder





          
 
 
    
       
     
  
    
     
   
     
    
    
  









    
 




         
   
         
  
     






    
  
   
   
 
   
 
       
     
       
   
 
         
     
     
   
    
       
   
    
  
     








         
     
     
         
         
         
           
          
Table 7: Summary of Selection Criteria for Interviewees, Challenges & Limitations
Stakeholder
group
Selection criteria for interviewees Challenges & limitations
NGO - Knowledge of CSR/sustainability topics
- Expertise about automotive industry
- Involved in stakeholder dialogues with MNCs,
such as VWG and policy makers
- Contributed to publications about
CSR/sustainability, ‘Dieselgate’, environmental
issues (e.g. in automotive industry)
Low number of potential
interviewees, as only few staff 
members are experts of automotive 
industry, transport policies & work
on ‘Dieselgate’. One way of
decreasing the dependence on NGO
interviews was the use of secondary
data
Policy maker - Involved in dialogues with NGOs and
automotive companies
- Involved in investigation of diesel scandal
- Expertise about automotive/transport
policies/themes
Limited time for interviews, however,
thorough preparation and focus on
new information helped to obtain 
valuable information
VWG - CSR manager has been selected, as this is
one of the main persons who interacts with 
NGOs, as well as with policy makers, and has
the expertise talking about CSR/sustainability 
and the effects of the crisis for the organisation 
- The other two VWG employees were chosen 
to provide a different view on CSR, the crisis
and stakeholder relationships
Low number of interviews with 
VWG’s representatives and 
suppliers, however the study’s focus 
has been on NGOs. Therefore,
interviews with VWG and its
suppliers served to complement
findings and provide a different 
perspective.
Supplier - Knowledge of CSR/sustainability topics
- Expertise about automotive industry
- Awareness of external factors that influence
behaviour of organisations in automotive 
industry
Other groups - Consultant (interview #34) has more than 20
years of experience in automotive industry and
was chosen to provide background information 
on CSR in the industry and the sustainability
practices of major German automotive MNCs
- Analyst at rating agency (interview #11)
evaluated automotive MNCs such as VWG and 
provided relevant information to CSR at VWG
and the role of stakeholders
- Different understanding of CSR:
Seen as part of PR, not as concept
that implies environmental and
economic aspects
- The rating agency’s understanding 
of MNCs’ CSR approaches mainly
based on reports
Source: Author
Further criteria for the selection of the interviewees were their availability and 
accessibility. Therefore, I followed purposeful sampling by understanding who the 
politicians and advisers are and who might be able to contribute the most. Furthermore,
political actors and other interviewees were asked whether they could recommend
additional relevant people who fulfilled the previously mentioned criteria. Therefore,
snowball sampling was employed, which is a technique that is especially useful for
populations that are rather difficult to reach, such as elites (Creswell 2014). I called the





              
        
              
        
        
        
             
            
       
         
        
        
         
         
        
     
     
             
           
          
           
              
             
           
         
            
           
   
          
           
           
        
        
However, as the research project also deals with topics that are usually discussed behind
closed doors, among others how the relationships between political institutions and VWG
take place and the role of the interviewed people in the (investigation of the) crisis, some
of the interviewees did not want to reveal information that could have been helpful. In
addition, some representatives of political parties only agreed to be interviewed if I did 
not mention their names and did not record the conversation. Usually, political advisors,
who offered meeting me in a ‘background conversation’ were more willing to give precise
information. When talking to these political actors or other people who could reveal
sensitive data, I promised ‘anonymity’, not ‘confidentiality’, unless the data would reveal
the identity of the interviewee, since that would ‘preclude most reporting’, as Gioia, 
Corley, and Hamilton (2012: 19) noted correctly. I interviewed several representatives of 
opposition parties (in the legislative period between 2013 and 2017); however, I did not 
specify the names of their parties to ensure their identity could not be revealed.
The advantages of semi-structured interviews have been discussed; for example, the
interviewer gains an in-depth understanding about the participants and their perceptions
and experiences and comprehends phenomena that are hardly described with numbers.
However, qualitative research interviews have also been subject to criticism and are not
without risks considering the amount of time it takes preparing and conducting the
interviews, gaining access to organisations and participants, transcribing and, in this
case, translating the interviews (Seidman 2013). Myers and Newman (2007) listed
several difficulties that may occur with interviews. Among these problems are the artificial
setting, as the interview ‘involves asking subjects to give or to create opinions under time
pressure’ (Myers and Newman 2007: 4), the level of entry, and the vagueness of the
language. For example, the interviewer’s expressions may confuse the participant who
does not fully understand the questions and context. Fontana and Frey (2000: 645)
added that the ‘spoken or written word has always a residue of ambiguity, no matter how
carefully we word the questions or how carefully we report or code the answers’.
4.4.5 Documentary Analysis
In this study, documents from various sources helped to complement and confront
information and perceptions from the semi-structured interviews. Table 8 provides a list
with examples of important documents indicating which data were drawn from these
sources. For Bowen (2009: 34-35), document analysis means to evaluate ‘documents in 





          
  
           
        
         
        
         
          
            
          
     
        
             
       
            
           
         
         
         
       
         
              
    
            
          
      
 
         
        
        
        
         
the process, the researcher should strive for objectivity and sensitivity, and maintain
balance between both’.
Documents may be analysed using content analysis and thematic analysis (Fereday and
Muir-Cochrane 2006). Furthermore, data gained from press databases, regulatory
agencies, and libraries were used to confirm, rebut, or emphasise data on the role of 
NGOs, certain CSR developments, and VWG’s and industry statements and actions.
Forster (1994) suggested exercising caution when collecting data from documents 
published from the studied organisations or other sources. It is important to be aware of 
the risk that is involved when using documents, that ‘should never be taken at face-value.
In other words, they must be regarded as information, which is context-specific, and as 
data which must be contextualised with other forms of research’ (Forster 1994: 149). 
Moreover, documents are ‘context-specific, they should be evaluated against other
sources of information’ (Bowen 2009: 34). As part of a rigorous research approach, the
motives and perspective of companies’ and institutional publications will be considered. 
Scott (1990) stated four main criteria when assessing documentary sources. First, the
documents should be authentic. It must be clear who the author is and from where the
source comes. Second, the records should be credible. The reader should be aware that
the text might be distorted and, therefore, the accuracy of the document may be affected.
Third, it should be representative and available. The researcher should be aware of the 
possible limited representativeness of documents, which might affect the drawn
conclusions. This leads to a weakness of document analysis that the selection of
incomplete collections may be biased and access to these may be restricted (Yin 2014).
Last, the document should be meaningful to the researcher.
The purposes of using document analysis as a source of evidence in this study are
manifold. It may allow including a wider context, reading about specific events in more 
detail, and complementing collected primary data (Easterby-Smith, Jackson, and Thorpe 
2015). 
In this study, documentary analysis was conducted by analysing the primary outputs of
NGOs, VWG, and political actors, and by reviewing documents relevant to CSR and 
Dieselgate. Documents and publications, such as VWG’s CSR and annual reports, that 
are published through channels owned by VWG (e.g. websites and social media





        
     
         
        
          
            
      
         
          
     
         
           
          
            
             
            
          
          







              
                
              
        
  
             
                  
     
           
       
departments, associations, and other organisations, such as rating agencies, were
analysed to corroborate, expand, and question already gathered data (Patton 2014).
Governmental reports published from the German Bundestag’s investigative committee
and the BMVI’s investigative committee have been examined as well.27 Moreover, press
coverage of the last years has been analysed, which is helpful not only to complement
the existing information but also to pose this information to more subjective documents
published by VWG, NGOs, and political institutions.
The crisis at VWG has been widely covered by international newspapers, magazines 
and TV channels. These views, comments, and judgements helped to sharpen my own
perspective and my awareness of experts, who were contacted thereafter with the 
request to answer concrete questions or to arrange interviews.28 It was impossible to
follow every article on the VWG scandal and its implications, but I followed the
contributions in the weekly magazines Der Spiegel and Manager Magazin and in
newspapers from September 2015 to April 2018 in Germany, and in The Guardian and 
The New York Times on the international level. I did not analyse these reports in a
formalised way but used these to increase my contextual understanding and to create
and complement a chronology of the incidents before and after the scandal. The
magazines and newspapers were chosen, as they can provide comprehensive and in-
depth analyses of the scandal.29 Refer to Table 8 for a more comprehensive list of the
selected documents.
27 The 5th investigation committee of the 18th German Bundestag was implemented on 7 July 2016; 125 
MoPs of the opposition made a request for the implementation of the committee to investigate the diesel
scandal and to understand the role of policy makers. The investigative committee of the BMVI was 
implemented by Federal Minister of Transport Dobrindt, on 21 September 2015 after the scandal became 
public.
28 For example, Professor Christian Scholz from the Universität des Saarlandes whom I contacted after
reading his article on VWG (Table 8). In the article (written in German), Scholz wrote about VWG’s mistakes
after the crisis (Scholz 2016).
29 For example, The Guardian was among the first international newspapers that provided information on 





       
      




        
   
 
        
  
    
    
  
   
    
   
      
   
  
   
  
   
  
     
  







   
     





        




   
             
         
        
        
            
        
         
             
        
          
           
        
              
             
Table 8: Examples of Analysed Documents and Data
Category Documents Selected Analysed Data




VWG (2014); VWG (2016c) VWG’s sustainability approach before
and after the crisis and attitudes 
towards NGOs
Policy makers: Report Report of the 5th parliamentary
investigation committee (Behrens
et al. 2017)
Important information about the role of 




Advisory opinion of Professor
Mayer (Mayer 2016)
Contrasting data on VWG’s and the




EPA (1998b); US Department of
Justice (2017a)
Details about the allegations against
VWG
Media: Reports Der Spiegel, SZ, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 
Manager Magazin, ’The
Guardian’




VDA (2015); VDA (2016) VDA sent email with enclosed





Scholz (2016) Written answer to questions based on
Scholz’ article on VWG’s governance
issues (after VWG emissions scandal)
Source: Author
4.4.6 Direct Observation
Direct observation was used to discover a ‘lack of fit’ (Blumberg, Cooper, and Schindler
2014: 308) between the researcher’s observations, conducted interviews, and analysed
documents. In 2016, I visited VWG’s factory and the Autostadt (‘car city’) at VWG’s
headquarters in Wolfsburg, observing informally and making field notes. Yin (2014: 113) 
mentioned that direct observation ‘covers the context of the case’. This was the main
intention when visiting VWG’s headquarters: to understand what other factors are 
important and to hear what CSR, NGOs, and the crisis mean to employees and local
suppliers with whom I spoke when attending a supplier fair in October 2016 in Wolfsburg.
I also attended CSR conferences, automotive fairs (e.g. the Internationale Automobil-
Ausstellung in Hanover in September 2016), and supplier exhibitions (e.g. the
international supplier fair in Wolfsburg) to observe the actions (and behaviour) of actors
of relevant organisations. I took field notes and documented and reflected these
observations in written form and incorporated the key terms into the data analysis that





        
        
    
      
              
     
              
           
           
        
       
      
            
          
           
            
             
          
          
 
             
         
        
            
       
            
            
         
     
         
           
               
    
it was informative observing how these prospective CSR and sustainability experts
reflected on VWG’s emissions crisis. The meetings enabled me to confront the ‘corporate
academics’ with the perspectives and reports from the media and NGOs. Moreover, I 
received first-hand information about the corporate perception on stakeholder dialogues
and insight into the corporate culture and the role of CSR in the crisis.
4.5 Data Analysis: Techniques and Process
The main purpose of analysing data is to understand what insight the collected data
uncovered and to break down the raw data in an organised and categorised way
(Langley 1999). Qualitative research is shaped by an iterative approach of collecting and
analysing data, moving back and forth from the data (Silverman 2015). For Miles,
Huberman, and Saldaña (2014), data analysis consists of data reduction, data display,
conclusion drawing, and verification, which take place concurrently. Stake (1995: 71) 
defined the analysis of data as a ‘matter of giving meaning to first impressions as well as
to final compilations’ taking ‘our impressions, our observations, apart’. For Merriam and 
Tisdell (2015: 202), the analysis is ‘the process of making sense out of the data. And
making sense out of data involves consolidating, reducing, and interpreting what people
have said and what the researcher has seen and read – it is the process of making
meaning’. Gibbs (2007) stated that coding can be concept driven, in which codes are
determined after consulting the literature, or can be data driven, in which codes emerge
from the collected data.
Data analysis was conducted by hand and with Excel, which allowed the presentation of
larger chunks of evidence, first-order categories, second-order themes, and aggregate 
dimensions in a clear and illustrative way. Next to the main sheet that includes all 
mentioned steps and the most illustrative quotes, various sheets were created, listing the
statements of each stakeholder group, namely, NGOs, suppliers, CSR experts, policy
makers, and VWG’s CSR representative. To prepare the analysis of the data, most of
the interviews were recorded and transcribed in German and translated afterwards by
the author. In the first phase of the primary data collection between November 2015 and 
November 2016, 14 of the 26 transcribed and translated interviews were recorded. In
the second stage of interviews, conducted between July 2017 and February 2018, 7 of
the 8 transcribed and translated interviews could be recorded. Hand-written notes were
copied into a Word document in a more structured form to ensure an easier coding





         
      
       
      
     
       
              
         
      
           
    
          
          
         
        
           
         
         
    
          
          
          
            
        
    
             
              
          
           
           
        
           
grammatical discrepancies can occur. However, I have tried to preserve the original to
keep the meaning of the statements.
The data have been analysed iteratively. Interviews have been conducted and codes 
and categories were created directly afterwards. That followed Gioia, Corley, and 
Hamilton’s (2012: 20) understanding that it is ‘artificial to parse the interviewing and the 
analyses’. To be best prepared for coding themes, most of the interviews have been
recorded and listened to twice to ensure that no key aspects were missed. Bryman and
Bell (2015) described coding as a process in which transcripts are reviewed and labels 
are given to salient components to organise data. Corbin and Strauss (2015) divided
coding practices into open, axial, and selective coding that can be applied at various 
steps of the data analysis.
In the open-coding process, also called first-order analysis (Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton 
2012), many categories and codes emerge; however, relationships between codes and
terms are not yet set. In the process of the first-order analysis, I ended up with around 
100 codes and categories and assigned them to ‘data chunks to detect reoccurring 
patterns’ (Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña 2014: 73). In vivo codes were used whenever
possible. These codes were taken from relevant statements that the interviewees made
on the role and influence of NGOs, CSR at VWG, the stakeholder interactions, and the 
developments around the VWG crisis.
Following Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton (2012: 20), I tried to ‘adhere faithfully to informant
terms’, as in vivo coding better captures the interviewees’ perception and understanding 
of certain issues using ‘words or short phrases from the participant’s own language in 
the data record as codes’ (Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña 2014: 74). Important factors
of the successful analysis of the data and the consequential development of a coherent
data structure and conceptualisation may be the selection of relevant categories.
According to Dey (1993: 103), categories ‘must have two aspects, an internal aspect –
they must be meaningful in relation to the data – and an external aspect – they must be
meaningful in relation to the other categories’. The data collected from documents were
integrated in the process of analysing the data from the interviews.
In the step after the open-coding process, I compared the different categories looking for
similarities and differences to reduce the ‘categories to a more manageable number’, as





             
          
             
        
   
           
        
            
           
            
         
      
             
         
              
            
       
         
       
           
 
             
          
         
           
     
       
          
          
       
       
        
            
and Saldaña (2014) referred to this step as data reduction, which is the process of
reducing information to sharpen and focus the data to draw conclusions. This stage can
be called axial coding, in which data are linked together in different ways by creating
connections between categories (Corbin and Strauss 2015). In this process, the iterative
element of qualitative research came even more into effect. While comparing the first-
order categories to obtain a more practical amount, new codes may occur while reading
transcripts. At the same time, bigger, more abstract conceptual terms or themes emerge, 
which may contribute to the development of concepts. This process sharpened the
researcher’s understanding about knowing what is important. At the beginning of the
data analysis process, there was the tendency to analyse all data, every sentence of the
interview transcripts. However, I learned to focus on key statements and to better
understand which parts describe the context when reading transcripts of past interviews
again. This accelerated the process and the formation of the themes and categories.
When I realised that I had obtained interesting ‘theoretical themes’, I consulted the
literature to see if such a concept existed already and if it did, what the context and the
other themes were. This shifted the focus to ‘surprising and unexpected data’ (van 
Maanen, Sorensen, and Mitchell 2007: 1147). These emerging themes stimulated the 
process of thinking about how many more data were needed to substantiate the themes.
When arriving at that point, I formulated questions based on the created 
conceptualisation of themes, which I have asked in the second phase of primary data 
collection.
Following Corbin and Strauss (2015), selective coding is the third stage of data analysis
after open coding and axial coding. Selective coding refers to the selection of the core
category that integrates the other categories. That may lead to ‘aggregate dimensions’ 
(Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton 2012: 20) that have the power to elucidate the different 
aspects of the investigated phenomenon (Gibbs 2007). The subcategories and 
development that led to the formulation of a core category should be clear. The visualised 
and transparent process from axial coding to selective coding ‘from raw data to terms
and themes in conducting the analyses’ (Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton 2012: 20) is a
crucial aspect of rigour in qualitative research.
Though coding is a key process in analysing the collected data, it has been criticised that
the context might get lost when taking text out of interview transcripts and inserting them





           
    
          
         
            
               
           
   
           
           
   
      
         
     
               
          
       
    
           
    
            
           
        
           
     
       
                
        
             
              
          
the danger of interrupting interview narratives unnecessarily. Coffey and Atkinson (1996:
52) pointed out the danger of decontextualising data:
Interview informants may tell us long and complicated accounts and
reminiscences. When we chop them up into separate coded segments, 
we are in danger of losing sense that they are accounts. We lose sight, if 
we are not careful, of the fact that they are often couched in terms of
stories – as narratives – or that they have other formal properties in terms
of their discourse structure.
The authors concluded: ‘segmenting and coding may be an important, even an
indispensable, part of the research process, but it is not the whole story’ (Coffey and
Atkinson 1996: 52).
Figure 7 shows the different aggregate dimensions, corresponding second-order
themes, and first-order categories following the Gioia method of analysing data
systematically in a data structure. The method was chosen, as it seemed feasible when
making sense of the data and coping with the complexity of the findings but not because 
a grounded theory approach has been followed. Appendix 4 provides a table with quotes
that substantiate the first-order categories and is listed according to the second-order
categories and aggregate dimensions.
In the concurrent process of data collection and analysis, the first-order themes, second-
order categories, and aggregate dimensions were formed and have been enriched 
continually. After the first phase of primary data collection, with the identified and existing
theories, the preliminary data structure guided the second phase of the primary data
collection, in which the categories have been further substantiated.
In this form of abductive research, the results in the first round of data collection and 
analysis have been confirmed and solidified; the determinant ‘strong intertwining
between policy makers and VWG’ has a limiting effect on the influence of NGOs.
However, the analysis of the data gained in the second phase also contributed to a better
understanding of how and with which instruments the NGOs exert influence. Moreover,
it contributed to a more detailed insight into the NGOs’ perception of their influence.
The structure of the subsequent chapters follows the data structure shown in Figure 7.






          
            
             
      
         
  
 
sections according to the chapters. The first aggregate dimension is ‘structures of
intertwining’, which forms Chapter 5. The dimensions of Chapter 5 are greyed out to
illustrate that it is a mixture of contextual factors and findings. The second and third
dimensions, ‘mechanisms of direct conditional NGO influence’ and ‘mechanisms of 
indirect NGO influence’ constitute Chapter 6. Chapter 7 consists of the dimension ‘NGO




              
	
    





             
           
      
        
         
         
        
        
     
          
             
          
             
              
        
          
             
             
         
  
          
            
        
             
         
                 
         
      
            
            
          
          
																																																						
             
         
The diagram shown in Figure 8 provides the conceptual landscape for the following
findings and analysis chapters. The illustration shows that the strong intertwining
between VWG and the German automotive industry and policy makers effects the direct
and indirect NGO influence on VWG. Therefore, Chapter 5 ‘Structures of Intertwining’
sets the framework within which the NGOs exert influence on VWG. It will show how the
determinants ‘regulatory softness’ and ‘indicators of political failure’ limit NGO influence.
Consequently, the terms ‘mechanisms of conditional, direct NGO influence’, 
‘mechanisms of conditional, indirect NGO influence’ and ‘unconditional, indirect NGO
influence’ will be introduced. Mechanisms of conditional, direct NGO influence will form
Section 6.2 and aim to explain how the above-stated determinants limit NGO influence
in their direct interaction with VWG. It will analyse the various forms, tactics, and 
strategies of how NGOs may exert influence. The second branch is reflected in the
mechanisms of indirect NGO influence that will be analysed in Section 6.3. This section
is divided into conditional, indirect influence with the focus on influence via policy makers
and unconditional, indirect NGO influence that is manifested in the coercive measure
‘lawsuit’ (as a last resort). It will show the significant role that this indirect influence
method plays in the NGOs’ efforts to influence VWG’s CSR approach.
30 
The instrument
‘lawsuit’ is called unconditional, as it is not affected by the strong intertwining between
policy makers and VWG and is independent of internal corporate factors that could limit 
NGO influence.
Figure 8 aims to provide an overview on the findings and the structure of the findings
chapters. However, it also intends to conceptualise the findings and to be a more
dynamic depiction of the data structure (Figure 7) by showing how this study may
contribute to the debate around stakeholder and NGO influence. The diagram does not
aim to be complete, as it will not provide an in-depth understanding of the various tools
with which NGOs try to influence MNCs. It shows in a more simplistic way the division of
NGO influence into direct and indirect NGO influence manifested in influence tactics and
measures under consideration of the limiting contextual determinants. Core elements of 
the diagram, the strong intertwining between policy makers and MNCs, have not been 
considered before in the understanding of NGO influence. Even though the limiting
factors ‘regulatory softness’ and ‘political institutional failure’ concern the environment in
which NGOs exert influence, they are part of the findings, considering that they are 
30
‘Coercion’ is a term borrowed from institutional theory and describes the pressure on organisations that 






        
       
         
          
           
     
       
           
            
          
        
     
           
          
           
            
          
         
           
            
          
             
             
       
         
 
          
         
          
        
          
           
   
underpinned by primary and secondary data. As a result of these limiting factors, the 
direct and indirect NGO influence has been labelled conditional, except the indirect
coercive approach ‘lawsuit’ and the multiplicity of NGO influence instruments. However, 
there are more factors that might limit or amplify the effects of NGO influence that are 
not part of the diagram. For example, dynamic and positive NGO alliances (will be
discussed in Section 6.3.2) might have a constructive effect on NGO influence, whereas
problems among NGOs might minimise their influence. Moreover, the uncertainty and 
financial restraints that NGOs face due to varying budgets may lead to irrational 
behaviour, which may be reflected in the withdrawal from campaigns or strategies
without identifiable reason for the public. Another example is the trade-off between 
influence strategies and campaigns that might attract more donors and attention versus 
actions that may influence MNCs more effectively.
The data structure (Figure 7) separates the dimensions ‘mechanisms of conditional direct
NGO influence’ and the ‘mechanisms of indirect NGO influence’; however, the illustrative
diagram (Figure 8) shows that these take place concurrently. In fact, the study shows 
that it is not only the instrument ‘lawsuit’ but also the NGOs’ parallel exertion of direct
and indirect influence instruments that lead to NGO influence. Individually considered,
the indirect instrument ‘lawsuit’ has an unconditional effect. Moreover, the study found
that the multiplicity of various direct and indirect influence tools leads to pressure that 
may influence the behaviour of both policy makers and the MNCs. The diagram’s
purpose is not only to show the different direct and indirect NGO influence instruments
and how the contextual factors affect these but also to lead to a better understanding of
the depth that the NGO influence may achieve. Thereby, Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) five
stages of influence play an important role, as these illustrate comprehensively NGO 
influence and contribute to better insight about how the multiplicity of instruments create
influence.
Figure 8 also points the way towards the discussion and contribution/implication
Chapters 8 and 9, which will bring the aggregate dimensions together and illustrate the 
complexity of NGO influence. This complexity is reflected in the multiplicity of the various 
approaches of NGO influence and the interplay between different factors such as choice
of influence instrument, strength of NGO alliances, the delay between cause and effect
of NGO influence, and the effect of the limitations resulting from the intertwining between










    
             
            
           
      
   
     
            
          
           
     
 
        
      
           
      
Figure 8: Diagram of Direct and Indirect NGO Influence
Source: Author
4.6 Reflections on Reliability and Validity
Reliability and validity are concepts that stem from the natural sciences. Reliability can
be understood as the degree to which a study ‘can be repeated, with the same results’
(Yin 2014: 46). The objective is that researchers who follow the same process as an 
earlier researcher may reach the same results and conclusions. However, the 
understanding of these two concepts differs among quantitative and qualitative research 
and may therefore lead to confusion (Lewis and Ritchie 2003). For quantitative 
researchers, reliability refers to replicability and generalisation of results and validity to
the accuracy of the means of measurement and ‘whether they are actually measuring
what they are intended to measure’ (Golafshani 2003: 599). Klenke (2016: 39) stated
that ‘positivist criteria such as reliability and validity may be misleading in qualitative 
research’.
Therefore, for qualitative researchers, terms such as transferability, credibility (Hoepfl
1997) and ‘dependability’ (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 114) are more suitable to assess the 
findings. Dependability can be considered to be the qualitative counterpart to reliability






           
            
              
        
               
      
          
      
      
          
           
          
   
 
          
       
         
           
          
         
           
          
        
         
       
          
             
           
        
     
    
        
     
outcomes (Klenke 2016). Credibility may be the equivalent to internal validity, which is
mainly applicable for explanatory case studies and relates to the identification of
variables that are not the object of the study. The credibility of the study has been
enhanced by showing and discussing preliminary interpretations of the results with the
participants. The conclusions drawn from the data gained in the first round of the primary
data collection were briefly presented to the respondents before the start of the second 
phase of primary data collection. Transferability may be considered the counterpart to
external validity that refers to the congruence between the studied topic and the subject
on which statements are intended to be made (Yin 2014). In other words, it is about the
generalisability of the findings. Triangulating data, as stated in Section 4.4.2, and
interviewing different stakeholders on NGO influence and CSR at MNCs contributed to
the ‘dependability’ of the research by decreasing the degree of dependence on
subjective views of the interviewees.
4.7 Summary
Chapter 4 introduces the research philosophy, stating that this study takes a subjectivist
ontological position and an interpretivist epistemological approach. Therefore, it follows
a qualitative research design that has been chosen to conduct a detailed and extensive
investigation of the research phenomenon. The chapter explains how and why the case-
study approach was selected to examine the direct and indirect NGO influence. The case
study’s phenomenon is ‘NGO influence’ and the NGOs are the units of analysis. The
Dieselgate crisis at VWG forms the context and an important boundary of the study.
This chapter shows that the data were collected via 34 semi-structured interviews
conducted with NGOs, CSR experts and managers, suppliers, automotive experts, and 
policy makers. The various stakeholders were interviewed in the first stage of the primary
data collection, while the second round of interviews focused on the NGOs. The
preliminary analysis of the findings gained in the first phase indicated that focusing on
NGOs may lead to interesting and surprising data that contributes to exploring the
mechanisms of NGO influence in more detail. The interviewed NGOs were selected
based on the importance that scholars and experts assigned to them, their expertise on 
CSR and the automotive industry, and the organisations’ experience in dealing with 
MNCs and policy makers.
The primary data collection was complemented by direct observation and document






        
       
        
           
           
             
     
         
       
         
    
        














Dieselgate offered a better sense of the crisis’ consequences and dimensions. Moreover,
VWG’s annual and sustainability reports, NGO outputs, and national and international
policy reports are examples of documents that were used to complement the interviews
and to improve the understanding of NGO influence, the emissions crisis, and the
intertwining among the automotive industry and German policy makers. Following Gioia,
Corley, and Hamilton (2012), the data were analysed iteratively by applying open, axial,
and selective coding. This analysis resulted in the (static) data structure that depicted 
the aggregate dimension. These factors form the pillars of the diagram, which
dynamically shows how the different dimensions and chapters are connected.
The next chapter presents the findings of the first aggregate dimension ‘structures of
intertwining’, which provides findings gained from both the primary data collection and 
contextual data gathered from secondary sources. It consists of the two sub-dimensions






    
  
            
        
         
        
       
        
          
         
           
       
     
          
            
           
       
         
           
               
         
            
            
           
         
          
          
   
               
           
         
            
CHAPTER 5: STRUCTURES OF INTERTWINING
5.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an analysis of the German institutional political context in view of
the proximity between policy makers and the automotive industry as well as the
emissions crisis at VWG. It combines contextual information gained from documentary
sources with primary data generated from semi-structured interviews. Chapter 5
provides background information that is required for understanding the following
chapters on the findings (Chapters 6 and 7). It was mentioned in the previous
methodology chapter how vital it is to identify and examine these contextual
circumstances to understand the case study and the research phenomenon, namely,
how NGOs influence VWG’s CSR approach. Therefore, this chapter takes account of the
case-study approach that assumes a holistic perspective on this study’s phenomenon 
and actors (explained in Section 4.3.1).
Chapter 5 aims to answer the first research objective, namely the examination of VWG’s
Dieselgate scandal and the German political institutional context. This chapter creates a
link between the overall research questions that focus on understanding NGO influence
and the role of the German political context. Thus, it considers the request of scholars to
include contextual factors in stakeholder studies (Arenas, Lozano, and Albareda 2009).
It has been stated in other parts of the work that it is impossible to comprehend the 
NGOs’ influence without understanding the role of the political actors in the crisis and as
‘receivers’ of (indirect) NGO influence. This chapter also contributes to explaining why
the intertwining between policy makers and VWG is a determinant that limits NGO
influence. The first section on regulatory softness shows the effects of the shift between
hard law to soft law and how that contributed to a changing role of NGOs. Section 5.3,
‘Indicators of Political Institutional Failure’, outlines how the political institutions’ failure
that has been manifested in ignoring signs of the upcoming crisis and the neglect of 
regulatory responsibility made it difficult for NGOs to exert influence.
5.2 Regulatory Softness
This dimension or theme refers to the way important political actors reacted to the VWG
scandal, how they interact with the automotive industry, and how NGO influence is
affected by a lack of governmental initiative to tighten and enforce environmental 






         
   
          
       
            
       
           
            
         
         
              
  
           
          
           
      
             
         
         
          
       
  
          
        
        
       
           
         
         
      
																																																						
                
            
                  
   
best how to regulate themselves, for example, by following voluntary CSR initiatives
(Scherer and Palazzo 2011).
The findings gathered speak against a further shift from ‘hard law’ to ‘soft law’, which is
often characterised by ‘voluntary action […], imprecise rules and delegation of authority
to non-state actors’ (Scherer and Palazzo 2011: 912). This delegation of authority
involves practical considerations of policy makers of being able to distance themselves
from responsibility. After the crisis in September 2015, the CSR expert of the government
stated in the interview that ‘escapism’ by the state is observable (Interview #1). The 
government places too much trust in MNCs and settles for voluntary regulations and
vague announcements and declarations of purpose. For Garsten and Jacobsson (2011:
425), ‘soft law bridges the dichotomy of law and non-law as well as of public and private
actors’.
Reich (2008) stated that it is a fallacy of both policy makers and CSR activists that 
corporations follow socially responsible interests, if those do not coincide with their
business interests. With CSR reports and high rankings in indexes (refer to Section 2.5.2)
and partnerships with NGOs, VWG successfully created the impression that
environmental and social activities are at least as important as significant profits for its
shareholders. However, the scandal and previous incidents indicated that VWG’s
extensive CSR reporting and campaigns (e.g. ‘clean diesel’) served as a smokescreen
for long-lasting fraud. Therefore, governments risk undermining democratic activities if
they open the door for corporate engagements to reduce governmental responsibilities
and expenditures. 
Fleming and Jones (2013: 36) added that it ‘becomes critical to limit the ability of 
corporations to penetrate government agencies and bureaucracies to influence and
shape regulatory frameworks and compliance mechanisms’. An example of how
corporations shape frameworks is the intervention of automotive lobbyists in the year
2015. There are reports stating that key representatives of the automotive industry
successfully influenced the chancellor to avoid stricter emissions tests that were
demanded by the EC (Amann et al. 2017).
31 
It has been reported that the German
Government changed its position within 48 hours of the intervention.
31 
According to the magazine, these representatives were Eckart von Klaeden who works in the department
of Global External Affairs and Public Policy at Daimler Group and the president of VDA, Matthias Wissmann.
Von Klaeden was the former minister of state at the German Chancellery before he changed abruptly to the






            
             
      
        
          
           
           
     
        
           
           
             
            
         
          
          
         
           
            
        
 
        
        
       
            
             
																																																						
                    
                
                
       
                
            
            
          
               
       
             
              
             
Scherer and Palazzo (2011: 911), who wrote about the political role of companies in a
more globalised world, stated that ‘in global affairs […] MNCs are largely able to operate
in a legal vacuum’ due to the difficulty to enforce national law. Consequently, self-
regulatory initiatives, such as the UNGC became more popular among corporations (and
governments and NGOs) considering that those initiatives legitimise MNCs’ efforts to
create their own regulatory frameworks or CSR forums with a low level of obligation. The
Account Ability’s AA1000 or the DJSI are examples of regulations that were created by
industries and private actors.
However, the VWG case showed, among others, that these voluntary frameworks only
provide limited guidance and do not prevent VWG from being prosecuted by a country
such as the USA that has the strength to enforce national law on transnational actors. It 
is not yet clear what the effects are; however, lawsuits could threaten the existence of
one of the world’s biggest car producers.
32 
An example of those voluntary groups in
Germany is Econsense, an initiative of mainly MNCs that discuss, publish, and promote 
CSR-relevant content (Econsense 2018).
33
Another driver of CSR is the internet platform
‘CSR Germany’ that is run and financed by four umbrella organisations of the German 
business community that represent the interests of German industries (CSR Germany
2018).
34
One of the primary goals of these organisations is to keep the voluntary aspects
of CSR and lobby for self-regulation instead of laws and federal regulations (Econsense
2013; Kinderman 2009). Representatives demand deregulatory measures to gain
flexibility in the formulation of CSR measures.
The CSR expert of the government (Interview #26) stated that the economic-liberal 
approach only makes sense if there is a well-functioning counterpart: strong institutions
and independent authorities, which were absent in the VWG scandal. Adding to that, it
would require strong and independent NGOs that take a monitoring role. However, most
NGOs are chronically underfinanced and rely on cooperation with MNCs. Therefore, it is
32
As matters stand in September 2017, the total costs of the scandal are around €25 billion for VWG. This
includes the settlement with the EPA, to which VWG agreed to plead guilty and paid $4.3 billion in criminal 
and civil penalties (US Department of Justice 2017a). However, there are still private lawsuits in Europe and
the US and lawsuits from different American states that could increase the costs significantly.
33 
Econsense is an initiative of German MNCs that was founded in 2000 by the Bundesverband der 
Deutschen Industrie (English: Federal Association of German Industry). Except the German Chemical
Industry Association, all the 32 members are MNCs and belong to Germany’s biggest publicly traded
companies (e.g. Daimler Group, Deutsche Telekom, Robert Bosch GmbH, VWG, and Siemens AG)
(Econsense 2018). The British equivalent to Econsense might be Business in the Community (BITC), which
has more than 800 members and was founded in the 1980s.
34
CSR Germany is an initiative of the Federation of the German Employers’ Associations, the Federation of
German Industry, the Deutscher Industrie und Handelskammertag, which is the umbrella organisation of 80






      
            
           
    
            
      
           
      
              
          
  
                
           
            
           
      
        
           
          
             
            
       
           
           
             
          
             
           
        
           
       
         
             
appropriate to be more critical regarding the encouragement of governments and CSOs
towards more self-regulatory measures. In Fleming and Jones’ (2013: 45) words: ‘We
find the notion that a private, hierarchical, authoritarian institution such as the MNC would
have an interest in furthering democracy to be deeply problematic’. Ironically, the VWG
scandal also showed that NGOs assumed the tasks of the government to control and
regulate MNCs and provided an idea about the consequences of increasing self-
regulation. In that regard, Murphy and Bendell (1999) referred to NGOs as civil regulators
offering a counterbalance to the MNCs’ self-regulation efforts. For Cragg (2005), self-
regulation is an instrumental part of CSR; however, it cannot be in the interest of society
that MNCs’ CSR approaches solely follow the purpose to anticipate or eliminate 
regulation.
There is also another way to view soft and hard law and the debate regarding whether
more regulation would minimise the power of MNCs or to prevent crises such as 
Dieselgate. This policy maker sees the debate from an economic perspective: ‘In
Germany, we place great emphasis on voluntariness because, ultimately, our companies
are also in an international focus and have to have a competitive orientation’ (Interview
#5). One of the interviewed policy makers argued that CSR and sustainability become
successful, if companies are behind the underlying values and acknowledge their
responsibility. For this MoP, stricter regulations might not be the most promising way:
Sanctioning would mean that you would have to make it [the law] even
stricter, and I'm not convinced of that. I think that is a matter of public
discourse. So, you have to talk about it publicly. You have to confront
them; you have to address it. You can’t give them CSR prizes, as long as
they do not get that done [their problems solved] internally. I do not think
we can control [it] better now. We as politicians are always behind the
corporate headquarters with the regulation and control. If in doubt, there
is a department on the 23
rd 
floor where only lawyers sit and think again
how to get out of there, and they are faster and better educated and better
paid than the people we have. Well, it doesn’t work without it [regulation],
but I don’t want to primarily rely on it. (Interview #16, policy maker)
This statement correctly remarks that societal actors should be more cautious when 
celebrating MNCs for their CSR engagement; however, it also indicates that policy






           
           
      
         
     
                 
     
     
           
             
          
             
   
       
            
            
            
           
         
      
          
             
           
          
         
      
         
         
            
           
         
           
a panacea, it would be helpful if policy makers consider themselves to be players that
act at eye level with MNCs. However, according to TI’s interviewed representative, more
regulations and sanctions would not help:
I don’t think so at all [….] How do you want to exterminate the sloppiness, 
the sense of wrongdoing? How do you want to do that from the outside? 
This is in the minds of the people. I believe this has been the case at VWG
due to the internal structures and a communication culture that is not open 
at all. (Interview #13, TI)
For the NGO, stricter external enforcement and the best internal compliance system
would not make a difference, if VWG does not ‘build a culture of integrity’ (Interview #13,
TI). In Section 7.3, it will be explained in more detail that other experts also perceived
shortcomings on the part of VWG to build and develop a corporate culture that
strengthens values such as honesty and trust.
‘Political blindness’ and ‘regulatory softness’ are other expressions that label the
inactivity and the rather reserved role that German political institutions have played in
the crisis. According to the NGO TI, VWG ‘felt safe to do such things [and] probably
thought they are always protected by the political system in Europe’ (Interview #13).
Gregor Hackmack, the director of the NGO Parliamentwatch stated that Dieselgate ‘is
also a description of the state of our political system [in which] the automotive industry
and policy makers are tightly interwoven’ (Hackmack 2015: n.p.). 
In conversations with the author, the unanimous statement of some bureaucrats working
for governmental institutions in Berlin was that if the scandal would have taken place in
Germany or Europe only, it would have never extended to this dimension or might not 
even have reached the public. In Interview #6, one of the representatives of the NGO
BUND gave an impression of how that could have happened. For example, if the
authorities would have given the automotive manufacturers the chance to recall the cars
in question, for the next models, the NGO representative assumed, the new generation 
diesel cars would have met the limit values, and nobody would have kept digging. This
is a hypothetical scenario; however, it reflects the NGOs’ distrust of the government.
Another senior representative of BUND stated in Interview #31 that the strong
intertwining between policy makers and car industry has not always been like that.






         
         
               
         
            
              
          
          
          
            
   
          
       
       
      
          
          
          
       
           
        
         
        
         
             
             
        
       
  
              
             
        
        
influential lobby organisation, VDA, appointed Mr Wissmann as the new president and 
the previous president, Mr Gottschalk, resigned. The BUND representative remembered
that Gottschalk said, ‘the limit values really hurt us, but we can make it’ and that his
powerful lobbying organisation supported plans to reduce CO2, considering that this 
could be a way for the German automotive industry to gain a competitive advantage due
to highly developed technologies. Today, it is difficult to prove whether 2007 was a
turning point or not; however, it can be stated that the German automotive industry is the 
key sector in Germany that has always enjoyed a special status (as described in Section 
2.3). For example, the former German Chancellor Gehard Schröder (from 1998–2005)
was a great supporter of the car industry and known as the ‘car chancellor’ (e.g. Hoinle
2006; Stuhr 2005).
The VDA might have had a progressive phase; however, today, it is known for an
organisation that tries to maintain the status quo, for example, by influencing the 
decision-making process and lobbying against stricter CO2 regulations (Lamparter,
Pinzler, and Tatje 2013). The tight relationships between the automotive industry,
especially the VDA and policy makers, are well documented. In the legislative period
between 2009 and 2013, there were at least 40 meetings between the representatives
of the car industry and the chancellor and her minister of state (BMVI 2013). According 
to a document of the German Government, the president of VDA, Wissmann, had six
meetings with the chancellor and her minister of state between 2015 and 2016 (BMVI
2013). This accumulation of meetings between the most powerful politicians in Germany
and the chief lobbyists of the automotive industry indicates the importance of the
industry, and the closeness and intimacy between the car manufacturers and policy
makers. A political advisor of the opposition commented as follows:
The VDA is a lobbying association that just wants to enforce its interests,
which is a legitimate request. The only problem is that the VDA is
constantly in the Chancellery. If the DUH would try to do that, they would 
be laughing at them when they want to talk to the chancellor. (Interview
#25, opposition party)
It appears to be a common thread that the NGOs do not get access to the most powerful
levels, be it at VWG or at the German Government. One of the reasons might be that
both NGOs and politicians of the opposition parties the Left Party and The Greens are 






             
             
     
        
        
          
    
         
   
          
          
       
       
      
          
             
    
           
            
       
     
          
              
          
   
         
         
          
              
        
         
The CSR and sustainability expert of the government pleads for more regulatory borders
to avoid a high degree of reliance on the MNCs’ goodwill [to engage in CSR] (Interview
#26). However, according to the interviewed senior representative of TI:
German policy makers have always advocated for the automobile
manufacturers, to push pollutant emission standards through on
European level [and] torpedo any legislation that might harm the
automobile industry in Germany…. VW could do such things because 
they were supported by the German Government at the EU level.
(Interview #13, TI)
In all interviews with the NGOs’ representatives, it was discussed that the German
Government did not formulate any sanctions for companies that do not comply to the EU
regulation 715/2007. The member states were asked to formulate sanctions that ‘must
be effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ (Council Regulation (EU) 715 2007: 9).
However, Germany failed to do so, as the following respondent pointed out:
The laws are relatively clear, but they are not implemented consistently.
The control does not take place…. In this case, European law has not
been transformed into German law…. Volkswagen is not punished for the 
offence at all. This is another scandal…. This is as if you attacked a bank
and captured €1 million. You are caught, and it is said, ‘give us the million
back, then the issue is over’. And that is the case at Volkswagen right
now. There are no sanctions. (Interview #7, NABU)
The BUND expert also stated that automotive producers have been given the opportunity
to make their cars legal through ‘voluntary recalls’ due to the lack of sanctions, clear
regulations, and the weakness of control authorities, such as the German Federal Motor
Transport Authority (KBA).
VW could admit these illegal manipulations easily because they don’t
have to worry about any penalties. For other manufacturers, it is even 
more perfidious; there's even now the possibility of voluntary recalls….
Also, we simply miss [do not have] the political will to say, ‘the car
companies have cheated the people’. They have sold vehicles to them,






          
         
          
          
            
         
           
           
        
          
         
        
         
    
              
            
             
            
            
       
          
           
 
         
          
          
             
          
           
     
    
This statement also illustrates that the NGOs lack the discernment of leading political 
actors regarding their role and that certain aspects, such as the absence of sanctions or
the intertwining between policy makers and industry, contributed to the emissions
scandal. This is important because it explains the ambivalence of the NGOs’ exertion of 
influence on policy makers. On one hand, NGOs invest resources to put pressure on
policy makers and influence the political decision-making process to move MNCs, such
as VWG, towards complying with regulations and investing in environmentally friendlier
technologies, as opposed to petrol and diesel engine models. On the other hand, NGOs
do not formulate much hope that legislators will strengthen regulation in Germany.
In our opinion, the lessons from Dieselgate are mainly directed to
legislators. That’s nothing the automotive industry would do voluntarily,
but these are all measures that should set new political framework
conditions. The automotive industry won’t do anything, if they are not
obliged. (Interview #6, BUND)
This statement shows how important it remains for NGOs to lobby for stricter regulations,
though there is the perception that policy makers do not have much interest in changing
the status quo. The previous quotation also demonstrates the role NGOs play in the
German governance structure. In this case, NGOs, such as BUND, DUH, NABU, and
Greenpeace act as civil regulators, a phenomenon that not only happens in developing
countries with weak regulations but also in advanced economies, such as in Germany. 
Dahan, Doh, and Teegen (2010: 26-27) spoke of the ‘blurring of sectoral roles in society’
and stated that NGOs’ engagement has regulatory character in situations in which
‘states…lack capacity because of resource constraints or corruption’. 
The closeness and the intertwining between the German Government and 
representatives of the automotive industry have been discussed in other parts of the
chapter; however, it is important to take up the discussion again, considering that this 
condition created a regulatory vacuum that NGOs try to fill. This situation reflects NGOs’
efforts to apply various influence strategies and tactics to disrupt these structures.
Individually taken, the NGOs’ measures to influence VWG and policy makers may not 
be very effective and may not lead to a change in the corporation’s environmental






            
       
          
           
           
        
         
              
            
             
   
               
             
         
           
          
      
            
           
           
              
     
              
             
             
   
             
          
              
            
        
																																																						
            
However, the NGOs’ approach to constantly inform and convince people within these
organisations may have a long-term effect that cannot be underestimated. Moreover,
indirect pressure from the NGOs on other (international) governmental organisations,
NGOs, and think tanks may have the desired effect, for example, if centre-right oriented
policy makers do not assume that certain environmental initiatives are coming from
ideologically motivated ecologists. In other words, NGOs transfer the salience of the 
problem to an actor who has a higher legitimacy among the targeted group. One of the
reasons it might be easier for industry associations and policy makers to maintain the
status quo and might be more difficult for NGOs to disrupt the current state is that the 
issue of NOx and CO2 emissions is more intangible and therefore more difficult to link
casualties with the scandal.
It came out in the interviews that, for many politicians, the crisis at VWG is not directly
linked to CSR and the role of policy makers. They acknowledged that VWG made a
mistake; however, many policy makers, especially the ones from the government at the 
time, did not see a contradiction in VWG’s CSR claims.
35
The interview with an advisor
of an opposition party testified with the stance that CSR and a company’s business
activities are perceived as two separate aspects in the political debate. In addition, CSR 
is considered an addition or accessory (Interview #15). Thus, the view of many politicians
resembles that of some of the top-ranking members of VWG: the scandal represents
technical errors combined with the misjudgements of few people, rather than a major
violation of the MNC’s CSR principles, which should play a role in each part of the 
company. Moreover, an interviewed representative of the SPD stated that the 
interweaving between business and policy makers does not have anything to do with the
scandal, as that was a single case, in which the management or only a few people from
VWG made faulty decisions (Interview #9). This was in line with VWG’s (initial) argument
that only a few people within the company were involved in the scandal (Gnirke 2017).
The judgement has been expressed several times by political decision makers (of CDU
and SPD) that the major crisis at VWG has been caused by the corporation’s
management and that it is mainly a VWG problem, as politicians do not have influence
on corporate decisions. The interviews with policy makers revealed that they did not see
how their behaviour could have influenced VWG to commit these frauds. A policy maker
35






         
   
                
          
              
        
    
              
        
        
         
             
          
      
           
             
         
                
          
            
          
            
        
 
            
         
              
           
               
          
       
             
       
indicated that ‘the policy was not involved at all when considering [whether VWG should 
use defeat device systems]’ (Interview #12).
Moreover, another policy maker stated that the cliché is not right and said that he has
never experienced the fact that a MoP has been used by the car industry. ‘The exchange
with companies is such that companies affected by a regulation point out that this
involves certain problems and say: “Please take this into account in the legislative 
process”’ (Interview #17, policy maker).
The policy makers only considered whether there is a direct causality, a short period
between cause and effect. However, these actors failed to recognise that the processes
are more subtle, complex, and longer lasting. The intertwining between policy makers
and industry has more systemic causes, for example, the regular changes from policy
makers to the industry and vice versa, and the lack of control of authorities that have
served MNCs, such as VWG, for many years. It is undeniable that political institutions
have a minor influence on a corporation’s culture and understanding of CSR. However,
it is too short-sighted to refer only to the corporation, considering the excess of the 
scandal and the lengthiness of the issues that resulted in the massive crisis that cost
VWG billions in the USA. These political actors’ understanding of their own role would 
mean that a great extent of NGOs’ efforts to interact with and to put pressure on policy
makers would be hopeless. Moreover, the problem that automotive producers exceeded
the allowed emission levels in their vehicles had been known for many years in Germany
and Europe (e.g. EC (COM) ENTR D5/PÅ D 2010). Policy makers could have formulated 
drastic sanctions for companies that disregarded the regulations or could have acted to
put companies, such as VWG, under pressure to avoid punishment as experienced in
the USA.
The regulative pressure might be the sharpest weapon of policy makers to ensure that
companies, such as VWG, ‘walk the talk’ and do not foster greenwashing activities.
Therefore, NGOs try to influence policy makers to move towards ‘hard law’ and to
enforce the existing regulations. That will be investigated in more detail in Section 6.3.
However, according to Sullivan (2006: 42), ‘it is important to recognise that […] the reality
is that in many 'hard law' agreements, provisions concerning controversial social issues
have been put into very general, and probably meaningless, hortatory language’.
Blowfield and Frynas (2005: 509) stated that NGOs’ call for more regulation ‘seem to






          
           
           
        
          
          
    
         
          
     
            
           
         
           
             
         
              
         
            
         
             
            
          
         
             
            
           
           
         
          
																																																						
                
           
           
           
         
environmental justice’. Therefore, there are limitations to the assumption that stricter
regulations solve existing CSR-related problems. First, MNCs like VWG actively shape
laws by influencing policy makers at the EU and national (Germany) levels. The
company’s corporate political activities aim at lobbying against stricter CO2 emissions,
the retention of legal loopholes, and privileges for the automotive industry, for example,
the tax relief for diesel cars or company cars. Second, stricter regulations might only
export the problem. Automotive manufacturers may produce more cars abroad.
However, Germany remains a major and strong sales market, and car producers can be 
forced to comply to German law, even if the rest of Europe would not formulate sanctions.
5.3 Indicators of Political Institutional Failure36 
It is no secret that the automotive industry is one of the most important industries in
Germany and is therefore of great significance for German policy makers. This has been
emphasised in several interviews with policy makers (e.g. Interviews #5 and #17). The 
automotive manufacturers spend millions of euros for lobbying activities, above all VWG
(Bank 2015), to remain the priority for political actors. The CSR and sustainability expert
of the German Government stated that the German automotive industry has ‘always
been handled with velvet gloves by all kinds of associations such as economic and car
associations as well as by political decision makers’ (Interview #1).
In a TV documentary on the VWG scandal, Mary Nichols, the former chairperson of
CARB, recalled a meeting with high-ranking German managers and Chancellor Merkel
in 2010 (Scheunert 2016). Nichols was surprised that Merkel knew her and how well she
was informed about the environmental laws in California. She remembered that Merkel
complained about the tough regulation. The German chancellor ‘sounded like the
spokesperson of the German automotive industry’ (Scheunert 2016). Another example
for the closeness between policy makers and the automotive industry was the last-minute
intervention of Chancellor Angela Merkel regarding the EU regulation that limited the
emissions of cars to 95 grams of CO2 per kilometre by 2020 (Carrington 2013). The CSR
expert of the government observed the final stage of the negotiations for environmental
regulations in Brussels and summarised the behaviour of the German automotive
companies with the following words: ‘If we can no longer prevent policies, then, we try to
36
Note: The expression ‘political institutional failure’ is a term that political actors from the coalition (CDU 
and SPD) and important representatives of VWG would not use in the context of Dieselgate and the general 
behaviour of policy makers towards the German automotive industry. From their perspective, there has never
been a political failure. It is civil society including NGOs and experts, the media, and members of the 






          
         
     
            
         
         
      
        
       
               
           
 
                 
       
       
    
     
              
     
     
           
             
           
        
              
           
       
           
       
       
           
          
shape it’ (Interview #26). In other words, when the MNCs realised that resistance against 
a regulation would not work anymore, as too many countries’ representatives wanted it,
they made sure that they contributed to shape the content, according to the expert.
The DUH stated that the German Government’s affirmation that it was surprised and did
not know about the automotive companies’ manipulations was simply wrong. According
to the DUH, during 2007 and 2015, the NGO warned policy makers and the public ‘in
countless press conferences, experts rounds, with publications, emission tests and
campaigns’ (Resch, Saar, and Hufeisen 2015: n.p.) of VWG’s, Daimler Group’s, and 
BMW Group’s violations of health and climate protection regulations.
The interviewed traffic policy expert of the NGO DUH stated that there are two debates
and crises. On one hand, it is an organisational crisis of VWG and a crisis of the German 
automotive industry.
On the other hand, it is a crisis of the institution, that is, of those who have
been aware of the problem for years and have not reacted to it. Then, the 
question [is], why can the industry do something? ... If I, as a private
person, would do something like that, I would have an annoying lawsuit
breathing down my neck. (Interview #18, DUH)
The passivity of the responsible authorities and the knowledge of policy makers that the
current procedures and the interplay between the relevant institutions are not working 
effectively have been mentioned several times in the interviews. In addition, NABU’s
traffic expert stated: ‘Something like the Federal Minister of Transport and this inactivity,
I have never experienced that in this form’ (Interview #7). The coalition consisting of CDU
and SPD denied the recognition of a complicity in the scandal. In June 2017, the
members of the 5th parliamentary investigation committee presented a 700-page report
about the role of policy makers in the VWG scandal (Behrens et al. 2017). The involved
members of the coalition stated that ‘the committee has not revealed any relevant new
findings’ and that the appointment of the committee was not required (Deutscher
Bundestag Online Dienste 2017), whereas the members of the opposition, The Greens,
expounded that the scandal revealed ‘organised government failure’ and ‘a culture of
looking away’ (Deutscher Bundestag Online Dienste 2017).
The parliamentary party leader of The Greens in Bayern, Bäumer, stated that only the






       
   
           
            
          
        
               
      
            
       
  
          
         
             
        
             
         
           
         
        
          
         
           
       
              
        
    
																																																						
                
     
          
                  
         
           
and VWG (Bäumer 2017: 66). However, the former unionist also critically asked where 
IG Metall’s and the works council’s demands are for a changing management.
37 
In February 2017, the EC sent a final warning to Germany regarding the country’s 
‘persistent breaches of NO2 [nitrogen oxide] limit values’ in various regions (EC 2017a).
38 
These indications are not surprising, considering that policy makers, environmental
agencies, and governmental authorities have known about the problem for many years.
The EPA discovered emission rigging at diesel trucks 20 years ago and made clear that
defeat devices are illegal (EPA 1998). Both European and American companies had to 
pay a multi-million dollars fine in the USA (US Department of Justice 1998). Tests
confirmed that German truck companies cheated in Germany too; however, they did not 
have to pay a fine.
The interviewed NGOs and members of the opposition remarked critically that politicians
have been changing seamlessly from political offices to companies in the automotive
industry. In 2016, Greenpeace published a booklet that listed 33 politicians and lobbyists
who either changed profession without a qualifying period, were identified supporters of
the car industry, or were so-called ‘double players’, who have a political mandate and
support the interests of the automotive industry (Austrup 2016). A prominent example is
the director of the lobbying organisation VDA, Matthias Wissmann, who was the minister
of transport between 1993 and 1998. The NGOs LobbyControl (Lange et al. 2017) and 
DUH (Interview #30) suggested implementing qualifying periods to disrupt or at least
delay this cycle.
39 
However, according to DUH, the discussion around a (longer)
qualifying period might not be the most important aspect in the debate of how the strong
intertwining between policy makers and companies, such as VWG, may be loosened.
I find it more important to create greater transparency in the decisions
made. If I, as an association, now want to know how a decision has
actually been made, then we need a very long breath [Note: this refers to
a long staying power] and a good lawyer, if we want to have appropriate 
37 
Refer to Section 2.5.1 for more information on incidents about the problematic relationship between VWG’s
management and the works council.
38 
The EC also sent final warnings to France, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
39
Since 2015, there is a law that ‘officials and former members of the Federal Government must display
employment outside the public service if conflicts of interest are to be feared. This applies to employment






        
    
         
            
             
       
         
 
           
              
              
             
             
           
             
            
       
          
        
         
        
           
        
            
      
            
       
           
        
																																																						
       
  
              
                 
 
access to the files. Then, one clearly realises the different balances of
power (Interview #30, DUH).
LobbyControl suggested introducing a ‘legislative footprint’ (Lange et al. 2017: 14) to
create more transparency in the legislative process. Such a footprint would aim to reveal
who contributed to the formulation of a draft law and to what extent incorporated
suggestions from the industry played a role in the process. The described issues show
that there are various factors that favour the engagement of car producers on the political
level.
Another example that illustrates the strong intertwining and extent that policy makers
follow the line of the automotive industry is the debate around the testing of emissions.
The transport policy experts of the biggest NGOs criticised in unison that there are no
RDE tests of diesel cars in Germany.
40 
Tests strengthened the accusation that the car
producers, among others, VWG, programmed the cars in a way that the device that
reduces the NOx emissions is switched off during the normal street use of the car.
According to the transport policy expert of the NGO BUND (Interview #6), VWG and 
other manufacturers justified the high values by stating that such a defeat device would
protect the engine and is therefore necessary. The Federal Minister of Transport,
Alexander Dobrindt, and his ministry copied these assumptions without checking
whether the industry’s statements were actually true (Adelhardt and Strozyk 2016).
The reports of several experts (e.g. from University Heidelberg, Technical University
Berlin, and Technical University Graz), which were created on behalf of the 5
th 
parliamentary investigation committee, stated that the KBA did nothing to stop the diesel
car manufacturers from cheating on emissions, even though it has been known for many
years.
41 
Denis Pöhler from the Institute for Environmental Physics at the University
Heidelberg assumed that the close interweaving between the KBA and the automotive 
industry could be the cause for these irregularities (Pöhler 2016: 6). He indicated that 
authorities and policy makers have not done anything, even though they were aware of
the great deviation between cars that became increasingly cleaner in the official emission
tests; however, the measured pollution burden increased continuously. Furthermore, the
40 
The portable emission measurement system (PEMS) is such a system that could be applied to determine 
the RDE.
41 
Note: The reports of the experts (In German: Stellungnahmen der Sachverständigen) Mayer, Mock, and
Pöhler can be found in the ‘Decision Recommendation and Report of the 5
th
Committee of Inquiry according






          
            
            
           
          
         
          
         
            
      
         
          
      
 
              
           
           
          
         
           
              
         
          
    
          
         
           
              
         
           
     
            
          
expert Andreas Mayer criticised the ‘lousy limits, false definitions, unrealistic
measurement procedures and the continuous reduction of controls (in comparison to the
USA)’ (Mayer 2016: 1) of the EU. He also stated that it is all about the operating cost and
that environmental ethics would be ‘from time immemorial a foreign word for the
automotive industry’ (Mayer 2016: 1). These statements indicate that the CSR and
sustainability reports of MNCs, such as VWG, serve to lull and satisfy ‘pressure groups’ 
like NGOs. These reports, such as the one from VWG, present a sustainable and social
corporate behaviour that may even exist in some areas; however, the evidence shows
that VWG failed when it came to finding solutions to make their core product, the car, 
environmentally friendlier and compliant with regulations. Note that the regulatory
softness in Germany favoured the whole industry, and VWG is not a single case (Mock
2016). Companies, such as Opel and the Fiat Group, cheated as well; however, none of
these companies did that (to this extent) in the stricter US market.
5.4 Summary
The aim of the chapter is to explore the determinants of the strong intertwining between
the automotive industry and VWG and German policy makers. Chapter 5 elucidates the 
study’s contextual factors, which are reflected in the two dimensions ‘regulatory softness’
and ‘indicators of political failure’. Within the first dimension, the presented findings show
the controversies around soft and hard law, the NGOs’ disagreement about the
usefulness of more regulations, and how voluntary CSR would change the role of NGOs.
It shows that NGOs might act as civil regulators in times of increasing soft law
agreements. That may strengthen the CSOs’ positions. However, at the same time, it
puts MNCs in a more powerful position and acknowledges that it is sufficient if they follow
self-created CSR standards.
The second dimension, ‘indicators of political failure’, illustrates the various forms of the
interconnections between policy makers and the automotive industry. These linkages
are reflected, among others, in the longstanding ignorance of problems that have been
known to policy makers and in the transfers of political actors into important positions of
automotive companies. The analysis of these circumstances contributes to a better
understanding of why NGOs felt urged to use coercive influence instruments, such as 
lawsuits (that will be discussed in more detail in Section 6.3.3).
The understanding of these contextual dynamics paves the way for the following chapter






         
          
             
         





























explaining how NGOs exert direct and indirect influence. Moreover, Chapter 5 
contributes to understanding how the contextual aspects effect the NGO influence
instruments. The next chapter will explain the mechanisms of direct and indirect NGO
influence on VWG by linking it with the information provided in this chapter and the 






     
  
         
            
             
     
            
         
           
            
   
           
            
             
             
             
          
            
     
            
          
         
         
         
            
             
          
    
     
            
          
          
CHAPTER 6: MECHANISMS OF NGO INFLUENCE
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter discussed the factors indicating a strong intertwining between 
German policy makers and the German automotive industry, especially VWG, and how
this interweaving is a restraining determinant of NGO influence. This chapter aims to
understand the mechanisms with which NGOs exert conditional and unconditional
influence on VWG. It presents the findings that were collected from senior
representatives of NGOs, policy makers and CSR experts between November 2015 and 
February 2018. Even though some of the findings will be discussed by bringing in 
stakeholder concepts, the focus will be on presenting findings shown in the data structure 
(Figure 7).
The data gained from the stakeholder literature and the primary and secondary data 
collection indicated that NGO influence may be roughly differentiated in two categories.
Therefore, this chapter is divided in direct and indirect approaches of NGO influence.
Even though NGOs often combine direct and indirect methods of influence, the division
makes sense, as it facilitates the analysis and structuring of the data. Section 6.2
‘Mechanisms of Conditional Direct NGO Influence’ analyses the formal and informal 
mechanisms of direct NGO influence by discussing how the relationships between NGOs
and VWG took place before Dieselgate and how the crisis changed these interactions.
By doing that, the exertion of influence via NGO-MNC stakeholder dialogues will also be 
examined. Lastly, Section 6.2 will present the process of how NGOs create gradual
pressure on the automotive company VWG and concludes with a table on NGOs'
measures and approaches of direct influence (Table 9). Section 6.3 ‘Mechanisms of
Indirect NGO Influence’ draws on the approaches of NGOs to influence political decision 
makers to increase the pressure on VWG and the automotive industry. Moreover, the
section provides evidence of the influence strength and effects of NGO alliances. It also
shows that the coercive pressure tool ‘lawsuit’ is an effective NGO influence instrument
that will be discussed in more detail in Section 6.3.3.
6.2 Mechanisms of Conditional Direct NGO Influence
This dimension encompasses the mechanisms that relate to the direct influence NGOs
exert on VWG. Direct NGO influence approaches consist of partnerships between MNC






           
           
 
          
              
            
              
            
              
         
           
        
          
          
         
 
          
           
          
     
           
       
 
  
                
         
              
       
         
            
        
           
             
interactions during AGMs. The depth of these relationships and the effectiveness of the
tactics and strategies differ, and which of these instruments weigh more cannot always 
be identified. 
Keck and Sikking’s (1998) stages of influence will be applied to better classify NGO
influence and explain why it is a long-lasting process to actually change MNC behaviour.
Frooman’s (1999) typology of influence strategies will be considered. Why it might be 
insufficient to rely on a typology that categorises stakeholder power but does not point
out that NGOs’ influence might not always be consistent will also be discussed. The
actors’ influence may change if an organisation experiences a crisis and has a greater
need for legitimacy. This section’s dimension is called ‘mechanisms of conditional direct
NGO influence’, as the findings show that the tight interweaving between policy makers
and the car industry limits the influence of NGOs. It is labelled ‘conditional’ due to the 
NGOs’ lack of leverage and the organisations' dependence on external, contextual
factors, and the MNC’s goodwill. This work shows how the contextual aspects, the strong 
intertwining between policy makers and the automotive industry, limit the effect of NGO
influence.
Section 6.2.1, ‘Influence within changing relationships’, explains how NGOs may exert
influence within partnerships and how the relationships changed during the emissions
crisis at VWG. It will investigate how the NGO NABU could influence VWG’s CSR
approach within the partnership. Section 6.2.2 examines to what extent NGOs are able 
to exert effective influence within the stakeholder dialogue with VWG. The last section,
Section 6.2.3 ‘Process of creating gradual pressure', considers various NGO approaches
to increase the pressure on VWG.
6.2.1 Influence within Changing Relationships
A couple of years ago, before the exposure of Dieselgate, VWG and a number of its civil
society stakeholders, such as the interviewed NGOs, were in mostly constructive MNC-
NGO dialogues. A crisis of such an extent was not yet foreseeable. This ‘ideal world’
ended around six months before the crisis arose in September 2015. However, in these 
years, clear indicators could be identified that there was something significantly going
wrong at VWG (refer to chronology of VWG scandal in Section 2.3). The often-praised 
stakeholder dialogue of VWG, their decorated CSR and sustainability approach (e.g.
CDP 2013; FTSE 2013; S&P Dow Jones Indices and RobecoSam 2013) and the






             
       
         
           
         
        
               
       
          
            
      
          
             
         
       
    
               
       
            
              
    
              
          
       
          
            
           
        
            
         
         
																																																						
         
      
         
from the crisis. This leads to several conclusions that will be elucidated in more detail at
a later stage. Before the crisis, VWG still had the image of being the frontrunner among 
the worldwide car makers as regards CSR. The corporation was listed in major
environmental indices and was considered to be one of the world’s most reputable
companies that was committed to improving the environment and social behaviour (refer 
for more details to Section 2.5 ‘VWG and its CSR Approach’).
Major institutions in society fuelled the hype and, to some extent, the myth around VWG
being Germany’s greatest and best-known manufacturer that builds ‘clean’ cars that
‘convey a special sense of life’ (Scheunert 2016). In addition, VWG had been lauded as
the vanguard of engagement with civil society and was celebrated as a best practice
example in many business areas. Universities and policy makers could not mention 
enough the important role VWG played for society and Germany as a business
location.
42 
For example, in May 2013, the magazine Forbes introduced VWG’s then CEO
Winterkorn as the impending leader of the world’s biggest car producer (Müller 2013). 
Today, VWG serves as example of bad business practice, as the following statement 
from a policy maker suggests:
This is a special example of how we do not want corporations to act. In
that respect, if one looks for negative examples; [I have] no idea who
would have been mentioned in the past, probably Mr Ackermann and the
Deutsche Bank, now it is VWG and that will not go away for a while.
(Interview #16, policy maker)
On one hand, this statement reflects VWG’s changing image after the crisis. On the other
hand, it illustrates that this period provided momentum for the NGOs to exert influence
on the automotive producer, for example, via policy makers. Dieselgate contributed to a 
certain de-legitimisation of VWG’s CSR behaviour and made it potentially more
vulnerable and receptive to NGO interventions. That goes into the direction of Hendry’s
(2005) proposition that NGOs are more likely to target a company if the firm’s actions
have (negative) consequences for the environment and if the company violates norms
regularly. Furthermore, the author stated that there is a greater likelihood that NGOs will
target a corporation, if it represents an industry that is under constant NGO observation
and if the company is a big player in its business. All these factors are given in VWG’s
42
In the author’s interviews, several politicians emphasised VWG’s importance for German society and the 
economy and their significance for the brand ‘made in Germany’. These statements implied that caution 






            
            
           
       
                
          
           
          
      
           
         
        
               
           
         
            
          
          
       
          
          
          
      
      
     
             
             
       
          
         
         
               
																																																						
             
case. The MNC is the biggest company of an industry that is under high scrutiny due to
its massive effects on the environment and its high resource requirements. Moreover,
VWG frequently trespasses regulations and broke the national and international laws
repeatedly within the last couple of years.
Prior to the crisis at VWG, there have been efforts from both VWG and NGOs to build
relationships and seek cooperation. Some of the most important ENGOs in Germany,
such as NABU, BUND, and Greenpeace, and the NGOs TI and DKA, talked to VWG
about different matters.
43 
The NGOs were aware of certain issues, for example, the 
deviation between the emissions that VWG and other car producers put in the 
descriptions of the models and the actual RDE. However, the overall impression of NGOs
were that these issues did not indicate a major scandal, which would affect most of the
German and international automotive manufacturers. There was the tendency to think
that the higher emissions were the norm in the automotive industry, as long as it could
not be proved that these deviations were the result of a systematic fraud, until the year
2015. This is illustrated in the following NGO statement:
We always had a feeling that there was something wrong. This was
known for years…. This NOx story – why are the vehicles getting cleaner
on paper, but the values do not decrease in the cities? That just makes 
no sense. Also, we know that the deviation from the norm and real
consumption [RDE] is always drifting further apart. For years, we have no
improvement in fuel consumption at all. There are always these borders
between what is legal and what is already fraud. They are so fluent. Also,
because the lawmaker did not look closely and sometimes, did not quite 
define what’s allowed and what isn’t. And here, the industry has become 
increasingly better at exploiting these loopholes. (Interview #7, NABU)
This statement describes a level of discontent about the discrepancy between cars that
became increasingly cleaner on paper and the increasing pollution in the cities that was
expressed by NGOs in letters and publications before the revelation of Dieselgate (e.g.
DUH 2015; Franco et al. 2014; Lohbeck 2011). In addition, NABU’s representative
pointed towards a certain legal ambiguity and the inactivity of legislators (refer to Section
5.3), who did not ensure that automotive companies, such as VWG, follow the existing 
rules or reply to the NGOs’ complaints. It also indicates that the NGOs’ influence exerted
43 






         
             
              
      
      
  
           
          
             
    
            
              
         
            
           
               
            
         
    
          
           
           
            
           
           
          
         
           
          
             
       
   
in dialogues, partnerships, and publications did not have sufficient influence to change
the MNC’s CSR practices. However, there is a question regarding whether the NGOs
were not able to create enough public outrage to question VWG’s legitimacy or whether
decision makers within KBA, the government, and technical inspection centres were
unwilling to intervene due to the discussed tight interconnection between industry and
political actors.
In its sustainability report, VWG wrote that it took stakeholders’ suggestions into account
and therefore ‘welcomes the introduction of RDE and WLTP [Worldwide Harmonized
Light Vehicles Test Procedure], as both testing methods will help close the gap between
emissions measured in the laboratory and those generated under real-world driving
conditions’ (VWG 2016c: 21). This is another example that NGOs are heard; however, it
has yet to be substantiated whether the NGO pressure will result in changing behaviour.
Drawing from Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) stages of influence, the rhetoric commitment
might be located among Stage 2 (influence on discursive positions) and 3 (influence on
institutional procedures). However, NGOs’ influence may only then be ascribed to a
change of VWG’s CSR behaviour (Stage 5), if the RDE tests of VWG’s models would
show the promised improvements. This will be shown eventually. Then, it will come out
whether the NGOs’ persistence has been successful and the MNCs understand that
there is no way around providing honest information about their cars’ real emissions.
The complexity of stakeholder interactions between NGOs and MNCs like VWG is due
to the fact that NGOs have different styles and attitudes in approaching and influencing
MNCs. That is paired with different motives that make it difficult to identify which NGO
has what influence on the CSR approach of an MNC. All the mentioned NGOs, in one
way or another, created a relationship with VWG that allowed the NGOs to exert certain
influence. However, only NABU had an official partnership with VWG until the end of
2015, which has not been resumed since then. After the scandal, the NGO demanded
changes as a precondition for the resumption of the cooperation (Oeliger 2015):
We have said [that] something substantial needs to happen in the
company. It cannot only be that the vehicles become compliant. And that
is where we have made this series of demands. My status today [July







             
       
               
             
      
       
              
            
       
             
          
 
            
        
            
             
     
           
          
       
           
        
            
              
      
               
         
          
         
 
               
           
Moreover, NABU’s statement indicates that VWG would need to go through a process
of change to regain the trust that is required to engage in a partnership or dialogue again.
This statement also reveals that NABU felt that its demands, listed on their website, have
been taken seriously (Oeliger 2015). The first one was that not only VWG’s board but
also the supervisory board should discuss environmental topics on a regular basis and 
allocate a person that is responsible for and reports on environmental aspects. The
second demand related to the concept of an internal operational control to prevent further
compliance violations. Third, NABU demanded that VWGmust take the limit values more
seriously and stop applying tricks that simulate lower emissions. It seemed that the
pressure, be it from NGOs or the public, influenced VWG to act more swiftly. The 
corporation’s cars, tested in 2016, were better than the average of the tested cars (DUH
2016c).
Another demand that NABU formulated was that VWG should use the instrument
stakeholder dialogue more intensively and seriously than in the past. Section 6.2.2 will
show that NABU has not been alone in the assumption that the stakeholder dialogue 
with VWG did not generate a satisfying outcome and did not work as VWG described it
in its sustainability and annual reports.
In addition, NABU’s interviewed traffic expert stated that the official cooperation between
the NGO and VWG had mainly been with representatives of VWG’s sustainability
department, who ‘consider sustainability and environmental protection as essential’
(Interview #7, NABU). Therefore, he had the hope that European’s biggest car
manufacturer would recognise its responsibility and act accordingly. However, since the 
crisis occurred in September 2015, the contact between the NGO and VWG is rather
informal, considering that both parties are not too keen to enter in a partnership again.
The following quote provides evidence for that:
Over time, it became clear that there is still one or another skeleton in the
cupboard. Especially now, after Der Spiegel revealed that…. [Note: this
refers to the cartel agreement scandal in the German automobile
industry.] There, we have to keep some distance for now. They must do 
their homework. (Interview #27, NABU)
This statement was made in the interview in 2017. One year earlier, in August 2016,






     
          
           
             
            
         
       
           
         
          
           
         
            
          
        
           
       
               
         
 
               
              
        
      
       
            
       
																																																						
                
                    
               
                
           
            
          
continuation of the dialogue with VWG in a non-partnership relation, and that the 
articulated demands would contribute to required policy changes. The statement above
reflects NABU’s dissociation of VWG and the NGO’s dissatisfaction about the
corporation’s lack of progress in the reappraisal of the crisis. Moreover, it illustrates that
the NGOs’ criticism and suggestions only resonate with VWG to a limited extent. Among
the reasons the NGO NABU felt it would be better to keep a certain distance for the time 
being is that VWG has annoyed and irritated customers, shareholders, consumer
protection organisations, and NGOs with its style of communication and lack of
understanding of the severity of the crisis. At VWG’s AGM in 2017, the corporate 
governance expert Strenger (2017) criticised that there is a ‘siege mentality’ and no
willingness for true transparency and clarification. For example, VWG promised to
publish the report of the law firm Jones Day; however, at the AGM, the chairman of 
VWG’s supervisory board, Pötsch, stated that VWG will never do that (Pötsch 2017).
44 
In this context, it is remarkable that it needed a court verdict that forced VWG to let a
special auditor investigate the events around Dieselgate (Oberlandesgericht Celle 2017). 
Funds and associations of private investors filed a lawsuit against VWG after they tried 
unsuccessfully to propose a special auditor at VWG’s AGM in 2016.
One of BUND’s traffic experts is not surprised that certain modes of behaviour have not
changed and showed some understanding for VWG, acknowledging that changes take
time:
VWG has not [changed] to the extent that I had thought. I know people at
VWG […] who say that little has changed within VWG. That is clear. One
cannot expect that decades of gridlocked structures [will] change within
one year. You need more air [time]. (Interview #28, BUND)
These ‘gridlocked structures’ within VWG and the rather distant attitude of the top 
management towards NGOs might be among the reasons the core of the relationships
between VWG and the NGOs did not change significantly after the crisis became public. 
44
Hans Dieter Pötsch stated that ‘Volkswagen is prevented from doing so for legal reasons’ (Pötsch 2017: 
n.p.). According to him, the final report of the law firm Jones Day was handed over to the US Department of
Justice and included the relevant information in the ‘statement of facts’, which was published by the US
Department of Justice (2017b). Moreover, the chairman of the supervisory board stated that the content of
the report might be too explosive, considering that VWG made a plea agreement with the US Department 
of Justice (United States of America Vs. Volkswagen AG 2017). In this agreement, VWG assumed the 






             
           
           
        
         
        
          
           
 
              
         
           
            
             
 
             
       
            
     
          
        
      
     
              
           
          
          
         
            
              
          
            
																																																						
          
   
The statement may also indicate the MNC’s inflexibility and be an indicator of a lack of
willingness to learn. Jung and Park (2017: 130) referred to past problems and scandals
when stating that an ‘insular governance culture was a roadblock to comprehensive
inquiries of a problem, which impeded effective organisational learning and prevention 
of repeated errors’. This ‘insular governance structure’ that is shaped by the tight 
cooperation between the government of Lower Saxony, the owner families,
45 
and the 
unions may be an explanatory factor concerning why NGO influence hardly permeates
the core of VWG’s business. Therefore, NGOs operate in a context in which it is difficult 
to exert sustainable influence.
After the crisis, it seems that VWG’s priority was on meeting the requirements (e.g.
changing the corporate governance structure, conducting PEMS tests of vehicles, and 
retrofitting cars) of the US and German authorities and to avoid further penalties.
However, NGOs are perceived to be more important, and there are indicators that the 
relationships between NGOs and VWG have changed after the crisis began and so did
the roles of the NGOs. 
As stated in the literature review, Ählström and Sjöström (2005: 238) categorised NGOs
as preservers, protesters, modifiers, and scrutinisers. Judging from the interviews and
secondary data, the NGO NABU can be categorised as a preserver that has always been 
oriented towards cooperation and even ‘joint marketing’. After the crisis, it shifted to a 
modifier who mainly uses demonstrations and appeals. In addition, DUH might be a good
example of a scrutiniser, as the organisation conducts its own measurements within 
more scientifically oriented investigations. Considering the developments after the crisis
and the NGOs’ reaction on lax regulatory standards, a fifth category named ‘suitors’ 
would make sense to capture the NGOs that trust this instrument most when attempting
to influence MNCs and policy makers. Ählström and Sjöström (2005) categorised
Greenpeace as a protester, a valid classification; however, the data shows that it is more
complex and multi-layered. It is true that Greenpeace’s primary approach has always
been campaigns (that were good publicity) to influence corporations, such as VWG. 
However, in 1999, Greenpeace opened its political representation in Berlin to be closer
to the political decision makers and to influence both policy makers and MNCs behind
closed doors and via publications, which is a characteristic for scrutinisers. Therefore,
Greenpeace may be found in many of these categorisations. Overall, it is difficult to
45 
The Porsche Automobil Holding SE holds 52.2% of the voting rights in VWG and is owned by Porsche 






         
          
        
       
        
        
              
   
       
            
         
 
             
    
           
         
  
         
       
     
        
        
         
        
    
         
        
        
          
      
             
              
        
categorise NGOs, considering that the organisations’ behaviour may change according
to a specific situation. Moreover, factors such as pressure from the NGOs’ own members
to follow a certain line, financial restrictions, and the coordination with other organisations
may play a role and influence the NGOs’ behaviour decisively.
Though Greenpeace is often associated with following an aggressive approach
(Mühle 2010), Friedman and Miles (2002: 14) pointed out that the organisation had 
been in various alliances with corporations in the 1990s. More recently, in 2013, the
international NGO engaged in a constructive dialogue with VWG and published a ‘joint
declaration’, in which the corporation announced that it would do everything possible 
to reach the EU target of 95 gram CO2 emissions per kilometre by 2020 (Greenpeace
2013). Greenpeace’s Managing Director Brigitte Behrens stated in the NGO’s press
release:
This is a decision for climate protection and an important signal for the
protection of the environment and society and the production of climate-
friendly technical solutions in series. We will continue to keep in touch
with Volkswagen, with regard to mobility concepts for the future.
(Greenpeace 2013)
At the end of 2015, the German newspaper FAZ expressed surprise at the ‘strange
alliance’ between Greenpeace and VWG. The NGO had apparently transformed from
‘the cheeky, impudent and annoying environmental organisation…to a tame bedside 
rug’ (Weingartner 2015: n.p.). In the interview with the author (Interview #14), 
Greenpeace’s transport expert stated that the journalist twisted his words and
displayed the dialogue with VWG as a measure that would contradict the NGO’s
principles. A VWG spokesperson was cited in the article as follows: ‘Dialogue took
place after the realisation that Greenpeace would never break up the campaign 
without success’ (Weingartner 2015: n.p.). The statement showed that VWG found 
itself compelled to engage in a dialogue, in which the corporation had to offer
something to the NGO to stop image-damaging campaigns. That can be evaluated 
as a clear indicator of the efficacy of Greenpeace’s campaign and its overall influence.
Following Frooman’s (1999) typology of influence strategies, Greenpeace is a 
powerful stakeholder who is less dependent on VWG than the other way around, and 
whose influence was expressed by the fact that VWG agreed to meet the NGO’s






          
          
          
         
          
            
          
    
             
        
             
        
          
 
         
       
     
          
          
          
        
         
     
        
       
      
      
        
            
       
        
            
        
its ‘resource relationship with the firm to leverage that demand’. The author’s
proposition has proved to be correct that, in a relationship that is characterised by
stakeholder power, ‘the stakeholder will choose a direct withholding strategy to
influence the firm’ (Frooman 1999: 202). However, the NGO used the resource
‘campaign’ to do that. Therefore, it was the combination of the withholding and usage
strategy that proved to be successful. The MNC sought the dialogue and was ready
to make compromises to minimise the (negative reputational) effects of the campaign. 
In that regard, Greenpeace’s pressure led to VWG giving in to the NGO’s demands.
However, it is difficult to prove whether the campaign or the dialogues influenced
decisions or advancements within the company’s sustainability approach or whether
it was VWG’s willingness to implement future mobility concepts in the next models.
This declaration did not deter VWG from cheating emissions. This process is a good 
illustration of the various stages of Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) ‘NGO influence 
framework’. 
Greenpeace passed successfully through the first stage, as they could set the issue
‘increased emissions’ on VWG’s agenda through aggressive campaigns and 
subsequent dialogues. It went even further, and Greenpeace managed to influence
the discursive position of VWG. Moreover, VWG followed the NGO’s line and adopted 
its environmental rhetoric. However, it is not observable regarding whether VWG
changed company policies or made other fundamental changes because of the joint
declaration. Therefore, Stages 3, 4, and 5, which build on the third stage, have not 
been reached. Greenpeace’s transport policy expert looked back critically when
recalling the agreement with VWG:
If you evaluate that now six [or] seven years later, even what happened
after that, then you have to qualify the story. This commitment [VWG’s
and Greenpeace’s joint declaration to reach 95 grams of CO2 emissions
per kilometre by 2020] did not lead to anything. In retrospect, you are 
always smarter. At the same time, if you look at that difference between 
CO2 consumption on paper and on the road, it was on average 40%
higher by manufacturers in Europe. These were findings that we did not
have at that time. This is a discrepancy that has split even further [….] If 
you look at it from this point of view, that's a Pyrrhic victory. We were able






          
    
                
        
        
          
              
            
      
        
      
     
             
      
           
       
     
           
           
           
        
                
   
             
             
              
          
           
      
																																																						
               
                  
     
          
          
climate change, where we actually want to go, our approach was the
wrong one. (Interview #33, Greenpeace)
The joint declaration with VWG in 2013 was result of a dialogue between the two actors.
The statement illustrates a certain process of reflection on the part of Greenpeace,
recognising that the confrontational instrument ‘campaign’, or clearer and more 
consequent demands might be more effective. However, in hindsight, the NGO realised
that the stakeholder dialogue might not be an effective tool, if there is still too much
latitude for the MNC and not much regulatory pressure to stick to the communicated
declaration. Greenpeace exerted sufficient pressure on VWG that the MNC met the 
NGO’s demands and therefore ‘won’ the campaign against VWG. However, not a great
deal has been achieved, considering the greater context and continuing discrepancy
between the CO2 values that VWG stated and the RDE. Mühle (2010: 223) analysed that 
Greenpeace is more interested in putting topics on the agenda and mobilising companies
and people, rather than developing ‘practical everyday solutions’. That indicates that 
Greenpeace could not have been concerned in following the process until VWG changes
its environmental behaviour. However, it sometimes only becomes clear in retrospect
that an MNC merely rhetorically committed to an agreed outcome.
Mühle’s (2010) statement might be one explanation regarding why NGOs, such as
Greenpeace, may influence VWG only to a limited degree from a rather short-term view.
It can also be related to the situation that NGOs depend on donations, and those are 
usually higher if the NGO is able to keep an issue in the media (Smillie and Minear
2004).
46
If the public attention abates, then an NGO might not be able to use such a
scandal for its purposes.
Even though it might appear to be a failure in that Greenpeace did not accomplish
persuading VWG to maintain the position to reduce emissions to 95 grams of CO2 per
kilometre,
47 
this declaration may have led to a situation in which other NGOs and
stakeholders could hold VWG accountable for the promises. In other words, though the 
behaviour of VWG could not be changed sustainably (Stage 5), future negotiations may
build on that declaration and be used to exert pressure on VWG. Therefore, other NGOs
46
In their book, the authors cite an NGO director with the following words: ‘You know instinctively what will 
sell and what won’t […] You can’t raise private donor money for Angola; you need sustained media attention’
(Smillie and Minear 2004: 180-181).
47 
That would be Stage 4 in Keck and Sikkink’s (1998: 26) framework: NGOs are able to influence MNCs or






              
           
         
           
     
            
           
  
          
        
        
           
           
       
        
      
             
          
 
           
      
     
        
    
             
               
       
            
           
              
           
         
may use the tactic ‘accountability politics’, which is part of Keck and Sikkink’s (1998: 25)
influence tactics, to hold VWG accountable for declarations made and to show the
discrepancy between the corporation’s lip service and its (lack of) actions. Thereby,
NGOs may increase the risk that the MNC’s reputation is damaged, which could increase
the pressure on the firm to minimise this gap (Sullivan 2006).
Generally, if a topic has raised the attention of an NGO, the organisation approaches the
MNCs to debate the topic in public or non-public discussions. Thus, DUH’s traffic expert
described this process with the following words:
If we take up a topic, it is often the case that we, as DUH, regularly
organise ‘expert rounds’. That’s how we call it, where we try to bring all
the actors to the table. Manufacturers, associations, … representatives
from the supplier industry who can supply innovative technologies and try
to discuss the problem in this circle, and to bring forward solutions. Some
of these topics are then more or less advanced in this context, without
large-scale public relations work. For other topics it is different, it is also
dependent on how complex the topic is and whether we can hope to raise 
some interest outside. On the other hand, it is also dependent on how it
is done here, whether we need the public pressure, or whether we feel
that it goes well without it. (Interview #18, DUH)
This response illustrates that this NGO follows a procedure when using ‘softer’, 
cooperative approaches. Direct methods, such as round table discussions and expert 
panels, bring different actors together to exchange views and to participate in the 
problem-solving process. Thereby, the DUH fathoms whether representatives of the
automotive industry understand the severity of an issue. Should these influence 
approaches not lead to any change, the NGO considers going to the next step and using
lawsuits as a last resort (that will be analysed in Section 6.2.3) or combining it with a
multiplicity of direct and indirect pressure tools.
There are various reasons it is attractive for both MNCs and NGOs to build relationships
or to have regular exchanges. Among the key reasons for MNCs are that these meetings
may minimise the risk of getting attacked by NGOs and provide information on potential
issues and how civil society representatives perceive the actions of an MNC. Moreover,






          
          
            
           
            
        
       
       
       
  
              
              
            
           
          
             
           
         
      
           
        
           
          
        
          
           
           
   
            
         
																																																						
        
              
     
compensate for the lack of power using ‘reputational capital’ (Curbach 2008: 371).
Reputational capital refers to the ‘intangible assets’ of an organisation, such as integrity,
credibility, quality, or safety. Teegen (2003: 273) stated that international NGOs are
informal institutions that possess social capital, as they ‘create value for themselves, for
other actors and for the public at large, further legitimising their importance in the global 
arena’. According to Teegen, Doh, and Vachani (2004: 466), NGOs are the 
‘organisational manifestations of civil society interests’. Furthermore, MNCs
acknowledge that some NGOs, such as Greenpeace and the WWF, develop
environmental expertise and add their experience and skills in discussions (Curbach
2003).
There are several more benefits than gaining expert knowledge for an MNC to have
NGOs at their side. The NGOs might also increase their legitimacy, as they show to 
members and society their initiative to engage in constructive dialogue. However, NGOs
such as NABU and BUND have been criticised by supporters and the media for being 
too close to companies (Biederbeck, Neubacher, and Traufetter 2013; Kreutzfeldt 2016). 
It is a thin line, considering that credibility and ‘moral superiority’ are the most important
assets for an NGO (refer to Section 2.4.2 for more information). Cooperation with and
donations from companies involve the danger that the NGOs’ watchdog role is
undermined and that these organisations have a conflict of interest, especially if MNCs
follow the ‘explicit aim of locking up potential enemies, or even of using them as Trojan 
horses’ (Elkington 1998: 40). This may eventually lead to a decrease of NGO influence.
These interactions take place in formal settings, such as official partnerships,
cooperation, joint projects, and studies, or in a rather informal manner, for example, in
irregular discussion rounds or telephone calls. Some of the exchanges between NGO
representatives and political actors, especially those from the Ministry of Transport, are 
informal. One of the reasons there is no official contact is that NGOs heavily criticised
the ministry for its inactivity, and the DUH sued the KBA, an authority that is directly
subordinate to the Ministry of Transport (DUH 2016b).
48 
The NGO NABU stated that the long-lasting partnership with VWG became better over
time and that goals could be achieved together and resources were secured for projects
48 
The DUH sued the KBA due to the authority’s refusal to release records regarding the VWG emissions
scandal. The NGO demanded access to the information on VWG’s recall of diesel cars and all the






        
       
            
 
       
             
             
         
       
        
            
       
           
        
          
         
        
           
         
         
         
             
       
           
         
   
            
            
          
            
              
          
       
around environmental protection. Over the years, a certain degree of trust was built
between the NGO and the people working in VWG’s CSR and sustainability
departments. The organisation even felt it could penetrate the car manufacturer’s core
business.
[Regarding] the projects that we have put together there, my impression
was the longer the cooperation existed, the better it got because it came
more and more to the core business. We have, for example, initiated a
joint green fleet concept with VW Financial Services where fleet operators 
can […] take the most efficient and comparatively environmentally friendly 
vehicles …. There, we contributed very strongly. (Interview #7, NABU)
Furthermore, NABU was involved in cooperative activities with VWG for 15 years. After
the crisis became known, NABU did not extend the collaboration. This partnership
reflected well that such a relationship may be beneficial for both parties: VWG gained 
legitimacy and public recognition and proved that it cares about actively engaging with 
civil society and stakeholders in general, while the NGO ensured resources for their
projects, for example, by involving VWG in their nature conservation activities, and 
generated publicity for environmental issues (Scholing-Darby, Flohr, and Oeliger 2014).
Moreover, NABU and VWG implemented projects together and the dialogue took place
at management level, which usually does not interact with representatives of
environmental associations. Thus, the NGO perceived that its actions influenced VWG’s 
CSR behaviour to some extent. Until the diesel scandal became public, this partnership
worked relatively well, and NABU and VWGmet on regular basis. Now and then, NABU’s
executive director called VWG’s sustainability department to ask about progress,
reminding them to fulfil their responsibilities and to exert pressure if necessary. According
to NABU’s representative, NGO intervened when certain plans that contradicted the
agreements were about to be implemented (Interview #7).
It seemed the NGO managed the relationship of tension and the created dependency in
an appropriate way. That means that the NGO had to accept that VWG did not fulfil all
their claims; however, the organisation knew that they had to keep insisting that VWG
practices what they preach, even though the NGO received money for projects. The 
cooperation with VWG expired at the end of 2015; however, there is still a cooperation
with VWG’s affiliated firm VW Financial Services, which has equipped NABU’s moor






         
             
         
           
           
       
         
          
        
             
         
   
            
            
           
        
           
 
   
         
        
          
        
           
           
            
           
         
       
        
																																																						
          
        
         
 
senior representative justified the cooperation by stating that VW Financial Services is 
independent of VWG’s automotive division and has nothing to do with their misconduct
(Interview #27). This explanation falls short, considering that the automotive division and 
the VW Financial Services belong to VWG and are therefore controlled by VWG’s top
management with which NABU did not see a basis for cooperation after the crisis. Even
though there might be a formal separation between VW Financial Services and the other
divisions of the corporation, VWG uses the cooperation between its subsidiaries and 
NABU to advertise its environmental efforts and commitment (e.g. in its sustainability
magazine Shift (VWG 2016b: 57) and in the sustainability report (VWG 2016c: 165)).
Therefore, NABU might state that it continues to act independently and their (publicly
visible) actions might prove that the money comes eventually from the owner of VW
Financial Services: VWG.
Judging from VWG’s (2014: 25) statements, the work of NGOs is noticed. For example,
the corporation stated that it replied to Greenpeace’s request to build more efficient
vehicles by explaining the product strategy. Moreover, VWG mentioned that it replied to
a request of LobbyControl but did not provide more information.
49 
LobbyControl has
reported repeatedly about the proximity between VWG and the car industry and policy
makers.
6.2.2 Influence within Stakeholder Dialogue
Theoretically, the stakeholder dialogue is an important platform for both VWG and NGOs
to exchange views and to understand each other’s issues. O’Riordan and Fairbrass
(2014) located the stakeholder dialogue within ‘communication’, the fourth pillar of the 
authors’ CSR stakeholder engagement framework and stated that it is one of the 
methods for a company to achieve transparency and accountability. However, the data
shows a discrepancy between an ideal stakeholder dialogue and the one that took place
between VWG and the various interviewed NGOs before and after September 2015. The
mentioned discrepancy between the conclusions that VWG should have drawn from the
stakeholder dialogue, and what ran through to the corporation’s top management,
implied that VWG did not take the stakeholder dialogue and interaction seriously. Or, the
company’s top managers and leading departments did not take the people seriously who
49
LobbyControl, founded 2005, is a German civil society initiative that ‘provides information on lobbying, PR
campaigns and think tanks and promotes transparency and democracy in Germany and on the European







          
       
           
  
       
            
         
                 
          
          
       
         
  
              
      
          
           
           
      
          
           
      
   
         
               
          
      
              
            
            
         
          
																																																						
        
led the stakeholder dialogue within VWG. Various interviewees’ statements indicate that
employees working in VWG’s CSR and sustainability departments are decoupled of the
areas, in which important decisions are made. An example is the following statement of
a BUND representative:
I am actually in [a] good exchange with company representatives, but not 
with those who end up making the decisions…. The people from the
sustainability departments say, ‘We can basically do what we want, if that
means €50 less profit per car at the end of the day, then it will not be
done’. This is less frustrating for me because I do not expect anything else
than for the people in the sustainability departments who put a lot of work, 
effort, and brainpower in the development of really innovative, good things
that do not end up in the product because it reduces the profit. (Interview
#28, BUND)
This statement reflects, to some extent, what a study found in 2010 regarding the
partnerships and dialogue between companies and NGOs. Leetz, Horn, and Marschall
(2010) stated that there is a lack of integration among the departments that communicate
with NGOs and those that could potentially benefit from the insight of the dialogue.
50 
Moreover, the authors’ study showed that the core motivation for companies when
engaging in partnerships with NGOs is to increase their reputation and credibility (Leetz,
Horn, and Marschall 2010). Similarly, Sullivan’s (2006) findings reflect the importance of
reputation in the interaction among NGOs and MNCs. The author stated that NGOs are
able to exert more pressure when they pose the danger of damaging an MNC’s
reputation (Sullivan 2006).
Leetz, Horn, and Marschall’s (2010) report also demonstrated that partnerships become
increasingly interesting for NGOs as a source of funding. That may lead to the following
equation: money for a good image. It is questionable regarding whether these factors
are the ingredients of a successful and sustainable partnership, considering that this
reflects a transactional understanding of the partnership, in which often only one area of
the company (e.g. the public relations or the sustainability department) is involved.
Repeatedly VWG (2014) reported its integrative approach and that the learning from the
stakeholder dialogue was considered by top management. However, there are indicators
showing that the interaction with NGOs remains at the edge of the corporation and within 
50 






           
        
            
     
        
           
   
      
               
          
          
       
            
           
       
         
     
               
           
      
      
             
     
            
          
           
      
             
           
       
             
      
         
the CSR and sustainability departments. Thus, BUND’s traffic expert, who is very
experienced in the dialogue with corporations, stated the following:
The strongest contact has been with BMW. There has always been an
open dialogue with BMW, however, with VWG [dialogue has taken place]
only with [a] few people…. The AGMs at VWG are more one-sided,
without feedback…. At some forums, where we could get together with
automotive companies, there are only some welcome speeches,
however, no content-related debates. (Interview #31, BUND)
The statement by BUND reflects that the NGO perceived a lack of critical exchange with
VWG and that the corporation uses dialogue platforms, such as AGMs for ‘one-sided
“monologues”’ (Jonker and Nijhof 2006: 457). Similarly, Burchell and Cook (2013) noted
that companies increasingly disseminate environmental information through reports
without engaging in a serious dialogue with stakeholders. This form of one-way
communication, which is a verbalised form of the sustainability report, makes it difficult
or impossible to influence the MNC’s CSR approach. The senior representative of DUH
stated that the NGO requested meetings with VWG to discuss ongoing issues; however, 
the corporation referred the NGO to the stakeholder dialogue:
We do not see the point to sit with 300 other people in a stakeholder
conference where we would get informed about new [innovations] ..., our
questions wouldn’t be answered there. Because […] one would not enter
into any commitments, which had legal implications. These are meetings
that would have to be led in a much smaller circle […] with people who
make decisions. (Interview #18, DUH)
This last line reveals the NGO’s scepticism about the decision-making power of the
people who lead the stakeholder dialogue. It also shows the NGO’s doubts that the MNC
follows a CSR approach that integrates the produced outcomes in the overarching
strategies. Thus, the NGO decided not to engage in the stakeholder dialogue with VWG,
as it realised that this cooperative instrument is not an effective means to exert influence
alone. The NGO opted instead for what it perceived as a more productive approach by
confronting VWG with the NGO’s own emission measurements along with public
pressure. In line with Burchell and Cook’s (2011) study, NGOs that decided not to take
part in a dialogue may exert even more external pressure. According to the authors’






       
         
        
       
           
        
            
              
    
     
         
       
            
          
             
         
             
          
     
      
        
  
         
        
           
        
        
           
           
          
          
           
           
VWG, can become overwhelmed by requests and demands from NGOs and might use 
that as an excuse to provide a delayed or fragmented reply. A well-coordinated approach
among NGOs that makes use of various instruments may be more effective (Section
6.3.2 will discuss this in more detail).
It has been noted that there were less regular and formal dialogues among NGOs and 
VWG after September 2015 and that the overall meaningfulness of the outcomes
regarding the MNC’s CSR approach was limited. However, there are different, potentially
more subtle ways that NGOs may exert influence or at least influence individuals within
automotive companies. The following quote from a Greenpeace environmental expert
indicates informal methods of staying in contact with VWG:
There are a few stakeholder dialogues. The dialogues are also dependent 
on personal contacts with former colleagues through years of contacts,
who are then sometimes invited as experts, where VW wants to get
informal feedback. If VW or other corporations have developed a new
environmental policy or a new car, then they want to get a first
assessment of environmental experts. That's very often informal […]
There are also the normal rounds, where we are in exchange, where one
says, we think that this and that is right and wrong. However, when we 
are in a more intensive dialogue with a corporation, then, it is usually
accompanied by a campaign. Otherwise it's a waste of time. We see it
that way. The package makes sense to bring about change. (Interview
#32, Greenpeace)
This statement illustrates that even NGOs that are rather confrontational, such as 
Greenpeace, are aware that they should not be closed to the dialogue instrument.
Informal dialogue is a suitable method to stay informed about CSR developments at
automotive companies without jeopardising the NGOs’ direct lines of dialogue, which
would be an uncompromising approach in Greenpeace’s case. According to the NGO,
the instrument ‘stakeholder dialogue’ is considered ineffective (this is in line with
statements of other NGOs, e.g. Interview #18, DUH; Interview #28, BUND). It is an
approach in which NGOs exert only conditional influence, and it reflects the
understanding that a dialogue with automotive producers becomes more effective if it is
in combination with other instruments, such as political lobbying or campaigns. Arenas,






         
          
 
             
           
               
     
         
          
       
           
         
             
   
             
      
        
        
        
              
            
    
          
           
          
            
         
           
       
        
aspects once they and NGOs have left behind the conflict stage. The following statement
may serve as proof that Greenpeace’s campaigns have an effect on MNCs, such as 
VWG:
We notice that we hit the right nerve with a campaign when companies
call and want to talk to us […] It's usually about them wanting to know
more about what our demands are. 'What do we have to do, so you do
not get on our nerves'? (Interview #33, Greenpeace)
For Greenpeace, campaigns create synergies, which may increase the effectiveness of 
other influence methods enabling other NGOs to become involved in the opportunity
(Section 6.3.2 will provide more details on NGOs acting in alliances). Moreover, a 
successful campaign makes demands more audible to the public, contributes to the
NGOs’ legitimacy, and clarifies their intention to influence MNCs’ CSR approaches.
However, the caveat is that NGO influence is limited if the CSOs do not follow up with 
the demands stated in campaigns.
For VWG, stakeholder dialogues play a role to have an exchange with stakeholders,
such as NGOs; however, the most important means of communication are the
sustainability reports (e.g. VWG 2014; 2016c). Some NGOs no longer take these
company reports seriously, as reflected in this comment from a DUH respondent:
I always get these CSR reports. I never read them because I think that is, 
so to speak, ... that they do not interest me in the sense [that] I am
interested in what happens with the vehicles and […] what these cars
emit. (Interview #18, DUH)
This statement leads to several conclusions. It shows that the sustainability report that 
is understood as an important instrument of VWG’s stakeholder dialogue lacks
acceptance among NGOs. It also indicates that an NGO, such as DUH, is not highly
interested in the various facets of an MNC’s CSR approach, especially those that are not 
measurable, reflecting that the NGO trusts numbers rather than words. However, the
focus of an ENGO is usually stronger on the environmental dimension of CSR. An
announced integration of CSR in VWG’s various areas would only then be credible if the 






          
      
      
        
        
          
           
             
            
         
       
        
          
           
        
      
          
        
           
              
           
     
          
        
           
     
      
      
           
        
      
																																																						
               
                
     
For VWG, the sustainability reports have always been a means to combine various CSR-
relevant activities. First, it provides both stakeholders and VWG’s sustainability
departments with a platform to discuss links and issues based on the corporation’s self-
evaluation. Moreover, stakeholders can check if the results of the discussions with VWG
appear in the report and if these influenced any of VWG’s environmental measures.
Second, VWG can show that it applies reporting guidelines, such as those from the GRI. 
Third, in the aftermath of the crisis, one of the priorities of VWG’s 2016 sustainability
report (published in May 2017) was to promise to the stakeholders that the company has
changed and that it drew the right conclusions from the diesel crisis. One of the promises
VWG made was that it intends to ‘pay even greater attention to how our stakeholders
[…] view our work’ (VWG 2016c: 6). However, these reports are perceived as a form of 
greenwashing
51 
and not greatly valued by representatives of one important target group
of these reports: the (traffic) experts of the ENGOs. The perception is that these reports
do not address issues such as the corporation’s plans to emit less CO2 and NOx or to 
build affordable electric cars. Similarly, NGOs, such as BUND, argue that VWG’s
stakeholder dialogues do not sufficiently address current issues:
VW stakeholder dialogues are all about future products…. VWG should
not focus on autonomous driving; however, they should show what
happens right now or what happens in five years, but not what might be 
in 20 years. This is what I always criticise in all companies, that they show
the customers the beautiful world of the day after tomorrow but leave them
in yesterday. (Interview #28, BUND)
This quote is revealing for several reasons. First, there does not seem to be goal
congruence between VWG and NGOs, which is, for Pedersen (2006), a requirement of 
a successful stakeholder dialogue. It can be inferred from the NGOs that both parties
approach this instrument differently. Second, for NGOs, the dialogue would be an 
appropriate platform to make VWG aware of issues and to present possible suggestions
by discussing environmentally friendlier solutions. Such a solution could be, for example,
the development of an electric car that is affordable for most people. According to NGOs,
for VWG, the dialogue serves a different purpose, for example, stimulating the
stakeholders’ fantasy about technological innovations like autonomous driving. The
51
Greenwashing can be considered a ‘legitimation strategy that occurs when firms voluntarily issue CSR
reports to promote an impression of legitimate social and environmental values, which may or may not be






         
         
         
          
              
          
       
          
          
     
       
       
           
                 
                
          
          
              
 
          
        
             
           
              
          
             
          
           
    
      
         
        
             
following statement of VWG’s CEO reflects the MNC's reluctance to defer to the 
demands of NGOs and critical policy makers regarding the required changes of diesel
engines: ‘I would like to have my engineers work future-oriented and not backward on 
engines that are ten and fifteen years old’ (Phoenix 2017). Even though the NGOs’
criticism might be justified, it needs to be mentioned that change in the automotive sector
is slow. The car corporations invested billions in diesel engines and other traditional
technologies and need to make profits with these. Though that is understandable from
an economic point of view, it does not explain why the development of alternative 
technologies has been neglected, considering that (European) regulations intend to push
automotive manufacturers away from diesel and gasoline cars.
Following Kaptein and von Tulder’s (2003: 210) comparison between ‘stakeholder
debate’ and ‘stakeholder dialogue’, the previously mentioned NGO-MNC interaction
shows characteristics of a debate, in which actors try to put themselves ‘in a better light’. 
In such a case, an MNC ‘will place more importance on being right than on pursuing what
is right for society at large’ (Kaptein and von Tulder 2003: 222). For the NGO DKA, the
power relations at VWG are one of the reasons the corporation withdrew from critical
interactions with its stakeholders: ‘[VWG] feel so secure because of the share ownership, 
[…] they do not consider it to be necessary to enter into dialogue with civil society’
(Interview #19, DKA).
Leaving present issues and challenges out of stakeholder dialogue can be considered
one form of deception, as the stakeholders’ attention is deflected towards future topics, 
which are rather vague, and VWG would not need to be more specific. Plans may
change; therefore, it would be more difficult pinning VWG down on concrete measures 
that are planned in the future. This results in frustration that goes hand in hand with
Burchell and Cook’s (2013: 517) observation of a ‘dialogue fatigue’ among NGOs, which 
are exhausted from investing resources into dialogue if MNCs do not ‘walk the talk’. This
element of greenwashing is one of the reasons NGOs, such as the DUH, put higher
expectations in testing VWG’s and other producers’ cars, considering that the NGO can
hold VWG accountable for measured values.
The evaluation of the interviews supported the conjecture that the communication culture 
at VWG affected the way the corporation engaged in dialogues with NGOs. All
interviewees criticised or at least questioned VWG’s corporate and communication






           
          
          
 
          
     
          
          
           
          
 
         
         
           
         
       
          
       
             
          
           
           
         
      
   
    
           
             
           
           
            
            
and makes it difficult to integrate different opinions and perspectives into the company’s
business and environmental strategies. For example, this statement comes from an
MoP, who talked to a high-ranking member of VWG’s works council some time before 
the interview:
[The employee representative] has also seen this very critically […] a kind
of Nibelung loyalty, ‘we are VW, we hold together, we are one, no 
mistakes are made here'. This is difficult because the internal
communication culture must change in a way that the individual should
be able to say: 'Listen, this is now critical what we do here; let us think
about it again' – without being immediately belittled. (Interview #12, policy
maker)
This statement indicates again that it appears that components of VWG's corporate
culture are problematic, inhibiting employees from incorporating insight gained in
stakeholder dialogue with NGOs. Such a siege mentality makes an open stakeholder
exchange more difficult. For successful stakeholder dialogue, it is essential that the MNC
shows genuine interest in learning and change, along with the insight that it is fallible. A 
cultural change may lead to better balanced stakeholder interactions that are not solely
tailored to the needs of the MNC.
In an article, the weekly newspaper Die Zeit reported about a workshop among VWG
managers on integrity that took place in November 2017. A VWG manager was quoted
as saying: ‘Criticism of the superiors means for many [managers] E-de-ka: Ende der
Karriere [end of the career]’ (Tatje 2017: 26). This exemplifies that certain behaviours
are deeply rooted in VWG’s corporate culture and cannot be changed just because the
CEO announced a new culture. Consequently, such an environment may not be 
considered a fertile ground for suggestions coming from NGOs.
6.2.3 Process of Creating Gradual Pressure
In the interview, NABU’s traffic expert stated that there was a regular exchange with
VWG about the development of projects and follow ups on discussed issues. If the NGO
felt that VWG protracted actions, it exerted pressure by sending out a letter from the
president querying the ‘state of the implementations’ (Interview #7, NABU). Such a letter
would be directed to VWG’s CEO, reminding the corporation to fulfil their part of the






        
            
          
              
      
         
       
           
            
       
     
          
       
   	        
       
         
              
             
 
            
            
       
            
                
           
          
        
           
          
  
                  
            
always been considered necessary to keep moderate pressure on the MNCs to progress
within the stakeholder dialogue. On the other hand, there is the risk that a company does
not talk to the NGO about certain topics or does not want to pin down verbally made
agreements. The quote of this BUND expert illustrates that VWG is receptive to changes
as long as the cars’ core attributes are not questioned:
I’ll say it this way: stories that don’t change the structure, that can all be
done. A particle filter can be installed, another coolant can be installed,
without reducing the power of the vehicle, [and without] making the
vehicle less attractive. You can say [that] these are soft factors. This can
be introduced, which makes us happy, and then we say, ‘oh just look,
we’ve made it’. (Interview #6, BUND)
The previously mentioned round table discussions, organised by DUH, serve as a
platform for companies to state their concerns and understand why a certain corporative 
action is subject of criticism. The statement by BUND suggests that automotive MNCs,
such as VWG, also use these gatherings to appease NGOs by accepting smaller
suggestions. However, the environmental organisation uses this stage to exert pressure
in case the MNC does not show commitment, for example, by providing resources to
tackle the discussed issue and evidence for efforts to address the problem in the
company.
The way NGOs attempted to pressure and influence VWG in the phase after the crisis
began depends on the focus of the NGO. For example, representatives of DKA spoke in
collaboration with other NGOs at VWG’s AGM and demanded that the shareholders
refuse the approval of management’s actions (Dufner 2016). Speaking at AGMs is the
primary means of direct influence for the NGO DKA: ‘Our focus is the influence in the
time of the AGMs. Also, to make a more intensified impact via media publicity’ (Interview
#19). The approach to achieve an effect via the media and the wider public seems to
make more sense, considering DKA’s perception that the demands and issues
addressed in their speeches at VWG’s AGMs do not show much effect. In the interviews, 
it has been an often-recognised pattern that NGOs use direct and indirect measures
concurrently.
Even though the media does not play a significant role in this study, it may serve as an






          
          
         
            
           
        
         
        
             
       
     
      
      
         
    
         
            
          
        
           
          
             
           
              
          
       
         
      
   
    
              
        
             
place in the public debate, very much through the media coverage’ (Interview #29, DUH).
Very often, media, such as newspapers, magazines, and social media channels process
difficult factual connections into smaller available pieces that are understandable for the 
wider public. The media matters considering that ‘favourable press attention is especially
important to environmental groups, [as] they have relatively few opportunities to exert
direct influence on decision makers’ (Markham 2011: 198). For the NGOs, the media
becomes even more important due to the shortage of financial means that are needed 
to finance advertising campaigns. Moreover, regular media attention may attract more
donors for the NGOs. However, there are also critical voices such as the following:
The public debate is disappointing. Media quickly loses interest in 
automotive scandals, and [they] don’t put the responsible politicians
under proper pressure. We need more serious debates that have depth 
and take scientific evidence into consideration. We, as NGOs, cannot do 
that alone. I do believe [that] NGOs have to sell themselves on public
television to contribute to serious debates. (Interview #31, BUND)
This statement offers a different view on the role of the media and puts the influence that 
NGOs may able to exert via the media into perspective. Moreover, BUND’s
representative was critical of the coverage NGOs receive and complained that the
organisations are not sufficiently supported by traditional media (e.g. television
broadcasters) with the investigation of the industry’s wrongdoing. However, it may not
be the media's role to take firms to task. Moreover, NGOs have to realise that ‘traditional
media is no longer the sole gatekeeper of information or opinion’ (Barnett, Henriques,
and Husted forthcoming 2018b: 15) and that the digital age offers multiple channels to
pressure MNCs. A clever use of the media may help exert pressure to make VWG more
accountable for providing feedback on requests. For example, DKA’s expert stated:
VWG can take a public or non-public position [to submitted 
counterproposals] …. That has been made insufficient in recent years,
and the accusations made in the counterproposals, not only in ours but
also in other counterproposals, have been flattened without replying to 
the actual accusations. (Interview #19, DKA)
As this quote illustrates, the involvement of indirect measures of NGO influence, such as
the media, investors, or pressuring policy makers, becomes more important the less






                
          
          
               
            
          
         
            
                
              
           
            
              
          
              
           
        
          
   
          
         
       
              
              
         
             
      
            
            
          
         
            
            
with the NGOs, it has always come out that it is difficult to judge whether an NGO has a
short-term or medium-term influence on VWG. Furthermore, BUND’s traffic expert stated
that ‘such meetings do not produce any real results. These are so long-term results ... 
Difficult to say that they do that or this now, because I've said it [in the past]’ (Interview
#28). Similarly, NABU’s senior representative indicated that ‘the bottom line is ultimately
what really has led to an implementation or what brought change in the sense of the 
environment…. This can only be assessed after a while’ (Interview #27). This reflects
that NGOs need long-term staying power and the resilience to cope with announcements
and promises, which might be tactics of an MNC to win time. It also shows that the NGOs
realised that it is not enough to be satisfied if VWG changes positions or procedures (see
Stages 2 and 3 of Keck and Sikking’s (1998: 24-26) stages of influence) as a 
consequence of the NGOs’ intervention but does not change its behaviour sustainably.
This reflects the ambiguity when evaluating the efficacy of NGO influence. On one hand,
it is important to acknowledge that NGOs influence MNCs’ environmental approaches. It 
would not be fair to measure NGOs’ work only by major changes in companies’ CSR
behaviour. That would undermine the efforts of the organisations and probably be an 
unrealistic claim. On the other hand, MNCs such as VWG have the possibility to escape 
from (informal) promises and agreements that were effective as publicity but were neither
binding nor pressuring the top management to make changes.
When understanding NGO influence, it is important to consider several other factors that 
have not been investigated in detail. For example, the NGOs’ governance structure, their
budget, and the parallel use of instruments are decisive factors that determine their
influence. An NGO, such as Greenpeace, may be able to finance a campaign against
VWG for several years and finally influence their behaviour. Other NGOs might not be
able to do that due to financial restraints, different foci, or their federal structures.
These aspects create a complexity that is rather difficult to capture in established
stakeholder influence models. This complexity is reflected in the various approaches of
NGO influence and the interplay between different factors, such as the choice of
influence instrument, strength of NGO alliances, or the delay between cause and effect 
of NGO influence. Barnett, Henriques, and Husted (forthcoming 2018b) stated that the 
complexity of stakeholder influence is also reflected in the digital age, as stakeholders 
such as NGOs are confronted with a flood of information that may lead to incoherent






          
         
              
         
            
         
      
        
          
           
              
            
          
    
           
      
             
           
            
          
            
        
              
      
      
           
         
    
   
the close relationships between policy makers and MNCs plays a role, too. Moreover,
according to Greenpeace’s experts, it is the mixture of various influence instruments,
and the combination of the NGOs’ strength, with which the greatest effect on an MNC’s
CSR approach may be achieved. The following statement underlines that:
There is a lot of money involved at corporations. Before they implement
the environmental policy goals that we consider necessary (these are the 
automobile companies, the coal industry) […] you can’t convince them in 
conversations without leverage. You can have great conversations, but
they lead to nothing. That's why we say, ‘yes, we should maintain a
dialogue’. That always makes sense. However, when we take the time to
sit down with them, then [it should be] only when we have the feeling that
we can really make a difference. That is usually in connection with
campaigns. Then, the corporations are more willing to talk and make other
concessions. (Interview #32, Greenpeace)
This statement of Greenpeace’s transport policy expert illustrates that the multiplicity of 
influence instruments creates gradual pressure, whereas a stand-alone MNC-NGO
stakeholder dialogue may not have a significant effect on the MNC’s CSR approach and
may serve to comfort and legitimise both organisations’ activities. Moreover, the
statement implies that NGOs may have a greater leverage if those at VWG perceive 
campaigns or other forms of pressure as a threat to their legitimacy and reputation.
According to Yaziji and Doh (2009), NGO campaigns may be considered a method to
delegitimise an organisation. This may provoke countermoves of the firm, entailing that
it either gives in or ‘fights’ back, for example, by questioning the legitimacy of the
stakeholder. That might eventually lead to a confrontational stakeholder-company 
relationship (refer to Table 3, Onkila 2011).
Table 9 summarises the points regarding the direct mechanisms of NGO influence on
VWG, categorised according to the following measures and approaches:
Cooperation/partnerships, stakeholder dialogue/agreements, AGMs, and campaigns












   
 















    



















   
 
  
    
 
   
  
 
   
 









     
    
 
 
   






   








     
             
       
           
            
                 
          
             
             
           
          
        
Table 9: Summary of NGOs' Measures and Approaches of Direct Influence on VWG
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6.3 Mechanisms of Indirect NGO Influence
This dimension reflects the importance of involving other actors and allies in the NGOs’
efforts to exert influence on VWG and the automotive industry in general. Indirect NGO
influence on an MNC’s CSR approach can take various forms, such as pressuring policy
makers, involving the media and suppliers, or using the power of courts and investors. 
The focus in this section is on how NGOs leverage the power of political actors and policy
makers to increase the pressure on companies, such as VWG.
However, due to the strong intertwining between policy makers and VWG, the indirect
influence on VWG via policy makers is conditional. Chapter 5 made clear that the lack of 
regulatory strictness and political measures against the automotive industry limited the
influence of NGOs. This chapter also demonstrates that the successful involvement of






              
        
       
          
            
         
           
          
        
      
          
         
           
          
           
      
      
        
      
           
            
             
             
        
          
          
          
         
  
           
             
        
means of influence. Moreover, it shows that the concurrent and successive exertion of a
multiplicity of direct and indirect influence instruments may lead to unconditional
influence and amplify the effect of individual methods.
The mechanism of indirect NGO influence builds on Guay, Doh, and Sinclair’s (2004:
136) notion that NGOs work through allies who act as ‘moderators or mediators of their
agenda’. It also considers Frooman’s (1999) framework that states, even if the
stakeholder is dependent on the firm, however, the firm is not dependent on the 
stakeholder (‘firm power’ relationship), indirect approaches to influence the firm are more 
promising. As Hendry (2005) noted, a more profound understanding of the interactions
between ENGOs/NGOs and companies is required to examine if these statements apply.
Keck and Sikkink (1998: 23) called the indirect influence approaches ‘leverage politics’
referring to the persuasion and exertion of pressure on powerful actors considering that
‘NGO influence often depends on securing more powerful allies’. In this dimension, how
indirect NGO strategies are used and why some approaches, such as lawsuits, are more
effective than others under the conditions of a major crisis and the strong intertwining
between German policy makers and the automotive industry will be shown.
6.3.1 Conditional Influence: Pressuring Political Actors
The findings show that there is an increasing understanding among NGOs that lobbying 
and pressuring governments to tighten legislations is a more effective way of achieving
change and corporate reassessment regarding environmental policies. This is a reason
that the NGO influence on MNCs cannot be examined by solely considering the NGO-
MNC relationships. Though there is the NGOs’ perception that the direct exchange with
VWG has been more difficult since September 2015, there is no uniform understanding
that it is more effective to interact with political actors considering the closeness between 
German policy makers, VWG, and automotive lobby groups. In addition, some political
actors actively avoided any contact with some environmental organisations. In addition, 
NABU’s representative commented with the following words that Federal Minister for
Transport Dobrindt (between 2013 and September 2017) forbid his department from
contacting DUH:
Mr Dobrindt has prohibited his employees [from] speaking with the DUH.
What can you say? [...] Then, it runs informally. Many meetings are not






        
        
           
            
          
         
          
             
            
       
         
         
           
             
              
       
       
        
               
          
     
        
        
              
     
           
        
 
																																																						
           
              
    
      
shows a bit that bitten dogs like to react strangely sometimes. This 
demonstrates, in the end, that Mr Dobrindt isn’t completely indifferent
about the work of the NGOs, or what they say. (Interview #27, NABU)
This quote indicates the NGOs’ perception that they irritate policy makers, who respond
by minimising the influence of environmental groups. How true this is, is open to debate, 
but this restrictive approach reinforces the impression that policy makers and the
automotive industry are too closely interlinked. However, it might only be directed against
one NGO, which could be compensated for by the coordination of NGOs (refer to Section 
6.3.2 for more details). However, the informal meetings show that there are bureaucrats
in the Ministry of Transport who are interested in an exchange with NGOs.
There has been an exchange between many NGOs and VWG before the crisis; however, 
that changed noticeably after the crisis occurred. Therefore, NGOs intend increasingly
to convince policy makers to establish rules or execute the existing ones properly. The
intention for NGOs is to become a counterweight to MNCs in the political context.
However, that may only happen if NGOs and other representatives of the civil society
are invited to summits and expert exchanges. For example, various high-ranking
politicians met with representatives of the German automotive industry at the National
Forum Diesel;
52 
however, representatives of consumer protection associations were not 
invited. Nevertheless, there are forums in which NGOs and policy makers are in a direct
and formalised exchange. For example, the council of the Berlin-based think tank Agora
Verkehrswende (English: Transport Transition) consists of representatives from
business, academia, unions, NGOs, and high-ranking politicians. One of the interviewed 
NGO traffic experts, representing the civil society in the council, commented as follows:
This is, in principle, a good platform, but of course we would wish [that]
there would also be such a platform elsewhere, that the Ministry of the 
Environment and the Ministry of Transport agree more closely on the
necessities, of course, with the Ministry of Economy. (Interview #28,
BUND)
52 
The ‘National Forum Diesel’ was organised by the Ministry of Transport and held on 2 August 2017 in 
Berlin. Policy makers and representatives of the automotive industry came together and discussed ‘an
effective contribution to a speedy and lasting reduction in NOx emissions and to the protection of the health 






         
           
        
        
               
                
   
           
             
           
         
            
        
          
          
            
      
            
    
     
        
       
   
        
         
             
             
    
              
       
           
            
         
The NGOs stated repeatedly that informal exchanges with policy makers are an 
important tool to convey messages and receive information about the processes and
plans within different ministries. However, considering frequent changes of political
personnel in the environment and transport ministries, some contacts and sources get 
lost. It then takes time to build new trusting relationships with politicians or with the
administrative staff, who are often more open, as they are less bound to act in favour of
any party’s policy.
The NGO DUH published a press release on 17 September 2015, one day before the 
revelation of the VWG scandal, and warned about the danger of diesel emissions and
urged Chancellor Merkel to stop ‘cosying’ with the bosses of Germany’s car
manufacturers (DUH 2015). According to the NGO, its executive director and further
transport policy experts were invited to the Ministry of Transport in 2011 and reported to
the officials that defeat-device systems existed and were used (DUH 2016d). A year 
before, the NGO complained that the Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia does not
enforce the so-called ‘environment zones’ in city centres. In 2018, DUH won a lawsuit
against the city of Dusseldorf, which may lead to driving bans for diesel cars
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht 2018) (refer to Section 6.3.3 for more details on lawsuits).
This is an example of how NGOs’ indirect measures may result in direct pressure on 
automotive manufacturers. The following statement provides insight into the role and 
meaning of the NGO DUH:
Without the Environmental Action Germany [DUH] nothing would have
happened in the last few years before the VWG scandal. They themselves
have made their own measurements with Axel Friedrich and can place 
them [the results] in the media, but nothing really has happened. Now
they are the pioneers who filed lawsuits for false declarations of cars. 
Actually, they play the role that an audit authority under the Ministry of
Transport should play. So … the DUH is very important in this context.
(Interview #25, opposition party)
The interviewee is a scientific assistant of an opposition politician, who was involved in
the 5
th
parliamentary investigation committee. According to him, NGOs, such as DUH,
fill the regulatory gaps that arose due to inadequacies and weaknesses of political
institutions. Moreover, there is a link between the NGOs’ increasing role as civil






      
        
            
            
      
          
          
         
            
         
               
           
              
             
           
             
           
          
            
 
         
           
           
             
             
            
        
             
            
 
            
        
          
automotive industry. These interconnections and the lack of enforcement of existing 
regulations contributed to this regulatory vacuum. Similarly, NABU’s representative
acknowledged the DUH for their strategy to influence the debate by doing their own 
measurements, stating that the ‘DUH also makes many emission tests, the RDE tests.
Therefore, they’re then able to talk about things’ (Interview #27, NABU).
The fact that the DUH conducts its own measurements may be one of the main reasons
this NGO has been invited to the various political committees on the national and EU
levels (DUH 2017b). The German NGO frequently submits initiatives and provides 
feedback to the EC that actively asks stakeholders and citizens for new ideas on laws
and regulations and views on ‘legislative proposals’ (EC 2018). For example, DUH
provided feedback to the EC’s initiative to strengthen RDE tests by stating that it is the 
right step to take. However, the NGO expressed concerns that the wording of the
regulation might be too slippery and that the EC might not intend to publish the test
results in a database (EC 2016). Moreover, DUH uses its membership at EBB to be
closer at the decision-making processes at EU level (EBB 2018). It becomes more
important for German NGOs to be present at EU level, considering the increasing
decision-making power of EU institutions. Doh and Guay (2006: 53) stated that EU
institutions, such as the European Council and Parliament, are attractive for NGOs due 
to their influence on the ‘Council by accessing member state governments in national 
capitals’.
Nonetheless, NGOs might have to reconsider their strategies and instruments when 
thinking about the best possible ways to exert influence. In times in which traditional
communication channels become less effective, NGOs might not be able to afford not
working with investors or not gaining the required expertise to act in their position. On
the other hand, it is important to mention that the interviewed NGO DKA is specialised
on the interaction with corporations by talking at their AGMs. The association does not
own shares of VWG; however, DKA’s members are able to speak at the corporation’s
AGM and confront VWG with their questions, as (private) shareholders may transfer their
right to vote to the association. The interviewed senior representative of DKA stated in
the interview:
The special thing about our association is that we try to gain influence in
these AGMs, as well as cooperation with other shareholders. Also, in






       
  
           
            
             
          
         
         
   
     
            
           
             
             
         
   
us, of course, over and above that, to influence the legislation. (Interview
#19, DKA)
One of these NGOs is BUND, which speaks on a regular basis on behalf of DKA and 
shareholders at VWG’s AGMs. Therefore, it cannot be said that there are no efforts of 
NGOs to exert influence via AGMs. However, there are no known and published
collaborations between NGOs and investors in the VWG case. Such cooperation might
add value to both sides; for the NGOs, as it would extend their instruments of exerting 
influence, and for investors, as they might benefit from the NGOs’ experience regarding 
environmental aspects and media relations.
6.3.2 Influence Strength of NGO Alliances
Alliances among NGOs play an important role when understanding the pressure and
influence NGOs exert on MNCs and policy makers. This section has been categorised 
within the mechanisms of indirect NGO influence, as the data show that NGO alliances
play a more dominant role at the policy level. However, the findings within this section
also include how NGOs acted collectively towards VWG. Therefore, alliances can also 









        
            
             
          
               
            
        
            
            
             
              
              
          
Figure 9: Work of NGOs in Alliances
Source: Author
Figure 9 illustrates the interconnections between the NGOs DKA, BUND, DUH, NABU, 
and Greenpeace. The four ENGOs are circled in green, whereas the NGOs DKA and TI
are circled in black. There is evidence that BUND, DUH, NABU, and Greenpeace interact
with each other; however, DKA has been included in the circle of NGOs that cooperate
with each other, as it works with BUND. The graph also shows that all NGOs except DKA
and TI show evidence of relationships with both MNC and policy makers. The dashed
arrow from the circle ‘policy makers’ to the ‘MNC VWG’ circle indicates that the influence 
is weakened due to the tight relationships between policy makers and VWG. Even
though TI published statements on the VWG crisis on their website, it did not send these
articles directly to VWG (Interview #13, TI). Therefore, there is no arrow from TI to the
MNC, as the NGO did not actively seek the interaction with VWG. It can only be surmised
why TI did not send it directly to VWG or approached the MNC in any other form.






                
 
          
             
          
  
          
            
       
             
     
 
           
         
          
              
         
        
        
        
      
            
       
        
          
  
              
     
           
																																																						
             
  
would not have been prepared for an interaction with VWG in any manner due to lack of 
53
resources.
All the interviewed NGOs are connected to each other, even though an alliance between 
TI and the other NGOs cannot be shown. The interviews indicated that the cooperation
between the organisations mostly takes place in a harmonious way, as the following
quote from a DUH representative illustrates:
These [alliances] are very important. We work frequently with NABU,
BUND, and WWF, etc. We are very well connected with all other
environmental associations and work very closely together [and] agree on 
most points. We've been doing this for decades.... There is not only the
traffic department but also five other specialist areas. (Interview #29, 
DUH)
The NGO cooperation is reflected in meetings, collective letters, and other activities that
are coordinated between the NGOs. The DKA has regularly invited one of BUND’s traffic
experts to speak on behalf of the NGOs and VWG’s shareholders at the MNC’s AGMs
(Hilgenberg 2017). In addition, in 2017, the BUND representative spoke at the AGMs of
the automotive corporations Daimler Group and BMW Group. Moreover, there are
studies and international workgroups at which NGOs work together. For example, the
European Climate Foundation (2018) initiates and supports projects that involve the
NGOs NABU and DUH. A longstanding representative of BUND stated:
The European Climate Foundation plays a role, too. They also support
the DUH, which is one reason why they are able to exert so much
pressure [with lawsuits]. It is a fact that there is a good cooperation, even
though one or the other [NGO] may receive most of the merits. It 
sometimes sinks into oblivion that we all contribute and all play a part.
(Interview #31, BUND)
The traffic expert might have referred to the situation in which other NGOs, such as DUH
and Greenpeace, are quite often present in the media. This may create the perception 
that it is mostly these two organisations that put VWG and policy makers under pressure
53 







     
 
              
      
         
       
        
  
            
     
      
         
      
  
             
            
              
       
           
      
           
             
 
            
         
           
         
        
          
             
       
        
by engaging in campaigns, conducting investigations, and measuring NOx and CO2 
emissions.
According to Reiche and Krebs (1999: 241; 291), NGOs will always be at a disadvantage
when trying to influence the policy decision-making process, considering their restricted
resources. Therefore, NGOs must decide carefully about the selection of instruments 
and how they can reach their objectives within their limited personnel and financial
resources. Moreover, NABU’s expert of transport policy chose the following words when 
describing the importance of alliances:
We coordinate political demands so that not one [NGO] may demand this
and the other that. Therefore, we try talking to each other within the 
associations, for one thing, having a similar language as regards the 
objectives, [and] for another thing, a certain division of tasks. Normal 
associations cannot do everything; the capacities are limited. (Interview
#27, NABU)
In the interviews, Greenpeace also spoke of a division of tasks and referred to the
importance of ‘finding a good role allocation, because everyone works a little bit
differently’ (Interview #32). The NGO made clear that it may be beneficial if some NGOs
are rather ‘soft’ and others, such as Greenpeace, are more confrontational.
Greenpeace’s transport policy expert stated: ‘It complements very well […] if a company
gets a beating from us, but then has the opportunity to engage in a more intensive 
exchange with another NGO’ (Interview #33). Valor and Merino de Diego (2009: 122)
referred to this method as ‘“the stick and the carrot” approach [that proved to be] fairly
successful’.
Arenas, Sanchez, and Murphy (2013) spoke of triadic relationships when stating that a
third NGO may facilitate a confrontational, dyadic relationship that develops into a 
collaborative one with a greater likelihood that the company engages in CSR policies
afterwards. The division of tasks is also predetermined to some extent, as BUND, DUH,
and NABU may exercise the right to sue, whereas Greenpeace is not entitled to do that.
Therefore, one of Greenpeace’s traffic policy experts pointed out that ‘it is not just a
single tool like the lawsuit that generates political change. There must be a campaign
around the lawsuits’ (Interview #32). These statements underline the importance to apply






        
 
         
        
           
          
         
       
              
        
       
        
        
           
          
            
       
            
        
             
        
            
           
            
             
        
         
            
             
     
         
          
(Section 6.3.3 will elaborate on the importance of the multiplicity of approaches in more
detail).
Curbach (2003: 129) emphasised that resource-poor actors in civil society, such as 
NGOs, are more reliant on alliances, partnerships, ‘short-run coalitions or long-lasting
networks’. Therefore, the NGOs are keen on keeping good relationships with each other
and informing and updating themselves on what the respective traffic experts are working
on. Insight has risen that bundling resources and demands may increase the effect of
NGOs on MNCs and policy makers.
For example, in October 2015, right after the Dieselgate scandal became public, the five
ENGOs, BUND, DUH, Greenpeace, NABU, and VCD, published an open letter that was
directed to Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, pointing out the problem that car
producers systemically ignore environmental standards and betray consumers (Miller et
al. 2015). The directors of the NGOs urged the chancellor to stop illegal manipulations
and companies from taking advantage of legal loopholes (Miller et al. 2015). Letters to 
policy makers are a common means of NGOs to represent their points of view and to 
formulate demands. They can speak with a ‘louder voice’ (Interview #29, DUH), if the
demands are coordinated among the NGOs and their experts sign the letters. In addition, 
NGOs hope to increase their salience within the political realm and to be perceived as a 
legitimate group of experts, whose suggestions advance discussion and represent a 
larger group of people. However, when analysing secondary data, it seems that collective
appearances do not happen in a high frequency. Instead, it appears that this tool is
chosen if the discussed issue is highly severe, such as the emissions scandal, and it is
important that the various NGOs act and appear in unity. One of the reasons might be 
that the NGOs usually have different foci and work on their own publications or projects. 
DUH’s traffic expert stated: ‘We have developed legal matters more strongly than the
other associations’ (Interview #30, DUH). According to the DUH traffic expert, NABU 
‘focuses on cruise ships and emissions [and] the VCT on public transport or fleet 
management’ (Interview #30). The BUND traffic expert added: ‘We and DUH do lawsuits,
as the DUH has the lawyer who has done that from the very beginning’ (Interview #31).
Section 6.2.1 provided information about the partnership between NABU and VWG. This
cooperation enabled the NGO BUND, which is closely affiliated with NABU, to interact 






           
           
         
           
      
 
          
              
             
               
        
              
           
           
              
      
 
           
          
            
        
            
         
           
         
       
        
       
           
        
           
       
We have a good relationship with NABU, working collegially together ....
Through this cooperation, we had the possibility of having a direct
exchange with Volkswagen, […] at a level where you would say, ‘they 
would normally not meet a speaker/expert of an environmental group if
this corporate cooperation wouldn’t have taken place’. (Interview #6, 
BUND)
This comment illustrates not only the affiliation between BUND and NABU but also that 
NGO alliances play a significant role in the interaction with VWG. Moreover, BUND could
use its ally’s partnership to take part in meetings and attain access to VWG in a form that
would not have been possible without the alliance. Even though NABU is also an NGO,
their partnership with VWG puts BUND in a more powerful position.
An example for the work of NGO alliances is the NGO collaboration on EU level.
According to the representative of BUND, the NGOs ‘have developed a proposal for the
regulation of the CO2 limit values’ (Interview #28). He continued by stating that NGOs
act more strongly if they disseminate the same messages. For example, stating the same
numbers when communicating with policy makers amplifies the relevance of their
demands.
Though NGOs work together, cooperate in projects, and align their objectives, there are
discrepancies in the evaluation of changes at VWG. In the interview with BUND, the
traffic expert stated that he was told by a high-ranking VWG manager (a few months
before the exposure of the crisis in September 2015) that there were no defeat-device
systems in VWG’s cars. The manager has been working as chief representative of VWG.
The representative of BUND recalled the incident as follows:
We asked Mr X (VWG’s chief representative) around half a year before
the emissions scandal […], before everything boiled up: ‘Mr X, does VWG
use defeat devices?'. We had not even asked if illegal defeat devices were 
used, only if defeat devices were used. If he had been smart, he could 
have said, 'Yes, but we need it to protect the engine'. Then, he would have 
covered his back. However, he said clearly: ‘No, there are no defeat
devices whatsoever at VWG’. (Interview #6; #28, BUND)
This statement questioned the credibility and trustworthiness of this important person.






             
         
       
         
        
             
      
               
            
            
   
          
      
             
            
        
      
      
          
         
            
        
          
          
          
               
           
              
           
         
            
         
       
incident correctly: either VWG’s chief representative lied deliberately or he did not know
better and presumed the company did not do that. Both cases are unflattering for a
person with such a great responsibility within VWG. However, for the NGO NABU, the 
post-crisis appointment of this manager as a newly responsible person for CSR and
sustainability was called a ‘personnel appreciation’ (Interview #7, NABU). In other words,
NABU’s representative felt that VWG upgraded the importance of CSR by shifting it into
the sphere of the chief representative’s responsibility. Therefore, there are different 
perceptions of the NGOs, regarding whether it is a good sign for the CSR efforts of VWG,
if CSR and sustainability are now part of the department External Relations and
Government Affairs (VWG News 2016), led by the person whose integrity has been
doubted by BUND’s representative.
Even though this section primarily stated the positive effects of NGO alliances and the
amplifying effects, NGOs compete for fundraising, members, and attention. Markham
(2011) spoke of the competition and cooperation dilemma that NGOs face but stated that
there is a shift towards more cooperation. The next section introduces the coercive
stakeholder method ‘lawsuit’ and shows that the previously mentioned division of tasks
also plays a role when it comes to the selection of the juridical method.
6.3.3 Unconditional Influence: Coercive Stakeholder Pressure
The third secondary dimension, ‘coercive stakeholder pressure’, is part of the
mechanisms of indirect influence and can be considered unconditional influence given 
that the strong intertwining between policy makers and VWG has a rather low effect on 
the ‘success’ of coercive instruments. The most important coercive method is the
‘lawsuit’. The data revealed that NGOs perceive and use this influence instrument if other
options do not work or do not come to a satisfying end, for example, dialogue with VWG
and policy makers. Therefore, lawsuits can be considered the NGOs’ last resort. 
However, it will be shown later that this coercive approach may have an even longer
lasting effect, if it is embedded in a multiplicity of influence instruments. How important
lawsuits are as means for NGOs to exert influence and affect the relationship with VWG
will be explained. The majority of and the most successful lawsuits were filed against
governmental authorities or cities, pressuring them to enforce existing laws. Another
instrument of unconditional influence could be the use of investors as NGO allies.
However, there is insufficient evidence that the studied NGOs consider the systematic






       
            
      
               
        
      
   
                 
            
     
              
           
             
        
 
            
        
          
        
            
          
            
        
        
     
           
         
																																																						
             
            
 
            
             
        
  
In the interview with the author, the CSR expert of the government was astonished that 
the NGOs do not involve investors or powerful individuals to influence and exert pressure
on VWG in the crisis (Interview #26). For example, the expert mentioned Dr Hans-
Christoph Hirth and Ingo Speich, who work for investors that hold shares at VWG and
are responsible for the sustainability areas.
54
Both investors criticised VWG’s reappraisal
of the crisis and the MNC’s corporate governance and complained that no senior figures
have been held accountable for the scandal (McGee 2017; Speich 2016).
55 
That shows
that the crisis could be perceived as a chance for NGOs to raise their voices and use the
momentum to achieve changes within VWG and at the political level. The NABU
representative explained the following to investors:
Yes ... clearly the role of investors and financial sectors is an exciting thing
that could perhaps have been even more pursued .... This is an area that 
you could have intensified, and now you must do it. However, for NGOs,
there is always the question of capacities and possibilities. (Interview #27, 
NABU)
The traffic expert conceded that NGOs could involve investors more and use their market
knowledge to put MNCs under strategic pressure. However, he pointed out the limitations
of NGOs by stating that there are insufficient resources to pursue the different paths of 
exerting pressure. In addition, NABU’s argument raises the question regarding what one
can expect from NGOs and where their expertise should lie. A DUH representative did
not see the need for involving investors, considering that there is the perception that
resources are already well allocated to create as much pressure as possible:
I don’t know ... when someone has built pressure, then it was the DUH. I
believe that you can observe very well what just happens right now. We 
are very strongly represented here, and those who build the pressure. I
would not know how we can build more pressure with the possibilities that
we have. We do what’s possible. (Interview #29, DUH)
54 
Dr Hans-Christoph Hirth is executive director and board member at the British investment management 
firm ‘Hermes EOS’. Ingo Speich is portfolio manager of Union Investment. In November 2015, he criticised
the appointment of Michael Müller as the new CEO (McGee 2017). 
55 
In an article in the Financial Times on 7 May 2017 (McGee 2017), Speich was cited with the following 
words: ‘We don’t see any significant improvement in VW[G]’s corporate governance. On the contrary, we
are very disappointed about Mr Pötsch’s [the chairman of the supervisory board] broken promise to investors






           
             
          
         
  
           
             
               
              
       
          
           
       
               
           
       
        
           
           
        
          
         
            
  
                
          
         
              
            
   
               
            
 
In the past, international NGOs, such as Greenpeace and FoE (BUND is the German
member of FoE), asked investors to exert pressure on companies and formed their own 
groups to do so (Burgy 2013). For example, in 2001, FoE bought shares worth GBP
30,000 of the construction company Balfour Beatty to ‘make a challenging resolution’ at
the corporation’s AGM (FoE 2001: n.p.).
Using Frooman’s (1999: 198) words on indirect influence strategies, lawsuits would
contribute to ‘shift the balance of power to favour the weaker actor’. In this case, courts
would act as powerful allies of NGOs. For Keck and Sikking (1998: 25), ‘calling upon
powerful actors’ is part of the tactic ‘leverage politics’ that intends to put pressure on
MNCs. Even though NGOs do not win every lawsuit, the effect that those have on 
regulators and automotive companies cannot be underestimated. During the interviews,
it was mentioned by policy makers, NGOs, and corporate actors that driving bans for
diesel cars would have severe consequences for both policy makers and corporations.
Therefore, there are attempts to prevent these drastic steps. However, it is difficult to say
whether the pressure from suing NGOs may direct VWG towards a more serious and 
sustainable CSR approach or whether it provokes a defensive behaviour.
The ambiguous role of policy makers in the previous chapters has been discussed. On
one hand, policy makers could be considered NGOs’ allies to exert pressure on VWG.
On the other hand, they could be considered NGOs’ opponents, who would rather serve
the interests of the automotive industry. Therefore, NGOs feel forced to take up legal
steps against policy makers and VWG, considering that the strong linkage between these
actors create a barrier to NGO influence. Filing lawsuits is always a concession when
arguments do not work anymore. For example, one of BUND’s senior traffic policy
experts stated:
We do not want to be the lawsuit association. This is not our goal at all.
We want to convince [others] with professional arguments, we want to
convince policy [makers] and hope that the automobile groups are also
looking at what we produce on paper and comparing in the studies. At the
end of the day, it will probably only be about lawsuits. This is totally sad,
but the experience shows it. (Interview #28, BUND)
The statement from a senior person within DUH follows the same direction and links the







            
         
        
            
               
 
         
       
        
          
          
              
          
            
           
         
 
             
         
             
           
         
        
         
               
            
        
  
                
          
          
       
The basic problem that we see is the strong bond between industry and
politics, which doesn’t make life easier for us. For this reason, the most
effective way for us is the juridical (i.e. the lawsuits), which we have.
Without these, we wouldn’t hardly be making any progress, I must say.
There is not much to do in the dialogue. Quite apart from that, the dialogue
from the other side is not wanted at all. (Interview #29, DUH)
The NGOs perceive legal methods as the ultima ratio, and this statement also reveals
that lawsuits are a possibility to break the strong interweaving between policy makers
and industry. It can also be considered a symbol for the failure of German political
institutions. The EU demanded that Germany introduce effective sanctions against car
producers that use illegal defeat-device systems (Council Regulation (EU) No 715 2007). 
The institution threatened Germany with a lawsuit at the Court of Justice of the EU if the
country remained inactive regarding the continuous violation of NOx limit values in 28 
regions of Germany (EC 2017). German policy makers have not fulfilled their tasks of
ensuring air pollution control. That may explain why DUH’s senior traffic expert stated
the following: ‘I honestly believe that not the policy decides what's next, but the courts’
(Interview #30).
The DUH’s measurements are a key element of the organisation’s strategy to exert
pressure on policy makers to file lawsuits against federal states and cities, forcing them
to comply with the air purity law and to protect citizens from fine particles. However, as
stated in the contextual chapter (refer to Section 2.4.1), the right to file lawsuits is
reserved for NGOs that are recognised by the UBA according to the Environmental
Appeals Act. Greenpeace does not belong to these environmental organisations and can 
therefore not file a lawsuit against cities’ clean air programmes or the KBA. 
Consequently, one of Greenpeace’s traffic experts stated that ‘the only way for us to sue
or to support lawsuits would be to find someone who is personally affected and considers 
filing a lawsuit and then supporting it’ (Interview #33). However, another transport policy
expert explained:
There are a few legal ways. This is also part [of] our toolbox when it comes
to campaigns. That applies to us as well.… You can also file criminal
charges. Then, there is also the Environmental Information Act. The entire






            
          
              
          
       
           
        
          
         
  
            
               
        
         
            
      
          
           
       
           
            
         
         
         
             
         
            
              
           
           
         
   
         
             
For Greenpeace, lawsuits have a stronger effect if there is a campaign around them and 
if NGOs implement the repertory of influence approaches and tactics effectively. ‘The
legal way is very strong and expedient, [but it would be less effective] if there was no
debate at all […]; if the DUH and we would not take any measurements’ (Interview #32,
Greenpeace). Even though one of this study’s key arguments is that the instrument 
‘lawsuit’ is the only one with an unconditional effect, the NGOs’ deployment of a
multiplicity of approaches that influence MNCs like VWG, which are exerted
simultaneously and successively, is also effective. It seems to create pressure and
eventually leads to NGO influence, though the approaches might be individually
considered less effective.
The magazine Der Spiegel stated that the DUH puts policy makers under pressure with
‘clever lawsuits’ (Bartsch et al. 2017: 44). Other NGOs also use lawsuits as a tool to
pressure political institutions, for example, the BUND filed a lawsuit against the KBA to 
reach a sales ban for diesel cars with a too-high NOx output (Schleswig-Holsteinisches 
Oberverwaltungsgericht 2017b). The decision of the court has not yet been published.
The same court rejected five lawsuits of the DUH against the KBA (Schleswig-
Holsteinisches Oberverwaltungsgericht 2017a). Table 10 lists examples of lawsuits that
have been pursued by NGOs and investors. BUND’s director, Weiger, stated that ‘the
scandalous inactivity of car manufacturers, the responsible authorities and Federal
Minister of Transport Alexander Dobrindt must finally be brought to a halt’ (BUND 2017b: 
n.p.). It is observable that NGOs increasingly use this strategy to put pressure on both
political actors and car manufacturers. The DUH has been successful with lawsuits and,
should they achieve their objective that diesel cars that emit more NOx than stated and 
allowed will be banned from entering cities, car companies, such as VWG, must quickly
find solutions, considering that the share of diesel cars is nearly at 50% in Germany
(Eurostat 2015). Moreover, substantial negative publicity has led to a decrease in the
sales of diesel cars (KBA 2018). In addition, BUND’s traffic expert predicted that the
infringement procedure of the EC will last if ‘Germany continues to insist on the tax
concession of the diesel’ (Interview #28). The EC opened the procedure against
Germany ‘for not applying their national provisions on penalties despite the company's
[VWG] use of illegal defeat device software’ (EC 2016). Additionally, DUH’s respondent
emphasised the importance of lawsuits in the following statement:
Our most important instrument is legal procedures. If we did not have the 






        
       
        
    
              
        
              
         
          
             
           
             
        
            
        











                 
             
         
have now repeatedly confirmed that driving bans for diesel are not only a 
sensible measure to limit (pollutant) burdens but are also necessary to 
consider health protection, which is established by law as a fundamental
right. (Interview #30, DUH)
This statement indicates why lawsuits seem to have such a high efficacy and why
automotive companies, such as VWG, are afraid of this instrument. The protecting hand
of policy makers might reach its limits when the judges make their decision. For Rieth
and Göbel (2005: 249), an NGO, such as DUH, that uses lawsuits frequently would be
one with a confrontational attitude. The authors distinguish between cooperative NGOs
that are willing to engage in dialogue and confrontational NGOs that call for boycotts or
litigate. However, the data show that NGOs follow various approaches concurrently, and 
it would be too short-sighted to link an NGO to one influence strategy. Rieth and Göbel’s
(2005) study indicated that NGOs have increasingly chosen ‘cooperative’ approaches
such as dialogue in the last years.
56
However, this thesis shows that the confrontational
method ‘lawsuit’ has gained popularity among NGOs, especially since the crisis began 
in September 2015.
56
Rieth and Göbel’s (2005) study took place between 2003 and 2004. Research was conducted with 25
NGOs from different areas, among others, unions and church-related organisations. The BUND and












   
    
  














   
   
   
     
   
     
 
    




   
   
     
    
    
  
 
   








    
  
 
   
 
  
             
   
  
              
       
            
      
         
         
          
        
           
        
     
Table 10: List of Selected Lawsuits
Description of Lawsuit/Case Date and File Number NGO Year Result
DUH v Dusseldorf 13.09.2016
3 K 7695/15
DUH 2016 Rejected
BUND v KBA 27.03.2017
3 B 41/17
BUND 2017 Rejected
DUH v KBA 13.12.2017
3 A 26/17, 3 A 30/17, 3 A 
38/17, 3 A 142/17 and 3 
A 59/17




DUH v BMVI 19.12.2017,
VG 2 K 236.16
DUH 2017 NGO won
BUND reported offences against
managers at VWG, Porsche, Audi,
Daimler Group, and BMW Group
Email was sent to BUND
to request details in
March 2018, no reply
BUND 2017
DUH v Stuttgart 28.07.2017
Az. 13 K 5412/15
DUH 2017 NGO won
Three US-American Funds v VWG 8.11.2017
Az.: 9 W 86/17
- 2017 Funds won
The Federal Administrative Court
in Leipzig largely rejected the
leapfrog revisions of the Federal




BVerwG 7 C 26.16 
(administrative court
Dusseldorf)
BVerwG 7 C 30.17
(administrative court
Stuttgart)
DUH 2018 NGO won
Source: Author
Refer to Appendix 5 for more detailed information on these lawsuits and criminal charges
and for references, which have been left out for clarity reasons.
6.4 Summary
The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings on how NGOs exerted influence
with direct and indirect instruments on VWG’s CSR approach during the emission crisis. 
Chapter 6 aims to answer the first research question: ‘How do NGOs influence the CSR
approach of an automotive MNC during a major organisational crisis under consideration 
of contextual factors?’ It builds on the outcomes of Chapter 5 that provide data on the 
interweaving of policy makers and the automotive industry. The chapter follows the
structure of the aggregate dimensions and second-order themes that were formed in the
data analysis process (refer to Figure 7 in Section 4.5). It starts by presenting evidence 
of how NGOs attempted to exert influence on VWG’s CSR approach by employing direct
influence instruments, such as stakeholder relationships (Section 6.2.1) and dialogues






        
          
           
   
   
         
        
          
         
        
         
        
           
  
          
            
       
        
       
        
              
        
          
   
          
      
          
          
 
	  
effects of the contextual factors, namely the close relations between policy makers and 
automotive MNCs, and the organisational crisis at VWG. The result of this
interconnection is the lack of accountability on the part of the MNC towards stakeholders,
paired with a certain degree of complacency regarding the implementation of required 
changes of the CSR approach.
Chapter 6 reveals that the efficacy of direct NGO influence approaches, such as 
stakeholder relationships, dialogues and AGMs, is rather limited, and NGOs have
difficulty entering productive exchanges with VWG. This chapter’s findings contribute to
stakeholder influence literature by showing that cooperative, direct influence
mechanisms become effective if these are complemented by confrontational
instruments, such as lawsuits and campaigns. That may happen via the simultaneous 
and successive exertion of a multiplicity of influence instruments, which lead to gradual
NGO pressure (refer to Section 6.2.3) and compensate for the weaker influence in
stakeholder dialogue.
The mechanisms of indirect NGO influence show how NGOs use more powerful actors
to exert influence on VWG. For example, NGOs pressure policy makers to tighten
regulations (Section 6.3.1). The findings demonstrate that the coercive instrument 
‘lawsuit’ appears to be the most effective stand-alone influence instrument, considering
the interconnection between government and industry. Section 6.3.2 indicates the
importance of NGO alliances and how a division of tasks may create pressure on the 
MNC. However, it also illustrates that the effect of NGO alliances may be weakened,
concerning disagreements about influence approaches and firm cooperation. This
chapter introduces Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) five stages of influence, which contributed 
to a better understanding and differentiation of the gathered data.
The dynamics of direct and indirect influence mechanisms contribute to the complexity 
of capturing NGO pressure on MNCs and will be discussed in Chapter 8. The next part,
Chapter 7, focuses on the perspective of the stakeholder group ‘NGO’ and presents







      
  
        
           
        
           
        
        
           
      
     
       
      
             
           
         
           
         
         
       
        
  
  
          
        
           
           
																																																						
          
           
        
                
                 
 
CHAPTER 7: NGO PERCEPTION OF (CONDITIONAL) INFLUENCE
7.1 Introduction
Sections 6.2 and 6.3 analysed the findings on the mechanisms of direct and indirect
NGO influence on VWG’s CSR approach and showed why NGO influence is limited. This
aggregate dimension, ‘NGO perception of (conditional) influence’, aims to analyse how
NGOs perceive their role and influence in the relationship with VWG. Moreover, it 
emphasises the NGO perspective, their perception of the different levels of influence,
and their view on the intertwining of government and VWG. This chapter builds on the 
calls of various scholars to investigate and focus on stakeholders’ views and perceptions
(Arenas, Lozano, and Albareda 2009; Burchell and Cook 2013; Frooman 1999). 
Moreover, Chapter 7 intends to answer the third research objective:
• To understand the NGOs’ perception of their role and influence on a major MNC’s
CSR approach in the context of Dieselgate.
This chapter also considers the views of suppliers and members of civil society
57 
on the 
crisis and VWG’s responses.
58 
It confronts these views with the NGOs’ perceptions of
their influence on and their relationships with VWG. Section 7.2, ‘NGOs’ Conditional
Influence’, provides the civil society actors’ reflections on their influence after Dieselgate
became public in 2015. It also explores the resulting implications, including the NGOs’ 
perception of having limited influence in the direct interactions with VWG. Section 7.3,
‘NGOs’ Perception of Corporate Social Irresponsibility’, illustrates that the NGOs
perceived that they were being used by VWG to strengthen and legitimise their CSR and
environmental activities.
7.2 NGOs’ Conditional Influence
This section focuses on how the NGOs perceived their influence within the interactions
with VWG and how the crisis affected their role and influence. The primary and 
secondary data do not provide an unambiguous view of these aspects. For example,
NABU’s representative stated that three groups can be differentiated within VWG:
57 
For example, it takes Professor Christian Scholz’ article on VWG’s inappropriate reactions on the crisis
into account, especially regarding the corporation’s personnel decisions (Scholz 2016). His answers on the
questions I sent him by email are considered here as well.
58
Next to the interviews with VWG’s CSR representative, I had several informal chats with doctorates who
work towards a PhD at VWG in Wolfsburg. One of my key questions was how VWG deals with the crisis, as






          
             
        
           
      
         
 
       
       
             
           
    
       
         
            
         
           
              
      
      
          
          
  
  
           
       
    
        
  
               
        
            
           
Volkswagen has 600,000 employees. There are simply very, very many,
who are not able to make use of us or do not deem it necessary [to] meet
[with] us. Then, there are others who have interest and want to change
something in the company for the sake of the environment. Then, there is 
a third group who simply knows that we are a relevant stakeholder and
influence political processes and public opinion to some extent. Then,
they see the need to talk with us. (Interview #27, NABU)
Representatives of the second group have a genuine interest in interacting with NGOs
and developing products that have a lesser effect on the environment. However, the data
retrieved from the NGOs and the behaviour of VWG before and after the crisis suggest 
that these people are in the sustainability department and not on the level of the
corporate decision makers. The difference between the second and the third group may
be that the second one perceives the exchange with NGOs as an opportunity to advance 
their sustainability approach and to make an effort to minimise the corporation’s negative 
environmental impact, whereas the third group may perceive the interaction with an NGO
as a necessary activity to satisfy stakeholders, especially shareholders. This group is
likely to categorise the stakeholder dialogue as just another risk minimisation strategy.
This is in line with van Huijstee and Glasbergen’s (2008: 301) proposed ideal types of 
stakeholder dialogue practices. The authors distinguished between the sustainability and 
the strategic management model. The sustainability model considers stakeholder
dialogue to be an important part of a firm’s CSR management and a chance to learn from
environmental experts. The latter focuses mainly on minimising risks when selecting
dialogue partners, positioning the dialogue within the company, and judging the 
outcomes.
The interviews indicated that VWG might be assigned to the strategic management
model. However, the corporation was not able to classify the risk properly and used the 
dialogue with NGOs and some political actors to appease and downplay the increasing 
accusations that the company used ‘manipulation software’ (US Department of Justice
2017a; Interview #7, BUND).
The findings show that NGOs had to face two issues when aiming to influence VWG’s
CSR approach in direct interactions with the MNC: the first issue concerns the general
NGO influence on VWG that was rather limited per se. The second contentious point 






            
        
         
       
    
        
         
           
      
   
          
           
          
           
         
         
    
           
         
           
           
         
         
             
        
     
          
        
           
           
     
 
influence internally. The findings showed that employees of this department, which is
usually the first contact point for NGOs, were often on the same line with the NGOs.
However, these people did not have the power to ‘sell’ environmentally relevant ideas
successfully to more powerful departments and individuals within VWG. A DUH 
respondent said the following:
I think, within the companies, there are two strands that are being
pursued. I also believe that CSR people are not really communicating with
those who deal with the acute issue. At the very least, the CSR people
might say, 'Now we also need substantial changes in the processes and 
decisions'. (Interview #18, DUH)
The DUH interviewee referred to the separation between the sustainability department
and the other areas of the company. The reasons the sustainability department does not
seem to communicate well with the corporate decision makers are manifold and have 
been discussed before: a lack of integration of CSR into the rest of the company, a
corporate culture that supresses contradictory opinions, a strict hierarchical system in
which lower positioned managers are afraid to share their opinion, and a corporate 
governance structure in which the works council and unions are exceptionally strong 
interest groups. Consequently, this constellation makes it more difficult for the
management to justify ‘sustainability-related expenses’. These findings raise the
question of whether CSR has ever been integrated in VWG’s business processes.
In various publications (e.g. Kopp and Richter 2007; VWG 2015a: 161), the MNC
communicated that it integrated CSR-relevant aspects into its strategies. According to
the CSR managers, VWG implemented a ‘stakeholder management [system], which
forms the core of an integrated CSR approach […] based on a process of open and
constructive communication on eye level’ (Prätorius and Richter 2013: 122). There is a 
discrepancy between the corporation’s statements, how important the exchange with 
NGOs is, and the gained data that show to only a limited extent that VWG has considered
the organisations' requests. This emphasises Eesley and Lenox’s (2006)
conceptualisation of salience, which states that stakeholders, such as NGOs, can be
considered salient or influential if the MNC’s actions reflect the NGOs’ requests or






        
            
           
               
            
          
            
          
     
        
       
    
        
 
             
           
           
         
       
        
  
          
        
       
            
         
        
          
          
         
       
             
          
The statement of NABU’s traffic expert on the different groups within VWG (at the 
beginning of Section 7.2) implied that NGOs gained legitimacy after the crisis and that
there is a different perception of the role of NGOs in the interaction with both corporations
and policy makers. Even though it is difficult to measure, it seems that NGOs gained in
support from citizens, from the media to some extent, and from some politicians and 
sustainability experts, who praised the work of NGOs as important to investigate
Dieselgate and promote regulatory changes. The crisis could have strengthened the role
of NGOs and the perception of policy makers and VWG. Moreover, NABU’s traffic expert
perceived that the crisis changed the mindset of some companies:
It has become clear that not everything was that wrong that we have
demanded or advised. They should have rather heard at one point or
another what we have suggested. Therefore, there are some in the 
company, who now evaluate the role of NGOs differently. (Interview #27,
NABU)
This quote indicates the perception that there is no way around NGOs and that policy
makers and MNCs are increasingly aware of their work after the crisis. In that regard, 
the crisis might have helped to remind civil society, companies, and policy makers of the 
importance of NGOs. Especially, NGOs’ core topics, such as the resistance against
nuclear power or the fight against climate warming, have been adopted by conservative 
and neo-liberal parties, such as CDU and Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic
Party).
Rucht and Roose (1999: 75) observed that the excitement around environmental policies
is gone and has been ‘overshadowed by “bread and butter issues” such as 
unemployment, budget deficits, and the integration of immigrants’, which are aspects
that still play a great role 15 to 20 years later. The NGOs’ standing may have been 
changed after the crisis. However, alternatively, stakeholder interactions between MNCs
and NGOs have been reduced and partnerships terminated (e.g. NABU with VWG), as
there has not been much common ground after Dieselgate. The interviewed NGOs (DKA, 
BUND, DUH, NABU, and Greenpeace) stated that the level of communication and 
feedback decreased after the crisis. According to the TI representative, there has never
really been an interaction between TI and VWG; therefore, a deteriorating relationship
was impossible. One of the reasons might be that VWG needs time to seriously prove






               
        
          
            
    
           
         
          
             
                
              
    
           
            
          
          
           
          
             
             
      
 
            
           
               
         
         
         
 
																																																						
                  
            
 
too early to judge whether a change took place within VWG and whether the corporate
culture has changed, NGOs do not perceive that there has been a transformation.
Statements by VWG’s top management indicate that VWG shows only a limited capacity
of discernment. For example, then CEO Müller was quoted by the newspaper FAZ that 
he did not agree with the wording 'entrepreneurial failure' (Frasch 2017).
59 
Shortly after the crisis, the NGOs expressed their expectations regarding VWG’s
behaviour, actions, and conclusions in the short and long run. The following statement 
represents the NGOs’ short-term expectation of the company: ‘I think VWG has to be 
measured by how they actually implement this recall now’ (Interview #18, DUH). Other
expectations aim more towards the changes that need to be made within VWG or how it
deals with its civil society stakeholders. Put simply, ‘the company has to deliver in many
areas’ (Interview #7, NABU).
In the summer of 2016, the interviewed DUH representative did not perceive that VWG
used the event to revise its CSR approach to communicate more openly with
stakeholders and policy makers. The traffic expert had the impression ‘that there is very
... very little willingness, … to more openness’ (Interview #18, DUH). The various
scandals that became public after Dieselgate show how challenging it is for VWG ‘to
deliver’. These scandals thwart the efforts of NGOs and the public to trust and believe 
that VWG intends to make changes. For example, in January 2018, VWG admitted that
it tested diesel fumes on monkeys in 2014 (VWG 2018). Scandals like these further
damaged the credibility of VWG and the German automotive industry, as the following
quote suggests:
What VW has to do is to create transparency. The scandal is now running 
non-stop for over two years, and there are always new things coming up.
You are lied to the whole time. Every time, they say, 'we'll clear things up
and everything will be transparent'. It's not like that at all. Things will be 
buried. With the tests using monkeys as experimental subjects, VW is
trying convulsively to keep it out of the lawsuits in the US. (Interview #33, 
Greenpeace)
59
Müller made this statement after the ‘National Forum Diesel’ in Berlin in 2017. This is the original wording







           
          
           
   	       
            
           
          
        
        
         
          
        
            
        
        
             
             
   
          
           
          
        
        
          
           
            
          
            
       
               
          
             
          
         
This quote reflects the difficulties that NGOs have believing VWG’s intentions to
implement changes considering recurrent issues. Moreover, NGOs perceive a lack of
transparency due to the MNC’s ‘piecemeal strategy’ in publishing details of the scandal
directly after it became public. Therefore, the statement also questions the NGOs’ trust
in corporate CSR reports, especially as ‘transparency is a necessary condition for CSR’
(Dubbink, Graafland, and van Liedekerke 2008: 391). A transparent company would face
its problems more proactively and involve its stakeholders by ‘making the decision
processes of the company visible’ (Madsen and Uhoi 2001: 86).
As a consequence of the fume tests on monkeys, VWG’s general representative and 
‘Head of Group External Relations and Sustainability’, Thomas Steg, was suspended
(VWG 2018). Earlier, in July 2017, the car producers VWG, BMW Group, Daimler Group,
and Opel were accused of having formed a cartel for many years (e.g. Breitinger and 
Zacharakis 2017). Though official results of the investigations have not yet been
published, VWG and Daimler Group submitted self-indictments (Kirchner, Leyendecker,
and Ott 2017). Reports stated that this cartel agreed upon technological features and 
tried to save money by deliberately leaving out better and cleaner technology. The
magazine Der Spiegel reported that the cartel scandal has been going on for 20 years
and can be considered to be the precursor of Dieselgate (Hengstenberg 2017). In the 
newspaper SZ, a VWG manager reacted with amazement regarding the publication and
could not understand the fuss about these (cartel) agreements, as this is completely
normal and car producers have never seen a problem with it (Ott 2017). This
disconnection from reality and from the propagated CSR values and the misjudgement 
of the huge scandal shows similarities to VWG’s reaction to Dieselgate.
When trying to understand why the direct interaction between NGOs and VWG
decreased after the crisis, it helps to recall the factors and preconditions of a successful
interaction. For example, Bundy, Vogel, and Zachary (2018: 476) stated that the
alignment of ‘their values and priorities’ is an important aspect for successful 
relationships between NGOs and MNCs. Trust and reliability, clear rules and structures,
and feedback of results are among the factors that Kaptein and van Tulder (2003) named 
to be crucial for an efficient dialogue. Even though the trust factor is only one of ten in
the authors’ list of preconditions for a successful dialogue, it is evident that most of the
other steps are based on trust. The trust between NGOs and VWG was no longer given
after September 2015. In addition, NGOs and other societal groups felt deceived,






           
         
          
           
   
             
      
           
       
    
             
         
              
           
          
             
            
           
          
             
           
          
        
          
         
        
       
         
           
																																																						
          
      
campaigns, which seemed to be stronger than rumours and suspicious RDE tests, years 
before the crisis became public. Therefore, some NGOs do not believe that a dialogue
with VWG would change anything, especially considering that NGOs, such as NABU,
perceive that VWG does not show much commitment. Shortly after the crisis, the NGO’s
representative thought that things were about to change at VWG:
There was a phase in which many people at Volkswagen were just as
horrified by the whole story as we were, and there was still good hope 
that the tanker could pulled around and we can still do something good…. 
However, there is not so much to discuss because the homework is not
done. (Interview #27, NABU)
Among the reasons that caused the NGO’s frustrations was VWG’s misjudgement of the
crisis. In the aftermath of the scandal, there was an observable discrepancy between the 
severity of the crisis and the way VWG reacted to it. For a long time, the corporation
insisted on the stance that only few technicians were involved in the scandal and that 
these people acted on their own behalf. Another aspect that made NGOs wonder
whether VWG understood the massive scale of the scandal is the way the MNC has
communicated the crisis internally and externally: ‘The wording is already a problem.
They call it “Dieseltopic”. This is systematic fraud…It's not a topic’ (Interview #18, DUH).
The questioned VWG researchers confirmed that the car producer also communicated
internally in this manner.
60 
Two of the researchers shook their heads about VWG’s
communication and that the corporation did not call things by the right names, especially
because this wording suggested the company’s unwillingness to face this massive
responsibility. ‘Dieseltopic’ euphemises the scandal, considering that the whole group
felt the consequences of the crisis very early, as budgets were cut and bonuses were
reduced. ‘Topic’ implies that the emissions scandal has been a minor incident, rather 
than a crisis that threatens the existence of Germany’s biggest company. It showed
stakeholders all around the world that environmental commitment and campaigns (e.g.
‘clean diesel’) were empty promises. According to TI, VWG’s internal communication
after the crisis was characterised by a ‘flawed incident management’ that conveyed the
60 
The author met several of VWG’s employees who work and do research in the corporation at a CSR






          
  
         
     
     
        
           
          
 
              
     
       
         
              
    
              
           
          
 
    
          
           
         
         
      
 
																																																						
           
        
   
        
                 
         
           
    
message that only a ‘small mistake happened’ (Interview #13), not showing any sense 
of guilt. 
Painter and Martins (2017: 216) analysed that VWG’s communication after the crisis
reflected a ‘rather reactive, defensive approach in information flow (e.g. denying 
knowledge and/or responsibility and downplaying impact)’.
61 
However, crisis 
management literature considers those companies to be effective that understand the 
full extent of a crisis and acknowledge and address the concerns of stakeholders (Reilly
1993). However, there is also a different perspective that is represented by the following 
statement:
On the one hand, [people] require you to take every step with care, [to]
be cautious and sustainable, and at the same time – and that
presupposes that you also think a bit longer – [people] demand [that] 
every step is taken immediately. This is always such a situation where
you can actually say, no matter in which direction you march, it is all a big
crap. (Interview #5, policy maker)
The politician stated that both policy makers and corporations, such as VWG, face the
same dilemma: the public seems to expect a thorough and fast clarification of the
scandal; however, it quickly criticises the policy or corporate actors’ approaches if
temporary results are not entirely satisfying.
7.3 NGOs’ Perception of Corporate Social Irresponsibility62 
This section emphasises the perspective of the NGOs and provides evidence regarding
why these organisations felt deceived. However, it also presents different views of
suppliers and representatives from the political sphere. It aims to show the discrepancy
between the insight on the current CSR debate on the integration of sustainability into
companies’ business strategies and the behaviour of VWG and understanding of policy
makers.
61 
The authors gathered the data from VWG’s press releases, and ‘statements to shareholders and investors; 
and transcripts of evidence presented to the UK Parliament Transport Select Committee’ (Painter and 
Martins 2017: 208).
62 
The terms ‘greenwashing’ and ‘CSI’ are sometimes used interchangeably. However, there are differences;
CSI is a broader concept that can be considered the ‘negative’ end of the CSR continuum. It includes
irresponsible behaviour in the social, economic, and environmental dimensions (Murphy and Schlegelmilch
2013), whereas greenwashing relates more to companies that mislead consumers about their environmental






           
            
          
        
          
           
     
     
   
       
         
           
          
           
            
          
          
         
 
          
          
        
         
              
        
 
               
           
              
              
            
Though many interviewed stakeholders cannot judge VWG’s CSR approach in detail,
there is the perception that it served to deceive stakeholders and cover fraud that has
been ongoing for several years. Thus, the NGOs were greatly disappointed about the 
developments at VWG, as the following statement by a leading DKA member shows:
Before this became known, VWG was exemplary in some areas. But that
was quickly unmasked. That was only a pretence because of this
fraudulent software. Therefore, you must revise all that we previously
thought of VWG as a modern, environmentally conscious company. 
(Interview #19, DKA)
Considering that CSR encompasses economic, environmental, and social aspects,
participants were usually able to refer to subcategories of one of these dimensions when 
discussing CSR and/or describing how they perceived VWG’s crisis. Four of the six
interviewed NGOs are ENGOs; therefore, they touched consciously and unconsciously
on more aspects of the environmental domain. Very often, the NGOs’ representatives
mentioned the fig leaf metaphor to describe that they felt they were being used and 
deceived. Furthermore, this metaphor also symbolises that the stakeholders perceived
VWG’s extensive CSR approach to be a huge apparatus covering the fact that the
company deceived stakeholders and society when it came to their core business: 
building efficient cars that keep the communicated promises.
I can only say, if there was such a compliance violation, then the whole
thing [CSR] was obviously a pure fig leaf activity [Note: this refers to
VWG’s efforts to use CSR to cover illegitimate behaviour]. You can do 
this with 550 people or with 1,550 people. It does not matter. If something
like that happened, it was a pure fig leaf activity. Five hundred and fifty
people have spent the day and got money for a fig leaf. (Interview #13,
TI)
The above quote came from a high-ranking representative of the NGO TI that is listed in
VWG’s stakeholder matrix (VWG 2012: 24). However, the organisation made it clear that
it maintained an observer’s role and did not have a close relationship with VWG before 
or after the crisis. One of the NGOs that was in closer contact with VWG was BUND. In






       
 
         
         
       
        
  
                
          
          
     
           
       
            
   
            
       
       
       
          
        
      
     
           
          
        
         
          
     
          
           
         
the disappointment about VWG’s lack of awareness and interest in environmental
aspects.
I feel, and I think the others as well, like a fig leaf. We talk to the company
and nothing comes out. The cars get bigger, the cars get heavier, dirtier,
or rather not cleaner. Then, you have not accomplished much in principle.
Then, a corporation like VW doesn’t really engage itself much. (Interview
#6, BUND)
Similarly, Greenpeace stated that ‘we do not want to be the fig leaf for a corporation that 
writes nice CSR reports’. Therefore, for the NGO, involvement in VWG’s CSR events or
publication does not make sense ‘as long as this is just a rhetorical story and the 
corporation does not really add substance’ (Interview #32, Greenpeace).
These quotes reflect the feeling of NGOs of being deceived and that they perceive
VWG’s CSR approach to be greenwashing. Moreover, VWG’s behaviour could be
reflected in Jones, Bowd, and Tench’s (2009: 304) conceptualisation of CSI that is ‘about
being reactive as opposed to proactive in addressing corporate issues and the ways and 
means by which they relate to wider society’. Similarly, for Greenwood (2007: 323), it is
corporate irresponsibility if a company shows ‘excessive engagement without
accountability or responsibility towards stakeholders’. Therefore, companies ‘only
appear to meet stakeholders' interests but are instead instrumentalising stakeholders for 
the sake of meeting the company’s self-interest’ (Lin-Hi and Müller 2013: 1930).
In their pre-crisis sustainability report, VWG (2014: 23) stated, ‘[we are] aware of our
stakeholders’ needs and expectations…that is why we seek and maintain a dialogue with 
our stakeholders’. Additionally, VWG’s CSR representative emphasised the importance 
of the dialogue with NGOs and stated they are one of the company’s most important
stakeholders (Interview #3). However, the NGOs’ perception is that these talks have, at 
best, a minor influence on the MNC’s business strategies. That may show the perceived 
powerlessness of NGOs and the powerlessness of VWG’s CSR Department. It shows
that the communicated claims and announced efforts, which were part of VWG’s CSR 
approach, do not reflect reality.
Furthermore, VWG’s ‘clean diesel’ campaign (e.g. Automotive News 2016; VWG 2009)
and the following statements may be counted as examples of these claims: ‘We stand 






          
             
          
       
         
            
         
   
           
              
         
           
      
             
        
          
            
        
           
   	     
              
             
             
           
       
           
         
           
              
       
            
           
         
advanced technologies available’ (VWG 2010: 19). For the interviewed CSR expert of
the government, these claims are one side of the coin (Interview #1). According to him,
automotive companies, such as VWG, follow a double strategy. On one hand, they
engage in CSR forums and seminars, publish CSR/sustainability reports, advertise fuel
savings and ‘environmentally friendly’ cars, and discuss the integration of CSR in existing
strategies. On the other hand, the German car manufacturing MNCs lobby for the
reduction of CO2 emission regulations and complain about initiatives of the EC regarding
CSR transparency and financial reporting.
There were many voices in the interviews speaking about deception and systematic 
fraud and that VWG used CSR to veil their efforts to bypass laws. However, some
members of another group of the interviewed stakeholders, the suppliers, do not really 
consider VWG’s crisis to be a CSR scandal or a major contradiction of the MNC’s CSR
approach. For example, this supplier stated:
As a CSR professional, I rather tend to consider this scandal, before being
a CSR or sustainability scandal, rather, you know, [to be] an ethics
scandal, a marketing scandal, [or] a customer loyalty scandal. One of the 
worst consequences, one of the worst features of this, of what happened,
I don’t think it is for the environmental sphere. (Interview #20, Supplier 2)
This statement reflects the opinion of some suppliers and policy makers that VWG made 
a technical mistake that harmed VWG’s reputation. However, the suppliers do not seem
to see the scandal as a reflection of a flawed corporate governance structure and an
MNC that does not take the environmental implications of its actions seriously. However,
it was surprising to some extent that the quoted CSR manager did not consider ethics to
be an integral part of a firm’s CSR approach. In addition, VWG’s CEO, Matthias Müller,
expressed himself similarly when he was interviewed by National Public Radio at the 
North American International Auto Show in Detroit in January 2016. He could not 
understand why people thought this scandal was linked to ethical problems. ‘It was an
ethical problem? I cannot understand why you say that’ (Glinton 2016). At that time, for 
VWG and the CEO, the scandal was nothing more than a ‘technical problem. We made
a default, we had a ... not the right interpretation of the American law’ (Glinton 2016). 
Though Müller apologised for his statements a day after, VWG’s understanding of the
law, the internal and external consequences of the scandal, and the role of its own top 






        
         
              
        
              
 
           
            
            
          
        
        
         
       
         
          
          
             
           
             
         
        
              
             
         
            
              
         
        
             
            
             
 
American law. That reflects a crude understanding of the misdemeanours and continues 
the argument that there has never been an illegal defeat-device system, according to EU
law (e.g. Doll and Vetter 2016). Thus, with all means available, VWG wanted to prevent 
paying compensation for damage in Europe. Müller’s statement also revealed VWG’s
view that the company made an error and behaved (once) unethically but did not see 
that as a contrast to the company’s alleged integration of CSR into all business areas.
The judgement of a former, high-ranking CSR director of one of VWG’s suppliers
deviated from the NGO’s point of view and supported the opinion that the crisis is not a
major CSR failure. In the interview, the CSR manager stated that VWG and other
German automotive manufacturers did well in integrating ‘CSR/sustainability into their
strategies and their core business and operations’ (Interview #20). In general, the tenor
coming from suppliers is that VWG supported them regarding CSR specific questions 
and offered training. Another supplier warned against making an example of VWG: ‘I 
don’t think everything’s bad just because a huge mistake happened, which will definitely
not happen again. And the competitors don’t really do things differently’ (Interview #21,
Supplier 3). This statement not only downplays the scandal’s ethical, economic, and 
reputational implications but also provides insight into the logic that justifies violations of
law as long as multiple actors commit them. It is in the best interests of many suppliers
to leave the emissions scandal behind and deal with a VWG that is financially well off,
considering that, for several, smaller suppliers, ‘the VWG scandal had a similar or even 
more severe effect […] than the financial crisis 2008’ (Interview #21, Supplier 3).
However, it is not the case that suppliers are unanimous in their perception regarding 
VWG’s CSR efforts along the supply chain before and after the crisis. The managing
director of one of VWG’s suppliers, who worked with them for many years, stated that ‘in 
regard to technical questions, the processes are crystal clear; however, when it comes
to CSR or ethical standards, there is a lot of room for interpretation, it is rather fishy’
(Interview #4, Supplier 1). The same supplier stated that he does not ‘think that CSR will
play a bigger role after the crisis. No one jumps higher than he necessarily must’. 
However, a company that aimed to be ‘world’s most […] sustainable automobile
manufacturer’ (VWG 2014: 14) should be able to be more concrete regarding their CSR
and environmental approach. It seems that the increasing NGO pressure that is, for







         
      
        
           
          
           
             
          
             
               
             
        
           
            
   
         
            
         
     
       
            
           
        
             
              
                
       
           
             
 
																																																						
                
    
Several indicators illustrate that the crisis did not arise out of thin air. There were 
warnings and signals from civil society, political stakeholders, and American 
environmental agencies, although several German political institutions did not exert 
pressure.
63
The interviews also reflected the ambiguity of VWG’s public communication
regarding their alleged efforts to reduce CO2 and NOx emissions, and the lobbying
activities of the corporation in Berlin and Brussels. These activities were aimed at
softening the limit values and stand in contrast to the public statements. Though this form
of deception did not play a great role in the interviews, it can be counted as one of the
indicators showing that the crisis might not have come as a big surprise.
There are different perceptions among the NGOs when it comes to the question of how
such a crisis at VWG may be avoided in future. Especially, ENGOs, such as BUND and
DUH, stated that a stricter enforcement of regulations and more transparency on the 
regulatory level is needed. However, other civil society actors take the view that change
may only come from within the company and not through laws and regulations. For
example, TI’s representative stated:
I can imagine that this is a corporate culture from the last century. 
According to the motto, 'don’t ask questions, just do it’.… This cannot
change in the shortest possible time. This is too deadlocked. They had 
people in certain positions, which are there and remain there, at first. They
cannot change all people. (Interview #13, TI)
Thus, TI aims at the required changes of the organisational culture, which VWG’s top
management would need to initiate to foster change. An important precondition for such
a successful cultural change is a ‘learning oriented and open’ (Müller and Siebenhüner 
2007: 236) organisational culture. For example, Scholz (2016) stated that VWG did not
really understand how corporate culture is created and that it cannot be changed within
a short period. He continued by stating that it will be very difficult to change behaviour if
sustainability and environmental values are not anchored in the company’s values 
(Scholz 2016). A lack of cultural openness might reduce the MNC’s receptiveness to
CSR ideas and thus increase the difficulty for external forces, such as NGOs, to influence
sustainability themes.
63
Refer to Section 2.3 ‘Background, Development and Chronology of VWG Crisis’ to read more about who






            
       
             
        
           
  
              
         
      
   
              
           
         
   
           
           
            
    
            
        
         
        
         
          
          
         
        
         
         
          
																																																						
                
 
             
It emerged from the analysis of the secondary material that VWG did a good job on paper
and ticked the relevant CSR boxes.
64
The crisis and the data gained in the interviews
with NGOs, suppliers, and CSR experts showed that this is not the case. It emerged that
the stakeholders missed the clear commitment towards CSR that would have been 
emphasised using financial resources to reach the goals that VWG proclaimed in the
stakeholder dialogue.
When it comes to money, when there’s the threat of selling less cars, then
CSR does not play a role anymore. If VWG or other corporations would 
have taken CSR really seriously, then it [the crisis] would have never
happened. (Interview #7, BUND)
This statement of the traffic and sustainability expert of the NGO BUND reveals several
aspects, such as a lack of willingness to engage in CSR and an insufficient anchorage 
of CSR within the company. Additionally, it suggests an absence of communication 
among the people within VWG who are interested in fostering CSR activities and the 
forces for which CSR is just an embellishment to the corporate objectives. Furthermore,
such a statement illustrates an existing conflict within the current CSR literature; the 
stream of literature that states that there should be a business case for CSR and that
sets the firm’s financial objectives in relation to CSR initiatives (O’Sullivan 2006).
Whereas, Vogel (2005) spoke of a new world of CSR that more thoroughly integrates
economic considerations with a focus on increased profitability, when attempting to be
more socially responsible. However, the author admitted that there is ‘no evidence that
behaving more virtuously makes firms more profitable’ (Vogel 2005: 17). It seems widely
accepted that MNCs should only engage in CSR if they identify the ‘business case’
ignoring that ‘socially desirable behaviour […] often decreases the firm’s profits’ (Karnani
2014: 16). In other words, corporations that face CSR with the expectation that it leads
to relatively higher returns or that it even stimulates non-financial objectives, such as 
image and reputation, will be disappointed and may not have sincere environmentally
and socially desirable intentions. In addition, the interviewed CSR expert of the German
Government (Interview #26) posed the question: ‘Companies keep talking about the




For example, a strong CSR department, an integration of CSR in the different areas of the corporation,
the ambition to develop models that are always ‘cleaner’ than the previous model, etc. 
65 






         
      
          
           
        
        
          
              
      
             
               
              
         
        
       
             
    
              
           
             
         
            
          
            
            
          
           
                 
      
             
         
     
      
Freeman (2017: 14) proposed that ‘any business case is somehow incomplete if it only
creates sustainability improvements to satisfy one single group of stakeholders through
economic benefits (financiers) but neglects the needs and importance of other
stakeholders’. In this study, there is evidence that VWG neglected the importance of the
stakeholder ‘NGO'. Moreover, VWG’s emissions crisis also showed that the stakeholder
group ‘customer’ was neglected as much as the internal stakeholder ‘employee’, as the
majority of the workforce was not involved in the scandal.
The transport policy expert at NABU stated in an interview on the website of his 
organisation that VWG lost credibility and the scandal fundamentally questioned the 
cooperation between the NGO and VWG (Oeliger 2015). In the interview, NABU’s traffic
policy expert said that ‘we have to ask what influence on VWG’s sustainability efforts did
we actually have, if something like that – which goes diametric to our organisation’s
values – happens during our cooperation’ that lasted 15 years (Interview #7, NABU). 
Though NABU was extremely disappointed by VWG, it acknowledged the good
cooperation that they had with representatives of VWG’s sustainability department. The
NGO considers this scandal a betrayal not only of consumers and authorities but also of
most of VWG’s employees.
Another significant reason VWG might not have seen the crisis coming or ignored the
signals, might be the misbelief that fraud and deception could not have been discovered.
Over the years, VWG and political institutions created an atmosphere in which a critical
discourse has hardly taken place. The MNC might have developed a self-understanding 
to believe they are ‘too big to fail’, an assumption that could be based, among others, on 
the strong intertwining between policy makers and the industry. This interweaving is
manifested by frequent changes of employment of policy makers into companies, such
as to VWG and back (Austrup 2016; Posaner, Müller, and Hervey 2017). Neither the
union, the works council, or the two federal politicians, who all are represented in VWG’s
supervisory board, nor politicians in Berlin challenged the board or intervened when it
was required. This is one of the reasons VWG might have felt secure and why the NGO
DKA came to the following conclusion:
Well, I think that is a system [the tight relationship between policy makers
and VWG] [that has] grown over many decades. This will not be able to 
be abolished because there are many powerful actors involved in it. This






              
      
            
       
 
           
         
            
     
           
           
             
           
          
          
         
         
         
  
           
          
      
          
       
         
      
          
             
          
       
        
             
           
culture of VWG. And with that, it does not seem to be the best. From my 
point of view, VWG has developed the self-understanding of being a state 
within the state, and [they] act as they think best, and as long as this does
not change, it will be difficult to turn the corporate culture decisively for
the better. (Interview #19, DKA)
In a documentary (Phoenix 2012), the former chairman of VWG’s works council, Klaus
Volkert, replied that ‘complacency’ might be the next crisis that could lead to
recklessness, resulting from being Europe’s biggest car manufacturer on the way to
becoming the world’s number one car producer.
The above-described closeness between VWG and its stakeholders used to be an
example of a well-working tripartite system that was considered one of the success
factors of the German economy. However, in the case of VWG, it serves more as an
indicator that important German institutions protect VWG and are afraid of leaving the
status quo. Political actors argue that they have a huge responsibility to protect hundreds
of thousands of jobs in the automotive industry and that every step that could harm the 
industry should be reassessed twice. However, policy makers expressing these
statements neglect the possibility that they might reach the exact opposite: an industry
that has been pampered over years and that did not present affordable innovations
regarding the development of cleaner cars.
In addition, TI’s representative stated in the interview that ‘corporate governance is a 
huge problem at VWG’ (Interview #13, TI). Works council, union, and political actors
developed dependencies and created privileges for themselves and are not capable of
controlling the management board at VWG. The borders between the board and
supervisory board are blurred, and managers change smoothly from one to the other
committee (e.g. Raabe 2011; Scholz 2016). The widely recognised automotive expert
Dudenhöffer stated in an interview with the magazine Automotive IT that ‘’over parities’
in the supervisory board and a parish-pump politics in the Federal State Lower Saxony’
(Dudenhöffer 2016a: 13) make it difficult for VWG to sustain in the world market and to
have cost structures like BMW Group or Toyota. He stated that the yearlong ‘intrigues
and blockades damage the corporation’. In a different industry magazine, the
Automobilwoche, Dudenhöffer is cited as stating: ‘not the managers or the owners'
families are responsible for the current situation, but above all the, works council and the






             
        
      
  
               
           
             
           
        
         
            
          
            
            
             
            
  
          
        
       
         
       
          
         
   
        
   
           
           
        
       
            
               
mixture of the various actors’ interdependencies, the role of powerful families, and the
omnipresence of political power makes it more difficult for NGOs to gain influence and 
represent the interests of civil society.
7.4 Summary
Chapter 7 reflects the fourth aggregate dimension of the data structure shown in Figure 7
(Section 4.5). It intends to answer the second research question: How do NGOs perceive
their role and influence on an automotive MNC? Thus, this chapter’s findings contribute
to the stakeholder theory by illustrating the perspective of NGOs on their role and
influence and the discrepancy between the NGOs’ perception and that of MNCs. This
chapter shows that the NGOs perceive their direct influence on VWG as rather limited 
and reveal the doubts NGOs have about the efficacy of their influence (Section 7.2). The
studied CSOs felt deceived and felt they were often used as camouflage by the MNC
(Section 7.3). Even though the NGOs perceive an increased appreciation after the crisis
at VWG became public, they feel that their key messages are not received by VWG and 
other automotive manufacturers. One of the reasons may be the lack of integration of
CSR into VWG’s business strategies and the rather limited power of the corporation’s
sustainability department.
Further scandals that are connected to Dieselgate became public and underline the 
impression that the company's behaviour is interspersed with CSI practices. These
scandals are reflected in the discrepancies between the MNC’s promises and actions
(e.g. regarding the NOx and CO2 emissions or the strong lobbying activities in Brussels). 
Consequently, NGOs perceive those measures as more effective, which equip them with 
greater forms of pressure to influence VWG’s environmental behaviour. The coercive
instrument ‘lawsuit’ and the concurrent use of a multiplicity of influence methods (e.g.
campaigns, dialogues, publications, and round tables) have been identified as
unconditional means used by NGOs to influence firms and represent important
contributions of this study.
Chapter 5 provides data that contribute to the contextual background of this study by
emphasising the role of the strong interconnection between German policy makers and
the automotive industry. Thus, it highlighted the constraining effects of this interweaving
on the influence of NGOs. Chapters 6 and 7 present evidence of the different
mechanisms of direct and indirect NGO influence and highlight the NGOs’ perception of






         
  
	  







     
  
           
          
             
     
       
         
       
            
          
              
        
           
          
          
          
           
      
     
            
      
        
          
    
          
        
       
      
       
            
 
CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
8.1 Introduction
The purpose of this study was to investigate qualitatively how NGOs in Germany
influence an MNC’s CSR approach under consideration of contextual factors, such as 
the crisis at VWG and the intertwining between German policy makers and the
automotive industry. This research examined the backgrounds and causes of Dieselgate 
and scrutinised the roles of the various actors in the crisis (refer to Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 5). It uncovered the importance of understanding the interweaving between 
policy makers and the automotive industry and how that limited the influence of NGOs
on VWG’s CSR approach (refer to Chapter 5). This study improved the understanding of
the significance of contextual factors, considering that the negligence of these dynamics 
would only provide a fragmented understanding of the role and influence of NGOs.
Furthermore, the study investigated the mechanisms of conditional and unconditional 
direct and indirect NGO influence on VWG (refer to Chapter 6). It found that the coercive
instrument ‘lawsuit’ is one that enables NGOs to exert unconditional influence (refer to
Section 6.3.3). It also showed that the simultaneous and successive use of the 
multiplicity of direct and indirect influence instruments has a greater effect on the MNC’s
CSR approach than pursuing just one approach in isolation. Moreover, this thesis
demonstrated the importance of the NGO perspective to CSR by providing a platform for
the civil society actors’ perception on their role and influence (refer to Chapter 7).
This thesis aimed to answer two research questions. First, how NGOs influence the CSR
approach of an automotive MNC during a major organisational crisis under consideration 
of contextual factors and, second, how NGOs perceive their role and influence on an 
automotive MNC. The following three research objectives (refer to Sections 1.2 and 3.4)
were derived from these questions:
• Research Objective 1: To examine the development and chronology of VWG’s
Dieselgate scandal and the German political institutional context;
• Research Objective 2: To explore the influence of NGOs on the CSR approach 
of a MNC in Germany in the context of a crisis; and
• Research Objective 3: To understand the NGOs’ perception of their role and 






           
           
          
            
          
            
          
             
           
           
          
 
    
              
             




   
             
      
         
            
  
            
      
         
           
   
     
  
        
 
        
       
  
The first objective focused on the understanding of the crisis’ extent and the involved 
actors and provided the required context in which NGOs interact with MNCs and policy
makers. The second research objective aimed at discovering the NGOs direct and 
indirect influence, what the organisation’s means are to employ pressure, and how the
contextual factors resulting from the first objective affect NGO influence. By responding
to the third objective, the study contributes to a better understanding of how NGOs
perceive their role and influence on the MNC’s CSR approach.
In the following chapter, the main findings of the thesis will be discussed according to
the three research objectives and the literature reviewed of Chapter 3. Chapter 8 brings
the previous three findings chapters together and indicates the study’s theoretical
contributions and practical implications. These will be presented concisely in Chapter 9.
8.2 Main Findings
8.2.1 Summary of Key Findings
Section 8.2.1 serves to summarise the insights gained in the previous chapters, as well
as to provide an overview of conceptual terms. Table 11 provides a summary of the key 
findings presented in the chapters 5, 6 and 7. These findings play an important role in
the discussion that follows in the Sections 8.2.2, 8.2.3, and 8.2.4. 
Table 11: Summary of key Findings
Key Findings
Chapter 5 • Contextual factors play an important role in the understanding of
NGO influence on the automotive MNC
• Policy makers failed to tighten and enforce regulations
• Policy makers strongly rely on soft law initiatives of MNCs such as
VWG
Chapter 6 • Direct influence instrument ‘stakeholder dialogue’ appears to have a
low effect on MNC’s CSR actions
• Multiplicity of influence instruments leads to strong NGO influence
• The coercive approach ‘lawsuit’ appears to be the most efficient
stand-alone NGO influence instrument
• Role of NGO alliances:
• Important to amplify pressure on MNCs and policy makers
• Disagreement among NGOs may weaken influence on
MNC
• Lack of integration of CSR in MNC’s business strategies:







         
   
     
         




           
         
        




     
   




   






    
 
 
   




   
  
  
   
    










     
   
      
 
   
     
   
     
    
 
   
   
  
 
   
   
   
     
      
 
    
      
   
 	
	
• MNC does not spend sufficient resources to implement
results of stakeholder dialogue
Chapter 7 • NGO perspective
• NGOs feel deceived: stakeholder dialogue deflects attention
• NGOs perceive lack of influence in interactions with MNC 
and policy makers
Source: Author 
Table 12 presents the key conceptual terms ‘direct influence approach’ and ‘indirect
influence approach’, which have been derived from the literature, and ‘conditional 
influence’ and ‘unconditional influence’, which emerged from the analysis of the collected
data. The table serves to recall the meaning of the terminology that is relevant to
understand the following discussion and contribution chapters.
Table 12: Overview on key Terms with Explanations and Examples
Key term & origin Explanation Examples
Direct influence approach NGOS exert - Stakeholder dialogue
(e.g. Frooman 1999; Hendry influence on MNC - AGMs
2005) without intermediary - Partnerships
- Co-operations
Indirect influence approach
(e.g. Frooman 1999; Hendry




such as courts, policy 
makers, media
- Lawsuits: courts ‘have the power
over companies being sued (Hendry
2005: 89)
- Interactions with policy makers
Conditional influence NGO influence is Contextual factors, such as the tight
(this term emerged from the limited by contextual interconnections between policy
iterative process of the data 
analysis)
factors, such as 
strong
interconnections
between industry and 
policy makers
makers and MNCs, such as VWG led
to low degree of corporate
accountability: MNCs felt above the 
law, hence NGO influence is limited
Unconditional influence NGO influence is Contextual factors do not condition 
(this term emerged from the less affected by the influence of NGOs. The coercive 





instrument ‘lawsuit’, as well as the
NGOs’ deployment of a multiplicity of
approaches, such as campaigns and
pressure on policy makers, lead to








          
            
        
           
       
        
       
        
       
  
               
           
           
        
         
           
          
          
         
 
           
            
        
            
       
           
   
             
        
        
          
           
         
8.2.2 VWG’s Dieselgate Scandal and the German Political Institutional Context
In this qualitative study, the case study of the phenomenon ‘NGO influence’ would have
been hardly understood without the consideration of contextual factors, namely the crisis
at VWG and the interconnections between automotive MNCs and the German political
environment. The study did not take a crisis management perspective; however, the data
collected provided insight into the perspectives of NGOs and policy makers on the crisis
at VWG. The findings contributed to a better understanding of how the various
stakeholders perceived the crisis and thereby considered Painter and Martins’ (2017:
216) recommendation to analyse ‘independent reports and interviews’ on the VWG
emissions crisis.
The role of national contextual factors played an important part in this study, as the
findings explain the strong intertwining between policy makers and the automotive
industry (refer to Section 2.3 and Chapter 5 for more detailed information on these
interconnections). This thesis considered that most studies on stakeholder theory ‘often 
overlook the national and regional contexts and their particular legal, social and political
backgrounds’ (Arenas, Lozano, and Albareda 2009: 177). This work started with a
section on the events around Dieselgate (refer to Section 2.3). The findings revealed that 
high-ranking VWG managers received early warnings about the NOx manipulations,
remained inactive, and did not take the requests for clarification of US authorities
seriously. 
Similarly, the chronology of the scandal showed that German and European policy
makers knew about the existence and use of defeat-device systems and the
discrepancies between VWG’s published values and RDE. The scandal had been a 
result of a mixture of factors, such as an unethical corporate culture within VWG, a
corporate governance structure that created various interdependencies and fostered
these developments, and the close link between VWG and political institutions (refer to
Chapter 5).
This led to a situation in which VWG felt they were ‘above the law’ (Bovens 2016: 276) 
and powerful enough to engage in criminal activities without the fear of getting caught.
Jung and Park (2017: 129-130) added that factors such as ‘austere leadership styles’
and ‘drawbacks from family feuds and nepotism’ contributed to an atmosphere that
created optimum conditions for the scandal. The findings showed that the strong






          
         
         
           
      
      
          
         
    
         
        
         
       
          
            
           
            
         
        
        
        
             
   
           
        
          
             
              
            
           
      
         
  
general, had not only been a factor that made such a crisis possible but, more
importantly, was also a determinant that limited the influence of civil society actors, such
as NGOs. Barnett, Henriques, and Husted (forthcoming 2018a: 29) encapsulated the 
role and importance of governments in the following statement: ‘Though stakeholder
pressures can bring sustainability issues to the fore, government intervention is
necessary to set the stage for meaningful action and to ensure follow-through’. Later in
this section, why the mentioned interconnection played such a strong role in this study
and why this contextual factor has not yet been considered in the debate of NGO
influence will be discussed.
The findings about the intertwining of policy makers and VWG were divided into the 
dimensions ‘regulatory softness’ and ‘indicators of political failure’. These themes
indicate the limited influence of NGOs and provided information about the inactivity of
policy makers and the degree to which these were influenced by VWG and other
automotive MNCs. The aggregate dimension ‘regulatory softness’ refers to a shift in
power from policy makers towards MNCs. A finding of this study is that German policy
makers granted more responsibility to MNCs linked with the belief that companies, such
as VWG, know best how to regulate their business activities. Therefore, the study also 
critically explains the self-governing efforts of MNCs with the simultaneous reduction of
governmental influence. Voluntary CSR initiatives and regulations may be beneficial in 
a globalised world where national laws might lose meaning for MNCs. However,
governments should not rely on the self-regulating power of MNCs, considering that they 
‘cannot be held accountable’ (Scherer and Palazzo 2011: 907) by civil society actors or
policy makers.
Moreover, Fleming and Jones (2013: 36) stated that MNCs should not be in the position
to ‘shape regularity frameworks’, considering the negative externalities they cause. In
that sense, ‘voluntary CSR initiatives [would serve] as poor substitutes for strict legal
regulation’ (Winston 2002: 76). The crisis indicated that VWG became a political actor
that is no longer driven by regulations but is the driver of (soft law) regulations that favour 
the business. This follows what Schneider (2012: 34) called CSR 3.0, in which an MNC
like VWG would be a ‘proactive political creator’. The author spoke of a ‘new governance’
that understands the relationship between government, MNCs, and civil society as one 







          
         
             
         
            
           
              
               
          
    
        
           
          
        
        
            
             
            
          
          
            
           
     
         
         
             
           
           
            
           
             
       
        
However, this study illustrates that the MNC VWG did not perceive a ‘mutual 
dependence’ with civil society actors, such as NGOs, which contributes to explaining
their relatively low direct influence on the MNC. It would be ‘wishful thinking’ if an MNC
had the described, cooperative understanding when making business decisions. The
declaration of MNCs as political actors might have the consequence that some political
institutions are degraded to ‘errand boys’ of the automotive MNCs, which were given 
plenty of rope by policy makers. This would increase the importance of NGOs as civil
regulators (Dahan, Doh, and Teegen 2010). As such, NGOs might be able to fill the
governance vacuum that is reflected in VWG’s emissions crisis and the intertwining
between policy makers and the automotive industry.
In this context, it makes sense extending the discussion on the perception of policy
makers. Section 2.4.1 indicated that critics questioned the NGOs’ legitimacy, credibility,
and sincerity. It is not part of this study to examine, for example, how policy makers and
economic actors perceive the role and the sincerity of the NGOs’ actions. However, it
needs to be pointed out that the success of indirect influence approaches depends on 
how important actors, such as policy makers, view NGOs. The interviews with policy
makers indicated that opposition parties (e.g. The Left Party and The Greens) ascribe
NGOs the role as effective civil regulators. In contrast, the governing parties SPD and
CDU view NGOs much more critically, as actors that often attack companies without the 
intention to change situations. Moreover, these policy makers perceive NGOs as just
another lobbying group that has its own agenda. This implies a certain degree of distrust
and may explain why NGOs perceive a lack of influence in the interactions with policy
makers.
Moreover, VWG’s scandal showed the flaws of the MNC’s own governance system and 
increased the mistrust towards the automotive industry’s pursuit of more self-regulation.
Similarly, according to Murphy and Bendell (1999) and Sullivan (2006), NGOs may act
as civil regulators in stakeholder dialogue and partnerships and through measures that
threaten the reputation, such as protests and campaigns. Another instrument that may
threaten an MNC’s reputation is litigation. This study found that the coercive instrument
‘lawsuit’ may be an unconditional means of NGO influence. Therefore, successfully filed,
a lawsuit might be considered the ultimate stage of civil regulation. However, the findings
also showed that (long-lasting) campaigns and the combination of influence methods






           
           
               
           
          
           
             
  
            
         
        
         
            
            
            
          
 
         
           
         
          
        
         
              
          
    	     
          
  
       
         
         
            
          
Additionally, VWG’s diesel campaigns, their wide range of CSR activities, and their high
rankings in national and international indices created a picture that suggested that hard
laws would not be required to ensure that the former model company meets the legal
limit values and complies with environmental regulations. The findings revealed that
regulatory softness and the failure of political institutions contributed to a situation in
which VWG gained more power than they should have. Political failure was, for example, 
manifested in a lax attitude of German policy makers towards the enforcement of
environmental regulation.
8.2.3 NGOs’ Influence on VWG’s CSR Approach in the Context of a Crisis
The second research objective was to explore the influence of NGOs on the CSR
approach of a MNC in Germany in the context of a crisis. According to the literature, 
NGOs influence MNCs, even though there is a certain disagreement about the efficacy
of that influence. Therefore, the focus was to understand how NGOs exert influence and 
the underlying mechanisms. The second objective addressed the gap for which more
research on NGOs is required, as the civil society actors ‘remain poorly understood’
(Lyon 2010: 2). Moreover, Arenas, Lozano, and Albareda (2009: 176) stated that
‘research on business-NGO engagement within the management literature is still rather
fragmented and limited’. The key findings that relate to the second objective were
categorised in direct and indirect mechanisms, through which NGOs exert influence on
VWG. Thereby, this study responds to Lee’s (2011: 284) observation that stakeholder
theory does not offer ‘explanatory mechanisms of how stakeholders’ exert influence on 
companies. Within the aggregate dimension ‘mechanisms of conditional direct NGO
influence’, the project aimed at finding out how NGOs exert influence in the relationships
with VWG and which platforms and forums NGOs use to interact with the MNC. The
findings stated that the most common instruments of direct interactions are formal
partnerships, stakeholder dialogues, campaigns, and AGMs. The findings revealed that
the NGO influence exerted with these direct methods is rather conditional due to 
contextual factors.
The findings suggest that NGO influence can be considered to be rather low, which is
concomitant with the NGOs’ own self-perception. Only a limited causality can be
established between the NGOs’ demands and VWG’s behaviour (in the short to medium
term). However, it may take a longer time until an NGO’s effect on the MNCs is reflected






            
           
           
       
         
        
          
         
        
          
      
           
         
  
           
        
            
            
         
          
        
             
            
            
         
          
         
    
       
       
         
           
     
many years could pass before an issue that an NGO set on the agenda (Stage 1)
ultimately changes an MNC’s behaviour (Stage 5). The data suggest that NGO influence 
barely exceeded the ‘rhetoric’ stage. That means that VWG reacted to NGO pressure by
promising changes in their MNC’s CSR approach; however, the corporation’s behaviour
did not significantly change. For example, the NGO NABU perceived the official
partnership with VWG to be relatively productive until the revelation of the crisis in 
September 2015 and the following termination of the partnership.
The NGO presented evidence of their achievements and influence over the years, such
as the generation of funding for moor protection projects and the implementation of 
‘green fleet’ initiatives with VWG. However, as helpful as these individual activities might
have been for the environment, they did not seem to influence VWG’s major business 
decisions sustainably. One reason might have been the NGO’s concentration on project-
specific objectives, knowing that it already is a success completing these smaller
projects.
It has been stated in Section 6.2.1 that NABU could have been categorised as 
‘preservers’ (before the crisis), whose primary tactics of influence are ‘cooperative
projects [and] joint marketing’ (Ählström and Sjöström 2005: 238). Even though NABU
terminated the official partnership with VWG, the NGO still works with VW Financial
Services. It is speculative whether NABU assumed that the exerted influence
compensates for the potential loss in legitimacy and credibility, or if the NGO cannot
pursue projects without corporate funding. However, it is a legitimate question whether
NABU should have cut the ties completely to prevent the de-legitimisation of their own
organisation and to set an example that the NGO does not cooperate with firms that are
part of VWG. As Hartman, Hofman, and Stafford (1999: 262) stated, even in non-crisis 
partnerships, NGOs ‘risk their public credibility’. Legitimacy is given as long as an NGO
is perceived to be an organisation that represents the interests of the public (Baur and
Palazzo 2011). However, that may change if the general perception is that the NGO is
driven by financial necessities.
Samii, van Wassenhove, and Bhattacharya (2002) formulated various requirements for
a successful partnership among NGOs and MNCs. Two of these factors are the
dependency on each other’s resources and commitment symmetry. The latter refers to
the importance of committing ‘at the highest level of the partners’ organisations’ (Samii,






            
         
         
          
           
           
           
     
          
             
         
           
          
            
        
          
      
               
              
          
            
        
             
           
   
           
       
        
       
          
         
              
          
Formally and on paper, VWG’s top managers were involved in the NABU-VWG
partnership; however, it is questionable whether there was a critical exchange that 
included high-ranking managers. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the partnership
‘touched’ on environmental challenges and ambiguities that are more closely linked to
VWG’s business model than the implemented projects. Examples are the increased NOx
values of the company’s diesel models and the consistent lobbying activities in Berlin
and Brussels (for lower CO2 limit values), which contradicted the corporation’s public
claims of being an environmentally responsible company.
From a resource dependence point of view, following Frooman’s (1999: 199) typology, 
the relationship between NABU and VWG could have been categorised as one of firm
power, considering the substantial financial resources that VWG put into the partnership. 
However, that would have only considered tangible resources and not the intangible
benefits that VWG gained from the relationship with NABU. One of the benefits is an 
improved public perception by profiting from the NGO’s credibility that may decrease the
consumers’ scepticism about the truthfulness of the corporation’s environmental
engagement (Maxwell 2010). Other benefits are an increased level of societal legitimacy
and access to expert knowledge and non-governmental networks (Curbach 2008). 
These are all aspects that make the NGO a very valuable partner in the MNC-NGO
partnership. Thereby, it helps that the organisations enjoy a high degree of credibility in
society. Redelfs (2005: 251) stated that the NGOs’ ‘legitimation issue’ might be offset by
their ‘credibility bonus’ (refer to Section 2.4.2 more information of NGO issues around
transparency and legitimacy). However, considering that political actors seem to have
lost societal reputation in the last years, Köhler (2018) stated that NGOs may benefit
from the legitimation crisis of political actors by sharpening their profile as independent 
civil society actor.
Frooman’s (1999) typology provided important insight in the understanding of direct and 
indirect influence approaches; however, it falls short regarding more complex
stakeholder relationships. For example, it does not explain why, how, and in which 
circumstances ‘firm power’ may change into ‘stakeholder power’. The differentiation
between direct and indirect stakeholder influence served Frooman (1999) to categorise
stakeholders’ power towards a firm. In short, a stakeholder uses direct strategies when 
it is able to control the flow of resources and indirect strategies when it needs allies to do 






         
               
            
              
           
            
              
           
          
         
     
       
             
        
      
           
              
         
          
      
      
        
              
  
               
        
           
          
       
																																																						
          
      
            
  
showing that a multiplicity of direct and indirect influence approaches leads to
sustainable NGO influence. This will be further discussed in the course of this section.
In their sustainability report, VWG stated its expectations from the partnership with
NABU; among others, it expected the NGO’s ‘readiness to put in a good word for us vis-
à-vis third parties’ (2014: 27). This indicates that, for VWG, its sustainability engagement
should be linked with an NGO’s quid pro quo. The statement suggests that collaborations
with NGOs only make sense if there is a positive outcome for the MNCs.
These are indicators for a transactional NGO-MNC partnership that is shaped by a 
moderate level of commitment and investment of resources (Jamali and Keshishian
2009). Austin (2000) introduced a continuum of cross-sector collaborations consisting of
philanthropic, transactional, and integrative stages.
66 
The latter stage reflects high 
commitment and a strategic understanding of stakeholder cooperation. The findings
indicate that the official partnership between VWG and NABU did not go beyond the
transactional stage, considering that significant changes in the corporation’s
environmental approach have not taken place.
When trying to understand why NGOs only seem to exert a limited degree of influence,
it is worth discussing the findings on the NGO-MNC stakeholder dialogue. There is no
agreement in the literature regarding whether NGOs are able to exert (much) influence
in the dialogue with MNCs, such as VWG, or whether these are ‘information events’.
However, efficiently approached stakeholder dialogue may contribute to a better
understanding of each other’s positions and eventually improve the company’s CSR
behaviour. Lawrence (2002) indicated that a successful dialogue requires engagement
to develop and improve the relationships by providing both opportunity to learn and gain
new insight. 
However, the NGOs perceived the dialogue as a monologue. This is in line with Jonker
and Nijhof’s (2006: 457) observation that the MNCs’ idea of ‘managing [stakeholders]
implies a one-sided monologue’. Similarly, Burchell and Cook (2008; 2013) stated that
there is a fatigue among NGOs considering that stakeholder dialogues often do not
contribute much to the company’s CSR approach.
66
The philanthropic stage follows the charity notion in which a company writes a check and does not expect
anything in return. In the transaction stage, both actors benefit by exchanging values. In the integrative 







          
          
            
          
          
        
           
  
             
           
          
             
        
             
         
          
         
        
             
   
           
        
          
         
             
          
         
      
          
             
            
        
        
It needs to be stated that the success of (multi-) stakeholder dialogues also depends on 
the extent to which other involved actors, such as unions and works councils, are willing 
to contribute and to recognise NGOs as equal partners. Arenas, Lozano, and Albareda
(2009) stated in their paper that unions might perceive NGOs as competitors and
question their legitimacy. Therefore, it is an important factor for the success of the 
dialogue that the doubts of involved stakeholders, concerning NGOs’ legitimacy and 
sincerity, do not overshadow the common efforts to develop ideas and to implement CSR
related actions.
This study builds on these findings and shows that NGOs like DUH and BUND are 
frustrated about the outcomes of the dialogues with VWG due to the certain one-
dimensionality. However, the thesis also shows that the stakeholder dialogue remains a 
relevant instrument for NGOs if it is accompanied by approaches with which civil society
actors have more leverage, such as persistent (media) campaigns, lobbying policy 
makers, or filing lawsuits. It is therefore the use of a multiplicity of instruments and the
combination of cooperative and confrontational methods that lead to more influence. 
In addition, VWG uses the stakeholder dialogues to outline plans about future
innovations and topics (e.g. autonomous driving), which require minimal accountability
regarding the effect on the environment and a limited inclusion of the stakeholders’ needs
and expectations. The focus on future topics may enable the MNC to stay in the realm
of vagueness.
These aspects would fulfil the criteria of greenwashing and CSI. For example, Lyon and
Montgomery (2015) and Siano et al. (2016) named decoupling and attention deflection 
as important types of greenwashing. Decoupling ‘takes place when organisations claim
to fulfil stakeholders' expectations, without making any actual changes in organisational
practices’ (Siano et al. 2016: 28). In other words, NGOs may perceive their actions as
effective; however, VWG’s formal CSR engagement may be decoupled from
organisational changes. Referring to Keck and Sikkink’s (1998: 26) five levels of goal
achievement, NGOs might believe they have exerted ‘influence on institutional 
procedures’, but VWG’s real actions did not correspond with the communicated actions. 
That would mean that the NGOs’ true influence would have not gone beyond the third
stage, as they could neither motivate VWG to keep their word (Stage 4) nor exert
influence on their (long-term) behaviour (Stage 5). After the crisis, there were changes






         
        
         
           
             
         
       
          
          
         
      
             
             
         
             
              
       
 
           
           
         
          
           
          
          
     
        
          
        
            
            
         
            
indicating that Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) third influence stage was fulfilled (exertion of 
influence on corporate procedures). However, the interviewees could not report
significant changes in the interaction with VWG, and regular scandals in the automotive 
industry raise doubts as to whether formal changes within the MNC are sufficient.
The findings also revealed that the two NGOs DKA and BUND use AGMs regularly as a 
platform to exert pressure on MNCs, such as VWG. However, evidence shows that the
NGOs’ influence is rather limited due to the organisations’ difficulties to engage in a 
critical exchange with VWG before, during, and after the AGM. It can be considered an
MNC’s obligation to deal with its various stakeholders, considering that CSR-related
themes are presented and discussed at these AGMs (e.g. Apostolides 2010; Kim,
Nofsinger, and Mohr 2010). Therefore, it critically explains VWG’s governance structure
in which these processes and interactions with NGOs seem not to take place. Even
though there is the perception and indicators that the NGOs’ influence via AGMs is low, 
that it creates attention in the media and among NGO members must be considered. 
This might not have an immediate effect on an MNC, such as VWG; however, it may
translate into influence at a later point when the MNC perceives topics to be urgent or
when the pressure increases on the MNC regarding environmental and social
responsibilities.
The role of NGO alliances has been explored in Section 6.3.2. In these often informal
partnerships, the NGOs act together against MNCs using direct (e.g. AGMs, stakeholder
dialogues) and indirect (e.g. interactions with policy makers, lawsuits) instruments. The
findings revealed that alliances among NGOs may be an important means to amplify
their influence. Building on Curbach’s (2003: 129) point that resource-poor actors, such
as NGOs, rely more on cooperation, this study showed that NGOs coordinate tasks to
use their limited resources more effectively. The findings also illustrate that NGOs are
aware that acting together may have an enhancing effect when dealing with and lobbying 
against policy makers, or when coordinating the exertion of indirect influence methods,
such as lawsuits. Thereby, NGOs are better able to exert leverage on policy makers and 
use them as powerful allies to exert pressure on MNCs.
This study adds to the finding by Dalton, Recchia, and Rohrschneider (2003) that the
formation of alliances is among the key (political) activities of ENGOs. Though NGOs’
work in alliances also affects the direct influence approaches on VWG, alliances are 






              
      
             
        
            
          
          
                
          
       
        
     
         
         
          
         
             
       
             
  
      
         
         
        
        
          
          
    
           
        
              
              
          
Sikkink (1998) and Tallberg et al. (2015) wrote about the strength of NGO networks and 
the increased influence of these coalitions on MNCs and policy makers.
While this study found that NGO alliances may often have a greater level of influence on 
MNCs and policy makers, it also showed that these partnerships may pose problems. 
These may occur, for example, if the NGOs disagree about the influence instrument,
coordination of activities, and approach when dealing with corporate partners. The
influence power of NGO alliances might even be weakened if one of the partners is in 
cooperation with an MNC. The fact that NABU was involved with VWG might be one of
the reasons the ENGOs did not have a (common) counterstrategy that would have 
convincingly exposed discrepancies in VWG’s reporting. Moreover, a common approach
could have led to more NGO pressure on the MNC in the past years. In addition, NABU 
and VWG implemented various projects together, which inevitably created a certain 
dependence. Therefore, it seemed that the NGOs did not strongly and in unison oppose 
VWG’s decoupling of their promises and actions, considering that NGOs are important
recipients of an MNC’s CSR reports and stakeholder dialogue. The findings indicated
that, over the years, some NGOs (e.g. BUND) showed resistance to VWG’s ‘value-
action’ gap and realised that promises were not kept (e.g. the high emissions of cars or
announced changes of the rigid corporate culture). However, it seemed that the NGOs
could not create an overall pressure that would have been sufficient to change VWG’s 
approach.
Markham (2011: 317) stated that the ‘difference in specific goals, organisation cultures,
[and] members’ identification with ‘their’ organisation’ might be reasons for NGOs’
disagreements and occasional lack of cooperation. The question is how strong NGO
alliances really are and whether individual NGO-corporation partnerships do not thwart 
the intentions of other NGOs, which are part of formal or informal coalitions. Moreover, 
considering the different governing and financing structures of the NGOs, it seems 
questionable whether the interests of the studied NGOs are congruent. For example, the
hierarchically structured organisation Greenpeace and the relatively small association
DUH (243 members and a lean organisational structure) might be able to make critical
decisions much faster than NABU or BUND with their federal structures.
The data on indirect influence methods was presented in Section 6.3. The core idea of
indirect influence is to use allies or actors that are more powerful, possess more






          
            
          
      
         
           
      
        
    
       
          
        
            
        
         
      
            
              
      
          
   
          
          
         
          
          
      
       
       
         
   
             
         
and Sikkink 1998). Hendry (2006) stated that indirect pressuring approaches are usually 
applied by activist organisations, such as NGOs. The findings showed that NGOs act on
more powerful players, such as policy makers or other NGOs (which created more formal
relationships with VWG), to exert influence on VWG’s CSR approach. 
The findings led to mechanisms of indirect NGO influence, such as the exertion of
pressure on policy makers. However, it showed that the NGOs’ indirect influence via
policy makers is conditional due to the described intertwining between relevant political
actors and the automotive industry. The findings also revealed that NGO influence is
unconditional and therefore not limited by the strong interweaving if NGOs use the 
coercive instrument ‘lawsuit’. For den Hond and de Bakker (2007: 911), the instrument 
‘lawsuit’ is a ‘nonparticipatory protest tactic’ that depends on the expertise of a few
activists than on the participation of many members. This applies, for example, to the
NGO DUH that gained experience and knowledge in filing lawsuits against companies.
Hendry (2005) acknowledged in her study and depiction of NGO influence that lawsuits
are an indirect approach to put companies under pressure. She considered lawsuits to
be one instrument among others but did not make a qualitative difference between the 
approaches. This study adds to the stakeholder influence debate by showing that the
coercive measure ‘lawsuit’ may serve as a last resort that forces policy makers to enforce
existing laws and regulations and forces automotive companies to comply with these. As
Hendry (2005: 89) put it, ‘courts can be considered allies […], since they have power
over the companies being sued’. 
Though mostly governmental authorities are sued, automotive companies would also be 
put under pressure by, for example, driving bans or the enforcement of emission 
regulations. Some NGOs, especially DUH and BUND, are perceived as organisations
that enforce environmental regulations using lawsuits. The use of lawsuits enables
NGOs to establish themselves as effective civil regulators with the intention to force
MNCs, such as VWG, to keep their sustainability promises. Thus, lawsuits could 
eventually contribute to a substantiation of MNCs’ CSR campaigns and engagement. 
Moreover, successful lawsuits may have the effect that NGOs (re)gain legitimacy,
considering that many NGO topics became increasingly part of the political programmes
of conservative parties (e.g. exit from nuclear energy, reduction of CO2, faster transition
to alternative energy sources) (Rucht and Roose 1999). In addition, it may give NGOs






             
           
             
           
  
           
           
           
            
          
           
        
             
            
         
       
         
        
            
             
  
            
             
           
         
           
           
             
        
         
          
           
              
law was broken and that the NGOs’ concern was legitimate. Therefore, it not only
provides legal certainty but also moral rectitude that plays an important role in the NGOs’
societal legitimacy (Baur and Schmitz 2012). However, the other side of the coin is that
NGOs might lose goodwill from members and MNCs if they are perceived as unable to 
negotiate or to lead a dialogue.
The quicker perceptibility of an instrument's effect is a reason the coercive influence
method ‘lawsuit’ is potentially more effective. In other words, it might only take few
months until a court made a judgement, which may put automotive companies under
immense pressure (e.g. the potential ban of diesel cars in inner cities or possible refusals
of type approvals). Similarly, Yaziji and Doh (2009: 99) explained that powerful groups,
such as courts, may contribute ‘to quickly reshape regulatory institutions’, whereas other
influence approaches and tactics might have no visible effect or only a very delayed one 
and therefore may hardly be linked any longer to an NGO influenced behaviour. In
addition, NGOs that file lawsuits can be considered to be on the very end of the 
engagement-confrontation continuum (e.g. Winston 2002: 77) and may represent the
aggressive NGO type. Esley and Lenox (2006) stated that resource-rich organisations, 
such as VWG, have the means to employ highly qualified lawyers and public relations
professionals. This decreases the likelihood that a lawsuit causes long-lasting
reputational and financial damage. That may also explain why NGOs, such as DUH,
mainly aim at federal authorities, such as the KBA, BMVI, or cities, as it is more promising 
to sue them.
The findings showed that both coercion in the form of lawsuits and the parallel use of a 
multiplicity of instruments with which NGOs exert influence on MNCs may lead to
unconditional influence. Unconditional influence refers to the situation in which NGO
influence approaches are less dependent on external factors, such as the strong
interconnection between policy makers and VWG. Various authors examined tactics and
strategies, for example, by understanding the potential harm they may cause for the
MNC (Spar and La Mure 2003), the type of damage caused (e.g. material and symbolic)
(den Hond and de Bakker 2007), and the effect of contrasting strategies (van Huijstee
and Glasbergen 2010). However, this study builds on Yaziji and Doh’s (2009)
understanding that NGOs exert influence more effectively if it takes place concurrently.
The findings illustrated how the simultaneous and successive exertion of influence






         
           
              
         
          
             
      
            
          
        
        
          
          
          
            
       
           
             
       
          
         
          
           
      	       
       
          
       
         
         
             
             
        
            
importance of applying a multiplicity of influence instruments is also because methods
such as the stakeholder dialogue are less effective when pursued in isolation. In addition, 
NGOs realised that topics raised in dialogue may gain sharpness and urgency if they
exert pressure via other approaches to the same issue. For example, NGOs’ campaigns
via traditional and social media raise awareness of a topic and erode the legitimacy of 
the targeted MNC(s). At the same time, NGOs may use the leverage of the instrument
‘lawsuit’ and thereby create an atmosphere that contributes to realising their demands.
Frooman (1999) focused on the power and resources in the firm-stakeholder relationship
and derived a structure regarding how stakeholders intend to influence a firm. Hendry
(2005) tested Frooman’s propositions and discovered why ENGOs select strategies and
tactics. However, both authors do not consider the role and effects of the context of
NGOs’ influence approaches in depth. The data for this study have been collected in the 
aftermath of Dieselgate and therefore illustrated how a loss of corporate trust and
revelations about multiple deceptions affected the view of VWG’s stakeholders,
especially that of the NGOs. It is the understanding of the wider contextual factor (the
interconnection between policy makers and automotive industry) and the immediate 
contextual factor (the crisis at VWG), which inform the theory on stakeholder influence.
This study includes these factors in the understanding of NGO influence and indicates
that those have a limiting effect on the efficacy of influence instruments.
The influence instrument ‘lawsuit’ may catapult NGOs from ‘dormant’ or ‘discretionary’
stakeholders to ‘dangerous’ or ‘definitive’ stakeholders, using the terms of Mitchell, Agle,
and Wood’s (1997) stakeholder typology. In the authors’ model, companies would tend
to categorise NGOs as stakeholders with a high degree of legitimacy, low power, and a 
rather low urgency (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997). The data suggest that these factors
are applicable to the studied NGOs, which would categorise them as ‘discretionary’
stakeholders. However, after Dieselgate, managers might have realised that such an
NGO classification would be dangerous and inaccurate.
Similarly, Mendelow’s (1991) power-interest matrix provides four types of stakeholders
that are categorised according to their level of power and interest. Companies might be 
tempted to classify NGOs as ‘subjects’ that have a low degree of power combined with
high interest. Again, this may change if an NGO like the DUH uses the influence tactic
‘lawsuit’ successfully. An NGO might very quickly become a ‘context setter’ or a 






        
          
         
       
           
         
            
            
       
              
             
       
        
           
            
               
        
         
    
         
           
             
          
     
       
       
           
          
         
           
           
          
             
    
powerful tool to de-legitimise companies, such as VWG. Consequently, this influence
approach is of high reputational risk for the MNC. Curbach (2008) stated that NGOs may
be more influential in their role as ‘de-legitimiser’, whereas the role as ‘legitimiser’ may
enable NGOs only to exert a limited amount of influence.
This study’s findings build on this insight and show that confrontational approaches may
be more effective than cooperation that does not force MNCs, such as VWG to ‘walk the
talk’. Moreover, the study reflects that cooperative methods become more effective when
applied after or parallel to confrontational approaches. One of the reasons lawsuits may
contribute to de-legitimising a company is the judgement by an independent authority
that the MNC lied to its stakeholders. This poses a high risk for a company’s reputation.
This is in accordance with the statements of some authors that NGOs may be very 
influential, if an MNC perceives that the NGOs’ actions can damage the corporate 
reputation (Leetz, Horn, and Marschall 2010; Sullivan 2006). For Valor and Merino de 
Diego (2009: 122), companies ‘only accept engagement with NGOs’ if the organisations
threaten a corporation’s reputation. This study’s data show that VWG took the initiative
to engage in dialogue when it perceived that this is the only way to minimise the pressure
created, for example, by campaigns (e.g. Interview #32, Greenpeace; Weingartner
2015). Therefore, this reflects the effectiveness of the confrontational approach that 
paves the way for cooperation.
Potentially, the pressure on VWG via investors would have also shown unconditional
effects; however, it has been stated in Section 6.3.1 that NGOs do not use the power of
investors sufficiently in their attempt to exert pressure on VWG. Therefore, there was not
enough data to substantiate this aspect. Even though there are overlaps in the interests
of investors, who would have enough leverage to exert sustainable pressure on 
corporations, and NGOs, there is not much known about the cooperation of the studied
NGOs with institutional and private investors. For Guay, Doh, and Sinclair (2004: 133), 
the advocacy work of NGOs towards institutional and individual investors may play an
important role when influencing corporations. This refers to Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) 
influence tactic ‘leverage politics’, which denotes to the involvement of more powerful
allies. There is selective evidence that the NGOs were able to apply this tactic; however, 
the organisations could have exerted more influence if they cooperated with more
powerful actors, such as investors. Both Schepers’ (2006) and Sullivan’s (2006) insight
indicate that the NGO-investor cooperation might create a scenario in which an MNC






           
          
         
       
           
         
          
             
 
             
               
              
         
         
          
     
         
         
               
           
          
           
           
        
            
      
   
       
             
       
        
         
        
In conclusion, both actors (NGOs and MNCs) should be clear that ‘many sustainability
issues can only be addressed through a collaborative, multi-stakeholder approach’
(Veldhuizen, Blok, and Dentoni 2013: 112). However, there is a certain ‘NGO tiredness’ 
and ‘readiness to sue’ VWG and authorities on the one side, and a possible lack of
willingness and enthusiasm of the MNC (to talk to rather confrontational NGOs) on the
other side. Therefore, MNCs and NGOs have to find ways to engage in a dialogue and 
follow rules that would make the interaction valuable for both.
8.2.4 NGOs’ Perception of their Role and Influence on VWG in Context of
Dieselgate
The third research objective was to understand the NGOs’ perception of their role and
influence on a major MNC’s CSR approach in the context of Dieselgate (see Chapter 7).
This research objective addressed the demand of scholars to do more research on the
perspective of NGOs (e.g. Burchell and Cook 2013; Camerra-Rowe and Egan 2010). 
Most stakeholder studies were conducted from a clear corporate perspective that 
determines and categorises which stakeholders are important and beneficial for the
company (Friedman and Miles 2002).
This study took Arenas, Lozano, and Albareda’s (2009) findings into consideration that 
the role of NGOs is ambivalent and complex, considering the different perceptions on 
their role and influence. This work intends to add to the debate about the NGOs’ role
considering the discrepancy between this study’s findings and the view of various
scholars (e.g. Hendry 2005; Teegen, Doh, and Vachani 2004) and MNCs (which ascribe
NGOs to be influential actors). For example, VWG stressed the importance of NGOs and
designated them as influential actors (VWG 2014; Interview #3, VWG’s CSR
representative). This study found that NGOs exert influence via various instruments; 
however, it also shows that the NGOs perceive themselves as players that lack
acceptance and significance in the interaction with an MNC like VWG (interviews #6,
BUND; Interview #19, DKA).
The third objective focused on how NGOs perceive the nature of their relationship with 
VWG and their role and influence. The findings formed the two dimensions ‘NGOs’
conditional influence’ and ‘NGOs’ perception of corporate social irresponsibility’. The
second dimension revealed that NGOs felt being used by VWG and perceived the 
company’s CSR approach as a smokescreen for their illegal activities (e.g. Interview #6,






      
        
          
       
         
            
     
         
       
           
      
         
       
          
          
         
          
   
              
          
          
        
         
     
        
          
           
             
               
      
          
   
was manifold, and they acknowledged that there are forces within the corporation that 
take sustainability seriously. Overall, the NGOs’ views showed that the influence of 
NGOs on the MNC is rather conditional. However, it becomes unconditional when NGOs
exert pressure and influence via a multiplicity of influence instruments and the juridical
way by conducting lawsuits against both policy makers and VWG.
Chapter 7 showed that NGOs felt deceived and felt they were used as camouflage that 
helped to legitimise VWG’s business activities. Moreover, NGOs, experts, and some 
political actors felt that VWG engaged heavily in greenwashing activities and did not
incorporate the notion of CSR/sustainability in its core product, the automobile (e.g.
Interview #28, BUND; Interview #1, CSR expert; Interview #16, policy maker). All other
environmental activities might have had a positive effect on the company’s overall
sustainability balance, for example, more efficient supply chains or a reduction of waste
and energy in the production. However, the scandal showed that VWG decided against
environmental solutions as soon as those solutions threatened the company’s margin.
That corresponds with Jones, Bowd, and Tench’s (2009: 304) differentiation between
CSR and CSI: CSI reflects the corporate attitude that ‘profit is the sole purpose of
business and should be achieved at any cost’, while CSR postulates that profit is only
one of a company’s purposes.
A salient aspect of the data regarding the role and influence of NGOs is the degree of 
complexity that is reflected in the different perceptions of NGOs and VWG. The MNC
stated that it considered NGOs to be very important stakeholders. However, NGOs
perceive a discrepancy between the importance that MNCs ascribe to them and the
company’s actual behaviour in stakeholder interactions. That does not reflect that NGOs 
play an important role in the reflection of environmental and legislative challenges and 
indicates that ‘a truthful and unbiased dialogue will be practically impossible’ (Arenas,
Lozano, and Albareda 2009: 179). In addition, NGOs perceive that they have the
legitimate right to exert influence regarding social and environmental aspects. However,
the perception of civil society actors is that MNCs, such as VWG, do not take NGOs
seriously and attribute to them the role of an idle observer. That might be due to the
company’s understanding of ‘managing’ stakeholders’ expectations, which, according to







               
           
             
               
           
              
        
      
             
         
           
         
          
         
       
  
           
                
            
            
        
         
    
           
            
       
          
            
           
  
          
        
The findings showed that the NGOs perceived their influence in the crisis at VWG in
various ways. First, according to the NGOs, the crisis changed how MNCs and the public
perceive their work and importance. Some people within VWG realised that they should
take NGOs seriously and can no longer ignore them. However, it remains to be seen
which conclusions MNCs will draw: whether they fight and defame NGOs, for example,
by suing them, or whether they reassess the interactions with NGOs and take their CSR
promises more seriously. Considering recent scandals and the NGOs’ perception, it
remains doubtful whether CSOs have gained salience after the crisis. However,
Alpaslan, Green, and Mitroff’s (2009) findings indicate that NGOs might be in a more
powerful position after the crisis. The authors referred to Mitchell, Agle, and Wood’s
(1997) typology when stating that a crisis may increase stakeholder salience, for
example, from being ‘dormant’ to ‘dangerous’. Similarly, Thijssens, Bollen, and Hassink
(2015: 888) demonstrated that more legitimate NGOs are better able to influence
companies ‘to disclose more extensive environmental information’. However, it exceeds
the scope of this work to evaluate whether NGOs are perceived to be more legitimate 
after the crisis.
Second, the crisis revealed prior problems in the relationship between NGOs and VWG.
The crisis made NGOs realise that their influence is rather limited or, at least in most
cases, not immediate. Until then, NGOs believed that the MNC felt accountable to fulfil
its role as the ‘world’s most sustainable automotive group’ (VWG 2015b: n.p.). The NGOs
assumed that they contributed to the MNC’s environmental accountability, which
corresponds to Keck and Sikkink’s (1998: 26) fourth stage (‘influence on policy change’) 
of their five types of influence.
Third, the crisis revealed the powerlessness of VWG’s sustainability department: the
NGOs’ primary contact. The NGOs perceived they had a certain influence on VWG’s
sustainability department. However, this ‘internal ally’ did not seem to have the decision-
making power and support of the corporation’s top management due to the lack of
integration of CSR into the MNC’s business strategies (more details will be given later in
further course of this section). Therefore, it led to a minimised effect of the NGOs’ 
influencing activities.
Fourth, VWG’s weak reaction on the crisis and the lack of understanding of the extent of






          
   
          
                
          
          
        
         
          
          
            
            
    
             
           
          
           
        
       
             
         
              
         
         
        
            
        
           
           
          
       
        
            
problems within VWG and from structural failures, such as the strong intertwining
between automotive companies and policy makers.
Fifth, the studied NGOs perceived that VWG designed the stakeholder dialogue in a way
in which the civil society actors do not have a real say and achieve only a limited effect 
on the MNC’s CSR approach, which leads to the previously mentioned ‘dialogue fatigue’
(Burchell and Cook 2013). However, the findings also showed that these perceptions are
not definitive and that NGOs will be open to dialogue with VWG, if CSOs perceive a 
change within the corporation linked with the hope for better results. However, it still
seems to be a long way off until MNCs, such as VWG, understand that the direct 
interaction with NGOs may be an enrichment for the MNCs’ CSR approach.
It has been mentioned that there is the perception of NGOs that MNCs, such as VWG,
lack the integration of CSR themes into corporate strategies. Van Huijstee and
Glasbergen (2008) differentiated between the strategic and sustainability management
model that separates strategies that serve to generate profit and an approach that
integrates CSR into all strategies. The findings indicate that VWG approached the
interactions with NGOs within the stakeholder dialogue and partnerships from a
‘strategic’ angle and less from an integrative perspective. Such a perspective would
consider the integration of CSR-relevant dimensions (economic, social, and 
environmental) as vital for the long-term success of the company.
Scherer and Palazzo (2007: 1114) stated that many CSR activities are primarily followed
for ‘strategic reasons’, such as the willingness to minimise the risk of regulations or to
reduce NGO pressure. These are activities that have ‘little or nothing to do with perceived
responsibilities or obligations’ (Laufer 2003: 255). However, this neglects the fact that a
strategic management approach should include integration of CSR, which implies an 
engaged dialogue with NGOs. It is questionable if dialogue practice deserves the label
‘strategic’ if it is simply about minimising the risks for the MNC, not acknowledging that
a lack of sustainability orientation may have wide-reaching strategic consequences. That
is in line with findings by scholars such as McElhaney (2009) and Porter and Kramer
(2006) who stated that strategic CSR is about the integration of socially and 
environmentally relevant activities into the company’s daily business. For McElhaney
(2009: 31), strategic CSR is ‘embedded in day-to-day business culture and operations’; 
however, the findings speak against that VWG cultivated a culture in which CSR values






           
             
    
              
         
               
        
         
             
    
             
            
         
            
   
      
        
          
     
 
            
          
         
           
            
           
           
      
          
              
          
CSR in its strategies is less receptive to NGO influence, considering that the goals might
be the reduction of reputational risk or to ‘maintain […], repair or to defend its lost or
threatened legitimacy’ (O'Donovan 2002: 349).
The emissions crisis is an indicator of the lack of integration of CSR into VWG’s core
processes and is a sign of an ineffective stakeholder management system. In addition,
it illustrated that VWG allowed only a limited extent of NGO influence in the relationships
and dialogues with stakeholders. Here, minimised corporate risk might be a
consequence, not the focus. A strategic CSR and sustainability approach also means 
that a company is not driven by a ‘coercive political and social environment’ (Husted and
Salazar 2006: 86).
However, a great extent of NGO pressure may eventually lead to coercive measures.
For example, successful NGO pressure on policy makers might contribute to tightened
regulations, and lawsuits may force automotive companies to adapt their CSR approach
by making changes that corporations promised years ago. In more concrete terms, VWG
would be forced to fit diesel cars with engines that meet the limit values of the RDE test
procedures and thereby the advertised values. Moreover, this coercive pressure might
influence automotive corporations to reconsider their insincere behaviour, such as
lobbying in Brussels and Berlin for lower CO2 and NOx limit values, while promoting the
company as the most sustainable automotive producer.
8.3 Summary
This chapter addressed the three research objectives and discussed the findings with
relevant stakeholder and CSR literature. Section 8.2.2 focused on the study’s first 
objective: to examine the development and chronology of VWG’s Dieselgate scandal
and the German political institutional context. It considered the findings in the context of
the crisis and the strong intertwining between policy makers and automotive MNCs, such
as VWG, and explained the relevance of these contextual factors to our understanding 
of NGO influence. Moreover, Section 8.2.2 discussed the factors and effects of
Dieselgate and the insight on the actors’ roles. It argued that it might be problematic that 
MNCs act as political actors, following increasingly soft regulations. Consequently, the
NGOs’ role as ‘critical observer’ may change towards that of a civil regulator that fills the






         
             
             
          
          
          
          
   
         
       
          
           
          
         
              
 
          
              
             
           
       
             
      
             
          
                
        
        
         
 
Section 8.2.3 approached the second research objective: to explore the influence of
NGOs on the CSR approach of a MNC in Germany in the context of a crisis. It 
summarised the key findings on how the studied NGOs influence VWG’s CSR approach
and discussed the findings in the context of the relevant literature. Keck and Sikkink’s
(1998) five stages of NGO influence contributed to analysing the different types of 
influence. While the overall effects of NGOs on the MNC’s CSR approach has been 
relatively low, it showed that NGOs could influence CSR discussions, corporate
agendas, and policies.
However, this chapter’s discussion revealed that the NGOs’ influence is frequently
thwarted by CSI elements, which make the NGOs believe they achieved progress in the 
interaction with VWG. The discussion points out the contributions to the stakeholder
theory, namely that the indirect coercive instrument ‘lawsuit’ and the multiplicity of NGO
influence methods play significant roles in the NGOs’ striving to exert sustainable
influence on the CSR approaches of automotive MNCs. The influence method ‘lawsuit’
is both a valuable pressure tool and NGOs’ last resort to achieve their environmental
objectives.
Section 8.2.4 answered the study’s third objective: to understand the NGOs’ perception
of their role and influence on a major MNC’s CSR approach in the context of Dieselgate.
It contributed to the stakeholder literature by adding the NGO perspective to the debate
about stakeholder influence. This thesis shows that there is a certain discrepancy
between the NGOs’ perception of their influence and role, and that from MNCs. While
VWG stated that it considers NGOs to be highly important, civil society actors do not
perceive the direct interactions alone as effective means of influencing the MNC. 
Moreover, the NGOs perceived CSI elements in the stakeholder dialogue with VWG as
well as a lack of a strategic orientation regarding CSR.
The next chapter will briefly summarise the findings of the work and then focus on the
theoretical contributions of this study. Moreover, it will list various practical implications 
for NGOs, MNCs, and policy makers. Chapter 9 will conclude with a personal reflection,







     
   
  
        
      
            
    
          
            
          
          
  
      
   
         
 
      
      
           
       
          
        
             
      
         
 
   
              
         
          
           
  
CHAPTER 9: THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, PRACTICAL
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
9.1 Introduction
Chapter 9 focuses on this thesis’ theoretical contributions and practical implications. This
study aimed to contribute to stakeholder theory by improving the understanding of direct
and indirect mechanisms of NGO influence on an MNC’s CSR approach in the context
of a corporate crisis and the strong intertwining between policy makers and the 
automotive industry. The two guiding research questions of the thesis were how NGOs
influence the CSR approach of an automotive MNC during a major organisational crisis
under consideration of contextual factors, and how NGOs perceive their role and
influence on an automotive MNC. The following three objectives arose from these
research questions:
• To examine the development and chronology of VWG’s Dieselgate scandal and 
the German political institutional context;
• To explore the influence of NGOs on the CSR approach of a MNC in Germany in
the context of a crisis;
• To understand the NGOs’ perception of their role and influence on a major MNC’s
CSR approach in the context of Dieselgate.
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 presented the findings, which are based on these research
objectives. Chapter 8 discussed the data by linking it to the relevant literature. This
chapter (Chapter 9) outlines the contributions to stakeholder theory and presents the
study’s practical implications for NGOs, MNCs, and policy makers. Possible steps will be 
shown for a more effective interaction in which all involved actors benefit more from the 
exchanges. The chapter concludes with a reflection by the author, a section on the 
limitations of the study, and recommendations for future research and concluding
remarks.
9.2 Theoretical Contributions
The influence of NGOs on an MNC’s CSR approach is complex and rather difficult to
capture in one model. However, Figure 10 depicts how the study’s findings may 
contribute to the stakeholder literature and the debates around NGO influence. This 
diagram is a modification of Figure 8 (in Section 4.6) and illustrates this study’s







       
	
 	
         
          
            
         
         
        
         
         
         
           
      
        
     
      
           
           
Figure 10: Diagram of Findings with Highlighted Contributions
Source: Author 
First, the diagram illustrates the effects of contextual factors on the influence of NGOs, 
which is an area that has been neglected in past studies. The findings show how
important the contextual factors are for the understanding of NGO influence. Taking the
political contextual factor ‘structures of intertwining’ into consideration, this work builds
on the notion that stakeholder theory has overlooked ‘the national and regional contexts
and their particular legal, social and political backgrounds’ (Arenas, Lozano, and 
Albareda 2009: 177). The examination of direct and indirect NGO influence on an MNC’s
CSR approach indicates that the strong interconnection between German policy makers
and automotive MNCs, such as VWG, and the crisis at VWG limits the influence of 
NGOs. The evidence shows that such a close relationship might have prevented 
‘stakeholder pressures [being] backed, bolstered, augmented, and given teeth by
government’ (Barnett, Henriques, and Husted forthcoming 2018a: 29).
Second, the diagram emphasises the thesis’ contribution to the stakeholder influence 
literature by pointing out the significant role of the coercive stakeholder pressure 
instrument ‘lawsuit’. This study draws on Lee’s (2011) analysis that stakeholder theory






           
        
         
    	     
            
         
           
          
            
              
         
            
         
        
  
           
          
            
          
          
            
           
         
         
  
           
       
          
           
            
          
         
              
finding by Tallberg et al. (2015: 213) that there is not much ‘agreement on the factors
that make NGO lobbying [on international organisations] effective’. This study illustrates
that the coercive instrument works better under environmental conditions that are shaped
by a strong interconnection of policy makers and the automotive industry. Thus, it builds
on Hendry’s (2005: 98) statement that more research is required to understand NGOs’
‘reasons for pursuing […] tactics in a given situation’.
This thesis identified that lawsuits contribute to breaking and neutralising the negative
effects of the interweaving of political actors and members of the country’s key industry.
Thereby, NGOs use political and legal institutions by applying the methods ‘lawsuit’ and
‘lobbying regulators’. This builds on Yaziji and Doh’s (2009: 96) work that called these
tactics that are usually applied by watchdog NGOs ‘highly institutional’. Therefore, the
indirect influence method ‘lawsuit’ is one with which some NGOs may exert unconditional 
influence. Thus, courts serve as powerful allies for the NGOs, helping to achieve the goal
that MNCs at least comply with regulations and possibly adapt their environmental
approach.
Hendry (2005: 98) demonstrated that ENGOs use strategies ‘regardless of the issue at
hand or the firm being targeted’. However, the author also stated that it is not clear how
the NGOs choose a particular influence strategy. Hendry (2005) perceived the coercive
measure ‘lawsuit’ as a valuable tool but not as valuable and important as this research
has demonstrated. This study shows that the lawsuit is both an important method that
complements other tools and an instrument that NGOs use as a last resort. This method
not only leads to more legal certainty but also adds credibility and legitimacy to the NGOs’
approach. Successful lawsuits may be considered a confirmation of moral rectitude,
while other media, such as campaigns and partnerships, are more subjective regarding
the justification of their selection and the evaluation of their success.
Third, the illustration reflects another contribution to the stakeholder influence literature
by showing the importance of the multiplicity of influence instruments that NGOs exert 
simultaneously and successively. The concurrent exertion of influence methods, such as
campaigns, lawsuits, dialogues, and lobbying of policy makers may lead to unconditional
NGO influence. The multiplicity of NGO influence approaches is an effective factor to
pressure MNCs, such as VWG, to comply to environmental demands. Therefore, this
study contributes to a better understanding of the efficacy of influence methods under






       
         
           
        
        
          
         
     
          
            
          
             
         
           
         
     
      
       
           
              
           
         
        
      
           
       
        	     
             
             
           
      
       
and La Mure (2003) listed various NGO influence tactics and the intended outcome of
these methods. However, they did not consider the effects of the concurrent exertion of
tactics or the NGO perception about the efficacy of instruments. Building on Yaziji and
Doh’s (2009) insight that NGOs use various confrontational and cooperative approaches
simultaneously, this study shows how NGOs achieve greater influence if they combine
various methods. This goes hand in hand with this study’s finding that the usage of 
individual methods, such as stakeholder dialogues and partnerships, does not enable 
NGOs to exert influence effectively. 
Therefore, the identified multiplicity of influence instruments adds a degree of complexity
that is not covered by the mere consideration of stakeholders’ resources (for example,
refer to Frooman’s (1999) model of influence strategies). An example of such a 
complexity is that NGOs’ influence may increase in a crisis due to the MNC’s higher
dependency on ‘external credibility’. The complexity in the understanding of NGO
influence is not only reflected in the different NGO influence methods but also in the
ambiguous effects of NGO alliances, the delay between cause and effect of NGO
pressure, and the consequence of the tight relationships between government and 
automotive manufactures. Therefore, the NGOs’ power and their perceived relevance is
dynamic rather than static and changes in times of crises.
Fourth, this thesis contributes to the stakeholder literature by stating how NGOs
perceived their role and their interaction with an MNC. Thus, this work responds to
demands for more studies on the perspective of the stakeholder group NGO (Arenas, 
Lozano, and Albareda 2009; Burchell and Cook 2013; Camerra-Rowe and Egan 2010;
Lyon 2010). It contributes to a better understanding of the NGOs’ perspective by 
exemplifying the discrepancy between civil society actors’ perception of their influence,
and the influence ascribed to them by MNCs, such as VWG. Moreover, NGOs may be
powerful drivers of change, especially regarding environmental legislations, if they use 
their options at hand in a clever and balanced way. However, the study’s findings
consider Eesley and Lenox’s (2006) view that the importance or salience of the
stakeholder NGO is best reflected in the actions of the MNC. Figure 10 illustrates that
NGOs perceive that the direct interaction with the MNC is characterised by elements of
CSI and that they observe the strong link between government and car manufacturers






          
          
            
           
         
           
            
          
          
        
          
          
         
             
               
          
       
            
         
         
       
        
       
          
           
           
 
        
        
          
           
           
             
            
Fifth, this thesis intends to contribute to stakeholder literature by improving the
understanding of how NGOs interact with MNCs in the stakeholder dialogue. It expands
Burchell and Cook’s (2013: 517) notion that there is a ‘growing process of “dialogue 
fatigue”’ among NGOs. This is due to the realisation of civil society actors that they may 
exert only limited influence through this medium. However, this study complements that
stakeholder dialogue often shows elements of CSI and contributes to the NGOs’
frustration. In addition, MNCs such as VWG, only seem to meet NGOs’ interests but
appear to exploit these in the pursuit to meet their own interests. Therefore, this
instrument did not function effectively in this instance. It raises questions about the
effectiveness of NGO-MNC stakeholder dialogues, which scholars have attributed as
increasingly important for MNCs to better understand environmental topics (e.g.
Pedersen 2006), to improve their CSR approaches, or to address changing stakeholder
expectations (e.g. Unerman and Benet 2004; Veldhuizen, Blok, and Dentoni 2013).
One of the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the MNC-NGO stakeholder dialogue is that
NGOs perceive that the stakeholder dialogue is designed in a way that NGOs do not
have a real say. To some extent, the dialogue has become a symbol of a long-lasting
‘value-action’ gap reflected by the MNC’s promises to act environmentally friendlier,
which is not followed by changes in actions. However, it needs to be stated that all NGOs
are open to dialogue with MNCs but only if accompanied by other instruments. The
cooperative and rather ineffective direct influence method ‘stakeholder dialogue’
becomes more effective if it is combined with confrontational approaches, such as
campaigns and lawsuits. This finding builds on Valor and Merino de Diego’s (2009)
outcome that MNCs engage with NGOs if the civil society actors threaten to damage the 
corporation’s reputation. Even though a confrontational approach may appear to be
contrary to one that might be required for a constructive dialogue (e.g. Rieth and Göbel
2005), it may lead to increased MNC accountability and thereby to an appreciation of
this instrument.
Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) five types of influence proved to be useful when analysing 
how NGOs achieve partial successes. The five stages allowed a more nuanced view of
NGO influence on an MNC’s CSR approach and therefore contributed to considering
and better understanding of NGO influence. Thus, it added an additional view and voice
to the debate of the effect of NGOs. Some scholars stated the increasing importance of 
NGOs in pressuring MNCs to engage in CSR practices (e.g. Burchell and Cook 2008;






            
     
           
            
            
         
          
           
           
           
      
          
               
  
     






    
 




   
  
 
   
  
 
     
 
   
   
    
   
  
    
 
 
   
  
    
  
   
 
    
 
    




   
    
  
    
 
    
  
 
    
  
    
   
    
    
 
     
   
   
and Roose 1999). However, it became apparent that NGO influence may often only be
analysed and proved retrospectively. In other words, NGO pressure that appeared to 
change MNC behaviour might not have had a sustainable, positive influence on the 
MNC. When applying Keck and Sikking’s (1998) approach, it needs to be considered
that, even if NGOs are successful in persuading an MNC, such as VWG, to adapt its
CSR approach, it does not say much about the overall behaviours of the MNC and
whether this corporate responsible behaviour is long-lasting or just a sophisticated CSR 
smokescreen. Therefore, NGOs may influence policy makers and MNCs successfully by
fulfilling the five different types of influence, yet an MNC’s CSR actions might still be
ambiguous due to factors that NGOs may hardly control (e.g. the corporate culture or
strong interweaving between policy makers and automotive MNCs).
Table 13 provides an overview of the research gaps and contributions, which have been
stated in the previous chapters, in particular Chapter 9. It is listed according to the study’s
three research objectives.
Table 13: Research Objectives, Gaps/Previous Studies and Contributions
Research Objective Gaps & previous studies Contribution




the German political 
institutional context
National, political context has
been overlooked in stakeholder
papers (Arenas, Lozano, and 
Albareda 2009)
This study included the contextual
factors ‘Dieselgate’ and the close
relationships between German 
government and automotive industry. It
explained how these limited NGO
influence on VWG’s CSR approach
More research required that The thesis gave account of the 
triangulates current data on the perspective of the stakeholder group
emissions crisis with material ‘NGO’ on the major corporate crisis at
gained from sources other than VWG
VWG (Painter and Martins 2017)
2) To the influence of 
NGOs on the CSR 
approach of a MNC in 
Germany in the context
of a crisis
‘NGOs remain poorly
understood’ (Lyon 2010: 1)
This work contributes to stakeholder
theory by providing a better
understanding of NGOs
Lack of research why NGOs
pursue tactics in a specific
situation/context (Hendry 2005)
It found out that the coercive influence
approach ‘lawsuit’ is the most effective 
one in the context of tight relationships
between government and industry
There is not much agreement on 
the factors that lead to effective
NGO lobbying (Tallberg et al.
2015)
Stakeholder theory does not
explain mechanisms of
This study contributes to stakeholder
influence strategies by showing 
mechanisms of NGO influence,
explaining that direct influence is mostly
‘conditional’ due to the weakening
effects of the contextual factors. NGOs
exert ‘unconditional’ influence by






      









    
      
   
    




   
     
      
 
    
     
   
 
  
   
 
    
  
   
   
 
   
  
     
   
      
  
    
 
   




   
 
             
          
         
           
       
      
            
        
       
         
         
         
            
       
Research Objective Gaps & previous studies Contribution
stakeholder influence (Lee
2011)
instruments, which are exerted
simultaneously and successively
(Lack of) effectiveness of direct
influence method ‘stakeholder
dialogue’. E.g. due to NGOs’
‘dialogue fatigue’ (Burchell and
Cook: 2013)
This study complements Burchell and 
Cook’s (2013) insights by stating that
the direct cooperative NGO influence 
method ‘stakeholder dialogue’ becomes
more effective, if applied together with
confrontational approaches that exert 
greater pressure on MNCs
Perception NGOs reflects that 
stakeholder dialogue with MNCs, such
as VWG, often shows elements of CSI
3) To understand the 
NGOs’ perception of their
role and influence on a
major MNC’s CSR
approach in the context
of Dieselgate
Stakeholder theory almost
exclusively focused on the 
‘analysis of stakeholders from
the perspective of the 
organisation’ (Friedman and
Miles’ 2002: 2)
Neglect of ‘growing role of
environmental and social
interest associations’ (Camerra-
Rowe and Egan 2010: 416)
This study emphasises the NGO 
perspective and perception of their role
and influence on a MNC’s CSR
approach. It contributes to stakeholder
theory by exemplifying the discrepancy
between civil society actors’ perception 
of their influence and the influence that 




9.3.1 Implications for NGOs
This thesis’ findings lead to several implications for CSOs. It contributes to a better and
wider understanding of the NGOs’ role, perception, and influence on MNCs and policy
makers. In addition, it illustrated that the strong intertwining between policy makers and
the automotive industry limits the influence of NGOs. The results provide insight that the
most successful NGO influence approaches are a mixture of confrontational and 
collaborative methods. Therefore, NGOs have to understand which levers are more 
effective when engaging in discussions with both MNCs and policy makers. To be able 
to exert influence successfully, a certain degree of flexibility is required regarding the
selection of influence instruments and tactics.
Traditional NGO work, such as informing the public about environmental topics and 
legislative developments, remains important; however, it is worth increasing the number
of instruments used and assessing the saliency and urgency of topics at the automotive 
MNCs. For example, by involving different (powerful) players with whom NGOs share






            
         
            
      
     
           
            
          
            
         
              
         
         
       
        
  
             
        
          
          
         
           
       
          
              
         
          
     
       
         
																																																						
               
            
    
possibly, ‘organisational slack’,
67
which might enable NGOs to free resources and work
with powerful actors, such as investors and strong individuals in politics or industry.
Moreover, the results show evidence that it is beneficial for NGOs to align demands and 
strategies with other NGOs and adapt existing strategies on changing environments to 
better shape the stakeholder dialogue with MNCs.
The findings illustrate that there is a lack of transparency regarding the decision-making
processes of policy makers. Therefore, it is worthwhile for NGOs to keep lobbying
together as alliance for more transparency and accountability. The suggestion of
implementing a lobbying register might be a step in the right direction. Other approaches
are the initiation of more multi-stakeholder dialogues and round tables that some of the 
NGOs already organise. Even though the study showed that dialogue might not be the
best choice to exert influence, dialogue should play an important role to better
understand the different parties’ views and to create more transparency. There will
always be a mixture of soft and hard law approaches, considering that a hard law
approach cannot be considered a panacea, as laws might be written ambiguously or
simply not enforced.
Transparency is a key aspect when it comes to the communication of the outcomes of 
MNC-NGO stakeholder dialogues. Chapter 2 showed the criticism of the NGOs by
journalists and other civil society organisations regarding agreements that NGOs made
with companies. NGOs need to make sure that collaborations with companies are 
handled in a transparent manner in order to avoid debates around possible collusions
between NGOs and companies. It is one of the key challenges for NGOs to find the right 
balance between keeping their legitimacy and independence and engaging in
collaborations with companies that enable NGOs to exert some influence, as well as to
secure funding. NGOs would do well to explain in an open and transparent manner
where their funding comes from and what the (companies’) expected return service is.
By doing that, NGOs may encounter suspicions that they would stop campaigns against
MNCs when receiving financial support. 
Furthermore, it could help to de-escalate some of the conflicts between NGOs, the
automotive industry, and policy makers, if NGOs showed a greater awareness of the
67
Näslund (1966: 26) defined organisational slack as the ‘excess capacity maintained by an organisation’.
For example, organisations may encourage employees to use a certain amount of their resources to try new






      
       
         
        
         
     
        
            
  
 
          
           
          
           
          
           
 
          
             
        
           
             
              
    
             
           
             
            
         
      
           
       
              
        
different corporate and political actors’ logic. That could be reflected in realistic demands,
offering viable solutions to environmental problems, and the insight that corporate
dialogue partners may usually not implement proposed changes promptly, especially if
the power of these people is restricted within the company. Policy makers follow the
institutional logic that focuses on keeping jobs and providing a stable framework for
companies. Businesses follow, among others, market logic but are exposed to 
institutional logic that demands job security, corporate socially responsible behaviour,
and so on. The MNCs’ reply to these partly conflicting logics might be reflected in
ambiguous and contrasting strategies, often with the intention to serve several 
stakeholders.
When assessing ways to make the intertwining between policy makers and automotive
MNCs more transparent, NGOs would be well advised to intensify working together on
key projects and legislative challenges. The results show that NGOs work in alliances
and coordinate demands to increase their effects; however, there is a greater probability
that their messages are more effective if these are consistent. Moreover, it increases the
likelihood of being acknowledged as a legitimate partner for policy makers and
companies.
The results gained in this study indicate that NGOs should think more carefully regarding
whether it would make sense to enter a partnership with an MNC and whether it really
creates a sustainable value for the NGOs while endangering their credibility and 
independence. The 15-year-long cooperation between NABU and VWG is a good
example. Even though there have always been rumours about VWG’s cheating, the NGO
trusted their statements. Moreover, NABU is right in saying that an NGO might not be
able to avoid such a crisis; however, NGOs could be more critical when cooperating with 
MNCs. Even though VWG had a very good image and was known for its social
responsibility before the crisis, it must be clear that the corporation only sponsors social
and environmental projects if it sees a clear economic benefit. Such a strong benefit
seemed to be the partnership among VWG and NABU with manageable costs for the
MNC. Furthermore, VWG gained in reputation due to common projects, and more 
importantly, it increased its social legitimacy. Moreover, the good relationship with NABU
and BUND (partly involved in the partnership) might have reduced the risk that public
outcries disturb the business. Both BUND and NABU are powerful civic organisations 
with hundreds of thousands of members. Therefore, it is appropriate for NGOs to be






         
     
             
            
          
            
              
        
               
          
       
              
      
   
           
         
          
          
            
           
          
      
         
             
        
            
    
       
          
             
          
       
partnerships with corporations, considering that the organisations’ service is to transfer
intangible values, such as legitimacy and credibility.
A question that could not be answered in the thesis but is important to assess is how
much influence NGOs are supposed to have and which role should they play to be most
beneficial for society (for further discussion, see Banks, Hulme, and Edwards 2014;
Dahan, Doh, and Teegen 2010). It may not be the desired outcome to achieve a situation,
in which NGOs exert more influence because we would not know whether that really had
a beneficial effect for society. It is about equipping NGOs with possibilities and 
instruments with which they can monitor the activities of MNCs to show them that their
actions will not be without consequences. The question is what constitutes a socially
acceptable outcome. Do we want powerless or powerful NGOs? They should be 
monitored and assessed in a similar way, using the criteria they usually apply to other
organisations: transparency, accountability, measurability, and professionalism. These
are aspects that do not entirely depend on a huge budget.
Additionally, NGOs have to stay flexible and extend their networks and should include
powerful actors more often. Thus, it may help to think about existing goal congruencies
with influential groups, such as investors and policy makers. Shareholders have a natural
interest in a corporation’s longevity; therefore, following a CSR approach that contributes
to ethical and sustainable business practices is in the interests of both NGOs and 
investors. In the case of VWG, there are investors who are interested in changes within 
the corporation. Therefore, there is a common intention in improving the governance
structures along with a more serious commitment towards the integration of aspects
related to sustainability and integrity in corporate strategies, aspects that might ensure
that such a scandal does not happen again. Often, NGOs argue that they do not have
enough resources to ‘fight at various fronts’; however, there will never be sufficient 
resources for NGOs; therefore, the issue is whether the available financial and personnel
resources are used properly.
This thesis indicated that the studied NGOs often only have a limited influence on the 
CSR approach of VWG. In the following, several recommendations will be presented on 
how the NGOs may improve their position in society and in the interaction with private
actors. Moreover, the recommendations address approaches how NGOs may find back






         
             
            
         
            
            
      
          
        
          
           
      
   
           
       
            
            
       
       
             
           
 
          
              
          
           
     
         
           
           
               
          
      
One of the recommendations for NGO decision makers is to more effectively position
their organisations as a solution provider by offering expertise to topics that are highly
relevant to society. The NGOs in this study are already strongly involved in exchanges
with various stakeholders in political and societal committees, however, it sometimes
seems that the public’s and policy makers’ perception is that NGOs act rather as plaintiffs
and admonishers. The NGOs have a huge expertise in environmental matters and could
play an immense role in the accomplishment of (environmental) problems that can be 
found in every city. Examples are noise and air pollution and a lack of infrastructure for
alternatively-fuelled vehicles and bicycles. Solutions are required to master the transport 
transition from diesel/petrol engines to electric cars and NGOs may provide approaches
for cities of the future that are less focused on cars. NGOs may be able to re-gain 
influence and revive a currently malfunctioning dialogue by providing this expertise
alongside with concrete suggestions to the implementation. 
Another aspect that may improve the NGOs’ current situation is their role as ‘bridge
builder’ between societal actors, policy makers and private actors. NGOs have the 
knowledge about policy making processes and are rooted in civil society with a large
number of members. Being in a constant exchange with citizens enables NGOs to better
understand the concerns of the population and communicate those to public and private
actors, for example, in multi-stakeholder dialogues. However, as mentioned in Section 
2.4.2, it is a key precondition that NGOs create transparency and accountability in their
decisions, in order to be recognised and perceived as legitimate representative of civil
society.
Both listed aspects, NGOs’ roles as solution provider and ‘bridge builder, require NGOs
with a cooperative attitude and the willingness to engage in dialogues with the different
actors. However, research has not provided a clear understanding about what makes
NGOs most beneficial to society. This thesis shows that a functioning approach might be
that NGOs are confrontational on the short run and more cooperative once MNCs and 
policy makers realise that some far-reaching NGOs demands are important impulses.
Clear recommendations are therefore difficult, as there is the constant conflict between
the cooperative and the confrontational approach. By following the latter approach,
NGOs might be able to raise greater awareness of problems in the media and among
policy makers, however, it might jeopardise their reputation by being portrayed as actors






         
       
            
             
       
             
        
       
       
            
            
          
         
      
 
  
           
           
            
          
               
          
         
         
          
            
              
        
      
        
           
         
          
attitude might not lead to sustainable changes, especially if MNCs such as VWG do not
perceive an obligation or accountability to the made statements.
The thesis indicates that there is a certain powerlessness of NGOs in the interactions
with MNCs and policy makers and that NGOs alone are not able to address CSR relevant 
topics. It needs the exchange of various (societal) groups to make sure that such a 
massive crisis does not happen again and that proclaimed values are followed. Actors
such as suppliers, trade associations, works councils, unions or rating agencies are
dependent on the big automotive companies, however, they have a duty to take 
environmental concerns seriously and to consider the long-term effects of managerial
decisions. A crisis such as ‘Dieselgate’ may occur again, if these actors do not take
warnings of NGOs seriously or support groups, which are critical towards MNCs’ CSR 
approaches. The decision-makers of these groups, for example, investors and big
suppliers, control resources that are important for automotive companies and therefore,
have the power to include the voice of civil society and to question a MNC’s CSR
approach.
9.3.2 Implications for MNCs
This thesis offers various practical implications for MNCs, for example, regarding their
interaction with NGOs and the influence of CSOs on the MNCs’ CSR approach. Though 
the study focused on the mechanisms of NGO influence and less on the identification of 
the NGOs’ effect within the MNC’s CSR approach, several conclusions regarding CSR
can be drawn. Figure 3 showed six aspects of a systemic approach to CSR (Section
3.2.4). By applying this approach to the case study, it reveals that VWG lacks the
understanding of the important stakeholder group ‘NGO’ (Aspect 1 of Figure 3). The data
indicated that the MNC’s strong interweaving with policy makers enhanced certain 
developments and behaviours that led to the neglect of stakeholders, such as NGOs. 
For example, it contributed to complacency and arrogance, which blinded managers and
led them to ignore critical voices and events that slowly developed into a massive crisis.
Furthermore, the results indicate that VWG’s current business strategies are not
sufficiently informed by outcomes of the interaction with NGOs.
To minimise the likelihood of future scandals and to be more proactive and genuine about
CSR aspects, MNCs should develop strategies that correspond to their claims made in
dialogue and integrate CSR-relevant dimensions (Aspect 4). The data suggest that






          
            
        
          
      
         
      
        
           
       
          
       
         
      
        
          
            
         
      
      
              
           
              
             
             
  
             
           
          
       
        
          
          
basis, not only when companies perceive a threat to their corporate reputation
(Aspect 5). The study showed that NGOs preferably use a combination of confrontational
and cooperative influence instruments. An MNC, such as VWG, may minimise the harm 
of such attacks by developing a CSR communication (Aspect 6 of Figure 3) that is 
shaped by transparency and awareness of a ‘company’s accountability in society’
(O’Riordan and Fairbrass 2014: 137), particularly since the communication of a firm's
purpose and responsibility to stakeholders reflects the essence of stakeholder theory
(e.g. Freeman 1994; Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar 2004).
The study’s results provide evidence of the NGO’s perspective and expectations. It
shows that MNCs, such as VWG, have to take a step towards their stakeholders to close 
the gap that has been created in the last years due to corporate messages that were
decoupled from reality. Furthermore, MNCs must understand that credibility and 
legitimacy depend on the truthfulness of their claims. The companies do not exist in a 
vacuum and therefore must act socially and environmentally responsible by better
understanding and including the expectations of the various stakeholders. That would be
the precondition for a stakeholder dialogue that aims to address current challenges
effectively. It is in the automotive MNCs’ interests to engage in a productive stakeholder
dialogue that is based on mutual respect and not solely on a risk minimisation strategy.
The outcomes depend on the power of the people leading the dialogue and the extent to 
which top management consider the results.
Moreover, a changing mindset is required to understand that it might take many years to
change and modernise a corporate culture and to create a corporate governance
structure in which a scandal of that scope does not happen again. That should include
the debate around the Volkswagen Act, which enables the government of Lower Saxony
to veto key decisions and, thereby, the exertion of unique influence that leads to conflicts
of interest.
The work also suggests that it would be negligent for an MNC like VWG to categorise
NGOs as a (powerless) secondary stakeholder group or to use stakeholder models, such
as the power/interest matrix/grid (e.g. Ackerman and Eden 2011; Mendelow 1991) or
Mitchell, Agle, and Wood’s (1997) stakeholder typology without acknowledging that 
stakeholders’ power may change. It might be that MNCs are not able to dynamically
apply existing frameworks to solve the ‘real world problem’ (discrepancy between






          
          
            
           
          
        
           
           
        
        
        
             
       
            
 
           
      
          
  
  
          
          
           
           
        
         
           
          
 
         
           
            
      
introduction (Section 1.1). It seems that it is not beneficial for a stakeholder dialogue that 
ought to take place at eye level, if a company’s (top) management sees NGOs as low 
interest and low power actors that may not affect a company’s business. Therefore, due 
to the NGOs’ power exercised through indirect influence methods, ‘literature on
stakeholder influence can no longer rely on the established binary distinction between
primary and secondary stakeholders’ (Barnett, Henriques, and Husted forthcoming
2018b: 25). The VWG emissions crisis and the various lawsuits, especially filed by DUH,
showed that NGOs may be powerful. The problem of common stakeholder models is 
that they are business centred and consider stakeholders mainly from the economic
perspective to understand who the most beneficial and legitimate stakeholders for the
company are. Moreover, through the conversations and interviews with practitioners, the
impression has been given that managers use these stakeholder concepts in a static
way. Once a stakeholder is categorised, for example, as one that is of high interest and 
low power, it remains there, which would not reflect the dynamics of stakeholder
relationships.
The success of MNCs, such as VWG, will depend on what kind of company the 
executives want to build and whether top managers are able to step back from the 
‘narrow economic logic’ when managing stakeholders, towards organisations that build
in virtues.
9.3.3 Implications for Policy Makers
The evidence provided shows that policy makers have to reflect whether a further
enhancement towards soft law activities is beneficial for society and the democratic
structures of the country. In such a scenario, important decisions would then be made
by MNCs under the control and regulations of private organisations or, at best, CSOs. In
this context, Barnett, Henriques, and Husted (forthcoming 2018a: 29) pointed out
correctly that ‘without government, self-interested stakeholders can pressure firms to
move away from the complex, long-term challenges of wicked problems, and without
stakeholder pressures, industries may self-regulate in ways that prove little more than
“the fox guarding the hen house”’.
This study provided insight that NGOs perceive multi-stakeholder dialogues as
beneficial, as it offers an open, informative, and reliant method of gathering various
decision makers and interest groups. However, there is the desire on the part of the 






      
         
          
        
            
      
         
         
       
             
            
          
             
          
          
          
      
           
             
     
      
            
           
       
     
   
           
     
                
           
     
         
          
Schaltegger (2014: 340) noted rightly that institutions, societal actors, and companies 
share the responsibility ‘to facilitate a deliberate democratic exchange between
stakeholders’. This may mean that decisions made by political actors become more
transparent. The data reveal several suggestions about how to create more transparency
in the decision-making processes. One idea would be to introduce a lobbying register to
understand which actors contributed to certain proposals or regulations. That might lead 
to a better balanced view on how political actors reach relevant decisions. Finally, it is
also important that policy makers understand that there is a danger that democratic
processes are hollowed out in times of increasingly powerful MNCs.
The outcomes of the thesis also show that policy makers cannot rely on the insight of an
MNC to draw the right conclusions from such a massive crisis. In addition, VWG’s crisis 
should sensitise policy makers that the enforcement of existing laws is important for
manifold reasons. On one hand, it would act as a signal for all automotive companies
that such a transgression will be punished. On the other hand, it would be a sign to 
society that the people’s health is a priority for policy makers. While the study shows that 
soft law approaches may not be advisable, hard law only makes sense if regulations are 
actually enforced against the most powerful MNCs in the country.
The study illustrates that all involved actors, especially those who have regulatory power,
would do well to be more critical towards the self-celebrations of MNCs. They should
question the significance of sustainability and CSR awards, which industry-sponsored
organisations distribute to ‘clean’ and ‘ethical’ companies. It would be a strong sign of
policy makers to boycott these events, as long as a firm’s core product does not fulfil the 
highest environmental standards. Moreover, it is worth more carefully examining MNCs’
activities to differentiate ethical and socially responsible business practices from actions
which may merely be considered employee retention and recognition programmes.
9.4 Reflection
Reflecting on the process of writing the dissertation, it has been a worthwhile learning
experience that helped me better understand different research methods and relevant
literature. However, it also allowed me to grow as an individual by learning to cope with
setbacks and phases of demotivation. The PhD requires multiple skills to master the
challenge, among others, resilience, time management, and information analysis. 
However, even more important has been the management of uncertainties and constant






           
      
             
            
           
        
         
     
         
            
       
        
         
      
      
               
         
             
        
            
            
               
         
         
        
          
           
          
       
             
           
          
          
     
predictability of the outcomes of the process, which comprise the very nature of
qualitative research. For example, at the beginning of the process, every interview
seemed to question the overall approach and involved a change of direction. In the data
collection process, after a few interviews became very anecdotal, I learned that I needed
to be sharper to receive relevant data. I had to remind participants not to go off-topic, 
even though it was interesting diving into their worlds. I also recognised that I needed to
start interviews with important questions because anecdotal digressions served as a
tactic to avoid further critical questions for some respondents.
Therefore, in hindsight, I would have conducted the interviews differently and, possibly, 
tested my interview approach in conversations with non-expert participants. I also would
have considered interviewing more representatives of stakeholder groups other than 
NGOs. It has been highly informative interviewing these actors; however, given the 
heterogeneity of the NGOs’ aims and approaches, further ‘external’ views on the role of
NGOs might have added interesting insight.
9.5 Limitations and Further Research
There are several limitations to this study. In terms of the methodology, the access to
interviewees was a limitation. After Dieselgate became public, VWG’s CSR managers
and other representatives of the MNC were quite cautious and less inclined to talk.
Consequently, I consulted documents, such as VWG’s annual and sustainability reports,
more intensively and shifted the focus towards the perspective of NGOs and other
stakeholders. Even though the case study was about the influence of six NGOs, the fact 
that the focus was on a single sector with the example of a single company may be
considered another methodological limitation in terms of generalisability (transferability)
and validity (credibility). By triangulating data collection sources and interviewing
experts, I tried to increase the credibility of the data. Moreover, agreeing with Eisenhardt, 
Graebner, and Sonenshein (2016: 1118), extreme cases, such as VWG’s crisis, may
reveal interesting and relevant insight that may be transferrable to other areas. Moreover,
there is reason to assume that the six studied NGOs exert influence on MNCs in other
sensitive sectors (e.g. pharmaceuticals, biochemical, and energy) in a similar fashion.
Another limiting factor is the low number of interviews with NGOs (13 interviews).
However, it needs to be stated that these in-depth interviews provided rich data that 
formed the identified categories, which were complemented by secondary data. There is
a great likelihood that more interviews would not have provided more depth considering






       
           
         
          
            
     
             
         
     
            
    
            
               
        
     
       
             
 
              
              
          
         
  
           
   
            
             
   
          
            
              
        
     
It must be acknowledged that the crisis situation contributed to a greater salience of NGO
influence. Therefore, this study’s peculiarities, such as the crisis at VWG and the
intertwining between the automotive industry and the German Government, need to be 
considered and fully understood before transferring the results to other settings. Future
research may include more companies and could compare the influence of NGOs on 
firms and sectors to understand whether the intertwining between policy makers and the 
industry is a factor that limits the work of CSOs in other sectors.
A limitation of the work may lie in the complexity of how NGOs exert influence and the 
underlying motives and objectives. Some NGOs might not have the intention to influence 
VWG sustainably and may focus fully on lobbying policy makers. Other NGOs would
rather concentrate on ‘attacking’ MNCs. Even though the in-depth interviews with the 
NGOs revealed considerable insight, it was sometimes unclear why a certain action or
measure was taken, whether it was chosen because it was the most effective method to
exert pressure on the company or because there were other motives, such as a lack of
budget, pressure within the organisation, or the prospect of gaining more attention and 
consequently donations with a different instrument. As with other individuals or
organisations, NGOs may also tend to rationalise activities that have been followed in
the past.
It can be considered a limiting factor of the study that the role of the media could not be
investigated in more detail. The media plays an important role for NGOs in disseminating
their messages and putting MNCs under pressure. Therefore, traditional media, such as 
newspapers and TV, as well as social media are means with which NGOs create and 
propagate their campaigns. This is an intriguing line of potential further research.
While the proximity between policy makers and the automotive industry has mostly been 
portrayed to be negative, a certain degree of lobbying and exchange between the actors
is normal and legitimate. Moreover, with the Volkswagen Act, the involvement of policy
makers in VWG’s activities is prescribed by law. Therefore, the Volkswagen Act would
need to be revised or abolished to eliminate political intervention.
The present study approached NGO influence very comprehensively. Further research
may investigate in more detail, for example, how the NGO-MNC stakeholder dialogue
can be designed to be more beneficial for both actors. Moreover, the role of NGO 
alliances and how these alliances limit and increase the influence of a single NGO might






          
        
            
  
          
        
       
       
       
       
      
          
         
          
        
      
         
   
                
         
            
         
       
 
              
        
           
           
    
            
         
            
            
Even though ‘outcomes are notoriously difficult to measure’ (den Hond and de Bakker 
2007: 920), further research may focus more on measuring the effects of NGO influence 
in a long-term study. Thereby, the emphasis could lie on the corporate perspective and
perception of influence.
The stakeholder theory has been chosen, as it appeared to be a proper lens to 
understand NGO influence. However, other perspectives, especially the institutional
theory, might provide good insight to better understand external forces, interactions
among political institutions and MNCs, and the role of each actor in the triangle of policy
makers, businesses, and civil society. Moreover, in a world where the various actors are 
closely intertwined, a more politicised stakeholder view might be helpful to provide 
explanations about corporate power and its relation to the democratic structure of
capitalistic countries. It would be interesting to apply the institutional theory when aiming
to understand in more detail how the intertwining between policy makers and the
automotive industry affect actors such as NGOs. This theoretical lens is beneficial in
explaining in detail how institutional facets influenced the behaviour of actors, such as 
NGOs. Therefore, future research might examine NGO influence, the relationships with 
policy makers, and the role of the national political context from an institutional theoretical
point of view.
The notions of soft law and hard law and the link to corporate crises could be an 
interesting avenue of further research. Consequently, whether NGO pressure ‘forces’
MNCs to establish voluntary CSR initiatives would need to be examined. These initiatives
might create win-win-win situations for corporations, governments (as they could
distance themselves from responsibilities) and NGOs, who would serve as watchdogs of
these initiatives, which also legitimise their existence.
An interesting question for further research may be to understand to what extent the
study’s findings on the role and influence of NGOs are applicable to other countries. This
study focused on the influence of mainly German NGOs on VWG, an MNC that is 
headquartered in Germany. The second paragraph of this section stated that this study’s
unique characteristics need to be carefully analysed before applying the results on other
contexts. Several factors stand out in this case, such as the strong involvement of
political actors (two politicians are members of VWG’s board), the immense economic
and societal role of the German automotive industry, as well as the political influence of






            
            
     
         
         
      
              
        
   
            
       
       
      
             
           
            
         
                
            
       
              
         
        
            
         
            
            
      
              
           
            
          
           
         
directive that grants NGOs in Europe the possibility to file lawsuits, if firms or authority
violate environmental standards. Therefore, NGOs in other countries may also use this
instrument, however, an important precondition is that these organisations are 
recognised by the respective country’s environmental agency. It can also be of interest 
for further research to understand how the dialogue of internationally active NGOs, such
as Greenpeace and FoE, takes place with MNCs headquartered in other countries. This
may also clarify whether such a stakeholder dialogue becomes more effective when it is
accompanied by more confrontational instruments, as shown in this study.
9.6 Concluding Remarks
The PhD journey was exciting and brought interesting findings beyond those that were
presented in the previous chapters. For example, it was interesting to experience how
cautious the various participants were before and during the interviews. This holds true 
for MNCs, suppliers, NGOs, and policy makers. It seemed the respondents were often 
in conflict between the official versions of their organisations and what they really thought
(positive exceptions were interviewees in higher positions). I expected this restraint with
members of VWG, who were more cautious about their public image after the emissions
crisis. In addition, policy makers seemed rhetorically well-trained and stuck to the
language rules of their parties. However, it was fascinating to see that some of the NGOs
were similarly as thoughtful as the previously mentioned actors. One of the reasons could
have been that NGOs have become big organisations with professional PR experts.
Therefore, they might be afraid of losing control when topic experts (e.g. traffic policy
experts) discuss their work. Moreover, it could have been connected to national
characteristics. Most participants are Germans, who are considered more risk-averse 
and may feel rather uncomfortable if they are questioned in areas about which they are
not entirely knowledgeable. I often encountered the phrase (on the phone or in emails):
‘I don’t think I can help you’ from NGOs and policy makers. I perceived that some 
representatives of NGOs were afraid to be themselves, maybe as a consequence of the
slight transformation of their NGOs towards less aggressive organisations.
Moreover, it was also an interesting and new experience to contact and speak with policy
makers who feel a responsibility to engage with the public; however, at the same time,
they were not particularly willing to discuss the emissions crisis. The crisis did not shed
favourable light on the role of policy makers, especially not on the governing parties CDU
and SPD, as they were in charge in the last years. However, it helped me to better






          
          
  
                
          
             
        
             
          
        
            
          
      
            
       
           
           
        
                
          
       
          
   
	  
an immense pressure on them in responding to the various stakeholders. Therefore, it is
to some extent understandable that policy makers perceive many events from an
electoral perspective.
Another important insight I gained in the process of writing this thesis is that NGOs might
only be able to have long-term effects on MNCs, such as VWG, if they are able to
mobilise the government. By doing that, they may make clear that environmental policies
are more important than the interests of major MNCs and their shareholders, even if
MNCs use thousands of jobs as a tool to exert pressure. In addition, NGOs need to
continue explaining to consumers how much power they have with their purchasing
decisions and should provide them with the required information. After all, NGOs play an 
important role in society and have a great responsibility if they investigate inconsistencies
and explain difficult issues to the wider public and represent society by scrutinising the
decisions of corporations and policy makers.
Lastly, it makes sense to direct the view to the big picture of NGO influence. I think it is
valuable to understand how, when, and where NGOs exert influence on MNCs; however, 
it is even more important to understand how the bigger environmental and societal 
problems may be approached. Consequently, it would be a beginning to understand how
civil society groups influence one big actor, such as VWG. However, more importantly,
it is relevant to aim for changes among whole sectors in agreement with the variety of
stakeholders to achieve major environmental and societal effects. That may happen by
‘moving away from individual business–NGO partnerships to large-scale, multi-
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Semi-Structured Interview Guide: Example of Interview with NGO
Translated semi-structured guide used for interview with an NGO:
1. Introduction of research project and my person
• My name is Malte Busch, I am a doctorate student at the Centre for Business in Society
(CBiS) at Coventry University. My PhD thesis is about understanding the mechanisms
with which non-governmental organisations (NGOs) exert influence on a multinational
company (MNC) such as Volkswagen Group (VWG). Moreover, I am interested in
understanding the interactions between political actors, businesses and NGOs. I would 
like to know more about how NGOs influence VWG's corporate social responsibility
(CSR) approach and how these organisations perceive their role.
• I conduct a qualitative study. An important feature to ensure the quality of the study is
that interviews are recorded in order to transcribe these properly. It enables the
researcher to use direct quotes, which is of enormous importance for the credibility and
relevance of the work. In addition, it allows the researcher to focus fully on the
conversation.
2. Question to role/position of participant
- What is your responsibility within your organisation?
- What do you currently work on?
3. Questions to stakeholder interactions and exchanges between NGOs and VWG
- How would you describe your organisation’s relationship with VWG?
Question rationale: To gather information about the NGOs’ formal and informal ties with
the corporation.
- What are the platforms and forums at which you meet?
Questions rationale: To get more insights about the level and formalisation of the
interactions, which may take place, for example, in stakeholder dialogues.
4. Questions to NGO influence on VWG’s CSR approach before and after
‘Dieselgate’
- How do you evaluate your influence on VWG before the crisis?
Question rationale: Getting an understanding about the state of the relationship and
insights about how the NGOs perceive their role and influence.
- How did the relationship with VWG change after the crisis?
Question rationale: Understanding if (formal and informal) NGO-MNC relationships







             
  
         
 
 
         
     
        
 
  
        
          
 
  
      
          
	
	
- How do you think did your influence and use of instruments to exert influence and 
pressure change after the crisis?
Question rationale: It was important to learn about the NGOs’ approaches and whether
these shifted from cooperative to confrontational. 
- How do you perceive VWG after the crisis?
Question rationale: This question aimed to understand how NGO perceive the VWG’s
behaviour after ‘Dieselgate’ and whether there’s a basis for dialogue.
- In view of the crisis, how would you have done things differently?
Question rationale: To understand how NGOs reflect on their behaviour and chosen 
influence instruments and how they see their role now.
5. Conclusion
- Do you have any questions?






      
 
 
   
 
        
      
 
 
           
           
             
        
     
 
     
              
          
  
          
 
      
               
               
             
             
              
 
        
       
 
       
                 
             
           
             
       
    
            
    
  
 
        
             
    
            
            
            
               
            
            
         
Appendix 2: Participation Information Sheet and Informed Consent Form
Participant Information Sheet
Study title: The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations on a Multinational
Company’s Corporate Social Responsibility Approach during a Crisis
Information about the project/Purpose of the project
This interview is part of a study about how NGOs affect the corporate social responsibility
(CSR) approaches of the Volkswagen Group (VWG) in the automotive industry. I am
interested in getting a deeper understanding about the matter by having discussions and
interviews with civil society, corporate and political institutional stakeholders about their
perceptions, experiences, and understandings on the role and influence of NGOs.
Why have I been chosen?
For the purposes of this study, I intend to interview representatives of NGOs, companies
and institutions who work in CSR-related areas as well as CSR/industry experts who
have gathered experience in the automotive industry. You have been selected for the 
interview, because you represent the civil society actor NGO.
Do I have to take part?
No. Participation is voluntary. There is no obligation for you to participate. It is your
individual decision to take part in the interview. It will fully be respected in case you do
not take part and no disadvantages will arise for you. If you decide to withdraw, you can
contact me using the contact details below. After withdrawal from the study, your data
will be destroyed and not used in the study if you so wish.
What is the duration of the research?
The interviews are likely to last between half an hour and one hour.
What do I have to do if I take part?
You will be asked to take part in a semi-structured interview at a place at your own
convenience. The interview will take place in February 2018. You will be asked about
the role and influence of NGOs, the relationship to VWG, your perception regarding the
influence of NGOs on the automotive industry and VWG’s CSR approach, and your
perspective on the incidents (‘Dieselgate’ 2015) at VWG. With your permission, the 
interview will be recorded using audio recording equipment, in order to create an 
interview transcript for data analysis purposes, which is complete and accurate. You will 
be asked to sign a Consent Form to confirm you understand the purpose of the research 
and agree to participate in this study.
What are the risks associated with this project?
The interview does not include intimate or other questions of private nature. The
questions asked are solely regarding the role and influence of NGOs, the relationship to 
VWG, your perception regarding the influence of NGOs on the automotive industry and
VWG’s CSR approach, and your perspective on the incidents (‘Dieselgate’ 2015) at
VWG. Any personal or controversial information shared by the participant will remain
confidential at all times. It will be coordinated with the participant which part of the
interview shall be included in the project. This research will not contain any unethical or
violating information. With utmost confidence I can assure that this research will not







       
               
    
         
     
           
 
          
            
            
         
               
     
  
 
       
             
          
     
 
         
                 
 
      
 
        
               
             
    
 
     
              
      
 
       
 
         
        
      
     
         
    
 
     
   
     





What are the benefits of taking part?
There will be benefits of taking part in this research for NGOs, policy makers and
automotive companies, as the research may help to develop a better understanding 
about the influence of NGOs, their role and perception, as well as, related interactions
and streams of influence between institutions and companies in the automotive industry.
The findings will also be shared with the involved institutions and companies.
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?
Participants will remain under anonymity in all stages of this investigation. Information
received from every participant will be stored securely in password protected electronic
files. All references to individuals or organisations will be removed or given pseudonyms
if data is to be included within the submitted study, unless express permission has been
given. Various data collected will be demolished on submission and completion of the
research project.
What if something goes wrong?
If you do not wish to be involved in the interview process anymore, you may withdraw at 
any time. If things go wrong, or you wish to complain, you can contact myself or the 
project supervisor. Contact details are given below.
What will happen with the results of the study?
The results of the study will be used for the researcher’s PhD thesis. At a later point,
parts of the thesis may be published in peer reviewed academic journals. The results of
the study may also be presented at academic conferences.
Who is organising and funding the research?
The research is being organised by Malte Busch, a PhD student in the Centre for
Business in Society (in the Faculty of Law and Business) at Coventry University. The
centre is funding the research.
Who has reviewed this study?
The project supervisor and a Faculty Research Ethics Leader, as part of the University
Applied Research Committee (UARC).
Further information/Key contact details of researcher and supervisor
Researcher Contact Details:
Malte Busch
Faculty of Business and Law
Centre for Business in Society
The University of Coventry
Director of Studies Contact Details:
Dr. Jason Begley
Centre for Business in Society






         
       
 


















































The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations on a Multinational Company’s
Corporate Social Responsibility Approach during a Crisis
(Researcher keeps this section)
I agree to take part in this interview under the conditions explained to me above:
Participant Signature......................................... Date...............
Researcher Signature....................... Date........................














   
       
     
 
   
  
 
   
      


























   
      
 
   

























The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations on a Multinational Company’s 




1. I confirm that I have read and understood the participant
information sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity
to ask questions.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time during the research process.
3. I understand that all the information I provide will be treated in 
confidence
4. I agree to be recorded as part of the research project










      
 
                    




               
         
      
      
       
 
 
                  
             
 
     
             
   
 































Appendix 3: Email to NGOs: Request for Interview
This is an example of a cover letter of an email that I sent to NGOs to ask for an
interview. This email was translated from German.
Dear Mr/Mrs X,  
My name is Malte Busch, I am a PhD student at Coventry University. My work focuses
on how civil society institutions such as NGOs influence corporate social responsibility
(CSR) approaches of multi-national companies (MNCs) in the automotive industry,
especially the Volkswagen Group (VWG). In the course of the data collection, I am
talking to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), politicians, and representatives of
companies.
Would it be possible to talk to you personally in your office or by phone for about 30
minutes? It would be very interesting to include the perspective of your organisation
[insert NGO] and to discuss, among other things, how you perceive CSR in the
automotive industry, the influence of NGOs on the CSR approach of an automotive 
MNC, such as VWG, and to learn more about your perspective on the emissions
scandal at VWG/the automotive industry.








        
 
	
    
  
 

















      
 
     
          
       
    
         




    
   
     
   
 
        
      
 
    
    
 
    
      
        
   
    
    
   
   
 
 
       
     
    
    
     
   
 
   
     
     
  
 
   
  
 
    
 
           
 
     
  
    
 
 
    
      
  
Appendix 4: Aggregate Dimensions, Second and First Order Themes, Exemplary
Quotes
Aggregate dimension: Structures of Intertwining
Second order
categories
First order categories Exemplary quotes
Regulatory softness MNC felt protected by
policy makers
‘[VWG] felt safe to do such things [and] probably
thought they are always protected by the political
system in Europe’ (Interview #13, TI).
‘The policy [makers] could affect the company 
[VWG] in a different way, but this is obviously not 
wanted. It is probably no longer the goal to enforce
stricter targets in order to meet the exhaust gas 
norms and then one comes to such problems as
you have not only with VWG, but with a large part of 
the automobile industry’ (Interview #19, DKA).
Imprecise formulation of ‘The first failure was quite clear that the Regulation 
laws and regulations 215/2007 was not properly implemented. This
clearly states that until 2 January 2009 it is 
necessary to express effective sanctions which 
have to be proportionate, but also daunting. In the
US, there are these sanctions, so there are now 
enormous fines to be paid by VW and which can
then be used to develop the infrastructure for
electric mobility. There is nothing like that in 
Germany’ (Interview #6, BUND).
‘There are always these borders between what is
legal and what is already fraud. They are so fluent. 
Since the automobile industry has been so creative.
Also, because the lawmaker did not look closely
and sometimes, did not quite define what’s allowed 
and what isn’t. And here, the industry has become
increasingly better to exploit these loopholes’
(Interview #7, NABU).
Problems known for ‘Something like the Federal Minister of Transport
years (inactivity of and their inactivity, I have never experienced that in 
policymakers) this form. From this point of view, unfortunately, 
nothing surprises us. One can only hope that
through the investigation committee, which is now at
the federal level or from the EU Parliament, that 
there is now much more pressure from this side’
(Interview #7, NABU).
‘It is a crisis of the institution, of those who have
been aware of the problem for years and have not






‘This is a dilemma in which we are at the moment,
that we are trying to make clear who is responsible
for the whole thing and who is to blame in the future
for driving bans in cities. Not us, that’s the
producers and the government that hasn’t felt
addressed and did not control. That must be said
clearly’ (Interview #28, BUND).
‘It is a crisis of the institution, that is, of those who
have been aware of the problem for years and have 
not reacted to it. Then the question [is], why can the






    
  
 
     
    
   
 
    
   
 
    
   
   
   
   
     
  
   
        
 
    
    
       
     
   
 
     
 
         
       
    




        
  
 






   
 
           
 
       
       
          
      
 
          
 
     
    
    
     
  
   
  
 
    
 
    
  
 
   
 
   
     
Aggregate dimension: Structures of Intertwining
Second order
categories
First order categories Exemplary quotes
annoying lawsuit breathing down my neck…’
(Interview #18, DUH).
‘German policy makers have always advocated for
the automobile manufacturers, to push pollutant 
emission standards through on European level [and]
torpedo any legislation that might harm the
automobile industry in Germany’ (Interview #13, TI).
Government followed ‘The lobby departments of the automotive 
requests of lobbyists corporations are very well-equipped. Among all
producers, VWG spends the most money.
Furthermore, we observe a massive exchange of
personnel between industry and politics. We see the 
boss of VDA, Wissmann, he was minister of
transport in his political career. There are very good
connections. Even politicians of The Greens
confess themselves to the industry with words,
which you would hardly expect from a party that 
calls itself ecological’ (environmental expert Moser
(Greenpeace) in Scheunert (2016)).
‘The VDA is a lobbying association that just wants
to enforce its interests, which is a legitimate
request. The only problem is that the VDA is
constantly in the Chancellery. If the DUH would try 
to do that, they would be laughing at them when 
they want to talk to the chancellor’ (Interview #25,
opposition party).
Aggregate dimension: Mechanisms of conditional direct NGO influence
Second order
categories








‘Over time, it became clear that there is still one or
the other skeleton in the cupboard. Especially, now
after Der Spiegel revealed [the cartel agreement
scandal in the German automobile industry]. There,
we have to keep some distance for now. They must
do their homework’ (Interview #27, NABU).
‘VWG has not [changed] to the extent that I had
thought. I know people at VWG […], who say that 
little has changed within VWG. That is clear. One
cannot expect that decades of gridlocked structures 
change within one year. You need more air’
(Interview #28, BUND).
NGOs were involved to ‘[There were] sponsoring projects on the topic of
foster environmental peatland conservation as a major climate protection 
actions (before crisis) tool, that was a few years ago. With the funds we
were able to generate with VW, we could found the
“International Peatland Conservation Fund“ and
also renovate many moors in Germany’ (Interview
#7, NABU).
‘This is a decision for climate protection and an 
important signal for the protection of the
environment and society and the production of
climate-friendly technical solutions in series. We will 






        
  
 
     
    




    
 
 
    
        
      
       
 
     
 
      
       
       
      
      
   
  
   
 
        
      
    
           
  
 
      
     
 




     
 
 
    
    
    





       
        
    
   
   
    
 
 
     
    
   
      
 
      
     
 
   
   
   
 
 
   
 
     
      
Aggregate dimension: Mechanisms of conditional direct NGO influence
Second order
categories
First order categories Selected evidence





Preconditions need to be
fulfilled for NGOs to
engage 
‘We have said [that] something substantial needs to
happen in the company. It can not only be that the
vehicles become compliant. And that is where we
have made this series of demands. My status today
[July 2016] is that quite a number of requirements
have been implemented’ (Interview #7, NABU).
‘We notice that we hit the right nerve with a
campaign when companies call and want to talk to
us […] It's usually about them wanting to know more 
about what our demands are. 'What do we have to 
do, so you do not get on our nerves'’? (Interview
#33, Greenpeace).
Stakeholder dialogue led ‘I am actually in [a] good exchange with company
by powerless people representatives, but not with those who end up
making the decisions…. The people from the
sustainability departments say, ‘We can basically do
what we want, if that means €50 less profit per car
at the end of the day, then it will not be done’. This
is less frustrating for me because I do not expect 
anything else than for the people in the 
sustainability departments who put a lot of work,
effort, and brainpower in the development of really
innovative, good things that do not end up in the
product because it reduces the profit’ (Interview
#28, BUND).
‘[VWG] would not enter into any commitments [in
stakeholder dialogues], which had legal
implications. These are meetings, which would have
to be led in a much smaller circle and then with
people, who make decisions. Otherwise, I can also 
read the annual report. I’d have the same 





‘If VWG or other corporations have developed a 
new environmental policy or a new car, then they
want to get a first assessment of environmental
experts. That's very often informal. Then there are 
also formal round tables, where the individual
companies usually meet with several environmental 
associations and experts’ (Interview #32,
Greenpeace).
‘This is a process where you get informed about
certain connections. This is necessary for an
environmental association to get expertise from
experts from specific areas, to get insights into what 
is possible and what is not possible. These
discussions are partly very constructive. But if you 
break it down to what is currently happening 
[August 2017], there are no conversations’
(Interview #29, DUH).
Simultaneous and ‘There must be a campaign around the lawsuits that
successive exertion of leads the DUH, we do that. Then, there is a public
influence instruments debate that may create and exert pressure. Of






        
  
 
     
       
         
    
 
 
       
    
  
 
           
         





   
  
 




    
 
  
        
      
    
    
   
      
        
         
   
   
 
   
     
     
    
     
   
   
   
 
      
  
    
       
       
     
     
       
      
       
   
 
     
    
Aggregate dimension: Mechanisms of conditional direct NGO influence
Second order
categories
First order categories Selected evidence
but if there was no debate at all, etc, the DUH and 
we would not take any measurements [...] the whole
repertoire then leads to changes’ (Interview #32,
Greenpeace).
‘We want to convince [others] with professional
arguments, we want to convince policy [makers]
and hope that the automobile groups are also 
looking at what we produce on paper and
comparing in the studies. At the end of the day, it
will probably only be about lawsuits. This is totally
sad, but the experience shows it’ (Interview #28,
BUND).
Aggregate dimension: Mechanisms of conditional indirect NGO influence
Second order
categories




NGOs are invited to
parliamentary
committees & forums
‘We are in very strong dialogues in different
compositions. With other associations, then with
industry associations, we sit at a table, with external 
experts, but there are also parliamentary events,
parliamentary evenings or breakfasts, where the 
appropriate political decision makers are invited to 
put certain demands on the table. Or, of course, the 
bilateral talks at federal as well as European level
with the deputies. At European level, we are talking
with the Commission depending on the subject’
(Interview #29, DUH).
‘A [BUND] representative [of environmental and 
consumer protection associations] sits in the
Council of the Agora Verkehrswende [transport 
transition] with state secretaries of all the Federal 
Ministries, a minister of state and representatives of 





“Without the Environmental Action Germany [DUH]
nothing would have happened in the last few years
before the VW scandal. They themselves have 
made their own measurements with Axel Friedrich
and can place them [the results] in the media, but
nothing really has happened. Now they are the 
pioneers who filed lawsuits for false declarations of
cars. Actually, they play the role that an audit
authority under the Ministry of Transport should
play. So…the DUH is very important in this context” 
(Interview #25, opposition party).
‘There […] are joint letters to ministries or the 






   
  
 
     
 
   
   
 
         
      
    
       
   
          
 
    
 
   
       
 
     
 
      
  
  
       
     
    
 
     
  
 
      
 
   
     
   





    
  
          
     
       
 
       
        
     
  
 
      
 
    
      
        
    
 
          
    
 
   
 
            
 
        
  
 
      




   
 
Aggregate dimension: Mechanisms of conditional indirect NGO influence
Second order
categories





‘We do very much with NABU, BUND and WWF,
etc. We are very well in contact with all other
environmental associations and work very close 
together. We've been doing this for decades. […] 
We also work closely with other environmental
associations and agree on most points. We are 
more or less always on a line - as regards the 
technical requirements and also the demands on
the policy’ (Interview #29, DUH).
‘it is a fact that there is a good cooperation, even 
though one or the other [NGO] may receive most of
the merits. It sometimes sinks into oblivion that we
all contribute and all play a part. We and DUH do 
lawsuits, as the DUH has the lawyer, who has done
that from the very beginning’ (Interview #31, BUND).
Taking advantage of ‘Different NGOs then complement each other with
each other’s differences different strategies. If a group gets a beating from
us, but then has the opportunity to engage in a more 
intensive exchange with other NGOs, to which we
have no interest, but to get the learning’ (Interview
#33, Greenpeace).
‘Everyone also makes something alone for
themselves or takes over key issues. We have
developed legal matters more strongly than the 
other associations. NABU focusses on cruise ships
and emissions, the VCT on public transport or fleet 





NGOs sue cities &
Federal States
‘We filed a lawsuit as BUND in Hamburg and won.
The city has to set up a new ‘urban clean-up plan’,
which is now based on false figures. Something has
to happen. If the automobile industry does not use
such an opportunity to contribute to air pollution
control, such as the diesel summit, the DUH will
make even more efforts through lawsuits’ (Interview
#28, BUND).
‘We also have various legal procedures. We have 
just opened a new one again today [in October
2016] and the last verdict in Dusseldorf; driving 
bans for diesel are clearly named as the central
measure, there was no doubt about that at the 
hearing’ (Interview #29, DUH).
‘If we did not have the lawsuits in the many cities,
the pressure would not be so great’ (Interview #30,
DUH).
Lawsuits being the most ‘At the end of the day it will probably only be about
effective approach lawsuits. This is totally sad, but the experience
shows it. We filed a lawsuit as BUND in Hamburg
and won […] the DUH will make even more efforts
through lawsuits. You can assume that. The courts
will follow them. All parameters and legal
requirements force them to do so’ (Interview #28,
BUND).
‘The basic problem that we see is the strong bond
between industry and politics, which doesn’t make 






   
  
 
     
       
     
       
 
      
  







         
       
        
       
    
 
      
    
    
   
 
   




   




      
  
 
     
  
 
   
 
         
    
 
 
    
 
          
       
       
     
     
     
 
     
    
   
       
      
   
  
 
   
 
    
 
Aggregate dimension: Mechanisms of conditional indirect NGO influence
Second order
categories
First order categories Selected evidence
way for us is the juridical (i.e. the laws), which we
have. Without these, we wouldn’t hardly be making 
any progress, I must say. There is not much to do in 
the dialogue. Quite apart from that, the dialogue




‘There must be a campaign around the lawsuits that 
leads the DUH, we do that. Then, there is a public
debate and you can also create and exert pressure.
Of course, the legal way is very strong and
expedient, but if there was no debate at all, etc. The 
DUH and we would not take any measurements [...]
the whole repertoire then leads to changes’
(Interview #32, Greenpeace).
‘If we take up a topic, it is often so [that] we as DUH 
organise regularly expert rounds, where we try to 
bring all the actors to the table. Manufacturers,
associations, representatives from the supplier
industry who can supply innovative technologies. 
[We] try to discuss the problem in this circle and to
bring forward solutions. Some of these topics are 
then more or less advanced in this context, without 
large-scale public relations work. For other topics it
is different, it is also depends on how complex the
topic is and whether we can hope to raise some
interest outside, whether we need the public
pressure or whether we feel, that goes well without’
(Interview #18, DUH).
Aggregate dimension: NGO perception of (conditional) influence
Second order
categories
First order categories Selected evidence
NGOs’ conditional
influence
Rare feedback on NGO 
publications
‘We do not get any feedback from the automotive
industry. Seldom, something comes back. I know
from different persons in the automotive industry
that they notice (the messages) and I also know
that politics notices it’ (interview #6, BUND).
“I think VWG will only come forward to do that
under great pressure. So, I believe […], the
shareholders feel so safe and, because of the
power relations, the share ownership, that they do 
not consider it to be necessary to enter into 
dialogue with civil society” (Interview #19, DKA).
‘They should have rather heard at one point or
another what we have suggested. Therefore, there 
are some in the company that now evaluate the 
role of NGOs differently. Whether the influence has
now grown or decreased is difficult to say’
(Interview #27, NABU).
Influence is restricted on ‘We have always managed to raise awareness in 
‘smaller’ aspects the public as well as among the companies that 
there is a greater perception, in our case, regarding
environmental performance in the widest sense. At






      
  
 
     
     
 
         
  
        
    
   
 
    
 
  
          
     
        
        
    
    




   
     
         
     
          
   
   
 
  
      
 
       
    
    
    
      
         
        
      
   
      
    
 
           
      
       
     
          
        
   
     
  
 
      
 
      
    
    
   
    
 
Aggregate dimension: NGO perception of (conditional) influence
Second order
categories
First order categories Selected evidence
end of the day, there are always internal economic 
interests that decide whether a thing is decided one
way or the other. We were quite intensively in
discussions with the manufacturers concerning the 
choice of a new refrigerant for air conditioning
systems and we have led quite constructive 
conversations – on a comparatively high level.
Initially, there was also an agreement to choose an
environmentally-friendly refrigerant, but in the end, 
they decided against it’ (Interview #18, DUH).
‘I'Il say it this way, stories that don’t change the
structure, that can all be done. A particle filter can
be installed, other coolant can be installed, without
reducing the power of the vehicle, not making the
vehicle less attractive. You can say, these are soft
factors. This can be introduced, that makes us
happy and then we say, ‘oh just look, we’ve made 





CSR is a lip service
‘VWG was exemplary in some areas. But that was
quickly unmasked. That was only pretence, 
because of this fraudulent software. Therefore, you 
must revise all that we previously thought of VW as
a modern, environmentally conscious company’
(Interview #19, DKA).
‘I don’t disagree that [CSR] is discussed at the
highest level, but when it comes to money, when 
there’s the threat of selling less cars, then CSR
doesn’t play a role anymore. If VWG or other
corporations would have taken CSR really 
seriously, then it [the crisis] would have never
happened’ (Interview #6, BUND).
NGOs used as fig leaf ‘I feel, and I think the others as well, like a fig leaf. 
We talk to the company and nothing comes out.
The cars get bigger, the cars get heavier, dirtier, or
rather not cleaner. Then, you have not
accomplished much in principle. Then, a 
corporation like VW doesn’t really engage itself
much’ (Interview #6, BUND).
‘As long as this is just a rhetorical story and the
corporation does not really add substance, we are
very careful and then do not let ourselves be
abused as a fig leaf. We do not feel like doing that.
We have to have the impression that there is an
exchange, where there is interest in what we do’
(Interview #33, Greenpeace).
Lack of MNC insight: ‘The wording is already a problem. They call it
scandal is called ‘Dieseltopic’ […] This is systematic fraud. My boss
‘Dieseltopic’ says that is bodily injury causing death. It is not a
topic. Therefore, I think within the companies I 
actually believe that there are two strands that are 
being pursued. I also believe that CSR people are 
not really communicating with those who deal with 






      
  
 
     
          
 
     
     
       
     
     
     
 
Aggregate dimension: NGO perception of (conditional) influence
Second order
categories
First order categories Selected evidence
‘The first thing that crosses my mind is that for VW,
the scandal is always only Dieseltopic, that is, they
have not understood within the company at all that
this is a large-scale scandal, which also costs quite
a lot of money. This still seems to me to be,
according to the motto, somehow that’s a topic that
can be processed quickly and then everything’s 






       
	
     
          
        
         
  
        
        
	




   
 
   
  
  
   
   






   
   
 
 
   
   
 
   















   






















   
  
  
   
    
    




   
    
   
 
   
 
Appendix 5: More Detailed Table of Selected Lawsuits 
Approach to analyse relevant lawsuits: 
1. Screening websites of the NGOs for indications of and reports about lawsuits
2. Scanning the press releases of the 24 German Higher Regional Courts (In German:
Oberlandesgericht). The Higher Regional Courts are second highest judicial authority
in Germany
3. Focussing on the news on lawsuits and court decisions that involved NGOs (e.g.
NGOs against cities, Federal States and VWG).








13.09.2016 DUH 2016 Rejected.
Reason: DUH is
Dusseldorf does not allow 
diesel cars with illegal
software to enter the city.
(Justiz NRW 2016)




27.03.2017 BUND 2017 Rejected. The
administrative 
there should be a sales
ban on diesel cars as these 










which the NGO 
referred to, does




13.12.2017 DUH 2017 The 
administrative 
Oberverwaltungsgericht 3 A 26/17, 3 A court rejected
2017a) 30/17, 3 A five DUH
38/17, 3 A lawsuits. 
142/17 und 3 A Reason: DUH is
59/17 not entitled to 









DUH demanded BMVI to
19.12.2017 DUH 2017 NGO won. BMVI
must publish the
reveal the document that
VWG handed over in
November 2015 with
information about the
VG 2 K 236.16 document. The 
court stated that









   
 
   






    





   
 
    
 
  
   
 









   
  
 
    
   
  
    
 






    










    
    





    
 
  
   
   
    
  
    
 
    
   
   
  








   
 
   
 
 










        
          











the interests of 
the BMVI





charges on suspicion of
intentional air pollution by

















The NGO demanded 
28.07.2017 DUH 2017 NGO won. The
court stated that
rectification of the clean air Az. 13 K health protection 
plan of the city Stuttgart
and a year-round driving
ban for diesel vehicles from
2018 onwards.
(DUH v Federal State
Baden-Württemberg 2017)
5412/15 is to be rated





8.11.2017 - 2017 Funds won.
VWG must let a
(Oberlandesgericht Celle
2017)




With two judgments, the
Federal Administrative 
27.02.2018 DUH 2018 NGO won.
The Federal
Court (highest BVerwG 7 C Administrative
administrative German 26.16 Court confirmed
court) in Leipzig has largely BVerwG 7 C previous
rejected the leapfrog
revisions of the federal
states of North Rhine-
Westphalia (BVerwG 7 C
26.16) and Baden-
Württemberg (BVerwG 7 C
30.17) against first-instance
court decisions of the
administrative courts of
Dusseldorf and Stuttgart for
updating the air quality








It is expected that the Federal Court (in German: Bundesgerichtshof), Germany’s highest
court, will decide verdicts within the next 3-5 years, which will affect the outcome of future 
lawsuits that NGOs, consumers and institutional investors intend to seek.
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